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Department of Banking and Insurance
Division of Insurance
Boston, December 31, 1946
To the General Court of Massachusetts:
Part I of the Ninety-second Annual Report on insurance is herewith sub-
mitted by the Commissioner of Insurance as required by law. This Part of the
Report relates to fire and marine insurance companies and includes the entire
Report of the Division of Fire Prevention of the Department of Public Safety,
submitted to the Commissioner of Insurance in accordance with Section 7, of
Chapter 148 of the General Laws
:
In this part of the Report, I shall inform your Honorable Body of the devel-
opments during- the first two years following the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the South-Eastern Underwriters' case, which decided that
insurance is interstate commerce and hence, subject to regulation by the Con-
gress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
Your Commissioner is indebted to a Special Committee of the Insurance Sec-
tion of the American Bar Association for the research and assembling of the
facts which form a substantial part of my report on insurance as interstate
commerce.
Insurance as Interstate Commerce
I have previously reported to the Legislature that following the decision in
the South-Eastern Underwriters' case, decided June 5, 1944, (United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters' Association, et al, 322 U. S. 533, 88 L. Ed. 1440),
confusion and hysteria was predominant among many people engaged in the in-
surance industry. Predictions of chaos and dire consequences flowing from the
decision were heard everywhere. The Commissioners of Insurance, who consti-
tuted the Committee on Federal Legislation, together with a group of executives
and lawyers for insurance companies, calmly approached the problem in the belief
that calamity was not inevitable. Their deliberations laid the foundation for the
accomplishments of the past two years.
The Assistant Attorney General of the United States, Wendell Berge, who
had much to do with the South-Eastern Underwriters' case, speaking at Poland
Spring, Maine, on June 28, 1946, said,
"INSURANCE IN A FREE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM
In the American system of free enterprise as it is supposed to operate,
the individual business enterprise seeks profits in open competition with
others and at the risk of incurring losses. In such a system business profits
over and above mere interest on invested capital are a reward for risk. Pri-
vate initiative is allowed a wide latitude for venture with new ideas, new
processes and new products. The right to venture implies the risk of loss
as well as the opportunity to succeed. This chance-taking is at the root of
a free enterprise system. Risk and uncertainty are the price we pay for the
right to exercise our talents freely. To eliminate individual risk as a basic
factor in economic life would mean to substitute a controlled economy for
the freedom we have traditionally wanted.
There are businessmen who, although professing belief in a free enter-
prise system, actually do not want one. These men want to eliminate risk
from the market by private restrictive agreements which guarantee them
against the discomforts of competition. They want to fix prices at non-
competitive levels. They want to create artificial scarcities through restric-
tions on production. They want to divide markets with their competitors in
order to create private monopoly domains in which competition will be non-
existent. They want to suppress new products and processes which will
render obsolete and supersede the old.
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Basically these attempts to eliminate competition from the production and
distribution of goods are attempts by collective action to build a protective
wall around the status quo. They are attempts to gain an artificial security
against the potential threat of more efficient competitors. They are attempts
to screen out risk by the substitution of monopoly control.
Another method of seeking the same result is to have government impose
and enforce a non-competitive, monopolistic organization of industry. Thus,
in some quarters it is argued that there are industries which should be sub-
ject to permanent government regulation as to production and marketing
quotas, sales, the adoption of new technologies, and like matters. In support
of such view it is suggested that competition no longer works as a regulator
of the market ; that overproduction and a flood of cheap goods threatens
industrial destruction unless something is done ; that the solution is overall
government regulation, with production, distribution and prices stabilized at
levels determined by government authority to be in the public interest. The
notion seems to be that risk should be eliminated by the establishment of
widespread regimentation of industry. Such arguments do not come from
crackpots and long-haired theorists alone. I have heard them from respect-
able businessmen who seem to despair of making the private enterprise sys-
tem work in the complicated modern world.
To my way of thinking, those who want to substitute regimentation for
enterprise and risk are all wrong, irrespective of whether they would ac-
complish their end by private agreements to restrain trade and monopolize
or by government controls. Both roads lead to fascism. Private monopoly
in time creates the necessity for a greater measure of government regula-
tion. And effective government regulation of production, distribution and
price would call for a plenitude of government power not consistent with
democratic political institutions. Whether you seek protection from the risks
of competition by private or government regimentation you will probably
wind up with a full measure of the latter, or at least a blending of the two.
I think we shall be better off with a maximum of healthy competition in
this country. I mean competition that is fair and honest but which is not
afraid to venture with new ideas for serving the people's needs and which
is willing to risk volume production at lower prices.
Now I have referred to the willingness to assume risk as fundamental in
a free enterprise economy. Does that mean that all risks of all kinds must
be endured without any attempt at mitigation ? Not at all. There are many
kinds of risk against which individuals, corporations and society itself can
and should provide protection and where protection is in no sense incom-
patible with free enterprise. Protection against the risks of death, accident,
sickness, fire, storm, shipwreck and other acts of God not only is consistent
with economic freedom but actually promotes it.
By bemg able through insurance to eliminate these and other fortuitous
risks, men can concentrate their energies and capital upon the creative work
of the world. To illustrate it simply, if a small businessman can make pro-
vision for his family through life insurance, he is then enabled to risk his
small savings in expanding his business. Without insurance he would prob-
ably feel compelled to invest his small savings at the going rate of interest
in something having a minimum of risk, or to hoard them. Again, if it were
not for fire insurance many businesses, the victims of fire loss, would be
ruined financially and thus would be unable to make their individual con-
tributions to an expanding economy.
Both in origin and in operation the principle of insurance is both com-
patible with and promotive of the objectives of a free enterprise economy.
But in our proper zeal to lessen the impact of those risks of life against
which insurance can be written, we must not lose sight of the fact that our
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free enterprise system requires a constant willingness to accept competitive
business risks if we are to have an expanding economy. Otherwise our
economy would become static because of our unwillingness to venture. In-
surance might properly be viewed as an approved mechanism for minimiz-
ing the fortuitous risks of life so that man's energies will be more free to
assume other risks in adventurous grappling with those problems which he
has a chance to solve. If we did not have insurance we probably would not
be able to maintain a private competitive system. Individuals would hardly
be able under modern conditions to risk their capital on new business ven-
tures if they were not able to pool with others through insurance their risks
of accident and disaster. Consequently, it should be emphasized that insur-
ance is a system of calculated risk, and as such it is a constructive corollary
to enterprise. Insurance is not designed to displace enterprise, but to assist it.
The Sherman Antitrust Act is a legislative expression of the philosophy
of free enterprise. It provides that no artificial restraints shall be imposed
upon the market. It involves no plan of government regulation or control
of business. Indeed, its purpose is quite the opposite, since it contemplates
a minimum of government regulation. Under the antitrust laws, business-
men are free to make individual decisions regarding the conduct of their
own businesses. Freedom of enterprise is protected against those who would
hamper the operation of the market and prevent free access to the market.
An antitrust suit is not an attack on business or a contest between govern-
ment and business. It is rather a dramatization of the conflict between
those businessmen who wish to operate in a free market and those who de-
sire a privately controlled market.
Two years have passed since the Supreme Court handed down its deci-
sion in the South-Eastern Underwriters Association case and caused the in-
surance industry to engage in some intensive soul-searching. Although
characterized by some as 'precedent smashing,' the decision was the
inevitable result of the growth and development of the insurance business.
Keeping pace with the organized commerce of our time, the insurance in-
dustry has lost most of its local aspect and has become more and more a
national concern. As the Supreme Court pointed out:
Perhaps no modern commercial enterprise directly affects so many
people in all walks of life as does the insurance business. Insurance
touches the home, the family, and the occupation or business of almost
every person in the United States.
This business is not separated into 48 distinct territorial compart-
ments which function in isolation from each other. Inter-relationship,
interdependence, and integration of activities in all States in which they
operate are practical aspects of the insurance companies' methods of
doing business.
And, I remind you, the insurance companies themselves had for years
vigorously maintained that they were in interstate commerce. This conten-
tion was often made in contesting the validity of state regulatory or taxing
laws.
In Paul V. Virginia, decided by the Supreme Court in 1869, it was held
that a Virginia statute which regulated foreign insurance companies did
not offend the Commerce Clause of the Constitution because 'issuing a pol-
icy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce.' In subsequent cases this
statement was repeated and broadened. But until the South-Eastern Under-
writers Association case, the Court never had before it any case involving
application of a federal statute to the business of insurance. In that case we
took the position, which the Court adopted, that Paul v. Virginia was not
authority for the proposition that insurance was not subject to federal regu-
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lation under the commerce clause of the Constitution, and that the Sherman
Act by its terms was all-inclusive and applied to all business that was com-
merce within the meaning of the commerce clause.
No purpose would be served in attempting now to restate the legal argu-
ments. It is now settled that the business of insurance conducted across
state lines is interstate commerce.
But even before the South-Eastern Underwriters Association case was de-
cided, a movement had been initiated to obtain for insurance legislative
exemption from the Sherman Act. A smoke-screen of misrepresentation
about the motives of the Department of Justice was cast about the basic
issues. Bitter controversy raged in the press concerning the implications of
declaring insurance to be interstate commerce. False prophets darkly pre-
dicted that the holding would mean chaos in the industry, that it was a
step toward socialization, that it would overturn state regulation and tax-
ation of the insurance business, and that the American agency system was
doomed.
Finally, Congress passed Public Law 15—the McCarran Act
—
granting a
period of moratorium from the application of the antitrust laws and affirm-
ing the principle of state regulation. Now in a calmer atmosphere brought
about by the passage of time, it may be well to comment on the record and
to venture some remarks regarding the future.
I think it has become abundantly clear by now that the action of the De-
partment in proceeding against restrictive practices in the insurance busi-
ness was not motivated by any desire to bring about federal regulation, or
to socialize the industry. Our position with respect to federal regulation
has been consistently stated from the outset. We have no program for fed-
eral regulation. Furthermore, I can state that I have not seen or heard of
any program for federal regulation suggested by any other government
agency. The allegations regarding a move to socialize the industry or to
manipulate its financial reserves were the worst sort of misrepresentations.
They were distortions of fact—an effort to confuse the issues.
The 'chaos' that was predicted has failed to materialize. If you suggest
that the chaos predicted was the overturning of developed and accepted
system of state regulation, and that Public Law 15 averted the disaster, I
answer by referring you to the case of Robertson v. The People of the
State of California, just decided by the Supreme Court on June 3. Mr.
Justice Rutledge, speaking for a unanimous court, sustained the principle
of state regulation of insurance under the police power of the states with-
out relying upon the McCarran Act. You will recall that we took this very
position in our arguments in the Sonth-Eastern Underzvriters Association
case. We there asserted that the application of the Sherman Act in no way
interfered with the application of reasonable state regulation.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note the similarity between the Rob-
ertson case and the historic case of Paul v. Virginia. The facts present a
startling parallel. Both cases were attacks by insurance companies on state
regulatory laws upon the ground that the state laws were regulations of
interstate commerce forbidden by the commerce clause of the federal Con-
stitution. The result in both cases was the same—the state laws were upheld
—although the rationale of the cases differed in some respects. So it is clear
that the South-Eastern Underwriters Association case holding the insurance
business to be in interstate commerce has not had the effect of invalidating
reasonable and non-discriminatory state regulation.
One field in which the McCarran Act has had a more direct efifect is in
regard to state taxation of the business of insurance. While the South-
Eastern Underzvriters Association case was not concerned with state taxa-
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tion, the decision that insurance was commerce had the effect of raising
questions about the propriety of various types of taxation upon the busi-
ness of out-of-state insurance companies. These, too, have just been an-
swered by the Supreme Court in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, de-
cided on the same day as the Robertson case. The Prudential case makes
it clear that the McCarran Act will serve as a general protection to state
taxing systems. There is, however, language in the opinion indicating that
the same result might have been reached in the absence of the McCarran
Act.
The most significant phase of the inter-action of the South-Eastern Un-
derwriters Association decision and the McCarran Act, however, is the fact
that the enactment of this statute terminated a bitter sruggle by some ele-
ments of the business to remove insurance wholly from the rules of the
free enterprise system. Instead of attaining this result, Congress granted
an opportunity to the business and to the states to demonstrate how free
enterprise in the insurance business can be preserved subject to state con-
trols designed to protect the public interest. The act was not an invitation
to continue a system of private regimentation under a cloak of state pro-
tection. Nor was it a declaration that the states could establish islands of
immunity from the antitrust laws for the furtherance of private group
interests.
What the McCarran Act does is to declare a moratorium on the applica-
tion of the antitrust laws to the business of insurance until January 1, 1948.
But Section 2 (b) of the Act provides:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or su-
persede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such busi-
ness, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance:
Provided, That after January 1, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as
amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914,
as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26,
1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall
be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such busi-
ness is not regulated by State law.
Thus Congress declared that no act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate state regulatory or tax laws unless it expressly relates to insur-
ance, and that after January 1, 1948, the antitrust laws shall apply to the
business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by
State law.
A narrow legalistic approach to the interpretation of the McCarran Act
will defeat its own ends. Insurance companies are not thereby to be per-
mitted to make contracts and agreements in restraint of trade, to monopo-
lize or attempt to monopolize interstate commerce, or otherwise to engage
in restrictive practices.
The states have the opportunity to re-examine and re-constitute their reg-
ulatory laws for the orderly correction of abuses which have existed in the
insurance business. Fairness, efficiency and the preservation of competitive
opportunity should be the criteria. If the attempt fails, the answer must
lie with Congress and the Courts.
The most discussed issue at the moment is the regulation of rates and
rate-making. It is argued that cooperative rate-making, illegal under the
Sherman Act, is necessary. Three reasons prominently advanced for this
conclusion are
:
First : It is necessary to use the combined past experience of all compa-
nies to determine future loss probabilities.
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Second: Competition in rates results in discrimination among purchasers
of insurance.
Third: Competition in rates will imperil the financial stability of the in-
dustry.
The need for combining the experience of all companies for rate-making
purposes is reasonably clear. But other factors enter a rate in addition to
what might be termed "'pure cost" based on past experience. Administra-
tive expense, acquisition cost and profit are also included in any final rate.
Under a system of agreed rates, rates must be weighted in favor of the
least efficient operator. Although each company should perhaps use the
same factors and tables, it does not necessarily follow that all should use
the same final rate—which includes other costs.. The latter are not uniform
for all companies. The need to make use of common experience, or even to
use a basic rate floor derived from such experience, does not necessitate de-
priving the public of the benefits of competition. I am sure that a plan for
permitting the fullest use of common experience while preserving competi-
tion could be worked out within the framework of the Sherman Act.
Discrimination among purchasers of insurance similarly situated is
undoubtedly unfair and uneconomic. But most of the states have long pro-
hibited such discrimination. The Sherman Act does not prevent each com-
pany from charging its own patrons uniform prices. Indeed, the Clayton
Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act actually forbids price discrim-
ination among customers in interstate commerce. So state laws enjoining
discrimination are entirely consistent with the federal laws. But the elimin-
ination of discrimination among customers does not require agreement
between insurance companies upon final rates.
The argument that competition in rates would injure the financial sta-
bility of the industry overlooks the vast body of existing state regulation
designed to guard against insolvency. There are regulations regarding min-
imum capital, adequate reserves, deposit of security funds, reinsurance, types
of security investment, and periodic examination by state authority. All of
these are entirely consistent with the Sherman Act, and could be further
implemented if deemed necessary.
The extent to which the states shall 'regulate' rate-making practices in
the business of insurance is one for their own determination. By 'regulating'
they will prevent the application of the antitrust laws at the close of the
moratorium period. The Department has never urged the states to pass any
laws or exercise any control over insurance rates and it does not do so now.
But, where the states do act, it is incumbent upon them to regulate affirm-
atively in such a manner as to protect the public interest. I construe the
word 'regulated' in the McCarran Act as requiring state laws designed to
prevent abuses or combinations among private groups which penalize com-
petition, promote the concentration of economic power, or otherwise re-
strain trade and commerce in insurance. The widest possible area of com-
petition should be preserved. Where combined activity is authorized, ade-
quate safeguards must be provided to guarantee that the grant is not mis-
used to the public detriment.
I am pleased to note that the reports coming to me demonstrate that yeo-
man efforts are being exerted by all branches of the industry, and by the
insurance commissioners of the several states, to eliminate restrictions and
abuses and to formulate proper legislation. The major stock company or-
ganizations have abolished the so-called 'separation rule.' The fire insurance
companies represented in the Insurance Executives Association have made
a commitment to the Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York
that they will not, by agreement or acquiescence, be bound to any rules in-
volving the principles of 'separation' or 'non-intercourse.' Let us hope that
these efforts to preserve freedom of enterprise will be successful.
P.D. 9
I have already stated that one of the charges which was made following
the South-Eastern Underzvriters Association decision was that it would mean
the end of the American agency system. Here again, I think that the pas-
sage of time has clearly demonstrated the baseless nature of the claim.
There was nothing in the Department's case nor in the Court's opinion
which could in any way reflect upon the agency system. Nor does the or-
ganization of agents into associations for the furtherance of competitive
objectives draw with it condemnation under the Sherman Act. It is the
natural tendency of individuals with common interests to group themselves
for common advantage. In business and labor, in agriculture, among vet-
erans and others, an improved understanding of the relation of individual
interests to community interests can thus be promoted. There is no inherent
inconsistency between the existence of such organizations and the principles
of a free economy. Associations can properly exist in the insurance field
just as they do in almost every field of business subject to the antitrust
laws. These associations can aid in promoting the democratic process. But
the power of any group must not be perverted to serve selfish or special
interests to the detriment of the broad social or economic order. They must
not further monopolistic practices or restrict the freedom of the channels of
commerce. Social responsibility is a necessary characteristic of group
activity.
Insurance agents and their organizations have long been an integral part
of the competitive aspect of the insurance business. It is to the agent that
the purchaser of insurance looks for advice and guidance. The agent is
most important in interstate insurance distribution. Insofar as the activi-
ties of agents are part of the stream of interstate commerce or affect that
commerce, they must avoid practices which hamper free operation of the
insurance market or free access to that market.
I believe that the Sherman Act stands between all industry and govern-
ment control. I believe that it stands between the insurance industry and
further government control. I have pointed out that concentration of pri-
vate power in industry becomes a challenge and an invitation to those who
would concentrate economic control in government. If competition is not a
satisfactory regulator of the market, then the government ultimately be-
comes the regulator. In some fields, notably public utilities, we have long
accepted the inevitability of government regulation. But it is traditional
American belief that the field of industrial life in which government regu-
lation is substituted for competition should be kept as narrow as possible.
Every time an exemption is made from the antitrust laws, some form of
government regulation must sooner or later be substituted. The American
people would not long put up with unregulated monopoly.
I therefore, strongly urge that businessmen should deplore the tendency
of special groups to seek legislative exemption from the Sherman Act. The
moratorium period provided by the McCarran Act allows ample time for
the states to work out appropriate state regulatory legislation and for the
industry to adjust itself to such changes in practices as seem necessary to
comply with the Sherman Act. I hope that the industry will not feel that
it is necessary to seek additional legislative exemption from the Sherman
Act. Other groups—the railroads and press associations—have gone to Con-
gress seeking antitrust exemption. I am confidently expecting that Con-
gress will refuse to take any of these groups out of a society of free enter-
prise. I believe that to do so would in the long run, merely be to create
the necessity for further and more stringent government regulation of these
industries-—a result which I would not like to see occur.
In cooperation with government, industry must work to perpetuate a free
economy. Wise leadership is essential. For if our present system fails, if
free enterprise becomes a sham and not a reality, if private groups abuse
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their privileges—then industry will have taken a step toward public control
from which there may be no returning."
There are the remarks of a Federal official whose Department was responsi-
ble for the initiation of the litigation which culminated in the decision in the
South-Eastern Underwriters' case. His thoughts herein set forth should be
carefully considered by the members of the Legislature in connection with the
drafting of legislation designed to avoid Federal intervention in connection
with the supervision of the business of insurance.
Let me now briefly deal with the series of events which have brought us to
the point of considering the revision of some of our State laws and the enact-
ment of a number of new State laws.
The S.E.U.A. Case
On June 5, 1944, the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Association, et at., 322 U. S. 533, 88 L. ed. 1440,
held that the business of insurance was commerce, that when conducted across
state lines it was interstate commerce, and therefore subject to the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act. (The full text of this case is included in the Report of the Com-
missioner of Insurance of this Commonwealth for the year 1944).
This was a criminal prosecution brought in the District Court of the United
States for the Northern District of Georgia against an organization of fire in-
surance companies operating in Georgia and surrounding states, and against 27
of its officers and 198 of its member companies. The indictment alleged a con-
spiracy to fix and maintain arbitrary and non-competitive premium rates and to
monopolize trade and commerce in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
Demurrer to the indictment was sustained in August 1943. On appeal, the Su-
preme Court of the United States reversed the District Court by a 4 to 3 decision
(Justices Roberts and Reed having disqualified themselves) and thus sustained
the indictment. It did so on the ground that the defendants were engaged in
interstate commerce and therefore subject to the Sherman Act. The opinion of
the Court (written by Justice Black; Justices Murphy, Douglas and Rutledge
concurring) distinguished the line of cases starting with Paul v. Virginia
(1869), 8 Wall. 168, on the basis that the earlier cases involved the validity of
state statutes and that this was the first case squarely presenting the question of
whether the Commerce Clause grants to Congress the power to regulate insur-
ance when conducted across state lines. There was a dissenting opinion by Chief
Justice Stone, Justice Frankfurter concurring, and a separate dissenting opinion
by Justice Jackson.
The Polish Alliance Case
On the same day, the Court held in a unanimous decision in the case of
Polish National Alliance v. National Labor Relations Board, 322 U. S. 643, 88
L. ed. 1509, that a fraternal benefit society was subject to the National Labor
Relations Act because the defendant was an insurance company and that its
operations "affect" commerce within the meaning of that act. The opinion was
written by Justice Frankfurter. While the S.E.U.A. case has been the subject
of the most frequent and comprehensive discussion, a study of the Polish Alli-
ance case will indicate the importance of this case in paving the way for Con-
gressional regulation of the insurance business under the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution of the United States. (The full text of the Polish Alliance
case is included in the 1944 Report of the Commissioner of Insurance of this
Commonwealth.
)
Analysis of the Act
I have included United States Public Law 15 as a part of this Report for your
convenience in considering the discussion of this Act. The full text of the Con-
gressional Act follows.
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[Public Law 15
—
79th Congress]
[Chapter 20 1st Session]
[S. 340]
AN ACT
TO EXPRESS THE INTENT OF THE CONGRESS WITH REFERENCE TO THE REGULATION
OF THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress hereby declares that the
continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insur-
ance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall
not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such
business by the several States.
Sec. 2. (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation
or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or super-
sede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance : Provided, That after January
1, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and
the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act
of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as
amended, shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such
business is not regulated by State law.
Sec. 3. (a) Until January 1, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended,
known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known
as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal
Trade Commission Act, as amended, and the Act of June 19, 1936, known as
the Robinson-Patman Anti-discrimination Act, shall not apply to the business of
insurance or to acts in the conduct thereof.
(b) Nothing contained in this Act shall render the said Sherman Act inap-
plicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott,
coercion, or intimidation.
Sec. 4. Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to affect in any man-
ner the application to the business of insurance of the Act of July 5, 1935, as
amended, known as the National Labor Relations Act, or the Act of June 25,
1938, as amended, known as the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, or the Act of
June 5, 1920, known as the Merchant Marine Act, 1920.
Sec. 5. As used in this Act, the term "State" includes the several States,
Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.
Sec. 6. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to
any person or circumstances, shall be held invalid, the remainder of the Act,
and the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than
those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected.
Approved March 9, 1945.
Anti-Trust Moratorium
After the SEUA decision, it was obvious that the insurance business would-
need some time in which to become readjusted to its newly acquired status under
the Federal Anti-Trust Act and related federal laws. This was especially true
of various types of property insurance for which industry rate-making had been
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found to be necessary. Congress accordingly enacted the McCarran Act (text
on facing page) which created the so-called moratorium period. It specifically
made the Sherman Anti-Trust and related acts inapplicable to the business of
insui"ance until January 1, 1948. (See § 3a, above.) It provides that even during
the moratorium period, as well as thereafter, the Sherman Act is to remain
applicable to boycott, coercion and intimidation. (See § 3b, above.)
It further provides that after the end of the moratorium period, the Sherman
Act, Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act are to be applicable
to the business of insurance "to the extent that such business is not regulated
by State law." (See § 2b.)
Congressional Consent
Another important and distinct part of the McCarran Act is a declaration by
Congress that the continued regulation and taxation by the states of the business
is in the public interest and that silence on the part of Congress shall not be
construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business
by the states (§ 1). Section 2(a) provides that the business of insurance shall
be subject to state laws which regulate and tax it. (See 1946 Decisions.)
For legislative history of the Act see Bibliography.
The first part of Section 2(b) has been in included in U. S. Public Law 15,
to avoid the surprise application of Federal laws to the business of insurance.
To enjoy the full benefit of this protection, it will be necessary for the insurance
business to scrutinize carefully proposed Congressional Acts regulating interstate
commerce and make known the position of the industry with respect to any pro-
posed act which specifically relates to the business of insurance. Eternal vigi-
lance in this regard is imperitive.
The 1946 Supreme Court Decisions
On June 3, 1946, the United States Supreme Court, in two decisions, effect-
ively disposed of two questions arising out of the South-Eastern decision
(namely, whether state laws which regulate and those which tax insurance vio-
late the Commerce Clause because insurance has now been held to be commerce).
In Prudential v. Benjamin, the Court with the aid of Public Law 15, sustained
the power of a state to impose a premium tax on the commerce of insurance
even though the tax applied only to foreign, and not to domestic, companies.
In Robertson v. California, the Court without regard to Public Law 15, upheld
state regulatory power exerted over such commerce.
A week later, the Court affirmed, without opinions, decisions by the Kansas
Supreme Court upholding not only a similar premium tax but also the Kansas
retaliatory tax. (See opposite page, last paragraph, for names of cases.) The
retaliatory tax law of Kansas, which is similar to that in 28 other states, imposes
an additional tax on companies from any foreign state to the extent that such
foreign state's tax exceeds the Kansas tax. The validity of such laws was up-
held by these decisions.
CITATIONS & DIGESTS
State Regulatory Laws Upheld
F. O. Robertson v. The People of California (90 L. ed. Adv. Op. 1040). Re-
hearing denied October 14, 1946. (The full text of the decision is included in
this Report as Appendix "A".)
Robertson, prior to passage of Public Law 15, was convicted of violating two
California statutes in that he ( 1 ) acted in California as agent for a non-admitted
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(Arizona) insurer, and (2) acted as an agent without an agent's license. His
defense was that he was engaged in interstate commerce and his acts, therefore,
were beyond reach of the state's regulatory powers.
The Court affirmed the conviction under both counts. It upheld the California
statutes on the assumption that their effect was to exclude Robertson's company
from its borders unless the state's reserve requirements were complied with. It
ruled such exclusion valid inasmuch as the reserve requirements constituted a
necessary and reasonable means of securing, in the interest of the public welfare,
a minimum assurance to the state's policyholders as to the performance of their
policies. (Douglas dissented from this part of the decision.)
Public Law 15 was not relied upon because to do so would have involved a
"semblance" of an ex post facto effect.
Premium Taxes Upheld
The Prudential Insurance Company of America v. L. George Benjamin as
Insurance Commissioner of the State of South Carolina (90 L. ed. Adv. Op.
1023.) The full text of the Opinion of the Supreme Court is included in this
Report marked Appendix "B."
South Carolina exacted of Prudential, a New Jersey corporation, a 3% tax on
aggregate premiums received from business done in that state. No similar tax
was required of South Carolina corporations. Prudential contended that this
statute was a discrimination against interstate commerce to which Congress,
through Public Law 15, by declaring in favor of continued state regulation and
taxation, either did not or could not give its consent.
The court upheld the tax. It declared that the Commerce Clause is not a lim-
itation of the power of Congress over interstate commerce, but rather a grant
to Congress of plenary and supreme authority over that commerce. The only
limitation on congressional power thereunder is as to what constitutes commerce.
In enacting Public Law 15, the Court stated. Congress must have known of ex-
isting tax and regulatory systems and intended to throw the whole weight of its
power behind the state's system.
There is a feeling among some life insurance executives that this case cannot
be too heavily relied upon as authority for the right of the State to oppose dis-
criminatory taxes upon out-of-State insurance companies. It is felt that the dicta
in this case justifies the inference that the special circumstances here presented
dictate caution reaching the definite conclusion that this case settles the question
of the right of the States to levy taxes on foreign insurance companies which
may be construed to unduly burden commerce.
Retaliatory Taxes Upheld
American Indemnity Co. v. Hohbs, Pacific Mutual Life v. Hobbs (160 Kan.
300, 161 Pac. (2d) 726, 90 L. ed. Adv. Op. 1258). Petition for rehearing filed
by American Indemnity; denied October 14, 1946.
Per curiam decisions (which along with Aetna v. Hobbs and Prudential v.
Hobbs of the same day—same citations) affirmed the Kansas Supreme Court's
decision in In re Insurance Tax Cases, 160 Kan. 300, 161 Pac. (2d) 726 (see
Bibliography hereof for further discussion). The first two upheld the validity
of the Kansas premium tax imposed under its retaliatory law. The other two
per curiam decisions on the same day (i. e., Prudential v. Hobbs and Aetna v.
Hobbs) upheld the regular Kansas premium tax. All four decisions merely cited
Prudential v. Benjamin and Robertson v. California.
Membership of All-Industry Committee
The All-Industry Committee was organized in May 1945 at a joint meeting
of the Federal Legislation Committee of the N. A. I. C. and representatives of
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the insurance industry to aid in the formulation of a legislative program to
strengthen existing state laws within the meaning of Section 2b of the McCarran
Act. It is made up of representatives of the following organizations
:
American Institute of Marine Underwriters
American Life Convention
American Mutual Alliance
American Reciprocal Association
Associated Factory Mutual Fire Insurance Companies
Association of Casualty and Surety Executives
Bureau of Personal Accident and Health Underwriters
Health and Accident Underwriters Conference
Inland Marine Underwriters Association
Insurance Executives Association
Life Insurance Association of America
National Association of Casualty and Surety Agents
National Association of Independent Insurers
National Association of Insurance Agents
National Association of Insurance Brokers
National Association of Mutual Insurance Agents
National Board of Fire Underwriters
National Fraternal Congress of America
Surety Association of America
National Association of Insurance Commissioners
The interest of the State Insurance Commissioners in the court proceedings
which culminated in the SEUA decision was manifested early by a resolution
adopted at the mid-year meeting of the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners in November, 1943. This resolution reaffirmed the position of the
Commissioners in favor of continued regulation of the insurance business by
the several states.
Through its specially appointed Committee on Federal Legislation, the Com-
missioners took a very active part in the formulation of federal legislation which
eventually became the McCarran Act—Public Law 15. This Committee held
hearings over a period of several months (see Bibliography for dates) and as a
result of its study prepared a proposed bill which was submitted to Congress
(90 Congressional Record, p. 9628) and which in somewhat altered form became
Public Law 15.
Following the enactment of the federal act, the attention of the Commissioners
was directed at the formulation of state regulatory legislation to meet the situ-
ation. The cooperative efforts of the Commissioners and the All-Industry Com-
mittee are described in the following paragraphs. Further details of the activi-
ties of the Commissioners are referred to in the Bibliography.
All-Industry Committee
The work of the All-Industry Committee can best be described by quoting
from a letter its Secretary wrote to Senator McCarran in September, 1946, in
answer to an inquiry by the Senator as to what steps the business of insurance
had taken to comply with Public Law 15
:
"The All-Industry Committee was organized in May, 1945, at a joint
meeting of the Committee on Federal Legislation of the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners and representatives of the insurance in-
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dustry and, as presently constituted, is composed of nineteen national
insurance' organizations representing all branches of the insurance business
(Life, Fire, Marine, Accident and Health, Casualty and Surety; Stock, Mu-
tual, Reciprocal and Fraternal ; Bureau and Independent companies ; Agents
and Brokers).
"Since its organization, the All-Industry Committee has held ten meetings
[as of September 6, 19U6—other meetings have since been held}. These
meetings have consumed twenty-three days, exclusive of time spent in re-
search and study. In addition, there have been numerous meetings of the
Committee's several sub-committees. All of these meetings have been open
to any interested company representatives and many such representatives
attended the meetings. Several meetings were joint meetings with commit-
tees of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and all other
meetings were attended by representatives of that organization.
"Because of the scope and great importance of the problem, the Commit-
tee decided that rate regulatory legislation should be the first matter for
consideration. Careful study and consideration developed the view that,
with respect to fire, inland marine, casualty and surety insurance, the im-
portant objectives of safeguarding insurance company solvency and ensuring
fair and equitable practices in the public interest could most certainly be
secured under a state regulatory system which permitted cooperative activity
in rate making to be conducted under adequate and affirmative regulatory
safeguards. It was recognized that such activities might, in the absence of
state regulation, be violative of the Sherman Act and thus that state regu-
lation of the sort which would make the Sherman Act inapplicable was
essential. It was also believed that the preservation of competitive oppor-
tunity in the insurance business was likewise essential and that this objective
should likewise be secured, to as great an extent as was possible without
defeating the paramount objectives.
"Our efforts and those of the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners have been directed not only toward developing rate regulatory
bills under which these objectives would be secured but at attaining a proper
balance among them. Divergent and sometimes conflicting views had to be
reconciled, not only among various branches of the industry but also among
insurance commissioners and between insurance commissioners and the
industry.
"As a result of this cooperative work of the Committee and the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, two rate regulatory bills have been
developed which, we believe, fulfill the stated objectives. One bill pertains
to fire and marine insurance and the other to casualty and surety insurance.
These bills were reported to the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners' Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations by that commit-
tee's sub-committee in June, 1946. The sub-committee's report observed
that 'the science of rate making is a progressive one and as time passes
changes and improvements will, no doubt, suggest themselves. However,
in the light of present day thinking and for those states which subscribe to
the principles set forth in the bills, the Committee recommends their use at
this time', and requested the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations
to submit the bills to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
with a recommendation that the bills and the report be approved and adopted
by the Association. The sub-committee's report was considered and unan-
imously adopted at a joint meeting of the Rates and Rating Organizations
Committee and the Federal Legislation Committee and thereafter by the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners at the Portland meeting in
June, 1946. A copy of the report so adopted is enclosed as well as copies
of the two bills.
"Insurance rate regulatory legislation was introduced in many of the
state legislatures that met in regular session in the early part of 1945. Pub-
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lie Law 15, however, became effective March 9, 1945, when state legislative
programs for that year were already well advanced or completed, thus pre-
cluding introduction of regulatory legislation which had been developed in
light of the provisions of Public Law 15. Nevertheless ten states did enact
new rate regulatory laws in 1945 while fifteen states established legislative
or other official commissions to study the problem and to report to the next
sessions of their respective legislatures. In 1946 only nine state legislatures
met in regular session. In some of these states rather comprehensive sys-
tems of rate regulation already existed. In three of them, however, new
rate regulatory laws along the lines of the Commissioners—All-Industry
bills were adopted.
"It should be noted that at present 35 states have some type of fire rate
regulatory law, 35 states regulate rates for Workmen's Compensation in-
surance, 23 states regulate rates for automobile liability insurance, and 19
states also regulate other casualty insurance. Several of these laws must
be changed, some slightly and some drastically, in order to meet the desired
pattern and it is anticipated that corrective legislation will be enacted, as
time permits, which will bring about a reasonably close alignment between
the proposed rate regulatory bills and the state laws.
"Copies of all existing insurance rate regulatory laws are enclosed with
the 1945-1946 legislation appropriately identified.
"Naturally our work has been pointed most directly at those states hav-
ing no rate regulatory laws and at those in which extensive overhauling
is needed.
"In 1947 forty-four state legislatures will be in session and it is confi-
dently expected that the legislatures of those states requiring rate regulatory
legislation will be presented with carefully prepared drafts of bills, adapted
to the situation in the respective states, under which rate regulation in the
public interest can be achieved.
"A vast amount of work has been done not only in connection with rate
regulatory legislation but also in connection with the other problems pre-
sented by the imminence of the applicability to insurance of the Sherman
Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Clayton Act and possibly the
Robinson-Patman Act, and much remains to be done and it will be done.
Many will share in it, including the many legislative commissions and com-
mittees, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and the in-
surance All-Industry Committee.
"We trust that this letter and the accompanying material supplies the in-
formation which you requested. We shall, of course, be most happy to un-
dertake to supply whatever additional information you may desire and as
conclusions are arrived at with respect to other matters we shall supply your
office with the materials relating thereto.
Yours very truly,
Henry Wood
Secretary of All-Industry Committee."
The Insurance Commissioners' and the All-Industry Committees are continu-
ing their joint study of all phases of the problem. Matters other than rating are
being searchingly dealt with and it is anticipated that agreement will be reached
soon on these matters also.
The goal of this intensive study by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners and the insurance industry is to work out a pattern for state
legislation to strengthen existing state insurance regulatory laws, and thus meet
the challenge laid down by the McCarran Act.
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McCARRAN ACT (P. L. 15, S. 340 OF 79TH CONGRESS)
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sioners, December, 1944. This was introduced into the Record in the clos-
ing days of the 78th Congress as an amendment in the nature of a
substitute to H.R. 3270 by Messrs. McCarran and Ferguson, 90 Congres-
sional Record, Dec. 18, 1944, p. 9628.
2. As introduced by Messrs. McCarran and Ferguson, January 18, 1945.
Referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.
3. Senate Judiciary Committee appoints Special Insurance Subcommittee,
January 22, 1945, consisting of the following members : Messrs. McCarran,
O'Mahoney, Chandler, Ferguson and Moore.
4. As reported by Senate Judiciary Committee, Senate Report No. 20, Jan-
uary 24, 1945.
5. As amended. Senate Floor, by Senator Ferguson, January 25, 1945.
6. As passed by Senate, January 25, 1945. Debate, 91 Congressional Record,
January 25, 1945, pp. 478-488.
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7. Bill as passed by Senate and sent to House of Representatives, January
29, 1945. Referred to Judiciary Committee.
8. Referred by House Judiciary Committee to Judiciary Subcomittee No. 3,
consisting of the following members : Messrs. Walter, Kefauver, Bryson,
Lane, Gwynne, Talbot and Lewis.
9. As reported by House Judiciary Subcommittee No. 3 and recommended to
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17. Approval message of President, March 9, 1945. 91 Congressional Record,
p. 1992.
18. Letter, Attorney General Biddle to Moses Lasky, Insurance Brokers As-
sociation, San Francisco, California. Released April 1, 1945.
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3. As reported by House Judiciary Committee, Nov. 16, 1943, Report No. 873.
4. Amendment Intended to be Proposed to S. 1362 by Mr. O'Mahoney, Dec. 2,
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ment, Sept. 14, 1944.
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(1) Part 1, Majority Report, Mr. McCarran
(2) Part 2, Minority Report, Mr. O'Mahoney
16. As passed Senate, without amendment, Sept. 21, 1944.
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18. Amendment (in the nature of a substitute) to H.R. 3270, Intended to be
Proposed, Senate, Dec. 18, 1944, by Messrs. McCarran and Ferguson.
Ordered to lie on the Table and to be Printed.^ 90 Congressional Record,
Dec. 18, 1944, p. 9628.
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Proposed, Senate, Dec. 18, 1944, by Messrs. O'Mahoney and Hatch.
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Dec. 18, 1944, p. 9628.
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21. Letter, President Roosevelt to Senator Radcliffe, Jan. 2, 1945.
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1. H.R. 4444. Introduced by Mr. Anderson, March 21, 1944. Referred to
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2. S. 12. Introduced by Messrs. O'Mahoney and Hatch, January 6, 1945. Re-
ferred to Judiciary Committee. (H.R. 1207, companion. Introduced by Mr.
Walter, January 8, 1945. Referred to Judiciary Committee.)
3. H.R. 1590. Introduced by Mr. Walter, Jan. 17, 1945. Referred to Judiciary
Committee.
4. H.R. 2021. Introduced by Mr. Walter, February 6, 1945. Referred to
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS
1. Hearings of Federal Legislation Committee of National Association of In-
surance Commissioners in regard to legislation which eventually became Pub-
lic Law 15.
New York—July 28, 1944
Chicago—August 16-18
St. Louis—August 28-29
Chicago—September 29-October 2
Chicago—November 9-12, 1944
2. Citations of Proceedings of the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners involving the question of insurance as interstate commerce.
Resolution presented by Committee on Federal Legislation relating to state
regulation. 1944, pages 54-55.
Report of Executive Committee to the mid-winter meeting December 7,
1944. 1945, pages 18-23.
2 In substance, the bill recommended by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
(See McCarran Act (1), supra)
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Report of Subcommittee on Federal Legislation to Executive Committee.
1945, pages 23-31.
Joint statement of President and Chairman of Executive Committee. 1945,
pages 31-47.
Joint statement of President, Chairman of the Executive Committee and
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Federal Legislation. 1945, pages 47-49.
Interim Report of the Subcommittee on Federal Legislation. 1945, pages
156-160.
Report of Subcommittee on Rates and Rating Organizations. 1945, pages
160-161.
Report of President of the N.A.LC. 1945, pages 161-167.
Report of the Subcommittee on Federal Legislation. 1945, pages 170-171.
Joint Report of the Committee on Federal Legislation and the Committee on
Rates and Rating Organizations of the N.A.LC, dated November 1,
1945.
Report of the Subcommittee of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organi-
zations dated May 22-23, 1946. Appendix "C".
Report of the joint meeting of Rates and Rating Organizations Committee
and Federal Legislation Committee held June 11, 1946. Appendix "D".
Report of the joint meeting of Rates and Rating Organizations Committee
and Federal Legislation Committee held Oct. 23-26, 1946. Appendix "E".
CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT AFTER SEUA CASE
1. F. O. Robertson v. The People of the State of California.
In the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of
Ventura :
a. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings and Entire Record of Proceed-
ings in Justice Court of Ventura Tovi^nship, County of Ventura, State
of California.
b. Opinion, April 20, 1945. (Not reported)
In the Supreme Court of the United States:
a. Statement as to Jurisdiction.
b. Appellant's Opening Brief.
c. Brief for Appellee.
d. Brief of Amici Curiae (Agents Ass'n) in Support of Appellee.
e. Brief of the State of New York,, as Amicus Curiae.
f. Transcript of Oral Argument.
g. Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, June 3, 1946
(90 L. ed. Adv. Op. 1040).
h. Rehearing denied, Oct. 14, 1946.
2. The Prudential Insurance Company of America v. L. George Benjamin, as
.
Insurance Commissioner of the State of Soiith Carolina.
In the Suprem,e Court of the United States:
a. Statement as to Jurisdiction.
b. Motion to Dismiss or Affirm.
c. Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss or Affirm.
d. Brief for Appellant.
e. Questions asked by the Court during Oral Argument.
f. Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, June 3, 1946
(90L. ed. Adv. Op. 1023).
3. The Kansas premium tax cases also challenged the validity of a premium tax
imposed on foreign (but not domestic) insurance companies. Plaintiffs in these
Mandamus proceedings (to compel issuance of licenses to companies refusing
to pay the tax) were Aetna Insurance Company, the Prudential, the American
Indemnity and the Pacific Mutual, and other companies. The last two named
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companies challenged the Kansas retaliatory tax as well as the Kansas premium
tax.
The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the tax in In Re Insurance Tax Cases, 160
Kan. 300, 161 P. (2d) 726. Rehearings were denied as to the four above-named
companies who appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Kansas Court
took no action on the rehearing applications of the remaining companies pending
the four appeals to the United States Supreme Court.
On June 10. 1946. by Per Curiam decision, 90 L. ed. Adv. Op. 1258, Affirmed
the above four appeals. Dockets 789, 790, 791 and 792, citing Prudential v. Ben-
janiin. Petitions for rehearing filed by Aetna. Docket 790, and American In-
demnity, Docket 791 ; both denied October 14, 1946.
Other jurisdictions in which actions to contest premium taxes on foreign com-
panies, with no corresponding taxes on domestic companies, were brought in the
following states : Alabama, California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, ]\Iississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin.
All of these actions were discontinued after the Benjamin decision.
STATE LEGISLATION
Exculpatory Laws
In 1945, the Legislatures of the following 21 states, because of the doubts
created by the SEUA case as to the validity of certain state regulatory and tax
laws, enacted statutes exempting officers and directors of insurance companies
for any liability for paying taxes or fees pursuant to state laws which might be
held to be unconstitutional
:
Arizona Maryland North Carolina
Arkansas Massachusetts Oregon
California Michigan Pennsylvania
Connecticut INIinnesota Rhode Island
Delaware Nevada Texas
Indiana New Jersey Vermont
IMaine New York Virginia
We favored the new legislation in 1945 as a temporary measure, because, as
a general proposition, we do not subscribe to the idea that officers and directors
should be relieved of liability attendant to the duties of a trustee. We did not
share the doubt concerning the validity' of State tax laws when this legislation
was proposed. Our position has been fortified by the decision in the case of the
Prudential Insurance Company of America v. L. George Benjamin (Supra).
We have strongly supported legislation to equalize the premium tax in this State
in order that all doubt concerning the question of validity of unequal tax be-
tween domestic and foreign companies might be resolved.
Equalizing Amendments to Premium Taxes
Legislation was enacted in 18 states to amend premium tax laws which had
applied to foreign and not domestic companies (or in some instances had taxed
domestic companies at a lower rate) and which, prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in 1946, Prudential v. Benjamin, were feared to violate the Commerce
Clause of the Federal Constitution. These states are
:
Alabama *Maine *Oregon
^Arizona Missouri South Dakota
Arkansas New Hampshire *Tennessee
Connecticut New Jersey *Texas
Florida =^New INIexico Washington
*Iowa Oklahoma West Virginia
* Retaliatory laws were repealed in these states and 6 others (California, Colorado, Delaware,
Georgia, Maryland, and North Carolina).
P.D. 9
Rate Regulatory Bills
Ten states in 1945 enacted new rate regulatory laws. 15 states established leg-
islative or other ofificial commissions to study the problem. In June 1946, the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, in Portland, Oregon, adopted
reports of its committees approving two model rating laws. One model bill per-
tains to fire and marine insurance and the other to casualty and surety insurance
(texts reprinted in Journal of Commerce 5-29-46). These bills are attached to
the report of the Sub-Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations, included
in Appendix "C" of this Report.
The report of the All-Industry Committee, with respect to casualty, surety, fire
and marine and inland marine rate regulatory bills received at the Convention
of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners at Portland, Oregon,
on June 11, 1946, is included as Appendix "F".
So many representations and misrepresentations have been made during the
current year with respect to the extent of the endorsement by interested parties
of the rate regulatory bills, forming part of Appendix "C", that it is important
for the Legislature to know the extent to which the Industry committed itself
to support the rating bills which were the subject of action by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners. The motion made by Walter Bennett,
which was duly seconded and unanimously adopted, is loosely worded as follows
:
'T move that the All-Industry Committee approve and accept the casualty and
surety rate regulatory bill and the fire, marine and inland marine rate regulatory
bill, each dated May 18, 1946, including the footnotes contained therein; I fur-
ther move that the Committee recognize that the science of rate-making is a
progressive one and that as time passes, changes and improvements will no doubt
suggest themselves as being of sufficient importance to require additional con-
sideration of this Committee." The same language is included in the report of
the Sub-Committee of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations dated
May 22 and 23, 1946, and evidences the extent to which the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners committed itself with respect to these bills. (Ap-
pendix "C").
I mention this motion at this time because considerable difference of opinion
has developed concerning the kind of regulation required to protect rating bu-
reaus whose members act in concert in the matter of fixing rates from the pen-
alties imposed by the Sherman Act. The nature and extent of the disagreement
among the parties seeking legislation in this State is contained in the transcript
of the proceedings before the Recess Commission on Insurance composed of the
members of the Insurance Committee at hearings held on November 20, 21 and
27, 1946. At those hearings, there was produced two important pamphlets which
had not been made available to the Commissioners' Committee on Rates and Rat-
ing Organizations of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
These pamphlets are the First, Second and Third Reports of the Sub-Committee
of Lawyers to the Committee on Laws of the National Board of Fire Under-
writers pursuant to a resolution adopted May 9, 1945, at a meeting of the Com-
mittee on Laws. I have included this pamphlet as Appendix "G" of this Report,
because it contains information which should be very valuable to the Legislature
deciding the momentus questions related to rate regulation, which will occupy
their notice. The Fourth and Fifth Reports of the same Committee are inchided
in this Report marked Appendix "H". The information contained in Appendix
"H" is of particular interest in view of differences of opinion now existing.
It has been my opinion for a number of months and it is still my opinion at the
date of this Report that the least possible regulation should be imposed upon the
industry at this time, in order that opportunity may be afforded to the insurance
companies to decide the extent to which it is necessary for them to combine
for the purpose of assuring the use of rates which are made in concert. Another,
and an equally important reason, is the terrific problem which will confront the
staff of the Insurance Department in undertaking the duties which may be im-
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posed upon the Department in connection with the supervision of all types of
insurance rates. It should be remembered that the imposition upon our staff of
heavy responsibilities and widespread activities will require an appropriation and
personnel sufficient to administer the law which is enacted. I hope this will be
very carefully considered by the Legislature at the next session when undoubtedly
rate regulatory bills will be enacted.
The rate regulatory bills, which form a part of Appendix "C", contain a foot-
note relating to the subject of profit to be allowed the insurance carriers in the
rates. The note reads as follows : "The All-Industry Conference Committee be-
lieves the word 'underwriting' should precede the word 'profit'." The National
Association of Insurance Commissioners is giving further study to this matter.
Your Commissioner is serving on a sub-committee with Superintendent Dineen
of New York and Commissioner W. Ellery Allyn of Connecticut, for the purpose
of making a study and reporting on this important problem. It is well-known
that a reasonable profit must be allowed all industries subject to public rate
regulation. The question before the Commissioners is the method of determin-
ing a reasonable profit. A number of Commissioners, including the writer, feel
that the 1921 Standard Profit Formula is out-moded and should be replaced by
a formula in keeping with modern concepts and underwriting methods. The sub-
committee hereinbefore referred to has produced its first report, which is included
herein marked Appendix "I". The publication of this report resulted in consider-
able controversy predicated on the false assumption that the sub-committee had
reached a determination of the method of computing profit or underwriting profit
and that other facets of the problem were not fairly treated. These conclusions
are entirely unjustified as reference to the final paragraph attached to Appendix
"I" will indicate. It has been definitely and unequivocally stated that "no in-
ference should be drawn that the sub-committee has made a determination upon
any aspect of the matter." This report will be supplemented by a subsequent
report or reports as the work of the committee progresses. Appendix "I" is
considered of sufficient importance to place before the Legislature for considera-
tion at this time.
The Robinson-Patman Act—The Federal Trade Commission Act—The
Clayton Act and Proposals for the Regulation of Accident and
Health Insurance.
The All-Industry Committee favored the joint Committees on Rates and Rating
Organizations and Federal Legislation of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners with reports dealing with the treatment of the Robinson-Patman
Act on a State level, the treatment of the Federal Trade Commission Act on a
State level, the treatment of the Clayton Act on a State level and proposals for
the regulation of the accident and health business. All of these matters were
carefully considered by the Commissioners' Committees at its meetings held on
October 23 to 26, 1946. The progress made by the Committees in the considera-
tion of these matters is evidenced by the report of these two Committees which
is made a part of this Report marked Appendix "E". The importance of enacting
some type of legislation which will constitute regulation sufficiently comprehen-
sive to parallel the Federal Trade Commission Act is of extreme importance
if the maximum State supervisory freedom is to be obtained under the provisions
of United States Public Law 15.
It was not possible to reach a final determination of the type of legislation
which should be suggested for enactment in the several States prior to the end
of 1946. The reports of the Committees on Rates and Rating Organizations and
Federal Legislation of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
covering the meetings of December 3 to 7, inclusive, 1946, was adopted by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners at the December meeting.
Copy of that report, with related exhibits, is included as Appendix
"J" in this
Report. It is evident from this report that during the year 1947, an effort will
xxiv P.D. 9
be made to dispose of the unsettled matters. These reports demonstrate the ex-
tent to which your Commissioner has participated in the national conferences
undertaken by the Industry and State supervisors jointly for the purpose of pre-
paring legislative proposals designed to take full advantage of the invitation of
the Congress to appropriately regulate the business of insurance at the State
level. The Insurance Industry and the Commissioners of Insurance have labored
diligently for many days and many long hours on the momentus problems with
which your Honorable Body is confronted. The results of our efforts have been
made available through the medium of your Committee on Insurance.
I would be remiss in my duty if I did not commend the intelligent and indus-
trious Committee on Insurance who have given unstintingly of their time, sitting
as a commission and as the Committee on Insurance, to the study and considera-
tion of the various matters which will enable them to make appropriate recom-
mendations for the consideration of the Legislature. It has been a pleasure and
a privilege to work with each and every member of this fine group of public
officials.
Valuation of Securities
The responsibility imposed upon the Commissioner by the General Laws to
appropriately value securities held by the various insurance companies under our
supervision has been discharged with the assistance of the Committee on Valua-
tion of Securities of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. It is
self-evident that security values should be determined on a national basis, par-
ticularly where there is no available market from which to procure the current
prices. Rules and regulations, relating to the amortization of bonds, should like-
wise be established at the national level. Your Commissioner has for several
years occupied the position of Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Valuation of
Securities—an organization which supervises a specially trained staff of assist-
ants who devote their entire time to the study of balance sheets, statements,
statistical data, evidences of security or debt, legal documents and all other ma-
terials necessary to intelligently determine the value of the thousands of securities
held by the various insurance companies under the supervision of the several
States. The technical staff is under the direct supervision and direction of the
Sub-Committee on Valuations, which reports to the full Committee on Valuation
of Securities. Acting under the authority conferred upon the Commissioner of
Insurance by the General Laws, I have promulgated rules and regulations to
be followed by all Companies in connection with the completion of their annual
statement of financial condition. Following are the resolutions which have been
adopted for use by all companies authorized to transact business in this State
:
Association Values
Resolved, that for the inventory of stocks, other than of insurance com-
panies and subsidiaries, and bonds in the annual statements of insurance
companies, societies and associations as of December 31, 1946 the following
basis is recommended as fair market value
:
1. That all stocks, other than of insurance companies and subsidiaries, and
bonds shall be valued at the market quotations as of December 1, 1946,
excepting bonds secured by the full faith, credit and taxing power of
political subdivisions of the United States of America and of political
subdivisions of the Dominion of Canada which are not in default as to
principal or interest on December 1, 1946. In the case of securities not
quoted on December 1, 1946 the latest aA^ailable information shall be
used. Values of insurance companies stocks as of December 1, 1946
shall be published in the book of Valuations of Securities. These values
should be used only in statements filed with those states whose depart-
mental practices or laws require the use of market value quotations in
determining the values allowable on insurance stocks.
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2. That stock valuations shall include accrued dividends on preferred
stocks and dividends declared and accrued on all stocks and shall be
determined in accordance with the following rules
:
(a) Where a stock sold ex-dividend on December 1, 1946 and a div-
idend is payable in December, the December 1 price is to be used.
(b) Where a stock sold ex-dividend on or before December 1, 1946
and the dividend is payable on or after January 1, 1947, the
amount of the dividend is to be added to the December 1 price.
(c) Where a stock did not sell ex-dividend until after December 1,
1946 and a dividend is payable in December, the amount of the
dividend is to be deducted from the December 1 valuation.
(d) Where a stock did not sell ex-dividend until after December 1,
1946 and the dividend is payable on or after January 1, 1947, the
December 1, 1946 price is to be used.
3. That where a bond is quoted "flat" on December 1, 1946 and interest
is paid in December, the amount of the interest shall be deducted from
the December 1, 1946 valuation.
Amortization of Bonds
Resolved, that for submission of annual statements to the various State
Insurance Departments as of December 31, 1946, bonds not in default as to
principal or interest, which are certified by the insurer submitting the state-
ment to be amply secured, shall be so deemed and shall be amortizable pro-
vided they are not income or perpetual bonds and provided they are included
in any one of the five classifications described below
:
1. All bonds issued, assumed or guaranteed by the United States of
America or the Dominion of Canada and all bonds secured by the full
faith, credit and taxing power of political subdivisions of the United
States of America and of political subdivisions of the Dominion of
Canada, which are legal for investment by insurance companies under
the laws of the respective states.
2. All special revenue bonds of any state of the United States of America
or any political subdivision thereof or any agency or instrumentality
of any of the foregoing and all corporate bonds which on June 1,
1946 were included in any of the four highest grades of any two recog-
nized rating agencies.
3. All special revenue bonds of any state of the United States of America
or any political subdivisions thereof or any agency or instrumentality
of any of the foregoing and all corporate bonds on which the yields
to maturities based on December 1, 1945 and on December 1, 1946
Association Values do not, in the first case, exceed 2.10%, and in the
second case 1.80% plus the yield for comparable maturities of fully
taxable U. S. Government Treasury obligations at the respective dates.
Bonds which were not outstanding on December 1, 1945 shall be
deemed amply secured and amortizable if the yield to maturity based
on December 1, 1946 Association Values does not exceed 1.80% plus
the yield for comparable maturities of fully taxable U. S. Government
Treasury obligations.
4. Any bond issued by the same corporation and other corporate bonds
and all special revenue bonds of any state of the United States of
America or any political subdivision thereof or any agency or instru-
mentality of any of the foregoing which, in the judgment of the Sub-
Committee of the Committee on Valuation of Securities, are equiv-
alent in security to those bonds hereinbefore described, provided that
satisfactory evidence thereof is either already available or is made
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available by insurance companies, societies and associations to the Sub-
Committee on or before September 1, 1946 and approved by it.
5. All bonds of foreign governments, foreign subdivisions and foreign
municipalities which in the judgment of the Sub-Committee are amply
secured on the basis of the estimated ability of the respective obligors
to make during the life of the issue, all contractual payments in the
currency or currencies specified and at the places of payment stipulated
in the bonds and upon evidence that such payments can be remitted
to the United States at the official rate of exchange.
Resolved, that bonds in default as to principal or interest and all special
revenue bonds of any state of the United States of America or any political
subdivision thereof or any agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing
and all corporate bonds not meeting the tests described under classification
2, 3 or 4 of the foregoing Resolution and all income and perpetual bonds
shall be deemed not eligible for amortization.
Resolved, that where quotations are obtainable, values of securities payable
in foreign currencies shall be quoted in the book of Valuations of Securities
at the appropriate foreign percentage quotation and at the appropriate Dollar
quotation in the United States. Values based on the foreign percentage
quotations should be used by insurance companies in their annual statements
only if such companies have substantial policy liabilities payable in the cur-
rencies involved and establish an appropriate non-admitted asset on account
of the exchange rate at which the assets and liabilities are expressed over
the rate of exchange specified herein or if evidence is made available that
such securities can be disposed of and the proceeds in such foreign currencv
can be converted into United States Dollars on the basis of such rate of ex-
change and remitted to the United States
;
provided, however, that nothing
herein contained shall require the rate of exchange used in connection with
securities payable in Canadian Currency to be other than the rate promul-
gated by the Canadian Foreign Exchange Control Board. The rates of ex-
change applicable at December 31, 1946 shall be the rates current at De-
cember 1, 1946.
Resolved, that in view of the fact that December 1st fell on Sunday in
1946, the references to that date in the resolutions of the Committee on
Valuation of Securities adopted at the June 1946 meeting of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, shall be deemed to refer to No-
vember 30, 1946.
Resolved, that the book of Valuations of Securities to be published in
January, 1947, shall be prepared in accordance with the foregoing resolu-
tions and contain a notation against each bond to indicate whether it is or
is not amortizable.
Resolved, that in order to meet any unforeseen conditions which may arise,
the Committee on Valuation of Securities shall have full power to amend the
resolutions regarding market and amortized values which have been adopted
at this meeting. Such amendments shall become effective immediately upon
their approval by the Executive Committee of the Association.
Resolved, that the Sub-Committee of the Committee shall have full charge
of the valuation and amortization work including disposition of unusual
situations not adequately covered by the foregoing resolutions.
Resolved, that in cases where the condition of insurance companies, so-
cieties and associations may require the immediate disposition of securities, it
is recommended that the discretion of the state supervisory officials of in-
surance should be exercised to vary the general formula herein set forth,
so as to adopt prices reflected by the exchanges.
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Instructions to Companies on Preparing Statements
Acquisitions made in December, 1946.
Stocks and bonds acquired in December, 1946 and not listed in the book of
Valuations of Securities should be valued at not exceeding cost and the
company reporting- any such stock or bond should be required to be prepared
to justify the value at which carried.
Amortizable Bonds on which no values are printed in the hook.
All bonds secured by the full faith, credit and taxing power of political
subdivisions of the United States of America and of political subdivisions of
the Dominion of Canada which are not in default as to principal or interest
on December 1, 1946 and all amortizable bonds, on which no values are
printed in the book of Valuations of Securities, the amortized values should
be entered in the "Market Value" column of Schedule D, Part 1 as well as
in the "Amortized Value" column.
United States Savings Bonds.
The following values shall be used for United States Savings Bonds in
Schedule D, Part 1
:
1. Market Values—Series "A", "B", "C", "D", "F" and "G". The re-
demption value at date of statement to be entered in the "Market
Value" column (col. 7).
2. Amortized Values—Series "A", "B", "C", "D" and "F". The value
to be entered in the "Amortized Value" column (col. 16) shall be,
(a) the redemption value with no entry for accrual of interest in col-
umn 9, or (b) the actual cost if the company does take credit in column
9 for the difference between cost and redemption value, or (c) the
value computed on a pro rata accumulation of discount or an effective
rate accumulation of interest with no entry in column 9.
3. Amortized Values—Series "G". The value to be entered in the "Amor-
tized Value" column (col. 16) shall be the par value with the interest
received and accrued entered in column 9.
Deductions from Admitted Assets on Account of Interownership of
Insurance Companies Stocks
Stock of the company itself, owned by it, or any equity therein or loans
secured thereby, or any proportionate interest in such stock through the
ownership by such company of an interest in another firm, corporation or
business unit shall not be an admitted asset.
Valuation of Stock of a Subsidiary Company.
The stock of a subsidiary (other than an insurance company) of an in-
surer shall be valued on the basis of the value of only such of the assets of
such subsidiary as would constitute lawful investments for the insurer if ac-
quired or held directly by the insurer.
Determination of Amortized Values of Bonds Received Under
Reorganisations.
The amount entered in the actual cost columns of Parts I and II, of Sched-
ule D, for bonds and other securities received in exchange under reorganiza-
tion, shall be based on the actual market quotations on such bonds and other
securities at the time of acquisition of such bonds and other securities.
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Valuation of Insurance Company Stocks.
As indicated in tHe Resolutions of this Committee insurance company stock
values printed in the book should only be used in statements filed with those
states whose departmental practices or laws require the use of market value
quotations in determining the values allowable on insurance stocks.
Bonds Not Eligible for Amortisation.
All such bonds should be carried in Schedule D, Part 1, column 16 "Amor-
tized or Investment Value December 31 of current year," at the Association
Values shown in the book of Valuations of Securities and should be so re-
flected in admitted assets.
Mortgages Insured Under the National Housing Act.
Companies shall be allowed to take credit for the amortized value, on a
five year basis, for the premium paid on a mortgage insured under the
National Housing Act.
Premium Paid on Real Estate Mortgage Loans.
In the December 31, 1946 statements, the book values of real estate mort-
gages acquired at a premium may be reported at values reflecting write-offs
of such premiums over a three year period from date of acquisition.
General
Oil Production Loans.
The Sub-Committee again gave careful consideration to oil production
loans held by insurance companies and on the basis of information before
the Committee recommends that such loans be not included in the book of
Valuations of Securities. That the Executive Secretary to the Committee
be instructed to keep a complete record of all such loans and prepare and
have available a file on each, including therein a completed questionnaire,
engineers reports, legal opinions and all other necessary data for the use
of the Sub-Committee. That the Sub-Committee will pass on such loans and
upon inquiry the Executive Secretary will submit the findings of the Sub-
Committee to the various state insurance department officials and to insurers
holding the particular issue.
In determining the allowable values, for statement purposes, of oil pro-
duction loan and oil production loan bonds the procedure to be followed
by the Executive Secretary of the Committee on Valuation of Securities
shall be as follows
:
1. The Executive Secretary shall first determine:
(a) That the loan is secured by a first lien on interests in oil produc-
ing properties or leaseholds in the United States on which there
are operating oil wells.
(b) That production from such wells and from other wells in the same
fields is subject to regulatory jurisdiction of a commission or tri-
bunal constituted by law of the state or states in which such wells
are situated.
(c) That the instruments evidencing the loan provide for the applica-
tion during the life of the loan of a portion of revenue from re-
coverable oil which, upon reasonable estimates of such revenue
as shown by an engineering or geologic report, shall provide for
the payment of the interest and the complete amortization of the
loan by maturity.
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2. The value of the underlying security (i.e., the oil in ground securing
the loan) shall be determined as of the statement date by multiplying
the number of barrels of recoverable oil in the ground, as estimated by
a licensed oil engineer, by the current market value per barrel of "oil
in the ground" in the locality where the wells constituting the under-
lying security for the loan are situated. The price per barrel of re-
coverable oil in the ground, used in determining the total security for
the loan, shall likewise be predicated on the estimate of a licensed oil
engineer.
3. The allowable value of the total unpaid oil production loan or oil pro-
duction loan bonds shall be the amortized value thereof, but shall not
in any instance exceed 60% of the value of the recoverable oil in
ground constituting the security for the loan on the statement date, as
determined in 2 above.
The Sub-Committee on Valuation of Securities held a meeting in New
York City on December 12, 1946 to review the work incident to the prepara-
tion, printing and distribution of this book. Decisions required as to amor-
tizability of bonds and market values quoted herein pursuant to the Resolu-
tions adopted on June 12, 1946 and amended on December 11, 1946, were
made with the advice of the Executive Secretary and approval of the Sub-
Committee.
Values of certain securities payable in foreign currencies are quoted in the
appropriate foreign currency and in U. S. Dollars. Values expressed in
foreign currencies should be used by insurance companies in their annual
statements only if such companies have substantial policy liabilities payable
in such currencies and establish an appropriate non-admitted asset on account
of the exchange rate at which the assets and liabilities are expressed over
the rate of exchange approved herein on any excess of assets over liabilities
of such companies expressed in such currencies. The following are the
rates of exchange as of December 1, 1946 applicable for use pursuant to this
paragraph. (Per U. S. Dollars.)
Argentine Peso
Australia Pound
Belgium Franc
Brazil Cruzeiro
British Pound
Canadian Dollar
Chilean Peso
Columbian Peso
Cuban Peso
Denmark Krone
French Franc (100 Fr.)
Indian Rupee
Mexican Peso
^0.2455
3.2300
0.0228
0.0546
4.0313
0.9950
0.0350
0.5850
1.0012
0.2087
0.8425
0.3032
0.2070
Netherlands Guilder $0.3790
New Zealand Pound 3.2450
Norway Krone 0.2016
Peruvian Sol 0.1500
Philippine Peso 0.5000
Portugal Escudo 0.0405
South Africa Pound 4.0350
Spain Peseta 0.0913
Swedish Krona 0.2785
Swiss Franc 0.2340
Uruguay Peso 0.5650
Venezuelan Bolivar 0.3015
In the case of bonds and stocks marked with the symbol o there was no
information or insufficient information submitted pursuant to the foregoing
Resolution to determine that such bonds were amortizable and there was no
information as to suitable market values. Any such security should be en-
tered in the annual statements at such market value as the company reporting
such security is prepared to justify on the basis of reasonable evidence.
The general procedure in making the valuations has been as follows
:
A card file is continually kept up to date containing full particulars regard-
ing each bond or stock. The valuations for bonds and stocks which are not
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quoted on any of the regular Stock Exchanges or in the leading daily papers
or financial periodicals have been determined from replies received to letters
of inquiry sent by the Committee, to bond and stock brokers and bankers who
are familiar w^ith the particular securities.
The values of the securities of foreign countries not active on the regular
stock exchanges of the United States have been determined by quotations on
the various foreign stock exchanges.
The values of all bonds, except bonds in default, are given not including
accrued interest in accordance with the requirements of the uniform state-
ment blank adopted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
Bonds and stocks which have been called for redemption early in 1947 are
carried in this book, at the call price. All other bonds are carried at the
nearest dollar per cent values. Bonds in default as to principal or interest,
also Common and Preferred stock have been valued on a flat basis—that is,
past due and accrued interest on such bonds and dividends accrued or de-
clared on stocks are included in the Association Values. The symbol (F)
preceding the valuation in this book for a bond indicates that the Association
Value includes interest due and accrued and that additional credit for such
interest should not be taken in assets in the statement. The values of stocks
in this book are per share, not per cent.
Where the quoted prices on securities quoted only at long intervals seemed
merely nominal, the figures were adjusted as the facts appeared to warrant.
Where there had been no sales or bids it was necessary to depend upon rates
of dividends or interest paid, the book value of the securities, the subscrip-
tion price and in general the financial condition of the issuing corporation
and the rate for similar securities.
Under the alphabetical arrangement adopted, each security appears under
the name of the corporation actually issuing the same, even though such
corporation may be controlled by another. To illustrate : West Shore 4s of
2361 appear under West Shore Railroad, and not under New York Central
Railroad, the controlling corporation.
It is important for each insurance company and society to send to the
Committee on Valuation of Securities, 61 Broadway, New York 6, N. Y.,
at the end of each of the first three quarters of this year, and at the end of
each of the other three months of the year schedules with full description
of the bonds and stocks acquired during that period. Photographic schedules
must be on white paper, the letters and figures black and no smaller than
elite.
ABBREVIATIONS : Many words have been omitted from and many ab-
breviated in the descriptions and many serial bonds, issued by the same city
or company and bearing the same rate of interest, have been merged in this
book in order to expedite the writing of copy for the printer and the type-
setting. It is important, however, for insurance companies and societies to
continue giving the full names and locations of the issuing cities or com-
panies with the full description of each security, the year and rate of option
of the first year of redemption, and to report separately the different serial
issues of the same city or company, although bearing the same rate of in-
terest, in order that full information can be entered on the valuation cards.
The merging in this book of serials issued by the same city or company was
possible this year as many of them have the same value. Another year many
similar mergers may be impossible. In some cases the words County, Com-
pany, Corporation, Consolidated, Convertible, etc., have been abbreviated
in this book, but abbreviations should not be used in the company schedules.
A list of the abbreviations used in this book will be found on page vii.
The Committee wishes to caution the general public against the use of this
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book as a guide for investors, or for the purpose of assisting in the sale or
disposal of any securities. Its use by any brokerage firm or security salesman
in a prospectus or otherwise, to assist in the sale of any security, will be
unauthorized and improper. Its sole purpose is to facilitate the valuation of
stocks and bonds held by insurance companies on a fair and uniform basis,
and for that purpose it is believed by the Committee to be well adapted. The
fact that a certain bond or stock is included in this list does not signify that
it is a legal investment for insurance companies under the laws of all states
or of any particular state.
Robert E. Dineen, Chairman,
Committee on Valuation of Securities, National
Association of Insurance Commissioners.
Companies Authorized to Transact Business in this Commonwealth
The following companies, transacting a fire and marine business, have been
authorized to transact business in this Commonwealth during the calendar year
1946:
Corporate Name
*Dubuque Fire and Marine
Insurance Company
Surety Fire Insurance Company
Location
Dubuque, Iowa
New York, N. Y.
Capital
$1,150,000
$1,000,000
Date of Authority
July 1, 1946
January 7, 1946
Companies Ceasing to Transact Business in this Commonwealth
The following companies, transacting a fire and marine business, ceased to be
authorized to transact business in this Commonwealth during 1946 for the
reasons indicated:
Corporate Name
Central Insurance Company
^Dubuque Fire and Marine
Insurance Company
Fall River Manufacturers'
Mutual Insurance Co.
First American Fire Insurance
Company
Maryland Insurance Co.
'National Reserve Insurance
Company
National Security Insurance
Company
Ohio Mutual Insurance
Company
Worcester Manufacturers'
Mutual Insurance Company
Location Capital
Baltimore, Md. $1,000,000
Dubuque, Iowa $1,000,000
Fall River, Mass. —
New York, N. Y. $1,000,000
New York, N. Y. $1,000,000
Dubuque, Iowa $500,000
Philadelphia, Pa. $1,000,000
Salem, Ohio —
Worcester, Mass. —
Remarks
Reinsured 100% with Phila-
delphia Fire & Marine In-
surance Company January 1,
1946
This company and the Na-
tional Reserve Insurance
Company were consolidated
June 30, 1946
Merged with Boston Manu-
facturers' Mutual Insurance
Company December 31, 1946
Merged with American Eagle
Fire Insurance Co. April 1,
1946
Merged with Niagara Fire
Insurance Company April 1,
1946 -
This company and Dubuque
Fire and Marine Insurance
Co. were consolidated June
30, 1946
100% reinsured with Phila-
delphia Fire & Marine In-
surance Company January 1,
1946
Withdrew June 30, 1946
Merged with Boston Manu-
facturers' Mutual Insurance
Company December 31, 1946
* The Dubuque Fire and Marine Insurance Company, Dubuque, Iowa and the National Reserve
Insurance Company, Dubuque, Iowa, consolidated June 30, 1946 and were succeeded by a new cor-
poration, the Dubuque Fire and Marine Insurance Company.
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Agents and Brokers
My report relative to the supervision and authorization of agents and brokers
is included in Part I of this Report and will not be repeated except by reference
in Part II of the Report.
The following report on agents and brokers licensed indicates that the number
of individuals presenting themselves for examination has rapidly increased. This
is due in a large number to the fact that veterans are returning to civilian life.
It is possible that a number of those who are now seeking to enter the insurance
business in the production branch, will find the road ahead rather difficult. It
appears that a number of returning veterans are taking examinations for brokers'
licenses with no immediate prospect for success in that line, but rather because
the licenses are issued without cost. The income from licenses will undoubtedly
continue to diminish in future years because of the large number of veterans
who are entitled to a license without payment of fee.
Agents and Brokers Examined
Agents
Year Appeared Passed % Passed
1943 1372 936 68.2
1944 1259 929 73.7
1945 1717 1321 76.9
1946 2559 1886 73.7
Brokers
1943 239 132 55.2
1944 185 98 52.9
1945 475 230 48.4
1946 951 552 58.0
1946— Brokers' Licenses Issued:
Regular Full Coverage Licenses 2693
Limited Coverage Licenses 557
Partnership Licenses : 143
3393 Paid Licenses
Regular Veterans Full Coverage Licenses 1418
Limited Veterans Coverage Licenses 249
1667 Unpaid Licenses
Total 5060
Intelligent supervision of the qualifying and licensing of insurance brokers
and agents is highly important if the public is to be protected against the un-
trustworthy and the incompetent. The number of complaints as a result of viola-
tions of law on the part of agents and brokers has diminished a situation which
is distinctly in the interest of the public.
Fire and Marine Insurance Companies in Receivership
Gloucester Mutual Fishing Insurance Company.— Louis A. Novins, 19 Milk
Street, Boston, was appointed receiver June 18, 1937. Since Mr. Novins entered
the service of the U. S.' Government he has not returned to this Commonwealth
and his records have not been available for verification. A certificate from the
Pilgrim Trust Company showed the balance on deposit to the receiver's account
as of December 31, 1946 was the same as on December 31, 1945, namely, $846.79.
The following schedules show the combined results of the Massachusetts fire
insurance companies. The figures indicate a healthy growth of these companies.
It is interesting to note that the Massachusetts underwriting results are currently
in line with the country-wide results.
Part I
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important insurance States rely upon examiners permanently employed by the
State whose salaries are paid out of the general appropriation. When these
examiners participate in the examination of companies domiciled in other States,
their services are paid for by the insurance company by remittance to the proper
authority in the State of domicile, or paid directly to the examiner on a per
diem basis. Examiners in this State, who examine out-of-State insurance com-
panies, receive their regular compensation from this Commonwealth and the
insurance company being examined reimburses the Commonwealth for the ser-
vices in accordance with the law. Charges for the services of examiners levied
upon insurance companies are regulated by Statute.
Special Examinations of Foreign Insurance Companies
During 1946 the Department participated in a zone examination of the Emmco
Insurance Company of South Bend, Indiana and made special investigations of
the American Indemnity Company, Galveston, Texas, and of the American
Mutual Reinsurance Company, Chicago, Illinois. These companies were apply-
ing for admission to transact fire insurance lines in Massachusetts. The zone
examinations of the Emmco Insurance Company was made in conjunction with
that of the Emmco Casualty Company and in the following table showing the
amounts by which the companies reimbursed the Commonwealth for expenses
and salaries of our examiners the two companies are combined.
Company ' Expenses Salaries
American Indemnity Company $ 277.50 $ 157.50
American Mutual Reinsurance Company 116.37 120.00
Emmco Insurance Co. and Emmco Casualty Ins. Co. 608.44 1,150.00
$1,002.31 $1,427.50
Expenses of Zone Examinations of Domestic Companies
The following schedule shows the charges made to the Boston Insurance Com-
pany and the Old Colony Insurance Company for services and expenses by
C. J. McCann, the examiner from Florida, representing Zone 3, in connection
with his participation in the joint examination of the two companies, together
with the charges made by this Department to the companies for expense of ex-
amining the branch office in Lansing, Michigan.
Services Hotel etc. Travel Total
No. of Rate per Amount Rate per Amount
Days Day Day
124 $25.00 $3,100.00 $8.00 $1,192.00 $144.00 $4,436.00
Massachusetts examiners at Branch office 280.00 150.00 430.00
Total cost to companies $4,866.00
The United Mutual Fire Insurance Company was examined jointly with the
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and the total cost is reported in detail
in Part II of this report.
The examination of the Allied American Mutual Fire Insurance Company
was made in conjunction with those of the American Mutual Liability Insur-
ance Company and the American Policyholders' Insurance Company, completed
in 1947. The total cost will be reported in Part II of the 1947 report.
Examination of Fire and Marine Insurance Companies
The following is a record of the examinations made by this Department dur-_ l
ing the year 1946 of fire and marine insurance companies authorized to transact
business in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
:
Part I
Company
Examinations completed in 1946
iBoston Insurance Co. ....
Cotton and Woolen Manufacturers' Mutual
Ins. Co. of N. E. .
Groveland Mutual Fire Ins. Co. .
Holyoke Mutual Fire Ins. Co.
Lynn Mutual Fire Ins. Co. .
Middlesex Mutual Fire Ins. Co. .
Mutual Fire Assurance Co. .
Newburyport Mutual Fire Ins. Co.
Norfolk and Dedham Mutual Fire Ins. Co.
lOld Colony Insurance Co.
lUnited Mutual Fire Ins. Co.
Examinations Pending Dec. 31, 1946
lAlIied American Mutual Fire Ins. Co.
Boston Manufacturers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co
Fall River Manufacturers' Mutual Ins. Co,
iNew England Fire Ins. Co.
iSentinel Fire Ins. Co. .
iSpringfield Fire and Marine Ins. Co.
Worcester Manufacturers' Mutual Ins. Co
iZone Examination
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Those company managements intending to take advantage of the under-
writing powers authorized by this legislation should address Edmund S.
Cogswell, First Deputy Commissioner of Insurance, 100 Nashua Street,
Boston, setting forth the additional lines of insurance to be underwritten.
If automobile casualty lines are to be written, the communication should be
received in this office not later than September 15, 1946.
The company should specify the lines of insurance presently being tran-
sacted, together with information concerning additional lines within the
scope of the underwriting authority possessed; the amount of surplus to
policyholders according to the latest statements ; and reference to the pert-
inent sections of the charter and by-laws showing the authority for con-
templated operations or the laws of the domiciliary state which authorized
the company to engage in kinds of insurance set forth in Chapter 285 of
the Acts of 1946, Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
To expedite matters, we would suggest that each foreign company for-
ward a statement from the Insurance Commissioner of its home state advis-
ing that the transaction of the additional lines of insurance authorized by
Chapter 285 of the Acts of 1946 will not conflict with the laws of the home
state, the charter or the by-laws of the company.
While it may not be a statutory or legal requirement in every case, the
Department believes the better procedure would be for each company, mutual
or stock, to obtain a vote of authorization from its policyholders or stock-
holders respectively, as the case may be, to take on these additional lines.
By-law provisions should be examined carefully to determine whether or
not there are restrictions on writing powers.
Fire and marine companies which propose to take on compulsory auto-
mobile insurance are notified that they should join the Massachusetts Auto-
mobile Rating and Accident Prevention Bureau, 89 Broad Street, Boston,
Mass. Further information regarding Bureau membership may be obtained
upon application to R. E. Hatfield, Manager. Under the Massachusetts
Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance Law, there are special types of data
which must be filed for rate-making purposes v/ith the Bureau. Further
details regarding the Statistical Plan will be forwarded to these companies
at a later date.
Each policy providing compulsory automobile liability insurance cover-
age must conform to certain statutory provisions and policies must be filed
with the Insurance Department for approval. In the past, the Bureau has
submitted a form of policy covering compulsory automobile liability in-
surance, extra-territorial insurance, guest coverage insurance, and property
damage insurance. Standard provisions for a combination form of policy
will be made available for use on 1947 risks. The basic form will be for-
warded to the companies from the Bureau.
Any casualty companies now authorized to issue compulsory automobile
liability insurance policies which desire to add fire and theft coverage will
be required to file such policy forms with this Department for approval as
the statute provides.
In closing we urge prompt action on the part of any company which
desires to take advantage of the Multiple Lines Law.
Very truly yours,
Edmund S. Cogswell
First Deputy and Acting
Commissioner of Insurance
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CHAPTER 285
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Forty-Six
An Act Relative to Multiple Line Underwriting, So Called, By
Certain Domestic and Foreign Stock and Mutual Insurance
Companies.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General
Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows : Chapter one
hundred and seventy-five of the General Laws is hereby amended by strik-
ing out section fifty-four B, inserted by section two of chapter three hundred
and eighty-four of the acts of nineteen hundred and forty-five, and inserting
in place thereof the following section :
—
Section 54B. Any company authorized to transact the kinds of business
specified in any one of the first, second, fourth, sixth or twelfth clauses of
section forty-seven may, except with respect to policies of life and endow-
ment insurance and contracts for the payment of annuities and pure endow-
ments, reinsure risks of every kind or description and may write any and
all kinds of insurance other than the policies and contracts hereinbefore
excluded; provided, that it maintains a surplus to policyholders, including
any guaranty capital, of not less than one million dollars.
House of Representatives, May 6, 1946.
Passed to be enacted, Frederick V. Willis, Speaker.
In Senate, May 7, 1946.
Passed to be enacted, Arthur W. Coolidge, President.
May 10, 1946.
Approved,
/s/ Maurice J. Tobin, Governor.
August 15, 1946
To All Fire Insurance Companies Transacting Business In The
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
In Re: Extension of Writing Powers of Certain Fire Insurance
Companies.
Chapter 471 of the Acts of 1946 becomes effective September 6, 1946, and
authorizes the extension of writing powers of fire insurance companies in
the following manner
:
All fire insurance companies, domestic and foreign, stock and mutual,
transacting business in the Commonwealth which have and maintain a sur-
plus to policyholders of at least $400,000 are authorized, except with respect
to household furniture and furnishings in dwelling houses, to insure build-
ings and building service equipment pertaining thereto, machinery, tools
and other equipment used in connection with any trade, business, manufac-
turing process, governmental operations, or public and private institutions,
for the difference between the actual value of the insured property at the
time any loss or damage occurs and the cost of repairing, rebuilding or
replacing if such property is totally destroyed.
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Graphically this new Statute permits as follows
:
Fire Insurance
Companies
Domestic
and
Foreign
Stock
and
Mutual
Surplus to
Policyholders
At least $400,000 or with
prior approval of the
Commissioner, full rein-
surance with an admitted
company if combined sur-
plus of both companies is
at least $800,000.
Additional
Writing Powers
G.L. Ch. 175
Sect. 47 Clause
Seventeenth
(Replacement
Insurance)
Exclusions
Household
furniture
and furnish-
ings in
ings in
dwelling
houses.
Company managements intending to take advantage of the underwriting pow-
ers authorized by Chapter 471 of the Acts of 1946 should address a communica-
tion to Edmund S. Cogswell, First Deputy Commissioner of Insurance, 100
Nashua Street, Boston, Massachusetts specifying the lines of insurance presently
being transacted, the amount of its surplus to policyholders, according to the
company's latest statement, and the pertitent sections of the charter and bylaws
of the company conferring the necessary authority for issuing "replacement"
policies and also reference to the laws of the domiciliary state if essential.
To expedite matters, it is suggested that each foreign company forward a
statement from the Insurance Commissioner of its home state advising that the
transaction of the additional coverage will not conflict with the laws of the
domiciliary state, the charter or the by-laws of the company.
While it may not be a statutory or legal requirement in every case, the
Department believes the better procdure would be for each company, foreign or
domestic, mutual or stock, to obtain a vote of authorization from its policy-
holders or stockholders respectively, as the case may be, to engage in this addi-
tional line of business. By-law provisions should be examined carefully to de-
termine whether or not there are restrictions on writing powers.
Fire insurance policies are issued under the authority of Clause First, Section
47 of General Laws, Chapter 175 and the coverage specified in Chapter 471
is issued under Clause Seventeenth of said Section 47. It is necessary, therefore,
to meet the requirements of Section 22A of General Laws, Chapter 175 that fire
insurance policies, which insure against the hazards specified in Clauses First
and Seventeenth, be filed with the Commissioner of Insurance for approval be-
fore such policies may be issued.
Each company should forward 2 copies of its proposed policy form promptly
to Edmund S. Cogswell, First Deputy Commissioner of Insurance, 100 Nashua
Street, Boston, Massachusetts.
After the necessary documents have been checked and examined, and statutory
requirements have been complied with, the Department will forward to each
company which qualifies an amendment to its certificate of authority or a request
that its license be returned to this office for amendment.
Yours Respectfully,
J. E. Curry, Counsel
Statutes Enacted in 1946 Relating to Fire and Marine Insurance
(Legislation relating to insurance companies other than fire and marine will
be found in Part II of this Report)
All of the legislation described herein, except Chapter 508, will apply to
casualty insurance companies authorized to write fire insurance under the pro-
visions of Chapter 285 included in this Section. Legislation, which applies to
all types of companies covered in Part II of this Report, will be so noted under
the head of "Comment" on the legislation.
Part 1
(Chap. 126)
An Act relative to the making by banking and insurance com-
panies OF loans to veterans of world war II guaranteed or insured
BY the administrator OF VETERANS'" AFFAIRS.
Whereas, The deferred operation of this act would tend to defeat its pur-
pose, which is to make available without delay to qualifying veterans of
World War II the additional benefits of the Act of Congress known as the
Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 which became available to them
on December 28, 1945, therefore, it is hereby declared to be an emergency
law, necessary for the immediate preservation of the public convenience.
Be it enacted, etc., as follows:
Section 1. Section one of chapter forty-six of the acts of nineteen hun-
dred and forty-five is hereby amended by striking out, in the ninth line, the
word "five" and inserting in place thereof the word : — ten, — by inserting
after the word "guaranteed" in the twelfth line the words : — or insured, —
and by inserting after the word "guaranties", in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth lines, the words : — or insurance,— so as to read as follows : — Sec-
tion 1. Subject to such regulations as the commissioner of banks deems to
be necessary or advisable in respect to trust companies, savings banks, co-
operative banks or credit unions, and to such regulations as the commis-
sioner of insurance deems to be necessary or advisable in respect to insur-
ance companies, any trust company, savings bank, co-operative bank, credit
union or insurance company organized under the laws of this commonwealth
is authorized, for a period ending ten years after the termination of the pres-
ent states of Avar between the United States and certain foreign countries, to
make such loans and advances of credit to qualified veterans of World War
II as are guaranteed or insured in whole or in part by the administrator of
veterans' affairs or his successor or successors in such office, under the act
of congress known as the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, or any
amendment thereof, and to obtain such guaranties or insurance.
Section 2. Section two of said chapter forty-six is hereby amended by
inserting after the word "guaranteed" in the tenth line the words: — or in-
sured,— so as to read as follows : — Section 2. During the period that the
provisions of this act are in force and effect, and, with respect to the obliga-
tion of any contract entered into during said period under the provisions of
this act, for the life of said obligation, no provision of law limiting the power
of a trust company, savings bank, co-operative bank, credit union or insur-
ance company organized under the laws of this commonwealth to make loans
shall apply to loans made pursuant to section one of this act, subject to regu-
lations referred to in section one and guaranteed or insured in whole or in
part by the administrator of veterans' affairs.
Approved March 12, 1946.
Comment
:
_
This Legislation increases the period from five to ten years after the termina-
tion of the present States of War for the making of loans and advances of credit
to qualified veterans of World War II by trust companies, savings banks, cooper-
ative banks, credit unions and insurance companies. It also permits such loans
and advances of credit if they are insured by the Administrator of Veterans'
Affairs.
The present Statute limited the period within which such loans could be made
to five years after the termination of the present States of War and also limited
such loans to those that were guaranteed by the Administrator of Veterans'
Affairs.
This Chapter applies to all classes of companies subject to report in Part II of
this Report.
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[Chap. 158]
An Act exempting the all-risk type of insurance policies commonly
known as personal property floater from being filed with and
approved by the commissioner of insurance.
Be it enacted, etc., as follows:
The first paragraph of section twenty-two A of chapter one hundred and
seventy-five of the General Laws, as amended by chapter two hundred and
thirty-four of the acts of nineteen hundred and thirty-five, is hereby further
amended by adding- at the end the following sentence : — The provisions of
this paragraph shall not apply to policies authorized by section fifty-four D,
— so as to read as follows : — No company shall issue any policy of insur-
ance which provides coverage against loss or damage caused by hazards
specified in more than one of the clauses of section forty-seven, until a copy
of the form of the policy has been on file for thirty days with the commis-
sioner, unless before the expiration of said thirty days he shall have approved
the form of the policy in writing ; nor if the commissioner notifies the com-
pany in writing within said thirty days that the form of the policy does not
comply with the laws of the commonwealth, specifying his reasons therefor,
provided that the opinion of the commissioner shall be subject to review by
the supreme judicial court; but nothing in the foregoing provisions of this
section shall permit the incorporation in the standard fire policy, prescribed
by section ninety-nine, or any policy issued under section one hundred and
two A, one hundred and eleven A or one hundred and seventeen A or any
policy subject to section one hundred and eight, or one hundred and thirteen
A, or one hundred and thirty-two, of any coverage not otherwise permitted
by this chapter to be incorporated therein. The provisions of this paragraph
shall not apply to policies authorized by section fifty-four D.
Approved March 22, 1946.
Comment:
This Legislation permits the issuance of Personal Property Floater Policies
without having received prior approval of the Commissioner of Insurance on the
form thereof.
By the enactment of Chapter 384 of the Acts of 1945 fire, marine, surety, lia-
bility companies and companies -writing burglary insurance zvere authorised to
issue Personal Property Floater Policies covering all risks and insuring against
any and all kinds of loss of or damage to, or loss of use of, any individual's per-
sonal property other than merchandise. Previously this type of policy coidd not
be issued under the Massachusetts Law because it contained fire insurance and
Section 99 of General Lazus, Chapter 175 required that policies insuring against
fire be issued on a Standard Form specified therein.
The Personal Property Floater Policy is essentially a marine insurance form
and marine forms are usually not required to be approved by the Insurance De-
partment before their issuance.
[Chap. 186]
An Act relative to signatures and information required on riders
and endorsements on insurance policies and contracts.
Be it enacted, etc., as follozvs:
Chapter one hundred and seventy-five of the General Laws is hereby
amended by striking out section thirty-three, as appearing in the Tercen-
tenary Edition, and inserting in place thereof the following section : — Sec-
tion 33. All such policies or contracts issued by such company shall be
signed by its secretary or an assistant secretary, or in their absence by a
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temporary secretary, and by its president or a vice-president, or in their ab-
sence by two directors. Riders or endorsements, other than riders or en-
dorsements providing for any of the benefits specified in section twenty-four,
attached to pohcies of hfe or endowment insurance and annuity or pure en-
dowment contracts, and riders or endorsements attached to policies of acci-
dent and heahh insurance, may be signed by one of the aforesaid officers of
the company. Riders or endorsements attached to any other pohcy or con-
tract of insurance need not be signed by any officer of the company if signed
by a duly authorized agent or representative of the company ; provided, that
the name of the company shall be printed, typed, written or stamped on each
such rider and the number of the policy or contract to which it is to be
attached is inserted therein. A facsimile of the signature of any such officer
imprinted on any policy or contract or any rider or endorsement attached
thereto, or a facsimile of the signature of any such agent or representative
imprinted on any rider or endorsement which under this section he is author-
ized to sign, shall have the same validity as his written signature.
Approved April 8, 1946.
Comment:
This Legislation zvill facilitate the issuance of rider and endorsement forms
which are to be attached to policies issued by domestic insurance companies.
This is accomplished by amending Section 33 of General Laws, Chapter 175 in
four particulars hereafter enumerated:
1. By permitting such rider forms as are to be attached to policies of life in-
surance and accident and health insurance to be signed by one officer of
the issuing company.
2. By authorising the issuance of rider forms designed to be attached to all
other types of insurance policies e.vcept fire policies to be signed by an
agent of the company.
3. By allozving the name of the insurance company to be printed, typed,
written or stamped on each rider and requiring the number of the policy to
zvhich it is to be attached to be inserted therein.
4. By recognising a facsimile of the name of the insurance agent to be affixed
to the form by use of a rubber stamp.
Permitting riders which are to be attached to life and accident and health in-
surance policies to be signed by one officer of the issuing company and author-
izing all other rider forms except those used on fire policies to be signed by an
agent of the company and sanctioning the use of rider forms on zvhich the name
of the insurance company may be printed, typed, written or stamped if the num-
ber of the policy to zvhich it is to be attached is inserted therein, this Chapter
relaxes the present statutory requirements that all riders and endorsements ex-
cept those used in connection with fire insurance policies be signed by two offi-
cers of the insurance company zvhich issues them and that the name of the insur-
ance company be printed thereon. (See General Lazvs, Ch. 175, Ss. 18, 33 and
192).
The Insurance Lazv presently permits the use of rider forms which are to be
attached to fire insurance policies to be signed by an agent of the company. (See
G.L., Ch. 175, Sec. 99, Clause Ninth).
At the Hearing held by the Committee on Insurance on the original Petition
for this Legislation it zvas stated by its proponents that there zvere in use in the
Commonzvealth by one branch of the insurance business 170 kinds of forms and
that these are printed in lots of 500,000 and distributed to 3,000 agents by the
295 companies which issue them.
This Department did not favor this Legislation in its present form.
This Chapter applies to all insurance companies subject to report in Part II of
this Report.
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[Chap. 250]
An Act to broaden the laws relative to the issuance of partici-
pating POLICIES BY foreign STOCK INSURANCE COMPANIES AUTHORIZED
TO TRANSACT BUSINESS WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH, BY PROVIDING THAT
SUCH COMPANIES MAY ISSUE SUCH POLICIES IF AUTHORIZED TO DO SO BY
THE LAWS OF THEIR STATE OR GOVERNMENT.
Whereas, The deferred operation of this act would tend to defeat its pur-
pose by depriving the people of this commonwealth of the opportunity of ob-
taining forthwith from certain insurance companies participating policies of
insurance, therefore it is hereby declared to be an emergency law, necessary
for the immediate preservation of the public convenience.
Be it enacted, etc., as follozvs:
Section one hundred and fifty of chapter one hundred and seventy-five of
the General Laws, as amended by section two of chapter six hundred and
nine of the acts of nineteen hundred and forty-five, is hereby further
amended by inserting after the word "charter" in the eleventh line the
words : — or by the laws of its state or government,— so as to read as
follows: — Section 150. Foreign companies, upon complying with the con-
ditions herein set forth applicable to such companies, may be admitted to
transact in the commonwealth, as provided in section one hundred and fifty-
seven, any kinds of business authorized by this chapter, subject to all gen-
eral laws now or hereafter in force relative to insurance companies, and sub-
ject to all laws applicable to the transaction of such business by foreign com-
panies and their agents ; except that no foreign stock company may issue
participating policies unless specifically authorized to do so by its charter or
by the laws of its state or government
;
provided, that no provision of law
which by its terms applies specifically to domestic life companies shall there-
by become applicable to foreign life companies ; and provided, further, that
the provisions of section eighty-one relative to the contingent mutual lia-
bility of members shall not apply to any foreign mutual fire company which
had been admitted to transact business in the commonwealth prior to Janu-
ary first, nineteen hundred and twenty-one and was then actually transacting
business therein without complying with said provisions.
Approved April 30, 1946.
Comment :
This Lazv amends the present Statute so as to permit foreign stock companies
to issue participating policies in Massachusetts if they are authorised by the
Laws of their domiciliary states or governments to do so.
This is accomplished by amending Section 150 of G.L., Chapter 175 which in
its present form permits foreign stock companies to issue participating policies
if specifically authorised to do so by their charters.
Chapter 250 applies to foreign companies only. The matter of issuing partici-
pating policies by domestic insurance companies is spelled out in the present In-
surance Law, G.L., Chapter 175, Section 50.
At the Public Hearing held by the Committee on Insurance it zvas pointed out
that in some States insitrance companies are not issued charters but are organ-
ised by Special Legislative Acts and it was claimed that unless Section 150 zvere
amended such companies could not qualify to write participating policies in Mas-
sachusetts because they had no charters.
The Department favored the change in the Lazv but made the suggestion that
a further amendment be made in Section 150 so as to bring the By-Lazvs of the
insurance company proposing to zvrite participating policies into line either with
its charter provisions or with the provisions of the lazvs of the State or Govern-
ment under which it was authorised to transact business.
The Insurance Committee did not incorporate our suggestion in Chapter 250.
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[Chap. 285]
An Act relative to multiple line underwriting, so called, by certain
domestic and foreign stock and mutual insurance companies.
Be it enacted, etc., as follozvs:
Chapter one hundred and seventy-five of the General Laws is hereby-
amended by striking out section fifty-foiir B, inserted by section two of chap-
ter three hundred and eighty-four of the acts of nineteen hundred and forty-
five, and inserting in place thereof the following section : — Section 54B.
Any company authorized to transact the kinds of business specified in any
one of the first, second, fourth, sixth or twelfth clauses of section forty-seven
may, except with respect to policies of life and endowment insurance and
contracts for the payment of annuities and pure endowments, reinsure risks
of every kind or description and may write any and all kinds of insurance
other than the policies and contracts hereinbefore excluded
;
provided, that
it maintains a surplus to policyholders, including any guaranty capital, of
not less than one million dollars.
Approved May 10, 1946.
Comment:
This Legislation broadens the zvriting pozvers of domestic fire, marine, surety,
casualty and burglary companies so as to permit such companies to insure risks
of all kinds other than life and endozvment insurance and contracts for the pay-
ment of annuities and pure endozvments provided they have a surplus to policy-
holders of not less than one million dollars.
This Chapter amends the Multiple Lines Lazv zvhich was enacted in 1945
(See General Lazvs, Chapter 175, Section 54B as inserted by Section 2 of Chap-
ter 384 of the Acts of 1945).
Under the present Lazv (G.L., Ch. 175, S. 54B) a domestic company author-
ised to zvrite fire, marine, surety, casualty or burglary insurance may reinsure
risks of all kinds zvherever located except life and endozvment insurance and con-
tracts for the payment of annuities and pure endowments and may insure risks
of all kinds outside of the United States other than life and endowment insurance
and contracts for the payment of annuities and pure endowments provided it has
a surplus to policyholders of not less than one million dollars.
As enacted in 1945 the present Statute permits Massachusetts companies to
write both fire and casualty lines outside the United States, its territories and
possesions. Life and endowment insurance and contracts for the payment of
annuities and pure endowments were excluded from this Law.
Chapter 285 extends the territory in which our domestic companies may zvrite
multiple lines by eliminating from the present Statute the zvords "with respect to
risks outside of the United States, its territories and possessions" and by doing
so authorises companies to write multiple lines within the United States.
The Legislature of this Commonwealth is to be congratulated for its liberal
and progressive attitude in enacting this legislation. The benefits which zuill
flow to the insuring public as a residt of this legislation zvill be abundant as in-
surance companies take advantage of the permission to zvrite both fire and cas-
ualty policies in the one insurance company. The foundation for this legislation
was laid by your Commissioner in 1943, zuhen, as President of the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners, he sought the assistance of an industry com-
mittee, headed by Mr. John A. Diemand, President of the Insurance Company of
North America and the follozving members, Mr. S. Bruce Black, President of
the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company; Mr. Kenneth C. Bell, Vice President
of the Chase National Bank; Mr. Williain A. LaBoyteaux of the insurance
brokerage firm of Johnson and Higgins; Mr. Arthur F. LaFrents, President of
the American Surety Company of New York; Mr. J. Arthur Nelson, President
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of the New Amsterdam Casualty Company ; Mr. William D. O'Gorman, an offi-
cer of the insurance agency firm of O'Gorman and Young ; Mr. William D. Win-
ter, President of the Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company.
The constructive and arduous work of this Committee, coupled with the assist-
ance of numerous progressive thinkers in the insurance business, produced for
your Honorable Body an abundance of information which influenced your Com-
mittee on Insurance to favorably report this legislation. Citizens in Massachu-
setts will in the immediate future enjoy the advantages which have been for
many years enjoyed by the citizens of other States because of the ability of in-
surance companies to afford most complete insurance protection.
[Chap. 299]
An Act relating to the issue of licenses to partnerships to act as
insurance agents or brokers or adjusters of fire losses, and the
qualifications of the members of such partnerships, and providing
that certain members of such a partnership need not be specified
IN ITS LICEiNSE.
Be it enacted, etc., as follozvs:
Chapter one hundred and seventy-five of the General Laws is hereby-
amended by striking out section one hundred and seventy-three, as appear-
ing in the Tercentenary Edition, and inserting in place thereof the following
section: — Section 173. The licenses described in sections one hundred and
sixty-three, one hundred and sixty-six, one hundred and sixty-seven, one
hundred and sixty-eight and one hundred and seventy-two may, upon pay-
ment of the fees prescribed by section fourteen, be issued to partnerships on
the conditions specified in and subject to said sections, except as otherwise
provided herein. Each license shall specify by name the partners authorized
to act thereunder in the name and on behalf of the partnership, which shall
include all the partners except as provided below. Executors, administrators
and trustees of the estates of deceased partners who were members of the
partnership to be licensed or any predecessor partnership which conducted
a business to which the partnership to be licensed has directly or indirectly
succeeded and partners or former partners who have retired from active
participation in such partnership or any such predecessor partnership or
their legal representatives may be partners in the partnership for periods not
exceeding in the case of such executors, administrators or trustees ten years
from the death of such partner, for the sole purpose of protecting and en-
forcing any rights of such deceased or retired partner. Such partners shall
not be specified in the license and shall not be authorized to act in the name
or on behalf of the partnership in respect to any matter requiring a license
under any of said sections
;
provided, that any such non-specified partner
may request the continuance with the partnership of the account of any one
who was a customer of such partnership or predecessor partnership at the
date of such death or retirement. Each partner so to be specified shall file
the statement or application required by law, including a written request that
the license be issued in the partnership name, and a list of the partners to be
specified in the license; partners not to be specified shall not be required to
file such statement or application, but there shall be furnished with respect
to them such information as the commissioner shall request. Together with
said statements or applications, there shall be filed a duplicate original of the
written partnership agreement signed by all the partners. The license shall
be issued in the partnership name, and may be revoked or suspended as to
one or all specified members of the partnership. Minors who are parties to
the written articles of partnership may be included in the partnership license,
provided that there is one adult member of the firm who is a specified part-
ner. If the partnership is terminated prior to the expiration of the license,
the partners shall forthwith give notice thereof to the commissioner, who
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shall thereupon without a hearing revoke the license. Each specified partner
shall be personally liable to the penalties of the insurance laws for any vio-
lation thereof, although the act of violation is done in the name of or on be-
half of the partnership. Whoever, being licensed as a specified partner
under this section, fails to give notice as required herein of the termination
of the partnership, or after the partnership is terminated acts under such
license, shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty nor more than five
hundred dollars.
Comment:
This Lazv permits insurance partnerships to make provision in their partner-
ship agreements so that upon the death or retirement of any of the partners an
executor, administrator or trustee of his estate or a retired partner may be a
member of the partnership.
Under General Laws, Chapter 175, Section 173, previous to the enactment of
Chapter 299 , it zvas necessary that each member of an insurance partnership was
licensed zvith the result that upon the death or retirement of a member of an in-
surance partnership the former partnership must be discontinued because of the
statutory requirement that the licensee intends to hold himself out and carry on
business in good faith as an insurance agent or insurance broker.
This Legislation amends the present law (G.L., Ch. 175, S. 173) so tliat the
legal representative of the estate of a deceased partner or a retired partner may
be a member of the partnership but shall not be specified in the license and shall
not perform any of the acts usual to a member of a partnership engaged in the
insurance business except to request the continuance with the partnership of the
account of any person zvho was a customer of the partnership or its predecessor
at the date of the death or retirement of the former member of the firm.
In the case of executors, administrators and trustees of the estates of deceased
partners there is a ten-year limit on the time during which they may be members
of the partnership under this Chapter. These unspecified partners woidd of
course be liable to the penalties of the Insurance Law for any act in connection
zvith an insurance transaction except as authorised above.
It is not the intention of the Department to encourage corporations including
banks and lending institutions to serve in the capacity of unspecified partners in
insurance partnerships in cases zuhere a member of a partnership has deceased
and appointed said institution as his executor, administrator or trustee.
We liave commented at length on this legislation in order that the Legislature
may realise that the administration of this new law will be conservative and in
accordance with the legislative intent that the business of retired or deceased
partners be conserved for the benefit of those zvho have a right to receive such
benefits.
[Chap. 387]
An Act relative to the taxation of marine, or fire and marine,
insurance companies.
Be it enacted, etc., as follows:
Section 1. Section twenty-two of chapter sixty-three of the General
Laws, as most recently amended by section one of chapter seven hundred
and twenty-one of the acts of nineteen hundred and forty-five, is hereby
further amended by inserting after the word "twenty" in the fifth line the
words : — and marine, or fire and marine, insurance companies with respect
to business taxable under section twenty-nine A, -— so as to read as follows :
— Section 22. Every domestic insurance company coming within the scope
of the definition of a domestic company in section one of chapter one hun-
dred and seventy-five, except life insurance companies with respect to busi-
ness taxable under section twenty and marine, or fire and marine, insurance
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companies with respect to business taxable under section twenty-nine A,
shall anually pay an excise of one per cent upon the gross premiums for all
policies written or renewed, all additional premiums charged, and all assess-
ments made by such company on policyholders during the preceding calen-
dar year, exclusive of reinsurance; but such premiums and assessments for
policies written or renewed for insurance, exclusive of reinsurance, of prop-
erty or interests in other states or countries where a tax is actually paid by
such company, or its agents, shall not be so taxed.
Section 2. Section twenty-three of said chapter sixty-three, as most re-
cently amended by section two of said chapter seven hundred and twenty-
one, is hereby further amended by inserting after the word "twenty-one" in
the fifth line the words : — and marine, or fire and marine, insurance com-
panies with respect to business taxable under section twenty-nine A,— so
as to read as follows : — Section 23. Every foreign insurance company
coming within the scope of the definition of a foreign company in section
one of chapter one hundred and seventy-five, except life insurance companies
with respect to business taxable under sections twenty and twenty-one and
marine, or fire and marine, insurance companies with respect to business
taxable under section twenty-nine A, shall annually pay an excise upon the
gross premiums for all policies written or renewed, all additional premiums
charged, and all assessments made during the preceding calendar year for
insurance of property or interests in this commonwealth, or which are sub-
jects of insurance by contracts issued through companies or agents therein,
exclusive of reinsurance, at the rate of two per cent but not less in amount
than would be imposed by the laws of the state or country under which such
company is organized upon a like insurance company incorporated in this
commonwealth, or upon its agents, if doing business to the same extent in
such state or country.
Section 3. Section twenty-six of said chapter sixty-three, as appearing
in the Tercentenary Edition, is hereby amended by striking out, in the fifth
line, the words "twenty and twenty-five" and inserting in place thereof the
words : — twenty, twenty-five and twenty-nine A,— so as to read as follows :
— Section 26. The books, papers and accounts of every insurance company
and of its agents shall be open at all times to inspection and examination by
the commissioner and the commissioner of insurance, or their duly author-
ized representatives, for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the returns
made under sections twenty, twenty-five and twenty-nine A.
Section 4. Section twenty-seven of said chapter sixty-three, as so ap-
pearing, is hereby amended by striking out, in the second and in the twelfth
lines, the words "twenty or twenty-five" and inserting in place thereof, in
each instance, the words: — twenty, twenty-five or twenty-nine A,— so as
to read as follows : — Section 27 . Every insurance company neglecting to
make the return required by section twenty, twenty-five or twenty-nine A
shall forfeit twenty-five dollars for every day during which such neglect con-
tinues. If any company neglects to make such return for ten days after
notice thereof addressed to it has been deposited in the post office, postage
prepaid, it shall further forfeit five hundred dollars, and upon an informa-
tion by the attorney general at the relation of the commissioner it may be
restrained from the further transaction of its business in this commonwealth
until it has made such return ; but such penalties shall not be incurred if it
is proved that the return was duly made and deposited in the post office,
postage prepaid, properly directed to the commissioner, and that there was
no neglect. If any return required by said section twenty, twenty-five or
twenty-nine A contains a false statement which is known, or by the exercise
of reasonable care might have been known, to the officers making it, to be
false, such company shall be liable for the amount of tax thereby lost to the
commonwealth, and each offending officer shall forfeit not less than five
hundred nor more than five thousand dollars.
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Section 5. Section twenty-eight of said chapter sixty-three, as most re-
cently amended by chapter three hundred and forty-two of the acts of nine-
teen hundred and forty-five, is hereby further amended by striking out the
second and third paragraphs and inserting in place thereof the two following
paragraphs :
—
The commissioner shall assess upon all insurance companies liable to tax-
ation under sections twenty-two, twenty-three and twenty-nine A the excise
thereby imposed, and shall forthwith upon making such assessment give to
every such company notice of the amount thereof. Such excise shall become
due and payable to the commissioner thirty days after the date of such notice
but not later than June first.
Liability for the taxes imposed by sections twenty to twenty-three, inclu-
sive, and twenty-nine A, or by sections two and three of chapter five hundred
and thirty-one of the acts of nineteen hundred and forty-three shall be in-
curred by reason of the transaction of business during the calendar year
preceding that in which the assessment provided for in this section is made.
Section 6. Said chapter sixty-three is hereby further amended by insert-
ing after section twenty-nine, as appearing in the Tercentenary Edition, the
following section:— Section 29A. (1) Every marine, or fire and marine,
insurance company authorized to transact business in the commonwealth,
coming within the scope of the definition of a domestic company or of a
foreign company in section one of chapter one hundred and seventy-five,
shall, with respect to all insurance written within the commonwealth upon
hulls, freights, or disbursements, or upon goods, wares, merchandise and
all other personal property and interests therein, in course of exportation
from any country, importation into any country, or transportation coastwise,
including transportation by land or water from point of origin to final desti-
nation in respect to, appertaining to, or in connection with, any and all risks
or perils of navigation, transit or transportation, any portion of which ex-
portation, importation, transportation, navigation, transit, or shipment is
upon any ocean, and upon the property while being prepared for and while
awaiting shipment, and during any delays, storage, trans shipment or reship-
ment incident thereto, including war risks and marine builders risks, pay a
tax of five per cent on its taxable underwriting profit, ascertained as here-
inafter provided, from such insurance written within the commonwealth.
(2) The taxable underwriting profit on such marine insurance written
within the commonwealth, as determined in subsection (6), shall be that
proportion of the total underwriting profit of such company from such ma-
rine insurance written within the United States for the taxable period which
the amount of net premiums of such company from such marine insurance
written within the commonwealth for the taxable period bears to the amount
of net premiums of such company from such marine insurance written within
the United States for the taxable period.
(3) The underwriting profit of such company on such insurance written
within the United States shall be determined by deducting from the net
earned premiums on such marine insurance written within the United States
during the taxable year, meaning thereby the calendar year next preceding
the date on which such tax is due, the following items :
—
(a) Net losses incurred, meaning thereby gross losses incurred during
such calendar year on such marine insurance written within the United
States, less reinsurance claims collected or collectible and less all net sal-
vages and all recoveries collected or collectible from any source during such
calendar year on such losses and on losses deducted under this section in any
prior year.
(&) Net expenses incurred, meaning thereby expenses incurred during
such calendar year on such marine insurance written within the United
States, including all state and federal taxes in connection therewith; but in
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no event shall the aggregate amount of such net expenses deducted exceed
forty per cent of the net premiums on such marine insurance ascertained as
hereinafter provided; and
(c) Net dividends paid or credited to policyholders or insureds during
such calendar year on such marine insurance written within the United
States.
(4) In determining the amount of the tax payable under subsection (1),
net earned premiums on such marine insurance written within the United
States during the taxable year shall be arrived at as follows : From gross
premiums written on such marine insurance during the taxable year there
shall be deducted any and all return premiums, premiums on policies not
taken, premiums paid for reinsurance and net unearned premiums on all
such unexpired risks at the end of the taxable year ; and there shall be added
to such amount net unearned premiums on such unexpired risks at the end
of the calendar year next preceding the taxable year.
(5) In determining the amount of such tax, net expenses incurred shall
be determined as the sum of the following
:
(a) Specific expenses incurred directly and specifically in connection with
such marine insurance, including all commissions, agency expenses, taxes,
licenses, fees, and loss-adjustment expenses, less recoveries or reimburse-
ments on account of or in connection with such commissions or other ex-
penses collected or collectible because of reinsurance or from any other
source; and
(b) General expenses incurred on such marine insurance, consisting of
that portion of general or overhead expenses incurred in connection with
such insurance which the net premiums on such marine insurance written
by such company during the taxable year bear to the total net premiums
from all classes of insurance written by it during the taxable year. Within
the meaning of this paragraph, general or overhead expenses shall include
salaries of officers and employees, printing and stationery, all taxes imposed
by the commonwealth and the United States, except as included in para-
graph (a) of this subsection, and all other expenses of such company not
included in said paragraph (a), after deducting expenses and taxes specifi-
cally chargeable to any or all other classes of insurance.
(6) In determining the amount of the tax payable under subsection (1),
the taxable underwriting profit, if any, of such company on all such marine
insurance written within the commonwealth shall be ascertained as follows : —
(a) In the case of every such company which has written any such busi-
ness within the commonwealth during three calendar years immediately pre-
ceding the year in which such taxes are payable, the taxable underwriting
profit shall be determined by adding or subtracting, as the case may be, the
underwriting profit or loss on all such insurance written within the United
States, ascertained as hereinbefore provided, for each of such three years,
and dividing by three.
(&) In the case of every such company other than as specified in para-
graph (a) of this subsection, such taxable underwriting profit, if any, shall
be the underwriting profit, if any, on such marine insurance business written
within the commonwealth during the taxable year, ascertained as herein-
before provided; but after such company has written such marine insurance
business within the commonwealth during three calendar years, an adjust-
ment shall be made on the three year average basis by ascertaining the
amount of tax payable in accordance with paragraph (a) of this subsection.
Any tax credit resulting from such adjustment may be refunded without
interest upon written application at the time of filing the required return, or
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applied toward the payment of any tax due or which may thereafter become
due.
(7) Every insurance company liable to taxation under this section shall
annually, on or before the first day of April, make a return to the commis-
sioner, on oath of its secretary or other officer having knowledge of the facts,
setting forth the underwriting profit or loss, ascertained as hereinbefore
provided, for the taxable year or years required by the pertinent paragraph
of subsection (6), in such form and containing such other information as
the commissioner may deem necessary for the determination of the excise
imposed by this section. For cause, the commissioner may extend the time
within which any such statement may be filed but not to a date later than
May first.
(8) Every company liable to taxation under this section, when it ceases
to write any such marine insurance within the commonwealth, or discon-
tinues business therein, shall thereupon notify the commissioner in writing
within five days and shall within sixty days thereafter file with the com-
missioner a report of all such marine premiums written from January first
of the year of such cessation to and including the date upon which the com-
pany ceased to do business in the commonwealth, and an excise of one tenth
of one per cent on such net marine premiums shall be immediately due and
payable, and shall be in lieu of the excise provided by this section for such
period.
(9) The tax provided for in this section shall apply to the business of the
year ending December thirty-first, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and
subsequent years.
Section 7. This act shall take effect on January first, nineteen hundred
and forty-eight.
Comment:
Chapter 387 changes the method of computing taxes payable to the Common-
wealth by marine or fire and marine insurance companies transacting ocean ma-
rine business.
Under the present Law (General Laivs, Chapter 63, Sections 22 and 23) do-
m.estic and foreign companies transacting ocean marine business pay respectively
a one per cent and two per cent premium tax.
Chapter 387 changes the basis on zvhich the tax on ocean marine business is
computed from one per cent and tzvo per cent of the net premiums to a tax of
five per cent on its taxable underzvriting profit zvhich is to be determined by a
complex formula included in the Statute.
Similar legislation was before the 1945 General Court, being at that time House
Bill No. 2120. This Department did not favor the principles of House Bill No.
2120 and the Bill was vetoed by the Governor. See copy of Governor's Veto
Message, Senate Bill No. 626 of 1945.
This Department opposed the enactment of Chapter 387 on the ground that a
premium tax is easier to compute and less likely to involve controversy than the
underwriting profit tax which is substituted for the premium tax by this bill.
We are of the further opinion that there zvill be years in which no tax will be
paid by marine insurance companies; zvhereas that situation coidd not possibly
occur under the premium tax method. We believe there is a further reason for
objecting to a diminution of taxes payable by fire and marine insurance com-
panies, namely, the demands of such companies for further services at the hands
of the State in the matter of rate regulation. If this tax principle is extended, it
will be costly to the Commonzvealth.
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[Chap. 471]
An Act relating to insurance against expenses actually incurred
in repairing or replacing property damaged or destroyed by fire or
other causes and RELATING TO INSURANCE AGAINST THE COST OF ADDI-
TIONAL OR OTHER CONSTRUCTION NECESSARY TO COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE
LAWS, ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS.
Be it enacted, etc., as follows:
Section 1. Section forty-seven of chapter one hundred and seventy-five
of the General Laws, as amended, is hereby further amended by adding at
the end the following clause : —
Seventeenth, To insure buildings and building service equipment pertain-
ing thereto and a part thereof, and machinery, tools, and other equipment
appurtenant to or used in connection with any trade, business, manufac-
turing process, governmental operations, or public and private institutions,
except household furniture and furnishings in dwelling houses, for the dif-
ference between the actual value of the insured property at the time any loss
or damage occurs and the cost of repairing, rebuilding or replacing on the
premises described in the policy, or some other location within the common-
wealth mutually agreed upon between the insurer and the insured, with new
materials of like size, kind and quality, such property as has been damaged
or destroyed by fire or other peril insured against, if repaired, rebuilt or re-
placed within the commonwealth within not exceeding two years from date
of loss or such further time as may be agreed to between the insurer and the
insured; and also, to insure against the cost of demolition or reconstruction,
or both, of any portion of the insured premises which has not suffered
damage and the additional cost of repair or reconstruction, or both, of por-
tions of the insured premises which have suffered damage, necessary to
comply with applicable laws, ordinances or by-laws.
Section 2. Section forty-eight of said chapter one hundred and seventy-
five, as appearing in the Tercentenary Edition, is hereby amended by strik-
ing out the first paragraph and inserting in place thereof the following para-
graph : — Ten or more persons residents of this commonwealth may form a
stock company (a) to transact the business set forth in any one of the clauses
set forth in section forty-seven, excepting the third or seventeenth, (&) to
transact the business set forth in the first and eighth clauses thereof, (c) to
transact the business set forth in the first and second clauses thereof, in the
first and seventeenth clauses thereof, in the first, second and eighth clauses
thereof, or in the first, second, eighth and seventeenth clauses thereof, (d) to
transact the business set forth in any two or more of the fourth, fifth, sixth,
seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, twelfth and thirteenth clauses thereof, or {e) to
transact the business set forth in the sixth and sixteenth clauses thereof.
Section 3. Said section forty-eight is hereby further amended by striking
out, in the twenty-second and twenty-third lines, the words "Under the first
and second clauses, and under the first, second and eighth clauses, not less
than four hundred thousand dollars" and inserting in place thereof the fol-
lowing paragraph : —
Under the first and second clauses, under the first and seventeenth clauses,
under the first, second and eighth clauses, and under the first, second, eighth
and seventeenth clauses, not less than four hundred thousand dollars.
Section 4. Said chapter one hundred and seventy-five is hereby further
amended by striking out section forty-eight A, as so appearing, and inserting
in place thereof the following section: — Section 48A. Ten or more per-
sons, residents of this commonwealth, may form a mutual company, (a) to
transact the business set forth in any one of the clauses of section forty-
seven, except the eleventh, fourteenth, fifteenth or seventeenth; (&) to trans-
act the business set forth in the first and third, the first and eighth, the third
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and eighth, or in the first, third and eighth clauses; (c) to transact the
business set forth in the first and second clauses, in the first and seventeenth
clauses, in the first, second and eighth clauses, or in the first, second, eighth
and seventeenth clauses; {d) to transact the business set forth in any two or
more of the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, twelfth and
thirteenth clauses thereof; or {e) to transact the business set forth in the
sixth and sixteenth clauses thereof, except subdivision {e) of said sixth
clause.
Section 5. Section fifty-one of said chapter one hundred and seventy-
five, as so appearing, is hereby amended by striking out clause (a) and in-
serting in place thereof the following clause : —
(a) The first and second, if authorized to transact either, or the seven-
teenth, if authorized to transact any one or more of the first, second and
eighth clauses, provided it has a paid-up capital of not less than four hun-
dred thousand dollars, or the first and second excepting ocean marine insur-
ance, if authorized to transact either, provided it has a paid-up capital of
not less than three hundred thousand dollars, or subdivision {d) of the
second clause, if authorized to transact the first.
Section 6. Section fifty-four of said chapter one hundred and seventy-
five, as amended, is hereby further amended by inserting after clause (c) the
following clause : —
(o^) The seventeenth, if authorized to transact any one or more of the
first, second and eighth clauses, provided that it has net cash assets over all
liabilities, computed on the basis fixed by sections ten and eleven, of not less
than four hundred thousand dollars and provided further that if a company
does not have net cash assets to the said amount, it may transact business
under the seventeenth clause, with the approval of the commissioner, if all
risks insured by it under said clause are fully reinsured with a company
authorized to transact business in the commonwealth whose net cash assets,
so computed, together with such assets of the ceding company, aggregate not
less than eight hundred thousand dollars.
Section 7. Said chapter one hundred and seventy-five is hereby further
amended by inserting after section ninety-six the following new section : —
Section 96A. Neither insurance authorized under the provisions of clause
seventeenth of section forty-seven nor insurance against loss of use or occu-
pancy shall be subject to the limitations as to value contained in sections
ninety-five, ninety-six, ninety-nine, one hundred and two A and one hundred
and two B.
Comment
:
This Law authorises domestic insurance companies to insure buildings and
building service equipment pertaining thereto and a part thereof, and machinery,
tools, and other equipment appurtenant to or used in connection with any trade,
business, manufacturing process, governmental operations, or public and private
institutions, except household furniture and furnishings in dwelling houses, for
the difference between the actual value of the insured property at the time any
loss or damage occurs and the cost of repairing, rebuilding or replacing if totally
destroyed.
Previous to the enactment of Chapter 471, binder General Laws, Chapter 175,
Sections 95, 96 and 99, the highest amount for zvhich buildings may be insured
in the Commonwealth in case of total loss is for actual value at the time loss
occurs.
Chapter 471 permits the issuance of a form of coverage for which there is a
demand. This is accomplished under proper financial safeguards and with a re-
quirement that the policyholder rebuild within two years.
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This Legislation authorises a stock company with $400,000 capital and mutual
companies zvith $400,000 surphis to engage in this type of business and permits
mutual companies which have less than $400,000 surphis and zvhich obtain the
Commissioner's approval to write this coverage if the risks are wholly reinsured
with a company zvhose surplus when added to that of the ceding company aggre-
gates at least $800,000.
This Lazv increases the writing pozuers of insurance companies in case of total
loss only. Companies are presently permitted to insure against the increased
cost of reconstruction in case of partial loss.
This type of insurance is particularly advantageous for the protection of lessees
under leases which require them to repair or replace the leased property in the
event of fire at their otvn expense. It zvill therefore readily be seen that unless
the lessee can purchase insurance protection to take care of his possible liability
he is left in a position zvhere he must contribute some of his own funds for re-
placement in the event of fire.
[Chap. 508]
An Act further regulating the effect upon the taxation of insur-
ance COMPANIES OF THE REINSURANCE OF RISKS THEREBY.
Be it enacted, etc., as follows:
Section twenty of chapter one hundred and seventy-five of the General
Laws, as amended by chapter three hundred and forty-three of the acts of
nineteen hundred and forty-one, is hereby further amended by striking out,
in the sixth and seventh Hnes, as appearing in the Tercentenary Edition, the
words "reduce the taxes to be paid by the ceding company, nor, if a Ufe
company, shall it"— and in the eighth line, as so appearing, by striking out
the word "it" and inserting in place thereof the words : — a life company,—
so that the first sentence of the second paragraph will read as follows : —
Such reinsurance shall not reduce the reserve to be charged to a life com-
pany, unless effected with a company authorized to issue policies in the com-
monwealth covering risks of the same kinds as those reinsured, or with a
company incorporated or formed to reinsure and authorized to reinsure in
the commonwealth risks of the same kinds as those reinsured.
Approved June 11, 1946.
Comment:
This Legislation corrects Section 20 of General Laws, Chapter 175 to bring
this Section as corrected into conformity zvith the provisions of Chapter 721 of
the Acts of 1945. This Chapter amended Sections 22, 23 and 24 of General
Lazvs, Chapter 63 pertaining to the taxation of domestic, fire, marine and other
insurance companies. Chapter 721 of the Acts of 1945 changed the method by
zvhich domestic insurance companies other than life insurance companies were
assessed for premium, taxes in that it requires a company to pay the full tax zvith-
out any deduction for reinsurance. Previous to the enactment of Chapter 721
of the Acts of 1945, a cgmpany which reinsured a portion of its risks zvas allowed
a deduction on its tax assessment for such reinsurance.
On account of the change which zvas made in the tax base as outlined above,
it is necessary that an amendment be made in the First Sentence of the Second
Paragraph of Section 20 of G.L., Chapter 175, so that its provisions zvill be
brought into conformity with the 1945 amendment in the Tax Lazv.
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HOUSE NO. 50
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Department of Banking and Insurance,
Division of Insurance,
100 Nashua Street, Boston, December 3, 1946.
To the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
In compliance with the provisions of section 33 of chapter 30 of the General
Laws, as amended, a copy of the recommendations for legislation to be contained
in the annual report of the Commissioner of Insurance (Pub. Doc. No. 9) is
submitted herewith, together with draft of bill embodying the legislation recom-
mended. This draft has been submitted to the Counsel for the House, as required
by law.
CHARLES F. J. HARRINGTON,
Commissioner of Insurance.
RECOMMENDATIONS — RECODIFICATION OF INSURANCE LAWS.
Your Commissioner of Insurance participated in the deliberations of the Sub-
committee of the Executive Committee of the National Association of Insurance
Commisioners which commenced immediately following the decision of the Su-
preme Court of the United States handed down on June 5, 1944, in the South-
Eastern Underwriters' Case, the effect of which was to make applicable to the
insurance business a series of federal acts which in many instances are in direct
conflict with the provisions of our state laws and which further subjected the in-
surance business and state regulation to a long line of judicial decisions inter-
preting the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution and other federal regu-
latory acts enacted pursuant thereto.
Acting under authority granted by the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners, the Executive Committee submitted to the Congress of the United
States a legislative proposal in November, 1944. An examination of United
States Public Law 15 signed by the President on March 9, 1945, will indicate
the extent to which the Commissioners' legislative proposal, prepared in cooper-
ation with the insurance industry, forms the basis of United States Public Law
15. One of the main purposes of the legislative proposal was to assure the con-
tinued application of state laws regulating and taxing the business of insurance,
and further to indicate that future acts of Congress applying to the business of
insurance would specifically so provide. This course of action was decided upon
after many hearings in many parts of the United States. Accompanying the
legislative proposal was the following statement of the subcommittee
:
Declaration in Favor of State Regulation.
As a result of its deliberations the subcommittee found an overwhelming
sentiment for the retention of state regulation. The arguments advanced in
its favor were compelling. Chief and foremost among them was the fact—
undisputed —- that because the states are closer to the people than is the na-
tion, they are better able to deal with insurance problems arising in their
several jurisdictions.
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Second, and of equal importance, is the fact that the insurance business
does not lend itself to a rigid, centralized control. Flexibility is of the
essence. Regulation must be geared to regional and sectional needs.
A third and equally persuasive reason, although one which flows from the
first two, is the record of the business in this country, extending back over
one hundred years, and the service which it has rendered to the public. No
industry could have thrived to the extent that the insurance industry has,
nor could the public have gained as it has, if either the philosophy or ad-
ministration of state regulation had been unsound.
To accomplish the foregoing proposition the recommendations of the Insurance
Commissioner submitted to the 1946 Legislature provided for a special commis-
sion to revise, recodify and recommend the necessary changes, additions or
amendments to the insurance laws and to the laws relating to the taxation of in-
surance companies. Our recommendation in this respect was embodied in House,
No. 50.
This recommendation received the support of a number of Massachusetts in-
surance companies and was favorably reported to the Senate by the insurance
committee without dissent. The bill passed the Senate and received favorable
consideration in the House of Representatives but failed of final passage. We
are encouraged by the support which your Honorable Body accorded this con-
structive recommendation. We are satisfied that an increasing number of citi-
zens who are affected by the insurance laws are anxious that these laws be re-
vised and recodified. We urge the members of the Legislature to take the neces-
sary steps to provide us with a modern, improved and well-arranged insurance
code.
During the months which have intervened since our last recommendation to
your Honorable Body we have devoted considerable time to the consideration
and study of the problems arising from the impact of the decision in the South-
Eastern Underwriters' Case (322 U. S. 533) and the enactment by the Congress
of United States Public Law 15. We have likewise conferred with the insur-
ance supervisors of other States and with leaders of the insurance industry con-
cerning the opportunity afforded the States by the Congress to adjust their laws
to conform to the decision of the court that insurance is interstate commerce.
We have striven to be constructive and helpful to the Commission appointed to
consider the necessary changes, additions or amendments to the insurance laws
and the laws relating to the taxation of insurance companies. (See the Journal
of the Senate under date of January 22, 1946.)
We are satisfied that the Commission will produce substantial and constructive
suggestions requiring the amendment or modification of existing sections of the
law and also the incorporation of new sections in order that the continued regu-
lation and taxation of the business of insurance in the public interest may be
accomplished.
We again call attention to the fact that the insurance laws of this Common-
wealth have not undergone a complete revision at one time since 1907. We sub-
mit that in view of the opportunity afforded the States by the federal govern-
ment to continue to regulate and tax the business of insurance we are obliged to
assume the responsibility for the improvement and rearrangement of our laws,
to the end that a review by the Congressional Committee will justify the confi-
dence in state regulation of insurance indicated by the Congress when it enacted
United States Public Law 15. The accomplishment of this task by the State of
Washington in a period of a little more than one year justifies the conclusion
that the task, while a difficult one, can be accomplished in a reasonable length of
time provided an opportunity is available for specialized attention to the work.
During the past two years the insurance industry has urged upon the Legis-
lature the necessity for state rate regulatory legislation in order that rate making
in the public interest by companies acting in concert through rating bureaus
might be continued without conflict with the Sherman Act.
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We have no disposition to underestimate the importance of some form of rate
regulatory legislation which will recognize that "Congress was willing to permit
cooperative action, including price fixing, in the insurance business on a state
level, providing such activity was regulated and at the same time was interested
in seeing to it that reasonable competition was preserved." The subject of rate
regulation has been widely explored by the Special Recess Commission. As a
matter of fact, a number of rate regulatory proposals are presently receiving the
consideration of the Commission. Hence we shall give consideration to other
problems which must be solved if the most complete state supervision of insur-
ance is to be retained.
Most of the problems flowing from the application of the Sherman Act will be
met by the passage of a satisfactory rate regulatory law including provisions per-
mitting certain related co-operative action. Material on this matter has already
been placed in the hands of the Special Recess Commission.
The Committee on Federal Legislation of the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners has made a final recommendation with respect to the treat-
ment of the Robinson-Patman Act at a state level. We have at this time given
preliminary consideration to the action which should be undertaken by the State
in order to eliminate conflict with the Federal Trade Commission Act and the
committee is still considering a memorandum submitted with respect to the Clay-
ton Act. Under normal circumstances we would have preferred to await the
final report of the Committee on Federal Legislation of the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners before making recommendations to our Legislature.
Since the statute requires that department heads submit legislative proposals not
later than the first Wednesday in December, we shall quote from the report of
the Committee on Federal Legislation and submit for the consideration of the
Legislature the alternative proposals presently receiving the consideration of
that committee, with the understanding that, following action by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, we may deem it advisable to substitute
further legislative proposals which will more effectively or satisfactorily deal
with the subject.
Under date of October 26, 1946, the Committee on Federal Legislation of the
National Association of Insurance Commisioners completed a report which was
signed by—
Charles F. J. Harrington, Massachusetts, Chairman.
Robert E. Dineen, New York.
Newell R. Johnson, Minnesota.
James M. McCormack, Tennessee.
Seth B. Thompson, Oregon.
J. Edwin Larson, Florida.
Maynard Garrison, California.
This report, so far as pertaining to this discussion, reads as follows
:
The subjects considered by this committee were as follows:
1. Treatment of the Robinson-Patman Act on a state level.
2. Treatment of the Federal Trade Commission Act on a state level.
3. Proposals for the regulation of the accident and health business.
The committee was also asked to consider the regulation of the title in-
surance business, but the pressure of other business prevented that particular
problem from being considered at this meeting. Other aspects of the rating
problem were likewise not considered, for the same reason.
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Robinson-Patman Act.
The committee had before it and gave consideration to the reports of the
Robinson-Patman Act Subcommittee of the All-Industry Committee dated
September 19, 1945, October 19, 1945, and September 7, 1946. Copies of
these reports are attached hereto, made a part hereof and marked Exhibits
A, B and C. These reports were unanimously approved by the All-Industry
Committee and for the purpose of this report are treated as the reports of
the All-Industry Committee.
The committee voted unanimously to accept these reports. It was the
opinion of the committee that the suggested legislative procedure provided
an adequate and satisfactory method of dealing with the Robinson-Patman
Act on a state level, and the committee recommends for use in the States
the proposals therein contained.
Federal Trade Commission Act.
Numerous proposals as to how this problem should be treated were con-
sidered. In general and in brief, the following proposals were submitted to
your Committee
:
1. No legislation on a state level should be enacted, and the regulation of
unfair practices should be left to the Federal Trade Commission.
2. Each State should enact a so-called "baby federal trade commission
act" paralleling the language, in general, of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.
3. Each State should enact a "baby federal trade commission act", with
the exception that all prohibited practices should be promulgated by the
Commissioner in the form of rules, following notice and hearing to all in-
terested parties. This suggested modification is along the lines of the pro-
cedure contained in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (Public Law
404, 79th Congress).
4. Each State should pass an act giving the Commissioner the power to
restrain and enjoin unfair practices by the use of cease and desist orders.
To the extent possible, the Legislature should set forth in definitive form the
prohibited acts or practices. To the extent that it was not possible for the
Legislature to do this, the Commissioner should be entrusted with the power
to define the additional prohibited acts and practices under the procedure set
forth in plan 3 above.
5. The Commissioner should be entrusted with the power to issue cease
and desist orders in connection with unfair acts and practices. However, all
unfair acts and practices are defined by rules promulgated by the Commis-
sioner following notice and hearing, along the lines of the Federal Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. This is a so-called "baby federal trade commission
act." It becomes a definitive plan, in effect, upon promulgation of rules by
the Commissioner.
6. Under this pl'an all unfair acts and practices are prohibited. The
statute itself contains a list of prohibited acts or practices. Since this list is
not all-inclusive, the Commissioner is empowered in all other cases to con-
duct hearings as to whether or not an act or practice complained of consti-
tutes an unfair act or practice. If it does, the Commissioner makes a report
in writing, stating his findings. Thereafter the Commissioner may, through
the Attorney General, file a petition in court to restrain the violation. If the
court adopts the Commissioner's contention, a cease and desist order is issued
by the court. The Commissioner has no power under this proposal to do
more than make a finding as to whether or not an act or practice is unfair,
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and he may not issue the cease and desist order himself. With the exception
of those prohibited acts or practices specifically enumerated in the statute,
the actual definition of an unfair act or practice is by judicial rather than
administrative determination, and the issuance of all cease and desist orders,
whether or not the practices are enumerated, is entrusted to the courts.
7. This plan is similar to plan 6, except that the authority to determine
the unenumerated unfair practices and to issue cease and desist orders in all
cases is entrusted in the first instance to the Commissioner rather than to
the courts.
A refinement of plans 6 and 7 contemplated that the Commissioner should
have the power to issue cease and desist orders as to the acts and practices
specifically enumerated in the act, but not as to those of which he was the
arbitrator.
All of the plans considered contained provisions for judicial review.
The merits and demerits of these plans were exhaustively explored and
discussed by members of your Committee and by other interested parties.
Your Committee was unanimous upon the proposition that the regulation
of unfair acts and practices should not be left to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion in Washington. Its views on this subject have been outlined in pre-
vious reports and in the supporting memoranda of the Commissioner's legis-
lative proposal submitted to the Congress in 1944.
The committee looked with favor upon two alternative methods of dealing
with this problem, copies of which are attached and marked Exhibits D and
E. In both alternatives unfair methods of competition and unfair or decep-
tive acts and practices are prohibited. The general idea of these two pro-
posals is based upon the so-called definitive approach, namely, to enumerate
specific unfair acts and practices in the business which are generally known.
The committee recognized, however, that the enumeration of specific acts
and practices would not completely occupy the field, and that therefore pro-
vision had to be made for an omnibus section to cover unenumerated acts
and practices.
The proposals differ, however, in the following respects: One plan (Ex-
hibit D) follows the procedure outlined in the Federal Trade Commission
Act and empowers the Commissioner, after hearing, to determine unfair acts
and practices other than those specifically enumerated, and to issue cease and
desist orders as to all unfair practices, whether enumerated or not. Under
the alternative proposal (Exhibit E) the power to make adjudications as to
unfair acts and practices and to issue cease and desist orders in connection
therewith is given to the courts through the medium of the Attorney General.
These bills are receiving additional study by the members of the committee
and will be the subject of further consideration at the committee's next meet-
ing, which will be held some time before the December meeting of the Asso-
ciation in New York.
Accident and Health.
Certain conditions in the accident and health business have been a source
of grave concern to the members of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners and to the members of this committee. For years many
States have passed upon the forms used in the accident and health field. It
has been suggested, however, that supervision of forms is not enough, and
that rates should likewise be supei"vised, possibly under the ordinary rate
regulatory bill. While the committee recognized that his is a possible solu-
tion to the problem, the complexities of the accident and health business, and
the fact that it is transacted by different types of carriers, induced the com-
mittee to consider first the merits of a separate approach.
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The committee is agreed that legislation should be enacted prescribing
standards not only for the forms but for the premiums, because there is a
direct relationship between the coverage and the premium charged. The
problem is further complicated because certain companies act in concert, and
desire to continue that procedure. If these companies are to continue these
activities, the committee recognizes that legislation is necessary in this
respect.
In addition to regulation of rates under a rate regulatory law, three addi-
tional proposals were considered. One was submitted by the Bureau of Per-
sonal Accident and Health Underwriters, under date of October 16, 1946;
another was submitted by the Health and Accident Underwriters Conference,
under date of October 17, 1946; and a third was developed as a result of a
study of these two and legislation now in force in certain States. The first
two plans have been widely circularized among the insurance departments of
the several States, and for that reason no copies are attached hereto. While
this committee was in session, a telegram was received from Zone 3 expres-
sing its opposition to the proposal of the Health and Accident Underwriters
Conference. A copy of the third proposal is attached hereto and marked
Exhibit F.
In substance, the third proposal provides that no policy can be issued un-
less policy forms, applications, endorsements, classifications of risks and pre-
mium charges therefor are filed with the Commissioner. It contains stand-
ards for both the forms and the premiums. The standards for the premiums
are the customary ones, namely, that they shall not be excessive, inadequate
or unfairly discriminatory. The standards for the forms are likewise cus-
tomary, namely, that they shall not be unjust, unfair, inequitable, misleading,
contrary to law or to the public policy of the State.
Under this proposal the Commissioner is empowered, following notice and
hearing, to prevent any company from using any policy form if he finds that
it does not meet the standards. It also empowers the Commissioner to call
for statistical information from the insurer to enable him to determine
whether the standards have been met. Furthermore, it contains provisions
authorizing concert of action and subjecting those organizations of insurers
which operate in concert to the same supervisory processes substantially con-
tained in the model rate regulatory bills recommended by your Committee
in so far as licensing, examination,, admission to membership, et cetera, are
concerned.
It will be noted that this third proposal does not require affirmative
approval in advance of forms and rates. The multiplicity of forms in the
accident and health business, combined with certain other peculiarities of the
business, seemed to make such a requirement impractical at this time. This
proposal imposes no burdensome administrative details for dealing with
policy contracts which on their face are fair and reasonable ; on the other
hand, it does provide police power to deal with those policies where, because
of inadequacy of coverage or excessiveness of rate, or both, the result is un-
conscionable and not in the public interest. The practice of approving policy
forms in advance is widespread, and the optional character of the language
employed would enable a commissioner to adhere to this program under this
bill ; in short, the bill does not preclude that practice.
The committee has reached no final determination in the matter, and is
not prepared to express any A'iews upon any of the proposals until the con-
clusion of its further studies. Further consideration of the whole problem
will be given by the committee at its next meeting which, as stated above,
will be held prior to the December meeting of the Association in New York.
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Title Insurance.
The committee received communications from Commissioner Larson of
Florida and former Superintendent Scheufler of Missouri, requesting the
committee to consider the question of regulation of title insurance rates in
view of the fact that in certain sections of the country such rates are made
in concert. Time did not permit the committee to consider this problem.
The committee will be prepared to hear any one interested in this problem
at its next meeting.
Clayton Act.
At the conclusion of its labors a memorandum was submitted to the com-
mittee dealing with this subject, a copy of which is annexed hereto and
marked Exhibit G. The contents of this memorandum will be considered by
the committee at its next meeting.
Attached to and forming a part of the foregoing report was the supplemental
report of the All-Industry Committee. That report so far as pertaining to this
discussion reads as follows :
There is still some question as to the applicability of the Robinson-Patman
Act to insurance because of the content of the Robinson-Patman Act and be-
cause of the uncertain terms of Public Law 15. But our opinion is that in-
surance cannot afford to proceed on the assumption that the Robinson-Pat-
man Act is inapplicable and run the risk of the federal penalties, namely,
action by the Federal Trade Commission, suits for treble damages, and in
some cases criminal prosecution.
Our problem is to determine the state legislative program that will protect
the insurance industry from the impact of the Robinson-Patman Act.
1. Payment of Commission to Brokers.
We recommend that a brokers act in substantially the form submitted in
our legislative proposals be passed in each State whose laws recognize in-
surance brokers but which do not specifically authorize the insurer to pay
commissions to such brokers ; for example, in Arizona, brokers are defined
by statute and are licensed, but the law does not authorize the insurer to
pay commissions to brokers.
Frorn our preliminary examination we believe that legislation (in many
cases simply an additional provision authorizing payment of commissions)
is required in the following States
:
Arizona Massachusetts Pennsylvania Washington
Idaho Missouri Rhode Island West Virginia
Indiana Nebraska Tennessee Wyoming
Louisiana New Hampshire Utah Alaska
Maine Oregon Vermont Puerto Rico
2. Provisions to accompany State Rating Law.
(a) Anti-discrimination.
The provisions of the Casualty and Fire Rate Regulatory bills ("Rates
shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory") are recom-
mended.
1 In Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas and Wisconsin, brokers are not recognized. In Alabama
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Maryland
Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina
and Virginia, brokers are recognized but statutes already enacted are believed to be sufficiently defi-
nite to authorize the payment of commissions to the kinds of brokers recognized.
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(b) Anti-rebate.
The anti-rebate section attached to the Fire Rate Regulatory bills is
recommended.
3. Absence of Rating Law.
(a) Anti-discrimination.
Independent anti-discrimination statutes as suggested in the legislative
proposals are recommended for each kind of insurance unregulated as to
rates.
{b) Anti-rebate.
The anti-rebate section attached to the Fire and Casualty Rate bills is
recommended as a basis for appropriate independent anti-rebate statute.
(c) Necessary Exceptions.
The independent anti-discrimination and anti-rebate statutes must contain
exceptions as suggested in the legislative proposals.
The legislative proposals of the subcommittee recommended as a basis for an
appropriate brokers' act the following
:
Brokers Act.
The following, adapted from existing statutes, is recommended as a basis
for an appropriate brokers act
:
Section 1. This act shall apply to all brokers as defined herein.
Section 2. The term "broker" as used in this act, means any person,
partnership, association or corporation, who or which, for money, commis-
sion, brokerage, or anything of value, acts or aids in any manner in the soli-
citation or negotiation, on behalf of the assured, of contracts for insurance
of any of the followng kinds as specified in section
,
namely, life, acci-
dent, health, casualty, fidelity, surety, fire and marine.
Section 3. No person, partnership, association or corporation shall act
as a broker without first procuring a license so to act from the [Commis-
sioner].
Section 4. Application for a broker's license shall be filed with the
[Commissioner] in writing and in the form prescribed by him.
Section 5. The [Commissioner] shall issue a broker's license to an appli-
cant when {a) an application provided for in section four has been filed
with and approved by the [Commissioner] and the [Commissioner] shall
have determined the applicant to be competent and trustworthy; (6) the
applicant has paid an annual fee as follows : If the applicant is a resident of
this state, dollars ; if the applicant is a non-resident of this state,
dollars.
Section 6. Whenever the [Commissioner] upon notice and hearing is
satisfied that any applicant for license or any broker acting under his super-
vision and holding a license from him is violating or has violated any pro-
vision of the insurance laws of this state, or that he is incompetent or un-
trustworthy, he shall proceed to issue an order denying or revoking the
license of such broker.
Section 7. An insurance company or agent thereof may pay money, com-
mission or brokerage, or give or allow anything of value, for or on account
of the solicitation or negotiation of contracts for insurance of the kind or
kinds enumerated in section two of this act, to a duly licensed broker.
Detailed provisions for notice, hearings and review of orders and finding
should be integrated with the general state statutes.
The legislative proposals of the subcommittee on the Robinson-Patman Act
have recommended the following as a basis for appropriate independent anti-
discrimination statutes
:
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Statutes in the Absence of Rating Laws.
(a) Anti-discrimination.
The following are recommended as a basis for appropriate independent
anti-discrimination statutes
:
"1. Fire. — No insurer doing in this state the business specified in section
shall promulgate or use any schedule of rates, any form or any under-
writing rule or classification system which discriminates unfairly between
risks of essentially the same hazard, territorial classification, and having
substantially the same degree of protection.
2. Casualty and Surety.— No insurer doing in this state the business
specified in sections shall promulgate or use any schedule of rates, any
underwriting rule or classification system which discriminates unfairly be-
tween risks or classes of risks."
[A specific statute for Workmen's Compensation is not included, for the
reason that Workmen's Compensation insurance is so completely regulated
as to rates that it seems unnecessary to suggest a provision to be used in-
dependently of a rating law].
"3. Life.— No insurer doing in this state the business specified in section
shall promulgate or use any rate or system of rating which discriminates
unfairly between insurants of the same class and equal expectation of life in
the amount or payment of premiums or in any return of premium, dividends
or other advantages.
4. Accident and Health. — No insurer doing in this state the business
specified in section shall make or permit any unfair discrimination be-
tween individuals of the same class in the amount of premiums, policy fees,
or rates charged for any policy or contract of insurance, or in the benefits
payable thereunder."
(&) Anti-rebate.
The following is recommended as a basis for an appropriate independent
anti-rebate statute
:
"No insurer or employee thereof, and no broker or agent, shall pay, allow
or give, or offer to pay, allow or give, directly or indirectly, as an induce-
ment to insurance, or after insurance has been effected, any rebate, discount,
abatement, credit or reduction of the premium named in a policy of insur-
ance, or any special favor or advantage in the dividends or other benefits to
accrue thereon, or any valuable consideration or inducement whatever, not
specified in the policy of insurance. No insured named in a policy of insur-
ance, nor any employee of such insured shall knowingly receive or accept,
directly or indirectly, any such rebate, discount, abatement, or reduction of
premium, or any special favor or advantage or valuable consideration or
inducement. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as prohibiting the
payment of commissions or other compensation to regularly appointed and
licensed agents, and to brokers duly licensed by this State; nor as prohibit-
ing any participating insurer from distributing to its policyholders dividends,
savings or the unused or unabsorbed portion of premiums and premium
deposits."
(c) Necessary Exceptions.
In the absence of a statutory rating law, the anti-discrimination and anti-
rebate statutes must contain specific exceptions to enable the insurer affected
to operate efficiently. Uniform exceptions cannot be set forth in the statutes
because different classes of insurance require different exceptions. In the
case of life insurance, the following statute prohibits discrimination and re-
bates and contains typical exceptions for life insurance companies
:
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"No life insurance company doing business in this state shall make or per-
mit any distinction or discrimination in favor of individuals between in-
surants of the same class and equal expectation of life in the amount or
payment of premiums or rates charged for policies of insurance, or in the
dividends or other benefits payable thereon, or in any other of the terms and
conditions of the contracts it makes ; nor, except as otherwise expressly pro-
vided by law, shall any such company or any agent thereof make any con-
tract of insurance or agreement as to such contract, other than as plainly
expressed in the policy issued thereon ; nor shall any company or agent pay
or allow, or offer to pay or allow, as inducement to insurance, any rebate of
premium payable on the policy, or any special favor or advantage in the divi-
dends or other benefits thereon, or any valuable consideration or inducement
not specified in the policy contract of insurance; or give or sell or purchase
or .offer to give, sell or purchase, as inducement to insurance or in connec-
tion therewith, any stocks, bonds or other securities of any insurance com-
pany or other corporation, association or partnership, or any dividends or
profits accrued thereon, or anything of value whatsoever not specified in the
policy.
No person shall receive or accept from any company or agent, sub-agent,
broker or any other person any such rebate or premium payable on the
policy, or any special favor or advantage in the dividend or other benefits to
accrue thereon, or any valuable consideration or inducement not specified in
the policy of insurance.
Nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prohibit any company
issuing non-participating life insurance from paying bonuses to policy-
holders, or otherwise abating their premiums in whole or in part out of sur-
plus accumulated from non-participating insurance, nor to prohibit any com-
pany transacting industrial insurance from returning to policyholders who
have made premium payments for a period of at least one year directly to
the company at its home or district offices, a percentage of the premium
which the company would have paid for the collection of such premiums
;
nor shall anything in this section be construed as prohibiting the delivery of
any group life insurance policy in this state which provides for the readjust-
ment of the rate of premium based on the claim and expense experience
thereunder, at the end of the first year or of any subsequent year of insur-
ance thereunder, provided such readjustment is made retroactive only for
such policy year."
Sections 182 to 184, inclusive, of General Laws, chapter 175, pertain to re-
bating.
The complete report of this committee on the Robinson-Patman Act is con-
tained in the files of the special legislative commission.
Since the meeting of the Commissioner's committee it appears that there is an
increasing volume of opinion supporting the idea that a "baby federal trade com-
mission act", in general paralleling the language of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, should receive consideration if unfair practices are to be adequately
regulated at the state level in a manner which will avoid possible conflict between
the state and the federal government.
We are attaching hereto alternative legislative proposals for the purpose of
regulating most effectively unfair methods of competition and unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices at a state level. In our judgment the choice lies between
Exhibit D and the Green bill. We anticipate that previous to the hearings of
these bills we shall have reached a definite conclusion as to which of the pro-
posals will best serve the purpose.
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PROPOSED LEGISLATION.
Exhibit D.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Forty-Seven.
An Act relative to unfair practices in the business of insurance.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General
Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:
Section \. Purpose. — The purpose of this act is to regulate the trade
practices in the business of insurance, in accordance with the intent of Con-
gress as expressed in PubUc Law 15-— 79th Congress, by defining, or pro-
viding for the determination of, all acts, methods and practices which consti-
tute unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts and prac-
tices in this state, and to prohibit the same.
Section 2. Unfair Methods and Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices
prohibited. — No person-"^ engaged in the business of insurance shall engage
in this state in unfair methods of competition or in unfair or deceptive acts
and practices in the conduct of such business.
Section 3. Methods, Acts and Practices zvhich are defined herein as Un-
fair or Deceptive.— The following are declared to be unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the business of
insurance :
—
(a) Misrepresentations and False Advertising of Policy Contracts. — No
person engaged in the business of insurance in this state shall make, issue
or circulate, or cause to be made, issued or circulated, any estimate, illus-
tration, circular or statement of any sort misrepresenting the terms of any
policy issued or to be issued, or the benefits or advantages promised thereby,
or the dividends or share of the surplus to be received thereon, or shall use
any name or title of any policy or class of policies misrepresenting the true
nature thereof. Nor shall any such person make any misrepresentation to
any person insured in any company for the purpose of inducing or tending
to induce a policyholder in any company to lapse, forfeit or surrender his
insurance.
(6) False Information and Advertising Generally. — No person engaged
in the business of insurance in this state shall make, publish, disseminate,
circulate or place before the public, or cause, directly or indirectly, to be
made, published, disseminated, circulated or placed before the public, in a
newspaper or other publication, or in the form of a notice, circular, pam-
phlet, letter or poster, or over any radio station, or in any other way, an
advertisement, announcement or statement of any sort containing any asser-
tion, representation or statement with respect to the business of insurance or
with respect to any person in the conduct of his insurance business, which
is untrue, deceptive or misleading.
(c) Defamation. — No person engaged in the business of insurance in
this state shall make, publish, disseminate or circulate, directly or indirectly,
1 The word person, whenever used in this act, shall include individuals, corporations, associations,
partnerships, reciprocal exchanges, inter-insurers, Lloyds insurers, fraternal benefit societies, and any
other legal entity engaged in the business of insurance.
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or aid, abet or encourage the making, publishing, disseminating or circu-
lating of any oral or written statement, or any pamphlet, circular, article or
literature which is false or maliciously critical and which is calculated to
injure any other such person.
{d) Boycott, Coercion and Intimidation. — No person engaged in the
business of insurance in this state shall enter into any agreement to commit,
or by any concerted action commit, any act of boycott, coercion or intimi-
dation resulting or tending to result in unreasonable restraint of, or a mo-
nopoly in, trade or commerce.
{e) False Financial Statements. — No person engaged in the business of
insurance in this state shall file with any supervisory or other public official,
or shall make, publish, disseminate, circulate or deliver to any person, or
place before the public, or cause directly or indirectly, to be made, published,
disseminated, circulated, delivered to any person, or placed before the public,
any financial statement of an insurer which does not accurately state its
true financial condition.
(/) Stock Operations and Advisory Board Contracts. — No insurance
company doing business in this state shall issue, nor permit its agents, offi-
cers or employees to issue or deliver, agency company stock or other capital
stock, or benefit certificates or shares in any common-law corporation, or
securities or any special or advisory board or other contracts of any kind
promising returns and profits as an inducement to insurance; and no corpo-
ration or stock company acting as agent of an insurance company nor any
of its agents, officers or employees, shall be permitted to sell, agree or offer
to sell, or give or offer to give, directly or indirectly, in any manner what-
soever, any share of stock securities, bonds or agreement of any form or
nature promising returns and profits as an inducement to insurance or in
connection therewith.
(g) Discrimination. — No life insurance company doing business in this
state shall make or permit any distinction or discrimination in favor of indi-
viduals between those of the same class and equal expectation of life in the
rates charged for contracts of insurance or of life annuity or in the divi-
dends or other benefits payable thereon, or in any other of the terms and
conditions of the contracts it makes, nor shall it discriminate unfairly be-
tween other risks involving essentially the same hazards and expense ele-
ments or between risks in the application of like rates and credits.
(h) Rebates. — (1) Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no
life insurance company or its agent shall make any contract of insurance or
agreement as to such contract, other than as plainly expressed in the policy
issued thereon ; nor shall any such company or agent pay or allow, or offer
to pay or allow, as inducement to insurance, any rebate of premiums payable
on the policy, or any special favor or advantage in the dividends or other
benefits thereon, or any valuable consideration or inducement not specified
in the policy contract of insurance ; or give or sell or purchase or offer to
give, sell or purchase as inducement to insurance or in connection therewith,
any stocks, bonds or other securities of any insurance company or other
corporation, association or partnership, or any dividends or profits accrued
thereon, or anything of value whatsoever not specified in the policy.
(2) Nothing in this or the preceding subsection shall be so construed as
to prohibit any company issuing non-participating life insurance from pay-
ing bonuses to policyholders or otherwise abating their premiums in whole
or in part out of surplus accumulated from non-participating insurance ; nor
to prohibit any company transacting industrial insurance from returning to
policyholders who have made premium payments for a period of at least one
year directly to the company at its home or district offices a percentage of
the premium which the company would have paid for the collection of such
premiums; nor to prohibit the readjustment of the rate of premium for a
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group life insurance policy based on the loss or expense experience there-
under, at the end of the first year or of any subsequent year of insurance
thereunder, such readjustment to be made retroactive only for such policy
year.
(i) Any violation of any one of sections is also hereby declared to
be an unfair method of competition and an unfair or deceptive act and prac-
tice in the business of insurance.^
(/) The enumeration in this act of specific unfair methods of competition
and unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the business of insurance is not
exclusive or restrictive or intended to limit the powers of the [commis-
sioner] or any court of review under the provisions of section four of
this act.
Note. — Each state may add such additional definitive acts as may be con-
sidered necessary or desirable.
Section 4. Other Unfair Competition, Acts and Practices. — (a) If the
[commissioner] shall have reason to believe that any person engaged in the
business of insurance is engaging in this state in any method of competition
or in an act or practice in the conduct of such business, other than those
enumerated in subdivisons (a) to (i) , inclusive, of section three, and that
such method is an unfair method of competition, or that such act or practice
is unfair or deceptive, or if he shall have reason to believe that any such
person is engaging in this state in an}^ method of competition or in any act
or practice enumerated in section three, and that a proceeding by him in
respect thereof would be to the interest of the public, he may issue and serve
upon such person a statement of the charges and a notice of a hearing
thereon to be held at a time and place fixed in the notice which shall not be
less than days from the date of service thereof. The person so com-
plained of shall have the right to appear at the place and time so fixed and
show cause why an order should not be entered by the [commissioner] re-
quiring such person to cease and desist from the violation of the law charged
in the complaint.
If after such hearing the [commissioner] shall be of the opinion that the
method of competition or the act or practice in question is prohibited by this
act, he shall reduce his findings to writing and shall issue and cause to be
served on the person charged with the violation of law an order requiring
such person to cease and desist from such method, act or practice. Until the
expiration of the time allowed for filing a [notice of appeal] [petition for
writ of certiorari], if no such [notice of appeal] [petition for such writ] has
been duly filed within such time, or if a [notice of appeal] [petition for such
writ] has been filed within such time, then until the transcript of the record
in the proceeding has been filed in the court, as hereinafter pro-
vided, the [commissioner] may at any time, upon such notice and in such
manner as he shall deem proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part,
any report or any order made or issued by him under this section. After
the expiration of the time allowed for filing a [notice of appeal] [petition
for writ of certiorari], if no such [notice of appeal] [petition for such writ]
has been duly filed within such time, the [commissioner] may at any time,
after notice and opportunity for hearing, reopen and alter, modify or set
aside, in whole or in part, any report or order made or issued by him under
this section, whenever in his opinion conditions of fact or of law have so
changed as to require such action, or if the public interest shall so require.
(b) Any order of the [commissioner] directing any person to cease and
desist from using any method of competition or act or practice shall be sub-
1 Insert section numbers of any other sections of the insurance law which it is deemed desirable or
necessary to include as an unfair trade practice.
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ject to review [here insert language describing scope of review] by [appeal]
[writ of certiorari] to [the court] of count\\-'^ The court
shall determine whether the filing of the [appeal] [petition for such writ]
shall operate as a stay of such order of the [commissioner]. The court may,
in disposing of the issue before it, modify, affirm or reverse the order of the
[commissioner] in whole or in part. To the extent that the order of the
[commissioner] is affirmed or modified, the court shall issue its own order
commanding obedience to the terms of the order of the [commissioner].
(c) Xo order of the [commissioner] or judgment of the court to enforce
the same shall in any wise relieve or absolve an\- person from anj' liability
under any other laws of this state.
(d) An order of the [commissioner] to cease and desist shall become
final—
1. Upon the expiriation of the time allowed for filing a [notice of appeal]
[petition for writ of certiorari], if no such [notice of appeal] [petition for
such writ] has been duly filed within such time.
2. Upon a final decision of the court if a judicial review has been sought
of the order of the [commissioner].
(e) If the report of the [commissioner] does not charge a violation of
this act, then any party to the proceeding, including any intervenor, may
within days after the service of such report cause a like petition to
be filed in the court of county for a review of the report
of the [commissioner]-.
Section 5. Power of ICommissionerl. — The [commissioner] shall have
power to examine and investigate into the affairs of every person engaged
in the business of insurance in order to determine whether such person has
been or is engaged in any unfair method of competition or in any unfair act
or practice.
Section 6. Hearing, Witnesses, Production of Books. — At the time and
place fixed for the hearing before the [commissioner], such person shall
have an opportunity- to be heard. The [commissioner] upon such hearing
may administer oaths, examine and cross-examine witnesses, receive oral
and documentary evidence, and shall have the power to subpoena witnesses,
compel their attendance, and require the production of books, papers,
records, correspondence or other documents which he deems relevant to the
inquiry. The [commissioner] upon such hearing may, and upon the request
of any part}- shall, cause to be made a written record of all the evidence
offered or introduced and proceedings had at such hearing.
Nothing in this act contained shall require the observance at any hearing
of formal rules of pleading or evidence.
Section 7. Appearances.— Upon good cause vested in the [commis-
sioner] by this act shall be in intervene, appear and be heard at such hearing.
Section 8. Procedure Additional. — The powers vested in the [commis-
sioner] b}- this act, shall be in addition to any other powers to enforce any
penalties, fines or forfeitures authorized by law with respect to the methods,
acts and practices hereby declared to be unfair or deceptive.
Section 9. Penalty.— Any person who violates an order of the [com-
missioner] to cease and desist after it has become final, and while such order
is in effect, shall forfeit and pay to the state of a civil penalt\- of not
1 The countj' in which the seat of government is located. If time within which appeal must be
taken should be limited, insert such provision.
2 Set forth judicial review statutes and procedures in each state.
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more than five thousand dollars for each violation, which may be recovered
in a civil action.
Section 10. Punishment for Failure to Obey Subpoena. — In case of re-
fusal of any person to comply with any subpoena issued hereunder, or to
testify to any matter to which he may be lawfully interrogated, the
court of any countv- on application of the [commissioner] may issue an order
requiring such person to comply with such subpoena and to testify; and any
failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by the court as a
contempt thereof.
Section 11. Constitutionality.— If any section, sub-section, subdivision,
paragraph, sentence or clause of this act is held invalid or unconstitutional,
such decision shall not affect the remaining portions of this act.
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THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Forty-Seven.
An Act relative to unfair islethods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance.^
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General
Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follozvs:
Section 1. Unfair methods of competition in the business of insurance,^
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in that business, are hereby declared
unlawful. The [commissioner of insurance], hereinafter referred to as
[commissioner], is hereby empowered and directed to prevent insurers, and
all persons^ acting for them or on their behalf, from using unfair methods
of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of
insurance, as provided in this act.
Section 2. The [commissioner] shall from time to time make such rules
and regulations as are necessary for the carrying out of the provisions of
this act, which rules and regulations he may amend,, modify or annul. In
such rules and regulations he shall enumerate the acts which he finds con-
stitute unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive practices in the
business of insurance. Except as provided in section three of this act, no
such rules and regulations or any amendment or modification thereof shall
become effective until the [commissioner] shall have held a public hearing
thereon following the giving, at least thirty days prior to said hearing, of
notice of the intention to hold such hearing, by United States mail, to each
insurer licensed in this state who will be affected by the proposed rules or
regulations and by publication once in each week for three successive weeks
during said thirty days in a newspaper published at the state capitol. After
each such hearing he shall make his decision in writing, determining what,
if any, acts set out in the proposed rules and regulations he finds constitute
unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
the business of insurance, and make and file in his ofifice final rules and regu-
lations accordingly, of which he shall give immediate notice by mail to all
persons who were given written notice of the hearing. The rules and regu-
lations shall become effective thirty days after they are filed. Any insurer,
or person acting for or on behalf of an insurer, aggrieved by any rule or
regulation made by the [commissioner] may have the part of the decision
of the [commissioner] relating to such rule or regulation reviewed by
[appeal] [writ of certiorari] to [the court].* The [notice of appeal]
[petition for writ of certiorari] must be filed within thirty days after the
filing of the rules and regulations, and may be brought on for hearing by
the [commissioner] or the [appellant] [petitioner] on days' notice.
The court shall determine whether the filing of the [notice of appeal] [peti-
1 This proposed act follows as closely as practicable section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 52 Stat. Ill, c. 49, IS U. S. C. A., § 45, 4 F. C. A. Tit. 15, § 45. For recent decisions under
this act see Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, decided March 25, 1946; Federal Trade
Commission v. A. P. W. Paper Co. Inc., decided May 6, 1945; Ford Motor Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 120 F. 2d 175, cert. den. 314 U. S. 668; Pep Boys — Manney, Moe & Jack v. Federal
Trade Commission, 122 F. 2d 158; Scientific Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 124 F. 2d 640.
The Federal Trade Commission Act is not intended to exclude state control over the unfair practices
of a concern that is essentially local in its operation, merely because some of its transactions consid-
ered separately constitute interstate commerce. Ritholz at al. v. Ammon, 240 Wis. 578, 4 N. W. 2d
173. Principles relied on in last cited case reaffirmed in Southern Pacific v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761.
2 It is assumed that "insurer" is defined in some other section of the statutes.
3 It is assumed that the word "persons" is defined elsewhere in the statutes to include corporations,
associations, partnerships, etc.
4 Consideration should be given to the practice and procedure in each state.
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tion for such writ] shall operate as a stay of the rule or regulation, or por-
tion thereof, sought to be reviewed. The court may, in disposing of the
issue before it, modify, affirm or reverse the decision of the [commissioner]
complained of, in whole or in part, and the [commissioner] shall conform
his rules and regulations to the decision of the court. Except as provided
in section three of this act, no proceeding shall be taken by the [commis-
sioner] to prevent any unfair method of competition or any unfair or decep-
tive practice in the business of insurance unless such act is enumerated in a
rule or regulation adopted as provided in this section, and, after judicial
review thereof, if the operation of the rule or regulation as to that method
of competition or act or practice has been stayed during such review.
Section 3. Whenever it shall appear to the [commissioner] that any
insurer, or any person acting for or on behalf of an insurer, has been or is
using an unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice
in the business of insurance, and that an emergency exists requiring imme-
diate action in order that the public may not be defrauded, the [commis-
sioner] may proceed as hereinafter in this act provided without having first
adopted a rule or regulation enumerating the unlawful method, act or prac-
tice by which, in his opinion, the public will be defrauded. In any such case,
before proceeding the [commissioner] shall file in his office a declaration of
the emergency requiring immediate action, with his reasons for such declara-
tion, copies of which shall be sent by registered mail to all persons claimed
by the [commissioner] to be using the unlawful method, act or practice.
Section 4. The [commissioner] shall have power to examine and investi-
gate into the affairs of every insurer and every person acting for or on be-
half of an insurer, in order to determine whether such insurer or other per-
son has been or is engaged in any of the methods, acts or practices pro-
hibited by this act.
Section 5. Whenever the [commissioner] shall have reason to believe
that any insurer, or any person acting for or on behalf of an insurer, has
been or is using any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive
act or practice in the business of insurance which has been enumerated in an
effective rule or regulation adopted as provided in section two of this act,
and it shall appear to him that a proceeding by him in respect thereof would
be to the interest of the public, he shall issue and serve upon such insurer
or other person a complaint stating his charges in that respect and contain-
ing a notice of a hearing thereon upon a day and at a place therein fixed,
at least thirty days after the service of said complaint. The insurer or other
person so complained of shall have the right to appear at the place and time
so fixed and show cause why an order should not be entered by the [commis-
sioner] requiring such insurer or other person to cease and desist from the
violation of the law charged in the complaint. Any person may make appli-
cation, and upon good cause shown may be allowed by the [commissioner],
to intervene and appear in said proceeding, by counsel or in person. The
[commissioner] upon such hearing may administer oaths, examine and
cross-examine witnesses, receive oral and documentary evidence, and shall
have power to subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, and require the
production of books, papers, records, correspondence, or other documents
which he deems relevant to the inquiry. In case of a refusal of any person
to comply with any subpoena issued hereunder, or to testify to any matter
concerning which he may be lawfully interrogated, the court of
any county, on application of the [commissioner] may issue an order re-
quiring such person to comply with such subpoena and to testify ; and any
failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by the court as a
contempt thereof. Nothing in this act contained shall require the observ-
ance at any such hearing of formal rules of pleading or evidence. The tes-
timony in any such proceeding shall be reduced to writing and filed in the
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office of the [commissioner]. If after such hearing the [commissioner] shall
be of the opinion that the method of competition or the act or practice in
question is prohibited by this act, he shall reduce his findings to writing and
shall issue and cause to be served on the insurer or other person charged
with the violation of law an order requiring such insurer or other person
to cease and desist from such methods, act or practice. Until the expiration
of the time allowed for filing a [notice of appeal] [petition for writ of certi-
orari], if not such [notice of appeal] [petition for such writ] has been duly
filed within such time, or if a [notice of appeal] [petition for such writ] has
been filed within such time, then until the transcript of the record in the
proceeding has been filed in the court, as hereinafter provided, the
[commissioner] may at any time, upon such notice and in such manner as
he shall deem proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any report
or any order made or issued by him under this section. After the expiration
of the time allowed for filing a [notice of appeal] [petition for writ of cer-
tiorari], if no such [notice of appeal] [petition for such writ] has been duly
filed within such time, the [commissioner] may at any time, after notice and
opportunity for hearing, reopen and alter, modify or set aside, in whole or
in part, any report or order made or issued by him under this section, when-
ever in his opinion conditions of fact or of law have so changed as to require
such action or if the public interest shall so require.
Section 6. Any order of the [commissioner] directing any insurer or
other person to cease and desist from using any method of competition or
act or practice shall be subject to review [here insert language describing
scope of review] by [appeal] [writ of certiorari] to [the court] of
county.^ The court shall determine whether the filing of the [ap-
peal] [petition for such writ] shall operate as a stay of such order of the
[commissioner]. The court may, in disposing of the issue before it, modify,
affirm or reverse the order of the [commissioner] in whole or in part. To
the extent that the order of the [commissioner] is affirmed or modified, the
court shall issue its own order commanding obedience to the terms of the
order of the [commissioner].
Section 7. No order of the [commissioner] or judgment of the court to
enforce the same shall in any wise relieve or absolve any insurer or person
acting for or on behalf of such insurer from any liability under any other
laws of this state.
Section 8. Complaints, orders and other processes of the [commissioner]
under thi» act may be served by any one duly authorized by the [commis-
sioner], either in the manner provided by law for service of process in civil
actions or by registering and mailing a copy thereof addressed to such in-
surer or other person at its or his residence or principal office or place of
business. The verified return by the person so serving said complaint,
order or other process, setting forth the manner of such service, shall be
proof of the same, and the return postcard receipt for such complaint, order
or other process registered and mailed as aforesaid shall be proof of the
service of the same.
Section 9. An order of the [commissioner] to cease and desist shall be-
come final—
1. Upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a [notice of appeal]
[petition for writ of certiorari], if no such [notice of appeal] [petition for
such writ] has been duly filed within such time.
2. Upon a final decision of the court if a judicial review has been sought
of the order of the [commissioner].
1 The county in which the seat of government is located. If time within which appeal must be
taken should be limited, insert such provision.
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Section 10. Any person who violates an order of the [commissioner] to
cease and desist after it has become final, and while such order is in effect,
shall forfeit and pay to the state of a civil penalty of not more
than five thousand dollars for each violation, which may be recovered in a
civil action.
Conclusion.
All of the above-mentioned matters should be given consideration by a special
commission similar to the Special Recess Commission which sat during the 1945
recess, and therefore—
1. We recommend the enactment of a Resolve containing provisions similar
to those in House Bill No. 50 of 1946, and in addition authority to study and
make recommendations relating to Non-Profit Hospital Corporations formed
under General Laws, chapter 176A, and also such part of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law (G. L., c 152) as pertains to the activities of the Insurance De-
partment.
2. Realizing the burdens carried by the Insurance Committee, and taking into
consideration the length of our legislative sessions, it may prove desirable to
have this work undertaken by a special commission appointed by the Governor,
with the Commissioner of Insurance serving as a member ex officio. As an
alternative to paragraph 1 we recommend the appointment of a special commis-
sion consisting of four members, one of whom shall be the Commissioner of In-
surance, ex officio, or a member of the Insurance Department staff designated by
him, and three other persons appointed by the Governor, one of whom shall be
an attorney at law familiar with the Massachusetts insurance laws relating to in-
surance and insurance companies, and one of whom shall be a purchaser of
insurance other than an insurance agent or broker or employee or officer of an
insurance company or agency of such company. A Resolve drafted to accomplish
this purpose is submitted herewith.
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DEPARTMENT FINANCES
Income, 1946
Life Insurance Companies' Valuation Tax $40,911.97
Agents' Licenses 104,414.75
Brokers' Licenses 90,405.00
Company Licenses 2,634.00
Adjusters' Licenses . 1,900.00
Certificate Fees 3,114.00
Charter Fees 240.00
Service of Process Fees : 196.00
Statement Fees 7,534.00
Advisers' Licenses 650.00
Re-Examination Fees — Agents 374.00
Re-Examination Fees — Brokers 528.00
Re-Examination Fees — Advisers 10.00
Reimbursement for Services 11,902.11
Reimbursement— Examination of Retirement Systems 27,380.69
Miscellaneous (Retaliatory Fees) 404.90
$292,599.42
During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1946, the Division of Insurance col-
lected fees amounting to $292,599.42 of which $90,405.00 was produced by
brokers' licenses, $104,414.75 by agents' licenses, $40,911.97 by the valuation of
life policies, $7,534.00 by annual statements and $49,333.70 from miscellaneous
sources.
The expenses amounted to $500,460.77.
Financial Statement Verified
(Under Requirements of C. 7, S 19 GL)
Date : January 28, 1948
By : Joseph A. Prenney
For the Comptroller (App. R.E.N.)
Approved for Publishing
:
Fred A. Moncewicz
Comptroller
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The item entitled, "Reimbursement for Services" is set forth in the following
statement
:
Reimbursement for Services
Income for Fiscal Year, July 1, 1945— June 30, 1946
Travel Services
Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd $277.30 $ —
Allstate Fire Insurance Co 107.61 51.33
American Aviation & General Ins. Co 60.26 40.00
Manufacturers' Casualty Ins. Co.
Manufacturers' Fire Ins. Co
168.33 200.00
National Surety Marine Ins. Co 94.57 120.64
Interstate Insurance Co 101.18 150.00
United National Indemnity Co 14.91 10.33
Surety Fire Insurance Co 37.35 32.90
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co 731.42 —
United Mutual Fire Ins. Co 197.16 —
Knights of Columbus 811.77 1,078.17
Planet Insurance Co 148.47 66.32
Cuna Mutual Ins. Society 630.24 491.28
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co 621.08 —
Emmco Casualty Co. j
Emmco Fire Ins. Co. J
1,675.50 82.94
Hardware Indemnity Ins. Co 255.15 300.00
American Mutual Reinsurance Co 116.37 120.00
Continental Assurance Co 52.38 45.00
Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co 640.51 1,400.00
Old Republic Credit Life Ins. Co 285.64 315.00
$7,027.20 $4,503.91
Total Travel Reimbursement $7,027.20
Total Services Reimbursement 4,503.91
$11,531.11
New Zealand Insurance Company
Christiania General
National Re-insurance Corporation
Reinsurance Corporation of New York
Skandinavia Insurance Company
Colonial Assurance Company
International Insurance Company
Eagle Fire Insurance Company
Metropolitan Fire Reassurance Company
Northeastern Insurance Company
American Home Fire Insurance Company
Farmers Alliance
Oregon Mutual Fire Insurance Company
Hudson Insurance Company
Skandia Insurance Company
Prudential Insurance Co. of Great Britain
South Carolina Insurance Company
Western Millers Mutual Fire
Insurance Agents Council A. F. of L.
Aud
Aud
Aud
Aud
Aud
Aud
Aud
Aud
Aud
Aud
Aud
Aud
Aud
Aud
Aud
Aud
Aud
Aud
ting
ting
ting
ting
ting
ting
ting
ting
ting
ting
ting
ting
ting
ting
ting
ting
ting
ting
Copying Lists
Agents
Statement
Statement
Statement
Statement
Statement
Statement
Statement
Statement
Statement
Statement
Statement
Statement
Statement
Statement
Statement
Statement
Statement
Statement
of
20.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
11.00
$11,902.11
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APPENDIX "A"
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
No. 274.—October Term, 1945.
F. O. Robertson, Appellant, "^
[ Appeal from the Superior Court of
vs. /Ventura County, State of California.
The People of the State of California
[June 3, 1946.]
Mr. Justice Rutledge delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case differs from Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, No. 707, decided
this day, in three respects. It is a criminal cause ; the statutes involved regulate,
rather than simply tax, the business of insurance ; and appellant's acts held to vio-
late them were done before the McCarran Act's^ effective date.
Appellant vi^as convicted in a state court for violating §§ 703(a) and 1642 of
the California Insurance Code and the conviction was sustained on appeal to the
Superior Court of Ventura County.^ Appellant now urges here primarily that
the application which has been made of those sections is a regulation of interstate
commerce forbidden by the commerce clause of the Constitution, Article I, § 8,
in view of United States v. South-Eastern Underzvriters Ass'n, 322 U. S. 533.
He also puts forward due process and equal protection arguments, resting on his
conception of the applicability of those provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.^
The California Insurance Code provisions are as follows
:
"703. Except when performed by a surplus line broker, the following acts
are misdemeanors when done in this State
:
"(a) Acting as agent for a nonadmitted insurer in the transaction of in-
surance business in this State."
"1642. A person shall not act as an insurance agent, broker or solicitor
until a license is obtained from the Commissioner, authorizing such person
so to act."*
The complaint charged in two counts that appellant had (1) acted without a
license as an agent for a nonadmitted insurer in soliciting and selling a policy
contrary to § 703(a), and (2) solicited and sold a policy of insurance without
being licensed as required by § 1642.
The evidence, which is undisputed, disclosed the following facts. The First
National Benefit Society is an Arizona corporation, conducting from Phoenix a
mutual benefit type of insurance business. Its method of operation must be in-
ferred from the facts of record, in the absence of other evidence. One O'Lein,
1 Public Law IS, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., c. 20, approved March 9, 1945; 15 U. S. C. §§ 1101-1115.
See text infra, following note 32.
2 The conviction was obtained in the Justice's Court of Ventura Township, California. The Su-
perior Court of Ventura County was the highest court of the state to which appeal could be taken.
Its opinion is not reported. The penalty was a fine of $100 imposed for violating each count.
3 In the Statement of Appeal filed in the Superior Court the grounds relied upon, apart from com-
merce clause and local law objections, were only that appellant's acts "were, if true, done by him in
accordance with the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
. .
." and that §§ 703(a) and 1642 "are unconstitutional and in violation of . . . the Fourteenth
Amendment.
. .
."
4 Deering's California Codes, Insurance Code of California, §§ 703, 1642. These sections are part
of California's comprehensive regulatory scheme for the business of insurance; and are directly re-
lated, in the case of § 703, to the requirements laid by other sections for acting as surplus line broker,
see text infra; and in that of § 1642 to such requirements for securing a license to act in the speci-
fied representative capacities, see text tnfra.
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then an elderly resident of Ventura, California, had difficulty in securing insurance
on account of his age. Prior to August 28, 1944, he had learned of the Society's
"Gold Seal" policy, by radio and through "literature." This apparently was
mailed from the home office and included a printed form of return postal card
marked, presumably pursuant to postal permit, "Postage will be Paid by Ad-
dressee," the Society. O'Lein filled in and returned the card to the Society in
Phoenix, asking it to "send me, without obligation, details of 'GOLD SEAL'
POLICIES." A few days later, on August 28, 1944, appellant called at O'Lein's
home with the card, stating he represented the First National Benefit Society.
Thereupon he explained to O'Lein the terms of the policy, its benefits, and costs,
soliciting and persuading the prospect to take out a policy for himself and one
also for his wife. No medical examination was required. Appellant filled in the
application forms, procured the signatures, accepted from O'Lein a check made
out in appellant's name in payment of the first quarterly premiums, gave receipts,
later cashed the check at a local bank, and received the proceeds. A few days
later the O'Leins received policies by mail from the Society's office in Phoenix.
The evidence further showed that the Society was not admitted to do business
in California and that appellant had no license of any kind to act as an insurance
agent, broker or solicitor there.
We may deal first exclusively with the objections founded on the commerce
clause, since each of the others would be obviously without merit but for the sup-
posed effects of the South-Eastern decision® not only in relation to the prohibi-
tory consequences of that clause but also, apparently, to resurrect other limita-
tions upon state power long since settled adversely to such claims in reference to
the business of insurance.®
Little need be said in relation to the general license requirement of § 1642,
except to state more fully its effects by virtue of its relation to other provisions
of the California Insurance Code, which prescribe the conditions for securing the
license. Those requirements, in summary, are that an application must be made
upon a prescribed form setting forth the kinds of insurance the applicant desires
to transact (§ 1643) ; he must be a citizen of the United States or one who ha^
applied for citizenship; and must have attained his majority (§ 1648.5) ; he must
pass a written examination as to his qualifications (§ 1674) and pay two fees,
one a filing fee of $4, the other an examination fee of $5 (§ 1678). On his ful-
filling these conditions the license is issued if the state commissioner of insurance
is satisfied that he is qualified and intends in good faith to carry on the business
(§ 1649).
Section 1639 declares that the purpose of these and other provisions of the
Code is "to protect the public by requiring and maintaining professional stand-
ards on the part of all insurance agents acting as such within this State." The
statutory requirements apply to all agents, without discrimination, whether they
represent California or out-of-state insurance companies and whether the busi-
ness done is interstate or local in character. They apply only to agents acting in
California, not to acts done outside the state.
5 But see 322 U. S. 533, 547 ff.
6 Thus, it was long settled, under the doctrine of Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, that neither due
process nor equal protection of the laws forbids the kind of state regulation of the business of insur-
ance imposed by §§ 703(a) and 1642. Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648; Nutting v. Massachu-
setts, 183 U. S. 553. See also Hoopeston Co. v. Cullen, 318 U. S. 313, and text infra at note 32.
As to the dangers of blurring the due process and equal protection limitations with commerce clause
ideas, and the consequent necessity for separate treatment in disposing of these problems, see Ribble,
State and National Power over Commerce (1937) 98; Nippert v. Richmond, 66 S. Ct. 586, 589-580;
McLeod V. Dilworth, 322 U. S. 327, dissenting opinion at 357. Cf. also Bethlehem Motors Corp. v.
Flynt, 256 U. S. 421; Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional
Law (1918) 122; and see c. IX.
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Appellant has not sought to obtain a license under the Code provisions, has not
been denied one, and has not attacked any particular requirement. His charge
is wholesale, not particular. It is, in effect, that since the entire series of acts
done by him was directed to the conclusion of an interstate transaction, within
the South-Eastern ruling, those acts though taking place altogether within Cali-
fornia were inseparably a part of the interstate transaction and therefore beyond
reach of the state's licensing or regulatory power. The contention appears to
contemplate not only that appellant's acts were interstate commerce, but also that
the state cannot impose any licensing requirement upon them or, it would seem,
upon any phase of conducting an interstate insurance business through agents
acting in person.
To state the argument in this way is in effect to answer it. We accept the
regulation for what it purports to be on its face and by the statute's express
declaration, namely, a series of regulations designed and reasonably adapted to
protect the public from fraud, misrepresentation, incompetence and sharp practice
which falls short of minimum standards of decency in the selling of insurance by
personal solicitation and salesmanship. That such dangers may exist, may even
be widely prevalent in the absence of such controls, is a matter of common knowl-
edge and experience. And no argument is needed to show that these evils are
most apt to arise in connection with the activities of the less reliable and respon-
sible insurers, as well as insurance brokers or salesmen, and vitally affect the
public interest.'^
Such being the purpose and effect of § 1642, there can be no substantial ques-
tion concerning its validity on commerce clause grounds. That is true whether
appellant's acts are taken, in their setting, as being "in" commerce or only as
"affecting" it. For the case is ruled, so far as § 1642 is concerned, by decisions
such as California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 110; Hartford Indemnity Co. v.
Illinois, 298 U. S. 155; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465; Nashville, C. & St. L.
Ry. Co. V. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96 ; and Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322
U. S. 202.«
If, in the absence of contrary action by Congress, a state may license agents or
brokers for the sale of interstate transportation in order to prevent fraud, Cali-
fornia V. Thompson, supra; trainmen engaged in interstate commerce to secure
their competence, Smith v. Alabama, supra; Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v,
Alabama, supra; the sale on commission of interstate consignments of farm
produce to secure honest dealing and financial responsibility, Hartford Indemnity
Co. V. Illinois, supra; and the activities of customs brokers to secure responsi-
bility in the state courts on' claims arising locally. Union Brokerage Co. v.
Jensen, supra, by the sorts of conditions imposed through the respective licensing
provisions, there can be no valid reason for outlawing § 1642 here.
That appellant's activities were of a kind which vitally affect the welfare and
security of the local community, the state and their residents could not be denied.
Cf. Hoopeston Co. v. Cullen, 318 U. S. 313, 316 ff. They had in fact a highly
"special interest" in his localized pursuit of this phase of the comprehensive
process of conducting an interstate insurance business. Cf. Union Brokerage Co.
V. Jensen, supra, at 212. Here, as in each of the instances cited, appellant's activ-
ities called in question were concentrated in the regulating state, although affect-
7 See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Nelson, 291 U. S. 352, 360; German Alliance Ins.
Co. V. Lewis. 233 U. S. 381, 412-415; Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53, 65, 66; National Union Fire
Ins. Co. V. Wannberg, 260 U. S. 251, 257. And see also United States v. South-Eastern Under-
writers Ass'n, 322 U. S. 533, 539 ff. ; Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, No. 707, decided
this day.
8 In some of these cases, e.g., Hartford Indemnity Co. v. Illinois, 298 U. S. 155, and Union
Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U. S. 202, there were also federal licensing statutes which the Court
found neither inconsistent with nor, therefore, effective to exclude the state licensing regulation. The
Union Brokerage case involved an instance of state regulation of foreign commerce.
In addition to the cited authorities, see also the decisions cited and relied upon in each of the
opinions.
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ing or constituting interstate commerce. Moreover the licensing provision of
§ 1642 is regulatory, not exclusory in character ; is not discriminatory ; is not
in conflict with any policy or action of Congress but rather accords with its
expressed views in so far as the McCarran Act may be taken to be applicable;^
and is designed appropriately to secure the public from those evils of uncontrolled
insurance solicitation to which it is directed. In view of these facts the regu-
lation "neither discriminates against nor substantially obstructs the commerce."
California v. Thompson, supra, at 114.
Furthermore, here as in the cited cases, "unless some measure of local control
is permissible," the activities and their attendant evils "must go largely unregu-
lated," unless or until Congress undertakes that function. California v. Thomp-
son, supra, at 115. And in view of the well-known conditions of competition in
this field, such a result not only would free out-of-state insurance companies and
their representatives of the regulation's effect, thus giving them advantage over
local competitors, but by so doing would tend to break down the system of regu-
lation in its purely local operation.
11.
Section 703(a) is interwoven with different conditions and therefore has some-
what different effects than does § 1642. Unlike the latter, which applies to acting
as agent for all insurers, it forbids acting as agent for nonadmitted insurers
alone, unless the person so acting is a "surplus line broker. "^° To become a
surplus line broker one must procure a special license pursuant to the require-
ments of § 1765. This license also is issued upon application, if the commissioner
of insurance finds that the applicant is "trustworthy and competent to transact
an insurance brokerage business in such a manner as to safeguard the interest
of the insured." The applicant also must file with the commissioner a faithful
performance bond in the amount of $5000 and pay a filing fee of $50.
So far as concerns these requirements of § 1765 for procuring the surplus line
broker's license, if they are considered without reference to any of the other
Code provisions, the same conclusion is required concerning the validity of
§ 703(a) as for that of § 1642, by the authorities above cited and discussed. In-
deed the filing fee of $50 is larger than the combined fees required by § 1642,
out not more than the fee involved in the Union Brokerage case, supra. And the
bond provision is substantially identical with that sustained in California v.
Thompson, supra. In the absence of any showing that it is administered arbi-
trarily, the requirement that the license shall issue only after a finding of trust-
worthiness and competence by the commissioner cannot be taken to be other than
an appropriate means of safeguarding the public against the obvious evils arising
from the lack of those qualifications. California v. Thompson, supra. Consid-
ered separately from any relationship to other sections of the Code, therefore, the
prescribed conditions for securing the surplus line broker's license are no more
invalid than those which must be fulfilled to secure the general agent's license
under § 1642.^^
This the state contends is all that needs to be considered, since appellant neither
possessed nor, so far as appears, had applied for or been denied a surplus line
9 See text infra following note 32.
10 See note 14, as to "surplus line insurance." In general this is insurance involving special risks
or for some other reason not falling within the usual lines of authorized business.
11 Appellant also points out that by § 1775.S an annual tax equal to three per cent of the gross
premiums upon business done during each calendar year is imposed upon each surplus line broker.
Apart from the facts that appellant has not applied for such a license and that no effort has been
made to collect this tax from appellant, so far as appears, it may be noted that the tax applies alike
to all surplus line brokers, whether acting for domestic or admitted foreign insurers or for nonad-
mitted ones. No question as to the validity of this tax is presented by this record.
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broker's license. Consequently, in its view, the validity of other provisions of the
Code is not involved, either directly or by necessary relationship to § 703 (a) /^
III.
Appellant insists, however, that § 703(a) taken in conjunction with § 1765, is
more than a licensing requirement for regulating the qualifications of agents act-
ing in California in the transaction of the business covered by its terms. It is
ratherj he maintains, a prohibition of the writing of such insurance there by non-
admitted insurers and their agents. And this, he says, the state cannot do, both
because it cannot exclude interstate commerce in California and because it can-
not discriminate against out-of-state insurers in such a manner.
These conclusions are based on the view that § 703(a) is related inseparably
by its terms and in fact to other Code provisions in addition to § 1765, namely,
those regulating the admission of foreign insurance corporations to do business
in California^^ and the interwoven provisions regulating activities of surplus line
brokers.^* Section 703(a) on its face forbids acting as agent for nonadmitted
insurers, except in the case of a surplus line broker. And the combined effects
of the provisions relating to such brokers and of those governing the admission
of foreign corporations are said to be to "absolutely prohibit" the writing of or
aiding in procuring the type of insurance issued here or indeed of any insurance
issued by the Society.^^
12 Indeed the state argues that no question is raised concerning the validity of the requirements of
§ 176S for procuring the surplus line broker's license since, "so far as this record shows, the life in-
surance sought to be effected in this case might or might not have been procurable from admitted
insurers."
However, on the alternative basis of accepting appellant's view that the insurance would not have
been so obtainable, California concedes the insurance would fall within the surplus line exception, but
asserts that appellant, if he had obtained the license, could have acted as ageut in the transaction.
Hence, since he did not apply for the license, the state argues that § 1765 has not been applied to him
and its validity is not involved.
Appellant, however, maintains that even if he had secured the license, the combined effects of
§ 703(a) and other sections relating to surplus line insurance would have forbidden him to act in this
transaction. See text iiifra Part III. California maintains that the validity of other Code sections,
apart from §§ 703(a) and 1642, was not in issue in the state courts and, though raised here in the
briefs, is not necessarily involved.
13 See California Insurance Code §§ 1560-1607, 10818. Appellant relies particularly upon § 10818,
prohibiting the organization or admission of new insurers after January 1, 1940, to operate as so-
called "Chapter 9" companies, that is, among others, as mutual companies having less than the re-
serve requirements specified for such insurers operating on the assessment plan, but permitting pre-
viously organized or admitted companies to continue under specially imposed requirements. See text
infra at notes 16, 21.
Pertinent also is § 700 of the Code providing: "A person shall not transact any class of insurance
business in this State without first being admitted for such class," through securing a certificate of
authority from the commissioner on compliance with the code's requirements.
1* California Insurance Code, Chapter Six. Surplus Line Brokers. §§1760-1779.
Section 1761 reads: "Except as provided in Sections 1760 and 1760.5, a person within this State
shall not transact any insurance on property located . . . within, or on the lives or persons of resi-
dents of this State, with nonadmitted insurers, except by and through a surplus line broker licensed
under this chapter and upon the terms and conditions prescribed in this chapter."
Section 1760 provides: "Any citizen of this State may negotiate and effect insurance on his own
property with any nonadmitted insurer," cf. note 20, and § 1760.5 requires specified kinds of insur-
ance, e. g., marine and aircraft risks, to be placed with nonadmitted insurers only through a " 'special
lines' surplus line broker."
By § 1763 a surplus line broker "may solicit and place insurance, other than as excepted in section
1761, with nonadmitted insurers only if such insurance can not be procured from a majority of the
insurers admitted for the particular class or classes of insurance. Such part of the insurance as can
not be so procured may be procured from nonadmitted insurers," if it is not so placed to secure a
lower rate than the lowest any admitted insurer will accept. Stringent provisions for supervising the
section's requirements by the commissioner are included.
Other sections require maintaining an office in the state (§ 1767), keeping records and making re-
ports (§§1768, 1769, 1774), and provide criminal sanctions for violating the chapter's provisions, §1776.
See as to surplus line brokers, Patterson, The Insurance Commissioner in the United States (1927)
188-190.
15 The argument is not only various but somewhat devious. Appellant disclaims intention to main-
tain that the state cannot "regulate the insurance business" and goes on to rest on the general propo-
sition that it cannot prohibit interstate commerce entirely and that the effect of the statutory provi-
sions, particularly § 10818, see note 13 supra, is to do this. As will appear, the argument really
comes down to maintaining that California cannot require foreign companies or their agents to comply
with her minimum requirements for issuing the type of insurance issued here.
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California in effect concedes this, alternatively to maintaining that no question
concerning the validity of those provisions is presented. The short effect of the
admission provisions, for purposes now^ pertinent, the state admits, is to forbid
either foreign or domestic companies to do a life insurance business in California
other than on a legal reserve basis,^^ except as to companies engaged in doing
such business there prior to January 1, 1940.^'^ The policy underlying this ex-
clusion is said to be founded in the state's experience showing that a mutual com-
pany doing business "on the stipulated premium plan with right of assessment,-"^^
without a sufficient surplus and full reserves is not adequately safeguarded to
insure that money will be available to pa)^ death benefits." In support of this
statement of California's policy and the experience on which it is founded,
counsel point to the Annual Reports of the Insurance Commissioner covering a
period of some six years, from 1934 to 1940,^^^ which resulted in some of the
legislation now called in question. See also X Report of Joint Insurance Investi-
gation Committee (N. Y.) 364-365 (1906) ; Hoopesfon Co. v. Cullen, 318 U. S.
313, 321.
Furthermore, the state apparently concedes, as appellant contends, not only
that the Society is excluded from transacting insurance business by the admission
requirements and its failure to comply with them, but also that appellant would
be forbidden to place insurance with it by the provisions relating to surplus line
insurance, even if he had secured the surplus line broker's license.^"
As we understand it, therefore, appellant's argument in this phase comes in
substance to two things : ( 1 ) That the admission requirements and the surplus
line broker provisions, as they relate to nonadmitted insurers and their agents,
are invalid for discrimination against out-of-state insurers and in favor of do-
mestic ones; (2) that California, as a result of the South-Eastern decision, no
longer can require foreign insurance corporations seeking to do business there to
maintain minimum reserves for protection of policyholders in the state or compel
agents or brokers to refrain from representing them there notwithstanding such
noncompliance.
The discrimination argument is without substance in so far as it maintains
that the status permit domestic companies to operate without meeting these re-
quirements, but forbid out-of-state insurers to do likewise. For, as has been
noted,"-^ the conditions apply alike to domestic and foreign corporations, except-
ing only those organized or admitted to do business in California before January
1, 1940. As to them different standards are applicable, but they too apply equally
and alike to domestic and foreign insurers.'"
16 By § lOSlO of the Code, "An incorporated life insurer issuing policies on the reserve basis shall
not transact life insurance in this State unless it has a paid-in capital of at least two hundred thou-
sand dollars ($200,000)." Section 36 defines "paid-in capital" as including the surplus of a mutual
insurer. The effect of the two sections, it is conceded in the state's brief, "is to require that a stock
company have a capital stock aggregating at least $200,000 and that a mutual company have a surplus
of at least $200,000 in order to do business in California." Both requirements apply to domestic and
foreign companies alike, with the exceptions noted below in note 17.
17 The exception was the result of a series of amendments to the Code, made from 1935 to 1939,
designed gradually to restrict the operations in the state of companies operating without reserves, to
enable such companies already engaged in business to build up reserves, and to forbid the organiza-
tion or admission of new companies operating without them or with reserves below the minimum re-
quirement. See Calif. Stat. 1935, cc. 282, 283, pp. 1002, 657, 667, 678; Stat. 1937, c. 726, p. 2024;
Stat. 1939, c. 321, p. 1609. And see also the Annvial Reports of the Insurance Commissioner, State
of California, as follows: Sixty-sixth, 10-11; Sixty-eighth, XX; Sixty-ninth, XVII; Seventieth,
XVIII; Seventy-first, XXIX; Seventy-third, XVII, XXII-XXIII.
18 The policy issued in this case contained the following provision in small type on the reverse side
of the sheet: "The lawfully required portion of Premiums paid on this Certificate shall be set aside
into the Mortuary Fund. Premiums necessary to maintain the Certificate in force are not fixed
amounts and in event of Premium insufficiency may be adjusted, with the written approval of the
Corporation Commission, for the purpose of payment of claims and general operating expenses. In
the event of any emergency caused by excessive mortality the Corporation may, with the written con-
sent or at the direction of the Corporation Commission, levy Assessments on Members to be placed
in the Mortuary Fund."
19 See note 17.
^20 See § 1763, quoted in part in note 14, supra, and text infra at note 30. The type of insurance
issued here is not within the exceptions specified in § 1763, which in turn relate to ?§ 1760 and 1760.5.
The former, it is to be noted, relates on its face only to property insurance; the latter to various
special risks, not including mutual assessment insurance, which can be placed only by a " 'special
lines' surplus line broker." See note 14.
21 See note 13.
22 Ibid.
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That the state has seen fit to draw a lone as of that date between new com-
panies seeking to enter the field and established companies, differentiating the
two classes by different standards in the minimum reserve requirements, in order
to permit the latter to continue in business and build up reserves,-^ does not in-
volve any discrimination as between domestic and foreign or interstate and intra-
state insurers. For each may be authorized to enter, and each to continue, on
identical terms. Such a distinction does not become discriminatory, in any sense
now pertinent, merely because the preexisting companies are allowed to continue
their business under somewhat less burdensome reserve requirements than those
under which new companies are permitted to enter. See X Report of Joint In-
surance Investigation Committee (N. Y.) p. 365 (1906). Otherwise the state,
having authorized either domestic or foreign companies to engage in the busi-
ness, would be greatly restricted, perhaps foreclosed, in raising the reserve re-
quirements as experience and the public interest might make necessary.^*
Apart from this classification, which is clearly within the state's power, the
discrimiation argument becomes identical with the contention that the state can-
not exclude foreign companies, such as the First National Benefit Society, or
their agents, from carrying on their business in California for failure to meet her
reserve requirements.
This is the crucial contention. It too is without merit. The evils flowing
from irresponsible insurers and insurance certainly are not less than those arising
from the activities of irresponsible, incompetent or dishonest insurance agents.
The two things are concomitant, being merely different facades of the same
sepulchre for the investments and security of the public. Cf. Study of Legal
Reserve Life Insurance Companies, T. N. E. C. Monograph No. 28, Section XV.
It would be idle to require licensing of insurance agents, in order to secure
honesty and competence, yet to place no restraint upon the kind of insurance to
be sold or the kinds of companies allowed to sell it, and then to cover their rep-
resentatives with their immunity. This could only result in placing domestic and
complying foreign insurers at great disadvantage and eventually in nullifying
all controls unless or until Congress should take over the regulation.
No such consequence has followed from the South-Eastern decision. It did
not wipe out the experience of the states in the regulation of the business of in-
surance or its effects for the continued validity of that regulation. Much of this
was concerned with the activities of so-called foreign insurance companies and,
in particular, with requirements designed to secure minimum guaranties of sol-
vency and ability to pay claims as they mature. Essentially the protection sought
was against fly-by-night operators and the grosser forms of profiteering and
financial mismanagement all so common in unregulated insurance activity. See
generally Patterson, The Insurance Commissioner in the United States (1927).
It is true that California imposes her" reserve standards, for both domestic and
foreign insurers, by requiring them to secure a certificate of authority to do
business issued upon compliance with those conditions, in other words, by a form
of licensing. But we are far beyond the time when, if ever, the word "license"
per se was a condemnation of state regulation of interstate business done within
the state's borders."^ The commerce involved here is not transportation. Nor
is it of a sort which touches the state and its people so lightly that local regula-
tion is inappropriate or interferes unreasonably with the commerce of other
states."^ Not the mere fact or form of licensing, but what the license stands for
23 See the Reports of the Insurance Commissioner, cited in note 17.
24 Cf. Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, No. 769, decided April 22, 1946; Chicago & Alton R.
Co. V. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Nebraska ex- re!. Omaha, 170 U. S. 57.
23 See Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U. S. 202: Clark v. Paul Gray, 306 U. S. 583; Brad-
ley V. Public Utilities Commission, 289 U. S. 92; Hendrick f. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610; Clark v.
Poor, 274 U. S. 554; New Mexico ejc rel. McLean v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 203 U. S. 38.
26 Cf. Hale V. Bimco Trading Co., 306 U. S. 375; Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511; Hoopeston
Co. V. Cullen, 318 U. S. 313.
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by way of regulation is important." So also, it is not simply the fact of prohibi-
tion, but what is forbidden and for the protection of what interest, that is deter-
minative. For the commerce clause is not a guaranty of the right to import into
a state whatever one may please, absent a prohibition by Congress, regardless
of the effects of the importation upon the local community. That is true
whether what is brought in consists of diseased cattle-"^ or fraudulent or unsound
insurance.
Here California's reserve requirements for securing authority to do business
cannot be held, either on the face of the statute or by any showing that has been
made, to be excessive for the protection of the local interest affected ; or designed
or effective either to discriminate against foreign or interstate insurers or to for-
bid or exclude their activities, by all who are able and willing to maintain reason-
able minimum reserve standards for the protection of policyholders. Exclusion
there is, but it is exclusion of what the state has the power to keep out, until
Congress speaks otherwise. Every consideration which supports the licensing of
agents and brokers, and the authorities we have cited giving effect to those con-
siderations,^'' sustain the state's requirements in this respect, as do also the de-
cisions which have sustained various measures of exclusion in protection of the
public health, safety and security not only from physical harm but from various
forms of fraud and imposition.^"
It is quite obvious, to repeat only one of those considerations, that if appellant's
contentions were accepted and foreign insurers were to be held free to disregard
California's reserve requirements and then to clothe their agents or others acting
for them with their immunity, not only would the state be made helpless to pro-
tect her people against the grossest forms of unregulated or loosely regulated
foreign insurance, but the result would be inevitably to break down also the
system for control of purely local insurance business. In short, the result would
be ultimately to force all of the states to accept the lowest standard for conducting
the business permitted by one of them or, perhaps, by foreign countries. Inevi-
tably this would mean that Congress would be forced to intervene and displace
the states in regulating the business of insurance. Neither the commerce clause
nor the South-Eastern decision dictates such a result.
We do not intimate that this particular society's insurance is unsound or fraud-
ulent. As to that no showing has been made. We only say that California has
imposed its reserve requirements as allowable standards for securing minimum
assurance to the state's policyholders in respect to performance of their policies
by the insurer, not as a mere exclusionary measure in exercise of the power to
bar foreign corporations altogether ; and that in the absence of compliance the
state can exclude the company and its representatives as it did, until Congress
makes contrary command. Their remedy is not to destro)^ the regulatory reserve
conditions, but to comply with them.
It follows also that appellant's objections founded on the provisions relating
to the placing of surplus line insurance with nonadmitted insurers are without
merit. Apart from the phase relating to the requirements for obtaining the sur-
plus line broker's license, the objection is two-fold. One is that, even if licensed,
appellant would be forbidden to place the insurance with a nonadmitted insurer,
unless there were no admitted one with which the risk could be written. The
other, that in any event the risk could not be placed with the nonadmitted insurer
27 Cf. authorities cited in note 25.
28 See, as to state exclusions of and prohibitions on interstate commerce, Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181
U. S. 198; Smith v. St. Louis & S. W. R. Co., 181 U. S. 248; Compagnie Francaise v. State Board
of Health, 186 U. S. 380; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137; Oresjon-Washington R. R. & Navig. Co.
V. Washington, 270 U. S. 248; Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. S. 346; Crossman v. Lurman,, 192 U. S.
189; Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461; Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299. See also
Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217; M.-K.-T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613; Carter v. Virginia, 321
U. S. 131.
23 See Part I, text.
30 See note 28.
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for a less premium than would be accepted by any admitted insurer. The short
answer would seem to be that by the reserve requirements for admission and re-
lated prohibitions the state forbids entirely the placing of insurance of the sort
issued here whether with domestic, admitted or nonadmitted companies.^^
It remains to say a word concerning the effect of the McCarran Act for this
case and the contentions founded on the Fourteenth Amendment.
As for the latter, with respect to due process, the only objection advanced
which is independent of commerce clause considerations, is that to sustain the
state's requirements, particularly in so far as they exclude the Society from inter-
state operations in California and thus also appellant's activities in aid of its
business, will be in effect to project California's laws into other states, here pre-
sumably Arizona, and regulate the Society's activities there. The contention is
obviously without merit. Nothing which California requires touches or affects
anything the Society or appellant may do or wish to do in Arizona or elsewhere
than in California. Hoopeston Co. v. Cullen, supra.
Likewise the equal protection contention is wholly without substance.^^
Our determination has been made without specific reliance upon the McCarran
Act for two reasons. One is that this was not necessary. The other arises from
the facts that this is a criminal proceeding, the appellant's acts held to violate the
California statutes were committed in August following rendition of the South-
Eastern decision in June of 1944, and the McCarran Act was not approved until
March 9, 1945. The effect of that statute we have considered in the Prudential
case, decided today. But that case involved no criminal or penal phase and there-
fore no conceivable ex post facto eft'ect. It is doubtful that more than the sem-
blance of such an effect would be involved by reliance upon the Act in this case.
For it hardly could be maintained that the South-Eastern decision had the effect
to convert Congress' preexisting silence concerning a matter which prior to the
decision had been held not to be commerce into an expression by Congress of
disapproval of these provisions of the California Code during the short period
intervening between the decision and the date on which appellant acted. The '
indicated inference, if any, would be to the contrary, wholly without regard to
.
the McCarran Act. Its effect might reasonably be taken as merely declaring or
confirming expressly the inference which would be indicated from Congress'
silence entirely without reference to the Act's provisions. But the declaration
was made, as we have said, after appellant's acts were done. And to avoid any
semblance of retroactive effect in a criminal matter, we have refrained from ex-
plicit reliance upon the Act in this case. It does not detract from our decision
on other grounds that the McCarran Act, if applied, would dictate the same result.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court that the general license requirements which California
provides for the insurance agents were constitutional under the decisions of the
Court, even prior to the McCarran Act. But prior to that Act California could
not under our decisions under the commerce clause exclude an interstate busi-
ness, at least in absence of a showing that it was a fraudulent enterprise or in an
unsound condition. No such showing is made here. The McCarran Act changes
that rule ; but it should not be allowed to make unlawful what was lawful when
done.
31 See note 20 and text.
32 See note 6 and text infra.
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APPENDIX "B"
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
No. 707.—October Term, 1945.
The Prudential Insurance Company,
Appellant,
vs.
L. George Benjamin, as Insurance
Commissioner of the State of South
Carolina.
Appeal from the Supreme Court of the
State of South Carolina.
[June 3, 1946.]
Mr. Justice Rutledge delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case and Robertson v. California, No. 274, decided today, bring not un-
expected sequels to United States v. South-Eastern Underzvriters Ass'n, 322
U. S. 533. In cycle reminiscent conversely of views advanced there and in Paul
V. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, claims are put forward on the basis of the South-
Eastern decision to sustain immunity from state taxation and, in the Robertson
case, from state regulation of the business of insurance.
The specific effect asserted in this case is that South Carolina no longer can
collect taxes from Prudential, a New Jersey corporation, which for years prior
to 1945 the state had levied and the company had paid. The tax is laid on foreign
insurance companies and must be paid annually as a condition of receiving a
certificate of authority to carry on the business of insurance within the state.
The exaction amounts to three per cent of the aggregate of premiums received
from business done in South Carolina, without reference to its interstate or local
character.^ No similar tax is required of South Carolina corporations.^
Prudential insists that the tax discriminates against interstate commerce and
in favor of local business, since it is laid only on foreign corporations and is
measured by their gross receipts from premiums derived from business done in
the state, regardless of its interstate or local character. Accordingly it says the
tax cannot stand consistently with many decisions of this Court outlawing state
taxes which discriminate against interstate commerce.^ South Carolina denies
that the tax is discriminatory* or has been affected by the South-Eastern decision.
But in any event it maintains that the tax is valid, more particularly in view of
1 The statutes imposing the tax are §§ 7948 and 7949, South Carolina Code of 1942. Each section
in fact imposes a separate tax, the former of two per cent, the latter of one per cent, on gross pre-
mium returns "from the State," with provisions under § 7948 for reduction in the amount of the
tax scaled to specified investments in South Carolina securities or property. Both taxes are laid "in
addition to the annual license fees now provided by law," and are stated in terms to be required "as
an additional and graded license fee" (§ 7948) or as "a graduated license fee." § 7949. The two
taxes have been treated in combination, for purposes of this litigation, as being in effect a single tax
of three per cent.
2 Sections 7948 and 7949 expressly exempt South Carolina corporations from payment of the tax.
They however are subject to other taxes, which Prudential maintains have no bearing upon the issues,
other than possibly to demonstrate the discriminatory cliarf.cter and effects of the exaction in issue.
See note 36. These are chiefly taxes on real and personal property, incidence of which Prudential
largely escapes by the location of its property in other states.
3. Extending from Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, to Nippert v. Richmond, 326 U. S. — . See
the collection of authorities in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U. S. i3, 56, n. 11.
* In apparent reliance not only upon decisions rendered prior to the South-Eastern decision or made
without reference to its ruling, e.g., Lincoln National Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673; Bethlehem
Motors Corp. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421; but indeed also Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Hooper v.
California, 155 U. S. 648; and like authorities.
The state also maintains that Prudential's South Carolina business is not altogether interstate com-
merce but consists, in substantial part, of local transactions, the aggregate of which measures the tax,
for which view it relies upon such diverse decisions as McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U. S.
33; International Shoe Co. v. Shartel, 279 U. S. 429; Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue,
303 U. S. 250; and Polish National Alliance v. National Labor Relations Board, 322 U. S. 643. See
note 36 and text.
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the McCarran Act/ by which it is claimed Congress has consented to continu-
ance of this form of taxation and thus has removed any possible constitutional
objection which otherwise might exist. This Prudential asserts Congress has
not done and could not do.
The State Supreme Court has held the continued exaction of the tax not to be
in violation of the commerce clause or affected by the ruling made in the South-
Eastern case.— S. C.
—
; 35 S. E. 2d 586. That holding presents the principal
basis for this appeal.
I.
The versatility with which argument inverts state and national power, each in
alternation to ward off the other's incidence,^ is not simply a produce of protec-
tive self-interest. It is a recurring manifestation of the continuing necessity in
our federal system for accommodating the two great basic powers it comprehends.
For this Court's part, from Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, no phase of that
process has been more continuous or at times perplexing than reconciling the
paramount national authority over commerce, created by Article I, § 8 of the Con-
stitution, with appropriate exercise of the states' reserved powers touching the
same or related subject matter.''
The continuing adjustment has filled many of the great constitutional gaps of
Marshall's time and later. ^ But not all of the filling has been lasting. Great
emphases of national policy swinging between nation and states in historic con-
flicts have been reflected, variously and from time to time, in premise and there-
fore in conclusion of particular dispositions.^ In turn, their sum has shifted and
reshifted the general balance of authority, inevitably producing some anomaly
of logic and of result in the decisions.
No phase has had a more atj'pical history than regulation of the business of
insurance. This fact is important for the problems now presented. They have
origin in that history. Their solution cannot escape its influence. Moreover, in
law as in other phases of living, reconciliation of anomalous behavior, long con-
tinued, with more normal attitudes is not always easy, when the time for that
adjustment comes.
Essentially the problems these cases tender are of that character. It is not
necessary to renew the controversy presented in South-Eastern. Whether or not
that decision properly has been characterized as "precedent-smashing,"^° there
was a reorientation of attitudes toward federal power in its relation to the busi-
ness of insurance conducted across state lines. Necessarily this worked in two
directions. As the opinion was at pains to note, 322 U. S. 533, 545 ff., no decision
previously had held invalid an Act of Congress on the ground that such business
was beyond reach of its power, because previously no attempted exercise of that
authority had been brought here in litigation. But from Paid v. Virginia to
5 The pertinent portions of the Act are set forth in the text, Part III at note 37.
6 Cf . United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U. S. 533, at notes 9 and 23; but see also
note 33 for an early and highly authoritative but less mutually exclusive view of the possible alter-
natives.
7 Among the volumes which have been written, special reference may be made to Frankfurter, The
Commerce Clause (1937); Ribble, State and National Power over Commerce (1937); Gavit, The
Commerce Clause (1932); and see Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power (1940) 27 Va. L.
Rev. 1. For thoughtful comment since the South-Eastern decision, see Patterson, The Future of
State Supervision of Insurance (1944) 23 Tex. L. Rev. 18; Note, Congressional Consent to Discrim-
inatory State Legislation (1945) 55 Col. L. Rev. 927.
8 "Judges legislate interstitially and the interstices were great in Marshall's time." Ribble, State
and National Power over Commerce (1937) 47.
9 "Lines of demarcation are drawn largely according to the pull of the Court at one period towards
the interests of local self-government, and at another in the direction of a nation-wide rule." Frank-
furter, The Commerce Clause (1937) 97.
10 S. Rep. No. 1112, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 2.
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New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U. S. 495, negative impli-
cation from the commerce clause was held not to place any limitation upon state
power over the business, however conducted with reference to state lines. And
correlatively this was taken widely, although not universally, to nullify federal
authority until the question was squarely presented and answered otherwise in
the South-Eastern case.
Whether Paul v. Virginia represented in its day an accommodation with or a
departure from the preexisting evolution of commerce clause law and whether
its ruling, together with later ones adhering to it, remained consonant with the
subsequent general development of that law, may still be debated. But all may
concede that the Paul case created for the business of insurance a special, if not
a wholly unique, way of thinking and acting in the regulation of business done
across state lines. See Ribble, State and National Power over Commerce (1937)
89, 186-187. The aegis of federal commerce power continued to spread over and
enfold other business so conducted, in both general and specific legislative exer-
tions. Usually this was with judicial approval; and, despite notable instances
of initial hostility, the history of judicial limitation of congressional power over
commerce, when exercised affirmatively, has been more largely one of retreat
than of ultimate victory.^^ The plain words of the grant have made courts cau-
tious, except possibly in some of the instances noted, about nullifying positive
exertions of Congress' power over this broad and hard to define field. At the
same time, physical and economic change in the way commerce is carried on has
called forth a constantly increasing volume of legislation exercising that power. ^^
Concurrently with this general expansion, however, from Paul to South-
Eastern the states took over exclusively the function of regulating the insurance
business in its specific legislative manifestations. Congress legislated only in
terms applicable to commerce generally, without particularized reference to in-
surance. At the same time, on the rationalization that insurance was not com-
merce, yet was business affected with a vast public interest,^^ the states devel-
oped comprehensive regulatory and taxing systems. And litigation of their
validity came to be freed of commerce clause objections, at any rate from Deer
Lodge on to South-Eastern. Due process in its jurisdictional aspects remained
to confine the reach of state power in relation to business affecting other states.^*
But the negative implications of the commerce clause became irrelevant, as such,
for the valid exercise of state regulatory and taxing authority.
Meanwhile the business of insurance experienced a nation-wide expansion
graphically depicted not only in the facts of the situation presented in the South-
Eastern case but also in the operations of Prudential as described by its advo-
11 E. g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U. S.
100; compare United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 1S6 U. S. 1, with United States v. American To-
bacco Co., 221 U. S. 106; Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, with National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1. See also discussion in Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U. S. Ill, 118 ff.
See Ribble, State and National Power over Commerce (1937) 63, n. 39, for listing of the decisions
invalidating Acts of Congress prior to 1879, noting that Mr. Justice Miller was "but slightly in
error" in the statement, in Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 96, that one then might count "on his
fingers" those decisions.
12 Beginning in modern phase with enactment of Interstate Commerce Commission and Anti-Trust
legislation near the beginning of the present century. The catalogue is now too long to repeat here.
13 See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389, 414, 415; La Tourette v. McMaster,
248 U. S. 465, 467; National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U. S. 71, 74; cf. Osborn v. Oz-
lin, 310 U. S. 53, 65: "Government has always had a special relation to insurance." See also United
States V. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U. S. 533, dissenting opinion at 585.
14 See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U. S. 149;
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U. S. 426; St. Louis Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U. S.
346; Hoopeston Co. v. Allen, 318 U. S. 313; Powell, The Supreme Court and State Police Power,
1922-1930 (1932) 140 et seq.; also St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218,
with which compare Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional
Law (1918) c. V. Cf. Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, concurring opinion, 349,
at 353 ff. ; and see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. —
.
Part I xxcvii
cates in this cause.'^" These divergent facts, legal and economic, necessarily were
reflected in state legislation. States grappling with nation-wide, but nationally
unregulated, business inevitably exerted their powers to limits and in ways not
sought generally to be applied to other business held to be within the reach of
the commerce clause's implied prohibiton. Obvious and widespread examples are
furnished in broad and detailed licensing provisions, for the doing of business
within the states, and in connected or distinct taxing measures drawn in apparent
reliance upon freedom from commerce clause limitations/''
Now we are told many of these statutes no longer can stand. The process of
readjustment began affirmatively with South-Eastern. Since the commerce clause
is a two-edged instrument, the indicated next step, indeed the constitutionally re-
quired one, as the argument runs, is to apply its negatively cutting edge. Con-
ceptions so developed with reference to other commerce must now be extended
to the commerce of insurance in completion of the readjustment. This, it is con-
fidently asserted, will require striking down much of the state legislation enacted
and effective prior to the South-Eastern decision. Particularly will this be true
of all discriminatory state taxes, of which it is said South Carolina's is one.
Moreover, those results must follow regardless of the McCarran Act's provisions.
For by that Act, in Prudential's assessment. Congress neither intended to, nor
could, validate such taxes.
It is not surprising that the attack is thus broad. When a decision is conceived
as precedent-smashing, rightly or wrongly, the conception's invitation may be to
greater backtracking than is justified, in spite of warning to proceed with care.
322 U. S. 533, 547 ff.
Prudential's misconception relates not to the necessity for applying, but to the
nature and scope of the negative function of the commerce clause. It is not the
simple, clean-cutting tool supposed. Nor is its swath always correlative with
that cut by the affirmative edge, as seems to be assumed. For cleanly as the com-
merce clause has worked affirmatively on the whole, its implied negative oper-
ation on state power has been uneven, at times highly variable. More often than
not, in matters more governable by logic and less by experience, the business of
negative implication is slippery. Into what is thus left open for inference to fill,
divergent ideas of meaning may be read much more readily than into what has
been made explicit by affirmation. That possibility is broadened immeasurably
when not logic alone, but large choices of policy, affected in this instance by
evolving experience of federalism, control in giving content to the implied nega-
tion. In all our constitutional history this has become no more apparent than in
commerce clause dispositions.
That the clause imposes some restramt upon state power has never been
doubted. For otherwise the grant of power to Congress would be wholly ineffec-
tive. But the limitation not only is implied. It is open to different implications
of meaning. And this accounts largely for variations in this field continuing
15 According to Prudential's brief, it transacts business in all forty-eight states and on December
31, 1944, "had in force 33,933,077 policies, insuring approximately 22,900,000 persons, for a total
amount of $22,741,134,075; and 36,733 annuity contracts operative during tlie lives of approximately
300,000 persons and providing for an annual income of approximately $63,200,000 on such lives.
During the year 1944 the Appellant issued 2,412,150 policies, insuring the lives of approximately
2,170,000 persons, in the total amount of $2,668,714,022; and entered into 451 annuity contracts oper-
ative during the lives of approximately 600 persons and providing for an annual income of approxi-
mately $150,000 on such lives. During the year 1944 the Appellant collected as premiums on insur-
ance policies $681,052,095.07, and paid out as claims on policies $246,776,197.45; and it paid out
$13,690,781.93 on annuity contracts."
For South Carolina, the company "had in force 26,373 policies insuring the lives of approximately
20,000 persons resident in said State for a total amount of $30,827,184.00. During the year ending
December 31, 1944, 1,439 policies insuring the lives of approximately 1,000 persons resident in said
State for a total amount of $1,475,062.00 were issued, and $457,602.28 in claims were paid on policies
covering the lives of residents." The South Carolina premium tax for 1943 amounted to $18,496.87;
for 1944, $19,676.94. All other state or local taxes paid in 1944 amounted to $3,103.92, making a
total for the year for all taxes of $22,780.86.
16 322 U. S. 533, dissenting opinion at 590; see note 40, infra; cf. Robertson v. California, No.
274, decided today.
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almost from the beginning until now/'' They started with Marshall and Taney,
went forward from Waite to Fuller, and have been projected in later differences
perhaps less broad, but hardly less controversial.^* Consequently in its prohibi-
tive, as in its affirmative or enabling, effects the history of the commerce clause
has been one of very considerable judicial oscillation.
Moreover, the parallel encompasses the latest turn in the long-run trend. For,
concurrently with the broadening of the scope for permissible application of fed-
eral authority,^^ the tendency also has run toward sustaining state regulatory and
taxing measures formerly regarded as inconsonant with Congress' unexercised
power over commerce,^" and to doing so by a new, or renewed, emphasis on facts
and practical considerations rather than dogmatic logistic.^^ These facts are of
great importance for disposing of such controversies. For in effect they have
transferred the general problem of adjustment to a level more tolerant of both
state and federal legislative action.
II.
We are not required however to consider whether, on that level, the authorities
on which Prudential chiefly relies would require invalidation of South Carolina's
tax. For they are not in point.
As has been stated, they are the cases which from Weltoh v. Missouri, 91
U. S. 275, until now have outlawed state taxes found to discriminate against in-
terstate commerce." No one of them involved a situation like that now here. In
each the question of validity of the state taxing statute arose when Congress'
17 That the question was discussed but not settled in the Constitutional Convention itself, appears
from debate on September IS, 1787, two days before submision of the proposed Constitution to Con-
gress, a portion of which bears quotation
:
"Mr. McHenry & Mr. Carrol moved that 'no State shall be restrained from laying duties of ton-
nage for the purpose of clearing harbours and erecting light-houses.'
"Col. Mason in support of this explained and urged the situation of the Chesapeak which pe-
culiarly required expenses of this sort.
"Mr. Govr. Morris. The States are not restrained from laying tonnage as the Constitution now
Stands. The exception proposed will imply the Contrary, and will put the States in a worse condition
than the gentleman (Col. Mason) wishes.
"Mr. Madison. Whether the States are now restrained from laying tonnage duties depends on the
extent of the power 'to regulate commerce.' These terms are vague but seem to exclude this power
of the States. — They may certainly be restrained by Treaty. He observed that there were other ob-
jects for tonnage duties as the support of Seamen &c. He was more and more convinced that the
regulation of Commerce was in its nature indivisible and ought to be wholly under one authority.
"Mr. Sherman. The power of the U. States to regulate trade being supreme can control inter-
ferences of the State regulation [when] such interferences happen; so that there is no danger to be
apprehended from a concurrent jurisdiction.
"Mr. Langdon insisted that the regulation of tonnage was an essential part of the regulation of
trade, and that the States ought to have nothing to do with it. On motion 'that no State shall lay
any duty on tonnage without the Consent of Congress.'
"N. H. — ay. Mas. ay. Ct. divd. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N-C no. S-C ay.
Geo. no. [Ayes — 6; nos — 4; divided— 1.]" Farrand, Records of the Federal Constitutional Con-
vention of 1787 (1937), Vol. II, 625-626.
See Note, Congressional Consent to Discriminatory State Legislation (1945) 55 Col. L. Rev. 927,
946 ff., for a short summary of views expressed in the debates and later by members of the Conven-
tion. See also Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary
Comment (1941) 25 Minn. L. Rev. 432; Hamilton and Adair, The Power to Govern (1937).
18 "The categories of 'burdens' en interstate commerce, of state laws 'directly affecting' commerce,
etc., are natural concomitants of Marshall's doctrine. The theories as to the silence of Congress are
the outgrowth of Taney's. When diverse theories cohabit, the miscegenation may produce strange
progeny." Ribble, 204. For tracings of all but the latest of the various trends, see the summaries
cited in note 7; see also Bikle, The Silence of Congress (1927) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 200. More recent
diversities are discussed in Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 Va. L. Rev. 1, 8 ff.
See also e. g., the different views expressed in Nippert v. Richmond, 326 U. S. — ; Southern Pacific
Co. V. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761; McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327; Northwest Airlines v. Min-
nesota, 322 U. S. 292; and the opinions in Hooven & Allison_ Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652. And
compare American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459, with Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304
U. S. 307.
19 See note 11 and text.
20 Cf., e. g.. South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177; Western Live
Stock V. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U. S. 33; Nel-
son V. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U. S. 359; California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109; Duckworth v.
Arkansas, 314 U. S. 390; Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U. S. 202, 209 ff.
21 Cf. Nippert v. Richmond, 326 U. S. —, — . notes 9 and 23, and authorities cited.
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power lay dormant. In none had Congress acted or purported to act, either by
way of consenting- to the state's tax or otherwise. Those cases therefore pre-
sented no question of the vahdity of such a tax where Congress had taken affirm-
ative action consenting to it or purporting to give it validity. Nor, consequently,
could they stand as controlling precedents for such a case.
This would seem so obvious as hardly to require further comment, except for
the fact that Prudential has argued so earnestly to the contrary. Its position
puts the McCarran Act to one side, either as not intended to have effect toward
validating this sort of tax or, if construed otherwise, as constitutionally ineffec-
tive to do so. Those questions present the controlling issues in this case. But
before we turn to them it will be helpful to note the exact effects of Prudential's
argument.
Fundamentally it maintains that the commerce clause ''of its own force" and
without reference to any action by Congress, whether through its silence^^ or
otherwise, forbids discriminatory state taxation of interstate commerce. This is
to say, in effect, that neither Congress acting affirmatively nor Congress and the
states thus acting coordinately can validly impose any regulation which the
Court has found or would find to be forbidden by the commerce clause, if laid
only by state action taken while Congress' power lies dormant. In this view the
limits of state power to regulate commerce in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress are also the limits of Congress' permissible action in this respect,
whether' taken alone or in coordination with state legislation.
Merely to state the position in this way compels its rejection. So conceived.
Congress' power over commerce would be nullified to a very large extent.^* For
in all the variations of commerce clause theory it has never been the law that
what the states may do in the regulation of commerce. Congress being silent, is
the full measure of its power. Much less has this boundary been thought to con-
fine what Congress and the states acting together may accomplish. So to regard
the matter would invert the constitutional grant into a limitation upon the very
power it confers.
The commerce clause is in no sense a limitation upon the power of Congress
over interstate and foreign commerce. On the contrary, it is, as Marshall de-
clared in Gibbons v. Ogden, a grant to Congress of plenary and supreme author-
ity over those subjects. The only limitation it places upon Congress' power is
in respect to what constitutes commerce, including whatever rightly may be found
to affect it sufficiently to make Congressional regulation necessary or appro-
priate.-® This limitation, of course, is entirely distinct from the implied prohibi-
tion of the commerce clause. The one is concerned with defining commerce, with
fixing the outer boundary of the field over which the authority granted shall
govern. The other relates only to matters within the field of commerce, once this
is defined, including whatever may fall within the "affectation" doctrine. The
one limitation bounds the power of Congress. The other confines only the powers
of the states. And the two areas are not coextensive. The distinction is not
a
__^
22 See note 3, and compare: "... State laws are not invalid under the Commerce Clause unless
they actually discriminate against interstate commerce or conflict with a regulation enacted by Con-
gress." Gwin, White & Prince v. Henderson, 305 U. S. 434, dissenting opinion at 446.
".
. .
except for State acts designed to impose discriminatory burdens on interstate commerce be-
cause it is interstate — Congress alone must 'determine how far [interstate commerce]
. . . shall be
free and untrammeled, how far it shall be burdened by duties and imposts and how far it shall be
prohibited." Id. at 45S.
See also, for essentially the same position, Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, dissenting
opinion; Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, dissenting opinion at 795.
23 See note 18.
24 Thus, for instance, the limitations upon the length of trains imposed by the Arizona Train Limit
Law, and held to be in violation of the commerce clause in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325
U. S. 761, W'ould be beyond the power of Congress, perhaps also of Congress and the states acting
together, to impose; and on commerce clause grounds, thus nullifying the very power conferred in
order to regulate such matters. The argument is reminiscent of that of Mr. Justice McLean in the
second Wheeling Bridge case, cf. note 34.
25 Cf. note 11 and text.
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always clearly observed, for both questions may and indeed at times do arise in
the same case and in close relationship.-'^ But to blur them, and thereby equate
the implied prohibition with the affirmative endowment is altogether fallacious.
There is no such equivalence.
This appears most obviously perhaps in the cases most important for the de-
cision in this cause. They are the ones involving situations where the silence of
Congress or the dormancy of its power has been taken judicially, on one view or
another of its constitutional effects,"^ as forbidding state action, only to have Con-
gress later disclaim the prohibition or undertake to nullify it.-** Not yet has this
Court held such a disclaimer invalid or that state action supported by it could not
stand. On the contrary in each instance it has given effect to the Congressional
judgment contradicting its own previous one.-^
It is true that rationalizations have differed concerning those decisions,^" in-
deed also that the judges participating in them differed in this respect. ^^ But the
results have been lasting and are at least as important, for the direction given to
the process of accommodating federal and state authority, as the reasons stated
for reaching them. None of the decisions conceded, because none involved any
question of, the power of Congress to make conclusive its own mandate concern-
ing what is commerce. But apart from that function of defining the outer boun-
dary of its power, whenever Congress' judgment has been uttered affirmatively
to contradict the Court's previously expressed view that specific action. taken by
the states in Congress' silence was forbidden by the commerce clause, this body
has accommodated its previous judgement to Congress' expressed approval.
Some part of this readjustment may be explained in ways acceptable on any
theory of the commerce clause and the relations of Congress and the Courts
toward its functioning.^^ Such explanations, however, hardly go to the root of
the matter. For the fact remains that, in these instances, the sustaining of Con-
gress' overriding action has involved something beyond correction of erroneous
factual judgment in deference to Congress' presumbaly better-informed view of
the facts,^^ and also beyond giving due deference to its conception of the scope
26 See the argument for the plaintiff in error in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 172, 173, as a
classic instance.
27 Cf. note 18. See also the discussions cited in note 7.
28 Legislation which, typically, has presented the problem is found in a variety of measures, of
which the Wilson Act, 26 Stat. 313, is the prototype. Earlier legislation presenting the difficulty was
that involved in the second of the Wheeling Bridge cases, Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont
Bridge Co., 18 How. 421. See note 43 for further citations.
29 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, with which compare Pennsyl-
vania V. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, and The Clinton Bridge, 10 Wall. 454;
Leisy & Co. v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, with which compare In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545; Bowman
V. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 125 U. S. 465, with which compare Clark Distilling Co. v. Western
Maryland Ry., 242 U. S. 311.
30 See, e. g., Ribble, at 62, 106, and other materials cited above in note 7.
31 For the modern record it is interesting to note that in the first Bridge case Justice McLean spoke
for the Court, Chief Justice Taney and Justice Daniel dissenting in separate opinions, and the same
division prevailed in the further opinions filed upon consideration of the master's report and entry of
the decree. In the second Bridge case Justice Nelson spoke for the Court, with Justices McLean,
Grier, Wayne and Daniel each filing separate opinions dissenting on one or more of the issues
presented.
32 Thus, in some instances conceivably the reversal might be rationalized as only one of factual
judgment, made in deference to the contrary finding of like character made by a body better able to
make such a determination. Moreover, Congress' supporting action deprives the Court's adverse view
concerning state legislation of any strength which may have been derived from the inference that
Congress, by its silence, had impliedly forbidden it. Hence insofar as its judgment may be taken,
not as conclusive, but as being entitled to deference here on questions relating to its power (and his-
torically the scope of that deference has been great, cf. note 11), Congress' explicit repudiation of the
attitude inferentially attributed to it from its silence, compels reversal of the Court's earlier pro-
nounced view.
33 In the first Wheeling Bridge case the Court itself made the finding, upon evidence taken by a
master, that the bridge in fact obstructed navigation, to which it added the legal conclusion that it
was a public nuisance, and went on to specify the height to which it must be raised to avoid this
effect. Not only this finding of fact, therefore, but also the legal conclusion drawn from it was, in
effect, overturned by the Act of Congress. See note 34. The finding of obstruction in fact depended
in no sense upon previous determination by Congress. But the Court found in Congress' prior legis-
lation a policy of freedom for navigation which it applied to outlaw the bridge.
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of its powers, when it repudiates, just as when its silence is thought to support,
the inference that it has forbidden state action.^*
Prudential has not squarely met this fact. Fixed with the sense of applicability
of the IVelton or Shelby County line of cases, it rather has posed an enigma for
the bearing of the Bridge and liquor cases upon the decision to be made. It is,
if the commerce clause "by its own force" forbids discriminatory state taxation,
or other measures, how is it that Congress by expressly consenting can give that
action validity?
The answer need not be labored. Prudential in this case makes no contention
that commerce is not involved. Its argument is exactly the opposite. Its con-
tention founded on the commerce clause is one wholly of implied prohibition
within the field of commerce.
This it regards as operative not only in Congress' silence, but in the face of
its positive expression by the McCarran Act that the continued regulation and
taxation by the states of the business of insurance is in accord with Congress'
policy. That expression raises questions concerning its own validity and also
concerning whether the policy stated extends to the kind of state legislation
which is immediately in issue. But those questions are not answered, as Pru-
dential seeks to have them answered, by any conception that Congress' declara-
tion of policy adds nothing to the validity of what the states have done within the
area covered by the declaration or, in other words, that it is mere briitum fiilmen.
For to do this not only would produce intolerable consequences for restricting
Congress' power. It would ignore the very basis on which the second Wheeling
Bridge case and indeed the Clark Distilling case have set the pattern of the law
for governing situations like that now presented. ^^ Accordingly we turn to the
issues which are more alive and significant for the future.
III.
In considering the issues raised by the McCarran Act and the question of its
applicability, ground may be cleared by putting aside some matters strenuously
argued in the state supreme court and here. First, it follows from what has been
said that we are not required to determine whether South Carolina's tax would
be valid in the dormancy of Congress' power. For Congress has expressly stated
its intent and policy in the Act. And, for reasons to be stated, we think that the
declaration's effect is clearly to sustain the exaction and that this can be done
without violating any constitutional provision.
By the same token, we need not consider whether the tax, if operative in Con-
gress' unilluminated silence, would be discriminatory in the sense of an exaction
forbidden by the commerce clause, as Prudential categorically asserts, or not so,
as South Carolina maintains with equal certitude. Much attention has been given
both here and in the state court to these questions. But in the view we take of
the case the controlling issues undercut them. Nor do we determine, as Pru-
dential's argument seems to subsume, whether all of its business done in South
34 See note 33. "So far, therefore, as this bridge created an obstruction to the free navigation of
the river, in view of the previous acts of Congress, they are to be regarded as modified by this sub-
sequent legislation; and, although it still may be an obstruction in fact, is not so in tlie contemplation
of law. . . . The regulation of commerce includes intercourse and navigation, and, of course, the
power to determine what shall or shall not be deemed in judgment of law an obstruction to naviga-
tion." Mr. Justice Nelson, speaking for the Court, in the second Wheeling Bridge case, 18 How.
421, 430, 431.
Compare the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice McLean, who wrote for the majority in the first
Wheeling Bridge case, going not only on the ground, among others, that the Act of Congress invaded
the judicial function, but also that the Act, apart from its effect, was unconstitutional: "It [Con-
gress] may, under this power, declare that no bridge shall be built which shall be an obstruction to
the use of a navigable water. And this, it would seem, is as far as the commercial power of Con-
gress can be exercised." 18 How. at 442. Thus was the grant of authority to Congress upon which
he relied in the first decision, in part, to outlaw the bridge, converted into a limitation. Cf. text
infra. Part IV, at note 49 ff.
35 Cf. note 29 and text. And see Part IV.
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Carolina and affected by the tax should be regarded as constituting interstate
commerce so as to fall within the "in commerce" classification or, on the other
hand, some of it may properly be considered as being only local or intrastate
business.^*' These questions we put to one side. And for present purposes we
assume that the tax would be discriminatory in the sense of Prudential's conten-
tion and that all of its business done in South Carolina and affected by the tax
is done "in" or as a part of interstate commerce.
It is not necessary to spend much time with interpreting the McCarran Act.
Pertinently it is as follows
:
Sec. 1. The Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public
interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed
to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the
several States.
Sec. 2. (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regula-
tion or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or super-
sede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business
of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such
Act specifically relates to the business of insurance. ... 59 Stat. 34; 15
U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015."
Obviously Congress' purpose was broadly to give support to the existing and
future state systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance. This
was done in two ways. One was by removing obstructions which might be
thought to flow from its own power, whether dormant or exercised, except as
otherwise expressly provided in the Act itself or in future legislation.^^ The
other was by declaring expressly and affirmatively that continued state regula-
tion and taxation of this business is in the public interest and that the business
and all who engage in it "shall be subject to" the laws of the several states in
these respects.
Moreover, in taking this action Congress must have had full knowledge of the
nation-wide existence of state systems of regulation and taxation; of the fact
that they differ greatly in the scope and character of the regulations imposed
and of the taxes exacted; and of the further fact that many, if not all, include
features which, to some extent, have not been applied generally to other inter-
state business. Congress could not have been unacquainted with these facts and
its purpose was evidently to throw the whole weight of its power behind the state
systems, notwithstanding these variations.
36 Whether within or without the "affectation" doctrine. Cf. United States v. South-Eastern Un-
derwriters Ass'n, 322 U. S. 533, 548, and authorities cited.
In making these assumptions, however, it is not improper to note that the record, as made in the
state court, does not purport to deal factually with the latter question as a matter of proof. It is
simply alleged that all of Prudential's South Carolina business is done interstate, an allegation which
is denied; and there are supporting allegations concerning the extent of the business and manner of
conducting it.
Nor is the case in much better shape factually on the question of discrimination. While the briefs
include tables of figures designed to show that Prudential pays more proportionately under the tax
than South Carolina corporations pay under other taxes levied against them, cf. note 2, these figures
were not made part of the record in the state court until the petition for rehearing was filed, and
Prudential has insisted both there and here that they have no proper place in consideration of the
questions presented. Its position is that the tax is discriminatory on the face of the statute and
without reference to other taxes South Carolina corporations may pay. Cf. note 4.
We express no opinion concerning whether such a showing, in either respect, would be sufficient
to require determination of the issues to which it is directed, tendered in the absence of action by
Congress.
37 The remainder of the statute, including a proviso to § 2(b), relates to applicability of the Sher-
man Act and other related federal statutes to the business of insurance before and after January 1,
1948; provides that the McCarran Act shall not affect in any manner the application to that business
of the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act or the Merchant Marine Act of
1920; extends the term "State" as used in the Act to include specified territories and the District of
Columbia; and provides for severability.
*8 See note 37.
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It would serve no useful purpose now to inquire whether or how far this effort
was necessary, in view of the explicit reservations made in the majority opinion
in the South-Eastern case. Nor is it necessary to conclude that Congress, by
enacting the McCarran Act, sought to validate every existing state regulation or
tax. For in all that mass of legislation must have lain some provisions which
may have been subject to serious question on the score of other constitutional
limitations in addition to commerce clause objections arising in the dormancy of
Congress' power. And we agree with Prudential that there can be no inference
that Congress intended to circumvent constitutional limitations upon its own
power.
But, though Congress had no purpose to validate unconstitutional provisions
of state laws, except in so far as the Constitution itself gives Congress the power
to do this by removing obstacles to state action arising from its own action or
by consenting to such laws, H. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3, it clearly
put the full weight of its power behind existing and future state legislation to
sustain it from any attack under the commerce clause to whatever extent this
may be done with the force of that power behind it, subject only to the excep-
tions expressly provided for.
Two conclusions, corollary in character and important for this case, must be
drawn from Congress' action and the circumstances in which it was taken. One
is that Congress intended to declare, and in effect declared, that uniformity of
regulation, and of state taxation,"^ are not required in reference to the business
of insurance, by the national public interest, except in the specific respects other-
wise expressly provided for. This necessarily was a determination by Congress
that state taxes, which in its silence might be held invalid as discriminatory, do
not place on interstate insurance business a burden which it is unable generally
to bear or should not bear in the competition with local business. Such taxes
were not uncommon among the states,"*" and the statute clearly included South
Carolina's tax now in issue.
That judgment was one of policy and reflected long and clear experience. For,
notwithstanding the long incidence of the tax and its payment by Prudential
without question prior to the South-Eastern decision, the record of Prudential's
continuous success in South Carolina over decades*^ refutes any idea that pay-
ment of the tax handicapped it in an}' way tending to exclude it from competition
with local business or with domestic insurance companies. Indeed Prudential
makes no contrary contention on any factual basis, nor could it well do so. For
the South-Eastern decision did not, and could not, wipe out all this experience
or its weight for bearing, as a matter of the practical consequences resulting from
operation of the tax, upon that question. Robertson v. United States, No. 274,
decided today.
Consequently Prudential's case for discrimination must rest upon the idea
either that the commerce clause forbids the state to exact more from it in taxes
39 There is, of course, no constitutional requirement that state taxes must be uniform, in the sense
of that requirement as laid upon the federal taxing power by the first clause of Article I, § 8. Nor
has it ever been held that such a requirement is made by the commerce clause or any other constitu-
tional provision. This is a different thing entirely from the strictures against discrimination within
or by a state laid under the equal protection and commerce clauses.
The McCarran Act is, in effect, a determination by Congress that the business of insurance, though
done in interstate commerce, is not of svch a character as to require uniformity of treatment within
the distinction taken in the doctrine of Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, except as other-
wise expressly declared.
40 As of the effective date of the McCarran Act, sixteen states had imposed on "foreign" life in-
surance companies taxes substantially similar to the South Carolina tax in issue. Ala. Code (1940)
(it. 51, §; 816, 819; Fla. Stat. (1941) §205.43(1), (6); 111. Rev. Stat. (1943) c. 73, §1021; Ind.
Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1940) §39-4802; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1935) §40-252; Ky. Rev. Stat.
(1944) 136.330; La. Gen. Stat. (Dart. 1939') §8369; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) §12387; Mo. Rev.
Stat. (1939) §6094; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §77-902; N. M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §60-401; N. D.
Comp. Laws (1913) §4924; Ohio Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 1940) §5433; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 72, §2261; S. C. Code Laws (1942) §§7948, 7949; Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon. 1925) Art.
4769.
We express no opinion concerning the validity of any feature of these statutes not substantially
identical with those of the South Carolina tax dealt with herein.
*l Prudential was first authorized to do business in South Carolina in 1897 and since that time it
has received annual renewals of its license. As to the present scope of its business in South Carolina
and in all the states, see note IS.
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than from purely local business ; or that the tax is somehow technically of an in-
herently discriminatory character or possibly of a type which would exclude or
seriously handicap new entrants seeking to establish themselves in South Caro-
lina. As to each of these grounds, moreover, the argument subsumes that Con-
gress' contrary judgment, as a matter of policy relating to the regulation of inter-
state commerce, cannot be effective, either "of its own force" alone or as oper-
ative in conjunction with and to sustain the state's policy.
IV.
In view of all these considerations, we would be going very far to rule that
South Carolina no longer may collect her tax. To do so would flout the ex-
pressly declared policies of both Congress and the state. Moreover it would
establish a ruling never heretofore made and in doing this would depart from the
whole trend of decision in a great variety of situations most analogous to the one
now presented. For, as we have already emphasized, the authorities most closely
in point upon the problem are not, as appellant insists, those relating to discrim-
inatory state taxes laid in the dormancy of Congress' power. They are rather
the decisions which, in every instance thus far not later overturned,*^ have sus-
tained coordinated action taken by Congress and the states in the regulation of
commerce.*^
The power of Congress over commerce exercised entirely without reference to
coordinated action taken by the states is not restricted, except as the Constitution
expressly provides,** by any limitation which forbids it to discriminate against
interstate commerce and in favor of local trade. Its plenary scope enables Con-
gress not only to promote but also to prohibit interstate commerce, as it has done
frequently and for a great variety of reasons.*^ That power does not run down
a one-way street or one of narrowly fixed dimensions. Congress may keep the
way open, confine it broadly or closely, or close it entirely, subject only to the
restrictions placed upon its authority by other constitutional provisions and the
requirement that it shall not invade the domains of action reserved exclusively
for the states.
This broad authority Congress may exercise alone, subject to those limitations,
or in conjunction with coordinated action by the states,**' in which case limita-
tions imposed for the preservation of their powers become inoperative and only
those designed to forbid action altogether by any power or combination of powers
42 Cf. Ashton V. Cameron County District, 298 U. S. 513, which may be said in effect to have
been overruled by United States v. Bekins, 304 U. S. 27. See Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial
Supremacy (1941) 240-241.
*3 See Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U. S. 495; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S.
548; Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U S. 334; Clark Distilling Co. v.
Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 311; Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431; In re Rahrer, 140
U. S. 545; Perkins v. Pennsylvania, 314 U. S. 586; Standard Dredging Co. v. Murphy, 319 U. S.
306, 308; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 66 Sup. Ct. 154, 157-158; cf. Parker v. Richard,
250 U. S. 235, 238-239. See generally Koenig, Federal and State Cooperation under the Constitu-
tion (1938) 36 Mich L. Rev. 752.
44 North American Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 327 U. S. — , — ; United States
V. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100, 114-115; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196. For example,
the provisions of Article I, § 9, forbidding the giving of preferences "by any Regulation of Commerce
or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another"; and commanding that "No Tax or Duty
shall be laid on Articles exported from any State," held applicable only to foreign commerce in
Dooley v. United States, 183 U. S. 151.
But compare the further provision of Article I, § 9, empowering Congress to consent to laying of
duties or imposts on exports by the states. See also note 47.
45 E. g., Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137; Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321; Hipolite Egg Co.
V. United States, 220 U. S. 45; Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308; United States v. Darby
Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100, overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251.
46 See cases cited in notes 29 and 43.
47 It is perhaps impossible to point with certainty to any such explicit limitation among the various
commerce clauses of the Constitution, for decision in the application of such provisions to such a com-
bined exercise of powers is sparse. See, however, the discussion in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and
Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 433 et scq., relating to the clause of Article I, § 9, providing: "No
Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over
those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear or pay
Duties in another."
There can be no doubt that the combined exercise of state and federal authority is limited, to some
but largely undefined extent, by other constitutional prohibitions or the combined effects of more than
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in our governmental system remain effective.'*'^ Here both Congress and South
Carohna have acted, and in complete coordination, to sustain the tax. It is there-
fore reinforced by the exercise of all the power of government residing in our
scheme.*^ Clear and gross must be the evil which would nullify such an exertion,
one which could arise only by exceeding beyond cavil some explicit and com-
pelling limitation imposed by a constitutional provision or provisions designed
and intended to outlaw the action taken entirely from our constitutional frame-
work.
In this light the argument that the degree of discrimination which South Caro-
lina's tax has involved, if any, puts it beyond the power of government to con-
tinue must fall of its own weight. No conceivable violation of the commerce
clause, in letter or spirit, is presented. Nor is contravention of any other limi-
tation.
A word should be added in the latter respect. Prudential has not urged grounds
founded upon other constitutional provisions than the commerce clause, except
in relation to the McCarran Act and then only in the event it should be con-
strued as having effect to validate continued exaction of the tax. As has been
said, it regards the statute as neither intended nor effective to "validate, author-
ize, or sanction state statutes which discriminate against interstate commerce."
But, against the event that the Act should be taken as intended to have such an
effect, it puts forward the somewhat novel contentions that the statute would be
in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment ; of the first clause
of Article I, § 8, requiring that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States"; of Article I, § 1, "which requires legislation to
be enacted by Congress" ; and, apparently of the Tenth Amendment, "as a vio-
lation of the states' power to tax for purposes of raising revenue for their own
use, which power is vested exclusively in the states. "^^
These arguments may be summarily disposed of. As for the due process con-
one. Cf . text herein at note 49 et seq. But apart from the provision of Article I, § 9, above quoted
as a possible exception, the specific limitations placed upon the commerce power or state power in re-
lation to commerce expressly provide for joint action to be efifective. Thus, this is true with reference
to laying of duties on exports by the states with the consent of Congress, Art. I, § 10, notwithstand-
ing the prohibition of such action by Congressional action alone, Art. I, § 9, and of course by state
action alone. Art. I, § 10.. And note the further provision that: "No State shall, without the Con-
sent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage," as to which see also note 17 above.
It was thus expressly contemplated, in some instances, that the combined exercise of the powers
of Congress and the states should be free from restrictions expressly applicable to each when exerted
in isolation. It is true that some of these provisions have been .held applicable only to foreign com-
merce, e. g., the prohibition of Article I, § 10, against levy of duties on imports or exports without
Congress' consent. Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123; American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192
TJ. S. 500, 519, et seq.; but see Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419. But others apply to coastwise
trade, indeed to trade between towns in the same state, in other words to intrastate commerce. State
Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204, 219 and see Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co.,
supra; Louisiana Pub. Ser. Comn. v. Texas & N. O. R. Co., 284 U. S. 125; cf. Williams v. United
States, 255 U. S. 336; and see also United States v. The William, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16,700.
All these provisions are intimately and expressly related to the commerce power. Notwithstanding
their diversities, in application to interstate and foreign commerce or both, and also to federal and
state power or their combined operation, no conclusion can be drawn from them that our constitutional
policy was, or is, to give Congress and the states acting together broad powers, in some instances
denied to each acting alone, in relation to foreign commerce, but to deny such authority altogether in
reference to interstate commerce. Indeed the opposite conclusion is clearly indicated, both Isy virtue
of express provision where applicable and by strong inference where not expressly forbidden.
48 The ruling is not new or only recent. "We have already said, and the principle is undoubted,
that the Act of the Legislature of Virginia conferred full authority to erect and maintain a bridge,
subject to the exercise of the power of Congress to regulate the navigation of the river. That body
having, in the exercise of this power, regulated the navigation consistent with its preservation and
continuation, the authority to maintain it would seem to be complete. That authority combines the
concurrent powers of both governments, state and federal, which, if not sufficient, certainly none can
be found in our system of government." Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 18
How. 421, 430. Compare this with Mr. Justice McLean's dissenting view, note 34 above.
49 The contentions are stated in appellant's brief as follows: "If it be assumed that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act is an adoption by Congress of legislation of the states, then the Act is unconstitutional
(1) as a violation of the due process clause of Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, (2) as a vio-
lation of Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution which requires that excises shall be uni-
form throughout the United States in the exercise by Congress of its taxing power, (3) as a viola-
tion of Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution which requires legislation to be enacted by Congress,
and (4) as a violation of the states' power to tax for purposes of raising revenue for their own use,
which power is vested exclusively in the states."
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tention, it was settled by a long line of authorities prior to the South-Eastern
decision, that the similar provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as that
requiring equal protection of the laws, does not forbid the states to lay and collect
such a tax as South Carolina's.^" Certainly the Fifth Amendment does not more
narrowly confine the power of Congress ; nor do it and the Fourteenth taken to-
gether accomplish such a restriction upon the coordinated exercise of power by
the Congress and the states.
The argument grounded upon the first clause of Article I, § 8, requiring that
excises shall be uniform throughout the United States, identifies the state exac-
tion with the laying of an excise by Congress, to which alone the limitation
applies. This is done on the theory that no more has occurred than that Con-
gress has "adopted" the tax as its own, a conception which obviously ignores the
state's exertion of its own power and, furthermore, seeks to restrict the coordi-
nated exercise of federal and state authority by a limitation applicable only to the
federal taxing power when it is exerted without reference to any state action. ^'
The same observation applies also to the contention based on Article I, § 1.
The final contention that to sustain the Act, and thus the tax, would be an in-
vasion of the state's own power of taxation is so clearly lacking in merit as to
call for no comment other than to point out that, by juxtaposition with the con-
tentions discussed in the preceding paragraph, the effect would be at one stroke
to bring the Act into collision with limitations operative only upon the federal
power and at the same time to nullify state authority.
No such anomalous consequence follows from the division of legislative power
into the respective spheres of federal and state authority. There are limitations
applicable to each of these separately and some to their coordinated exercise.
But neither the former nor the latter are to be found merely in the fact that the
authority is thus divided. Such a conception would reduce the joint exercise of
power by Congress and the states to achieve common ends in the regulation of
our society below the effective range of either power separately exerted, without
basis in specific constitutional limitation or otherwise than in the division itself.^^
We know of no grounding, in either constitutional experience or spirit, for such
a restriction. For great reasons of policy and history not now necessary to re-
state, these great powers were separated. They were not forbidden to cooperate
or by doing so to achieve legislative consequences, particularly in the great fields
of regulating commerce and taxation, which, to some extent at least, neither could
accomplish in isolated exertion."^
We have considered appellant's other contentions, including the suggestion that
the McCarran Act, construed as we have interpreted it and thus given effect,
would involve an unconstitutional delegation by Congress of its power to the
states. For reasons already set forth and others, including the fact that no in-
stance of delegation is involved on the facts, we find them without merit.
The judgment accordingly is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result.
Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of- this case.
50 ".
. . It has never been held that a State may not exact from a foreign insurance corporation
as a condition to admission to 'do business the payment of a tax measured by the business done within
its borders." Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673, 677. See Ducat v. Chicago,
10 Wall. 410; Fire Assn. of Philadelphia v. New York, 119 U. S. 110; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. i\
Harding, 272 U. S. 494; Continental Assurance Co. v. Tennessee, 311 U. S. S. See discussion in
Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law (1918) 101 ff.
51 The related contention that Congress' "adoption" of South Carolina's statute amounts to an un-
constitutional delegation of Congress' legislative power to the states obviously confuses Congress'
power to legislate with its power to consent to state legislation. They are not identical, though exer-
cised in the same formal manner. See Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U. S.
311, 327.
52
"It would be a shocking thing, if state and federal governments acting together were prevented
from achieving the end desired by both, simply because of the division of power between them."
Ribble, 211. And see note 48.
53 Cf. note 47.
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APPENDIX "C"
REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON
RATES AND RATING ORGANIZATIONS
NEW YORK, N. Y.
MAY 22-23, 1946
History
In view of the action taken at the meeting of the Sub-Committee at New York
City on May 17 and 18, 1946, it is essential that the Sub-Committee at the outset
of this report summarize the activities of the Committee on Rates and Rating
Organizations since the meeting held at New York City on May 11-14, 1945. At
that meeting steps were taken which resulted in the formation of the All-Industry
Committee, to which reference will be made later in this report, and the estab-
lishment of a liaison between that committee, representing the industry, and this
committee, representing the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
Since that time the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations or its Sub-
Committee, as the case may be, has met at the following places and on the follow-
ing dates
:
New York, N. Y. — March 8-10, 1945
New York, N. Y. — May 11-14, 1945
St. Paul, Minn. — June 4-8, 1945
New York, N. Y. — August 8-9, 1945
New York, N. Y. — September 19-20, 1945
Chicago, 111. — October 27 to November 3, 1945
New York, N. Y. — November 14-17, 1945
Grand Rapids, Mich. — December 1-6, 1945
New York, N. Y. — January 17-18, 1946
New York, N. Y. — January 23-25, 1946
French Lick, Ind. — March 11-15, 1946
Chicago, 111. — April 23-26, 1946
Atlantic City, N. J. — April 29 to May 2, 1946
New York, N. Y. — May 17-18, 1946
New York, N. Y. — May 22-23, 1946
These meetings consumed 56 days, exclusive of traveling time to and from the
places of meeting, and do not include time spent in research and study. All of
the meetings were devoted to the task of preparing two rating laws— a casualty
and surety rate regulatory bill and a fire, marine and inland marine rate regu-
latory bill.
At the same time that your Committee was conducting its work and studies
parallel studies were being conducted by the All-Industry Committee. This com-
mittee represented the following segments of the business :
American Institute of Marine Underwriters
American Mutual Alliance
American Life Convention
American Reciprocal Association
Associated Factory Mutual Fire Insurance Companies
Association of Casualty and Surety Executives
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Bureau of Personal Accident and Health Underwriters
Health & Accident Underwriters Conference
Insurance Executives Association
Inland Marine Underwriters Association
Life Insurance Association of America
National Association of Casualty and Surety Agents
National Association of Independent Insurers
National Association of Insurance Agents
National Association of Mutual Insurance Agents
National Association of Insurance Brokers
National Board of Fire Underwriters
National Fraternal Congress of America
Surety Association of America
The All Industry Committee appointed a Conference Committee to confer with
this Sub-Committee with a view towards devising bills which would be acceptable
to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and to the industry.
This Conference Committee consists of the following organizations
:
American Mutual Alliance
Association of Casualty and Surety Executives
National Association of Independent Insurers
National Association of Insurance Brokers
National Board of Fire Underwriters
Detailed reports were prepared by your Committee as to what transpired at
each meeting. Those reports covering activities prior to the meeting of the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners at Grand Rapids, Michigan in
December, 1945 are incorporated in the permanent records of the Association.
Those reports covering meetings since that date will be submitted to the Associ-
ation as a part of this report at its meeting in Portland, Oregon in June, 1946
for adoption and, if adopted, will likewise be incorporated in the permanent rec-
ords of the Association.
At the meeting of your Committee held at French Lick, Indiana on March
11-14, 1946 a resolution was adopted empowering the Sub-Committee of the
Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations, which up until that time had
been acting as a drafting sub-committee, "to take such action as it may determine
in connection with the completion of the drafting of rate regulatory legislation"
(see report of Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations, French Lick, In-
diana, March 11-14, 1946).
At the meeting in New York City on May 17 and 18, 1946 the Sub-Committee,
acting for the full Committee under the resolution adopted at French Lick, suc-
ceeded in reconciling the remaining areas of disagreement with the All-Industry
Committee on the casualty and surety rate regulatory bill and the fire, marine
and inland marine rate regulatory bill, thereby producing bills which were accept-
able to both your Sub-Committee and to the All-Industry Conference Committee,
subject to ratification by the full Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations
and further subject to the approval of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners at the meeting scheduled to be held at Portland, Oregon in June,
1946. The action of the All-Industry Conference Committee in accepting the
bills in their present form was likewise subject to approval by the full All-In-
dustry Committee.
In considering the action taken by your Sub-Committee at the meeting in New_
York on May 17 and 18, 1946 it is essential to keep in mind the action taken by
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners at the meeting held at
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Grand Rapids, Michigan in December, 1945. At that meeting the Association
adopted the report of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations dated
December 5, 1945, which submitted to the Association two rating bills, a fire and
marine rating bill and a casualty and surety rating bill. In its December 5, 1945
report the Committee said, among other things
:
"Committees in the industry are still attempting to compose some of their
differences of opinion on both fire and marine rating bills and casualty and
surety rating bills. Under ordinary circumstances this Committee might
have been disposed to still further delay the submission of proposed rating
bills to the Association in the hope that agreement might be reached. There
are, however, legislatures meeting early in 1946 and which will not recon-
vene until 1948. Consequently the Committee felt it necessary to furnish
drafts which could be used as a guide in those legislatures at this time.
"The great majority of legislatures will not meet, however, until 1947.
This Committee intends to continue its research and will, of course, consider
any ideas or material developed by the industry or the insurance-buying pub-
lic. The Committee makes no claim that the proposed bills represent the ulti-
mate or last word in rating bills. It is recognized that the science of rate
regulation is a progressive one and that changes in thinking will occur as
our experience and stock of knowledge increase.
"For those states which subscribe to the principles set forth in these bills
the Committee recommends the use of the bills as legislative guides."
The bills which your Sub-Committee accepted at the meeting in New York on
May 17 and 18, 1946 differ in a number of respects from the bills submitted by
your Committee to the December, 1945 meeting at Grand Rapids. It will be re-
called that at the Grand Rapids meeting the drafting Sub-Committee was author-
ized to make certain editorial and minor changes, which were embodied in the
final draft known as the January 18, 1946 draft. The differences between the
two drafts will be outlined in detail later in this report.
S. E. U. A. Case and U. S. Public Lazv 15
The legal problems confronting the Committee, including those arising from
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of United States v.
South-Eastern Underzvriters Association, 64 U. S. Supreme Court 1162 (June
5, 1944), and by the enactment by Congress of U. S. Public Law 15 — the in-
surance moratorium law (which became effective March 9, 1945) — are set forth
in the memorandum of this Committee dated November 17, 1945 which accom-
panied the rating bills approved by the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners at the Grand Rapids December, 1945 meeting. Further source ma-
terial will also be found in the legislative proposal submitted to the Congress of
the United States by the Executive Committee of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners dated November, 1944, which is printed in full in the
Congressional Record (Congressional Record, November 16, 1944). The mem-
orandum of November 17, 1945 also contains Report No. 143 of the House of
Representatives on S. 340 dated February 13, 1945, U. S. Public Law 15 and the
text of President Roosevelt's statement accompanying his signature of the bill on
March 9, 1945. Since all of this data is available in the permanent records of
the Association it will not be repeated in this report.
The Bills
Attached hereto and made a part of this report are the casualty and surety rate
regulatory bill and the fire, marine and inland marine rate regulatory bill which
were accepted by this Sub-Committee at the meeting in New York City on May
17 and 18, 1946.
Analysis of the Bills
Since many of the provisions in the two bills are identical we shall address
ourselves first to the casualty and surety rate regulatory bill.
c P.D. 9
Sec. 1 — Purpose of Act.
The purpose of Section 1 becomes clear when read in the Hght of the Con-
gressional debate preceding the enactment of U. S. Public Law 15, the reports
of the various Congressional committees in connection with that bill, particularly
Report No. 143 of the House of Representatives dated February 13, 1945, and
the law itself. These sources of material indicate quite plainly that Congress was
willing to permit co-operative action, including price-fixing, in the insurance
business on a state level providing such activity was regulated and at the same
time was interested in seeing to it that reasonable competition was preserved. It
was felt that the insertion of a purpose clause together with a provision calling
for a liberal interpretation of the bill would serve as a guide for state adminis-
trators in interpreting and enforcing the new law.
Sec. 2— Scope of Act.
The wording of this section is generally self-explanatory.
Of particular interest, however, is the fact that unanimous agreement was
reached upon the point that the rates for all forms of motor vehicle insurance
shall be regulated under the casualty bill.
Up to the time that work was completed on these two bills there were differ-
ences of opinion as to the manner in which certain phases of the accident and
health insurance business should be regulated. Rather than create a delay in the
consideration of these bills your Sub-Committee and the industry decided to ex-
clude accident and health insurance. Further consideration will be given by your
Sub-Committee to the nature and extent of the regulation required to deal with
this problem and a report will be forthcoming at a later date.
There are likewise conflicting views as to the nature and extent of the regu-
lation required in connection with aviation insurance rates. There are a number
of aviation rates which lend themselves readily to state regulation. On the other
hand, the rating problem in the aviation business has certain peculiarities which
are now being explored and it was felt that for the time being at least the regu-
lation of aviation rates should be excluded.
Lines 1 to 8 on Page 2.
These lines refer to so-called overlapping coverages and were inserted in the
bill to prevent regulation under two different rating bills of the same general sub-
ject matter. When the Committee prepared the January 18, 1946 draft it felt
that the Commissioner should designate under which particular act the regula-
tion fell but upon reconsideration it was determined that a more uniform pattern
could be secured by allowing the companies operating under the act to make their
own choice. Since both acts are subject to the same basic standards the public
would be protected in either event.
In drafting these bills your Sub-Committee made no effort to deal with the
possible conflict between laws of this type and compulsory laws such as work-
men's compensation and motor vehicle insurance. Such cases will require special
consideration.
Sec. 3— Making of Rates.
Subsection (a) recognizes the general principles to be considered in rate
making.
Subdivision 2 of subsection (a) is designed to recognize differences in the
operating methods of insurers in the field of rate making and was specifically in-
tended to preserve their independence in this respect.
Subdivision 3 of subsection (a) is designed to provide added flexibility in the
rate structure in the public interest.
Subdivision 4 of subsection (a) sets forth the standards to be used in rate
making and in rate regulation and is the heart of the bill.
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Subsection (b) is incorporated in the bill to implement directly Section 1, the
purpose clause. In drafting these bills it was recognized that many companies
desired to take independent action. It was recognized that uniformity while
authorized should not be mandatory, thereby preserving freedom of action upon
the part of those who desire to take action independently.
Sec. 4,— Rate Filings.
Subsections (a) and (b) of this section are self-explanatory. In a word, these
two subsections contemplate that all material data on rates shall be a matter of
public record and this result is accomplished by a mandatory provision for filing.
Subsections (c) and (d) recognize principles which differ to some extent from
those followed in the draft of January 18, 1946. In that draft it was provided in
substance, subject to certain exceptions, that no rate could be used unless it had
been first approved by the Commissioner. In this draft a duty is imposed upon
the Commissioner to review filings as soon as reasonably possible after they have
been made in order to meet the requirements of this act (Section 3
—
(c) ). Un-
like the January 18, 1946 draft, this bill provides for the use of a waiting period
between the time the filing is made and when it is to be used. The theory of the
bill is that the Commissioner will examine the filing during that waiting period.
It provides a waiting period of fifteen days plus an optional waiting period of
fifteen additional days, making thirty days in all. It was felt that this thirty-day
period under most circumstances would afford the Commissioner ample time
within which to review a filing before it took effect and at the same time would
not unduly impede the expeditious transaction of business. This conclusion was
based upon the fact that in most instances bureaus and companies informally sub-
mit filings to Commissioners in advance of formal filings ; bureaus and companies
are reluctant to go to the expense of printing and distributing rate manuals and
similar data without first ascertaining whether the filing will be approved. Sub-
section (d) also contains a provision permitting acceleration of the effective date
where the Commissioner has reviewed the filing before the expiration of the
waiting period or any extension thereof. Like the January 18, 1946 draft it con-
tains a ''deemer clause" although in this draft that clause is tied to the waiting
period.
Subsection (e) is a clause designed to meet a problem peculiar to the fidelity
and surety business. Certain forms of bonds are required to take effect forth-
with and it would be impractical to suspend their effective date during the wait-
ing period. The necessity for special treatment was recognized in the Commia
sioners' draft of January 18, 1946.
Subsection (f ) is designed to permit the Commissioner to dispense with filing;
under certain circumstances. The language of this subsection is self-explanatory ^
Subsection (g) is designed to provide relief for those assureds which are un-
able to obtain insurance at normal rates. The necessity for this form of relief
was recognized in the January 18, 1946 draft. To prevent abuses the approval of
the Commissioner for any excess charge is required and the Commissioner in
giving such approval may, of course, be guided by the statutory yardsticks set
forth in Section 3- (a) -4 of this bill. Assigned risk plans are treated in Section
15 of this bill.
Subsection (h) contains a provision requiring insurers to observe the provi-
sions of this act in connection with the issuance of policies ; it is the section which
gives the act effect.
Sec. 5— Disapproval of Filings.
The language of subsection (a) is generally self-explanatory. One phase of it,
however, is particularly noteworthy ; it requires the Commissioner in disapprov-
ing a filing to set forth the specific grounds on which he relied in making his
determinations. It should tend to improve the quality of rate regulation for the
requirement that the Commissioner shall furnish the reasons supporting his de-
cision prevents arbitrary and capricious action by an administrator.
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While the Commisisoner should consider the expense components of a rate in
order to determine its over-all correctness, the bill does not authorize the Com-
missioner to regulate the actual disbursements made by an insurer for expenses.
Subsection (b) is likewise self-explanatory. Since many of the bonds written
under this section cannot be cancelled by the insurer it was necessary to incorpo-
rate in this subsection a provision that any disapproval shall not be retroactive.
Subsection (c) is designed to meet two contingencies: (1) where a rate takes
effect under the deemer clause (Section 4-(d)) and the Commissioner subse-
quently discovers that the rate does not meet the standards, he can review the
filing, and (2) there are many filings which are proper when made but which
subsequently, due to a change in the statistical or economic picture, do not meet
the requirements of the act. This subsection enables the Commissioner, after a
hearing, to disapprove filings which do not meet the requirements of the act. It
contains a provision which prevents the Commissioner from making his order
effective retroactively.
Subsection (d) is designed to provide relief for any person or organization
aggrieved with respect to any filing. Complete machinery is established to deal
with this problem. As this draft now stands, the rating organization, the insurer,
the Commissioner and the buyer are all provided with the means of dealing with
any defect in the rate structure..
Sec. 6— Rating Organizations.
This section deals with rating organizations and their activities. It provides
for the licensing of such organizations and established standards therefor. In
drafting these requirements the Committee was fully cognizant of the fact that
rating organizations are engaged in price-fixing activities and recognized that
such activities should be surrounded with appropriate safeguards in the public
interest. On the other hand, the Committee also recognized the need for legiti-
mate cooperation among insurers through the medium of rating organizations
and the Congressional debate preceding the enactment of U. S. Public Law 15
reflected that fact. It should be noted that Section 4-(b) specifically provides
that nothing contained in this act shall be construed as requiring any insurer to
become a member of or a subscriber to any rating organization. However, there
are some rate structures which are so complicated that while there may be no
legal obligation imposed upon a company to become a member or subscriber of
such an organization, the company must in fact become either a member or a
subscriber if it is to survive economically. For that reason your Sub-Committee
felt it necessary to see to it that the bills contained provisions which gave the
necessary latitude to members and subscribers of rating organizations. This lati-
tude is reflected not only in Section 6 on rating organizations but also in Section
7, that dealing with deviations, and Section 8 covering appeals by minorities. An
examination of subsection (b) will disclose that special consideration has been
given to safeguards for subscribers to rating organizations.
The language of subsection (c) is identical with that employed by your Sub-
Committee in the January 18, 1946 draft. The comments made in the Sub-Com-
mittee's memorandum of November 17, 1945 in connection with that subsection
(see pp. 5-6) apply with equal force to this subsection and need not be repeated.
Subsection (d) is new and was not embodied in our previous drafts. In certain
instances it has been advantageous for rating organizations to cooperate with in-
surers or with other rating organizations. The development of standard forms
of coverage is an illustration of this form of cooperation. Since this form of
cooperation might conceivably be challenged under the Sherman Act it was felt
advisable to cover such activities in these bills. It M^as recognized, however, that
such activities might be carried to the point where they were no longer fair or
reasonable and the necessity for adequate safeguards was apparent. These bills
in their present form authorize cooperation but two restrictions are imposed
;
first, all rate filings resulting from such cooperative action are subject to all the
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provisions of the act which are appHcable to filings generally and, second, the
Commissioner may issue a cease and desist order if he finds that the activities of
practices carried on under this subsection are unfair or unreasonable or other-
wise inconsistent with the provisions of this act. Time will tell whether these
safeguards are adequate but in the present state of affairs the Sub-Committee felt
that no need for more drastic requirements had been established.
Sec. 7— Deviations.
It has become increasingly evident that any insurance rate regulatory law
which unduly restricts the desire of a carrier to pass on a demonstrated economy
to the insurance buyer is not in the public interest. The opportunity for increased
flexibility in the application of deviation statutes is conducive to increased com-
petition within the framework of a rating organization. This section is designed
to encourage the granting of deviations in proper cases.
Under ordinary circumstances deviations have been granted because of demon-
strated savings in the expense portion of the dollar. It is recognized, however,
that under certain circumstances a more favorable loss record of a company jus-
tifies a deviation. There may be still other circumstances calling for the granting
of a deviation. This section permits all such factors to be considered provided
the result is not inconsistent with the basic standards of the act.
The Sub-Committee calls attention to the fact that while there is a difference
between the language employed in the January 18, 1946 draft and the present
draft of the casualty bill, the two sections accomplish substantially the same result.
Sec. 8— Appeal by Minority.
The incorporation of a provision for an appeal by a minority in rating bills is
of very recent origin, having been first brought up in the last two years. The
right of appeal will probably be sparingly used by minority members of rating
bureaus where there are competing bureaus in the same field or where the in-
surer can operate to good advantage without retaining his membership in the
bureau. We say this because if the insurer is dissatisfied he can resign from one
bureau and affiliate with another one or can operate independently. On the other
hand, where an insurer does not have these choices and for all practical reasons
must be a member or subscriber of a rating organization, it seems reasonable to
assume that more frequent use will be made of this form of relief.
In the January 18, 1946 draft, which is concededly broader in scope than the
present bills, language was used which gave the Commissioner the right to affirm,
modify or reverse any decision of a rating bureau upon an appeal by a minority
member. The industry had offered as a suggestion a provision which specified,
in substance, that the Commissioner could affirm the action of the majority or,
in the event that the Commissioner disagreed, he could ask the majority to re-
consider. This suggestion was unacceptable to your Sub-Committee. Both the
Conference Committee of the All-Industry Committee and your Sub-Committee
agreed that a minority appeal section should unquestionably give the Commis-
sioner the power to compel a rating organization to make a filing on behalf of a
member or subscriber where the appeal was based upon the refusal of the ma-
jority to make a filing for the appellant based upon a system of expense provi-
sions which differed from the system of expense provisions included in the filing
made by the rating organization. Such a provision is included in the casualty
bill and to that extent meets one of the major objectives which your Sub-Com-
mittee sought to attain in the language which it used in the January 18, 1946
draft.
A second class of minority apppeals, but of equal importance, arises where a
majority in a bureau refuse to make a filing for a minority on new and broader
forms of coverage, or to state it another way, an addition to the filings of the
rating organization. The attached draft specifically meets this problem and to
that extent it likewise effectuates one of the results which your Sub-Committee
sought to attain in its draft of January 18, 1946. Experience in those states where
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appeals have been taken to the Commissioner from the actions of majorities in
rating bureaus have usually centered on the two grounds enumerated. Time will
tell whether other protection for minorities is required.
Section 9— Information to be Furnished Insureds: Hearings and Appeals of
Insureds.
The language of this section is identical to the language employed in your Com-
mittee's January 18, 1946 draft. On the whole it is self-explanatory. It has a
different purpose, however, from Section 5-(d). That sub-section enables any
person aggrieved to challenge the over-all propriety of any particular filing
whereas this section enables an assured to challenge "the manner in which such
rating system has been applied in connection with the insurance afforded him".
Sec. 10— Advisory Organizations.
While this section is new it was not overlooked when your Sub-Committee pre-
pared the January 18, 1946 draft. At that time it was recognized that this prob-
lem would have to be solved and further consideration of the problem has resulted
in the language now found in the bill.
In considering the enactment of rating bills it has been recognized that were
the states to require insurers to form separate rating organizations in every state
it would create a tremendous bureaucracy, in many instances wholly unnecessary,
and would increase the cost with little or no compensating return. At the same
time it was also recognized that in order to give the state adequate control over
the activities of rating organizations, as contemplated by U. S. Public Law 15,
a method had to be devised of placing such organizations under the jurisdiction
and control of the Insurance Commissioner. Licensing was the medium employed
to achieve that result in these bills. However, there are many organizations in
the insurance business which assist insurers and rating organizations in making
rates but which cannot be said to be rating organizations. It was felt that no
useful purpose would be served by making such organizations submit to the same
licensing requirements as rating organizations. Indeed, the same argument
against unnecessary duplication of effort and expense, to which reference has al-
ready been made, applied with equal force to these organizations. At the same
time it was decided that the public interest as well as the provisions of the Sher-
man Act required that a measure of control be kept over such organizations.
Section 10 was devised to meet this problem. The organizations were labeled
advisory organizations and have been defined in subsection (a). In subsection
(b) they are required to meet certain filing requirements there enumerated and
particularly to submit to examination under exactly the same requirements as a
rating bureau. In subsection (c) power is conferred upon the Commissioner to
issue a cease and desist order if he finds that the activities of such advisory
organizations are unfair or unreasonable or otherwise inconsistent with the pro-
visions of this act. As an added safeguard, under subsection (d) insurers and
rating organizations are prohibited from using the facilities of advisory organi-
zations unless the advisory organization has first complied with the requirements
of this section. Under penalty of suspension or revocation of their licenses (Sec-
tion 16 of casualty bill and Section 15 of fire bill), insurers and rating bureaus
are prohibited from dealing with an advisory organization which is in violation
of a cease and desist order issued by the Commissioner.
Sec. 11 — Joint Underzvriting or Joint Reinsurance.
This section is new but, like Section 10, its need was visualized when the Jan-
uary 18, 1946 draft was prepared.
Subsection (a) provides, in substance, that all joint underwriting activities are
subject to all the provisions of this act whereas joint reinsurance operations are
subject only to Sections 12 and 16 to 20 of the casualty bill and Sections 12 and
15 to 19 of the fire and marine bill. The reason for this variation in treatment is
obvious when it is considered that this bill does not contemplate that reinsurance
rates shall be regulated. It may well be that the activities of certain groups, asso-
ciations or other organizations of insurers engaged in joint underwriting may be
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conducted in such a way as to fall under Section 10 and if that occurs they will
necessarily have to comply with the provisions of that section. If their opera-
tions fall short of the activities enumerated in Section 10, they will nevertheless
be subject to the general regulatory provisions set forth in Section 11 including
being subject to cease and desist orders where their activities and practices are
unfair, unreasonable or otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this act.
Sec. 12— Examinations.
Under this section the Commissioner is empowered to examine rating organi-
zations, advisory organizations and any group, association or other organization
engaged in joint underwriting or joint reinsurance. The language of the section
is self-explanatory.
Attention is directed to the footnote in the bill which points out the advisability
of incorporating in any statute a provision making reports of examinations con-
ducted under this section public records. Such statutory provision is a distinct
administrative aid.
Sec. 12— Rate Administration.
The lang-uage of this section corresponds substantially with Section 9 of the
Commissioners' draft of January 18, 1946. The language in the Commissioners'
memorandum of November 17, 1945 is therefore relevant and is repeated here-
with.
"In recent times there has become an increasing awareness upon the part
of carriers, public and supervisory authorities alike of the necessity for ade-
quate statistics covering not only the loss portion of the dollar but the ex-
pense portion as well. In most rating formulas in use today expenses con-
sume a substantial portion of the dollar and in some lines consume a major
portion of the dollar. Practically all rating laws require the commissioner
in determining the correctness of the rates to consider expense elements in
the premium dollar. It is manifest that the commissioner requires good sta-
tistics on this portion of the dollar if he is to discharge his duty. Conse-
quently a rating law which proAndes for the collection of figures on the loss
portion of the dollar only is necessarily incomplete.
"Furthermore, we must keep in mind that the Robinson-Patnam Act, a por-
tion of which will be applicable to the insurance business after January 1,
1948, expressly prohibits price differentials by reason of volume or size un-
less supported by adequate cost figures. This development gives further im-
petus to the necessity for good figures on the expense portion of the dollar.
"It is apparent that some expense items will vary from state to state. Taxes
fall in this category. Acquisition costs likewise vary from state to state. On
the other hand, there are some items in the expense portion of the dollar
which do not lend themselves readily to a breakdown on a state-by-state
basis. State supervisory authorities are cognizant of these facts and there
is no sound reason to anticipate that any unduly burdensome requirements
will be laid down by the states in connection with the collection and report-
ing of expense figures.
"In the opinion of the drafting committee this Act makes reasonable provision
for dealing with both the recording and reporting of loss and expense ex-
perience and also lays a foundation for interstate cooperation in this field."
Sec. 14— False or Misleading Information.
In the field of rate making the collection of correct statistical data is of the
essence. The suppression of necessary data or its distortion can cause not only
inaccuracy in the rates but result in imposing a financial loss upon the insuring
public. This section is designed to put teeth into the law in order to insure
accuracy. At the same time the drafters of the bill employed language which
would not subject unintentional violators of this section to penalties.
Sec. 15— Assigned Risks.
Assigned risk plans are used in a number of different lines of insurance such
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as workmen's compensation and automobile insurance. In some states the plans
are statutory ; in other states they are voluntary. The provisions of the plans
also vary from state to state depending upon the policy of the state. The method
of dealing with these plans is further complicated in certain states because of
compulsory insurance and financial responsibility acts. All of these considera-
tions made it inadvisable to attempt to deal with this subject in detail in this
statute. The Committee accordingly incorporated a provision permitting co-
operative action in this field. As a precaution it added a footnote. The footnote
is specifically designed to call to the attention of legislative bodies the necessity
of considering all relevant factors in connection with assigned risk plans.
Sec. 16— Penalties.
The language of this section is in the main self-explanatory. In drafting the
bill a distinction was drawn between wilful violations of the statute and viola-
tions in which intention could not be proved. The penalty of suspension was also
provided for those who failed to comply with an order of the Commissioner.
Both insurers and organizations are protected against arbitary or capricious ac-
tion on the part of the Commissioner by appropriate provisions for hearing and
judicial review.
Sec. 17— Hearing Procedure and Judicial Review.
Subsection (a) was embodied in the Act to provide an appeal machinery cov-
ering administrative rulings or orders made without a hearing. A similar pro-
vision was incorporated in the Commissioners' draft of January 18, 1946.
Subsection (b) is identical with a provision also found in the Commissioners'
draft of January 18, 1946 and is self-explanatory.
Subsection (c). The Committee also agreed that every order or determination
of the Commissioner should be subject to judicial review and this bill so provides.
In the January 18, 1946 draft the Committee undertook to prescribe the scope of
judicial review. In this draft the scope of the judicial review has been left open.
The Committee decided that the scope of judicial review was a matter to be de-
termined by each state in accordance with its policy or dealing with the review
of determinations made by administrative agencies.
Sec. 18— Lazvs Repealed.
This is the repealer section customarily adopted in all legislation.
Sec. 19— Covistitutionality.
This is the customary constitutionality clause.
Sec. 20— Effective Date.
The footnote in the bill is self-explanatory.
Anti-Rebate Section.
This is an additional section recommended for states which have an inadequate
anti-rebate law or have no such law. The headnote on the addendum explains
the entire purpose of the section.
Fire, Marine and Inland Marine Rate Regulatory Bill.
This bill follows the same general pattern as the casualty and surety rate regu-
latory law. Indeed, many of its sections are identical. For that reason comment
will be made in this portion of the Committee's report only on sections of the
Fire, Marine and Inland Marine Rate Regulatory Bill which are peculiar to
that bill.
Sec. 2— Scope of Act.
This section is self-explanatory.
Sec. 3— Making of Rates.
Changes peculiar to the fire insurance business have been made in this section,
particularly in subsections 1 and 3, and the same observations apply to sub-
section 4.
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Sec. 4— Rate Filings.
Subsection (e) is in some respects similar to Section 4-(e) of the casualty and
surety bill dealing as it does with specially rated risks which do not fit in the
normal rating pattern. Provision is made for dealing with this special class of
risks in Section 5-(b) under the general heading of "Disapproval of Filings."
Sec. 6— Rating Organizations.
Subsection (e) is peculiar to the fire insurance business. In the parlance of
the business this section authorizes the operation of a "stamping office."
Sec. 7— Deviations.
The deviation section in the fire, marine and inland marine rate regulatory bill
differs somewhat from the deviation section of the casualty and surety bill. It is
broader in scope since it does not require a uniform percentage deviation and re-
flects the difference in the methods of operation of the two businesses.
Sec. 8— Appeal by Minority.
That portion of the casualty and surety rating bill which deals with appeals in
connection with systems of expense provisions is omitted from the fire, marine
and inland marine rate regulatory bill. This is due to a difference in the oper-
ating methods of the businesses.
Conclusion and Recommendation
The casualty and surety rate regulatory bill and the fire, marine and inland
marine rate regulatory bill represent the product of a series of conferences be-
tween the Conference Committee of the All-Industry Committee and your Sub-
Committee. The object of the conferences was to develop bills which would be
acceptable to the states and the industry based upon intensive research and study
extending over a period of more than two years. In the course of the conferences
many conflicting views among many segments of the industry as well as between
the industry and the Commissioners were reconciled and these bills can be viewed
as representing the composite views of those who participated in the deliberations.
The All-Industry Conference Committee has unanimously recommended to the
All-Industry Committee that the All-Industry Committee approve both bills. A
meeting of the All-Industry Committee has been called to act on the matter prior
to the time the matter will be submitted to the Commissioners for action at Port-
land.
As we pointed out in our earlier report, the sciences of rate making is a pro-
gressive one and as time passes changes and improvements will, no doubt suggest
themselves. However, in the light of present day thinking and for those states
which subscribe to the principles set forth in the bills, the Committee recommends
their use at this time.
The Sub-Committee requests the Committee on Rates and Rating Organiza-
tions (1) to approve and ratify the attached bills, (2) to approve this report and
(3) to submit the bills and this report to the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners to be held at Portland, Oregon in June, 1946 with a recommen-
dation by the full Committee that the bills and this report be approved and
adopted by the Association. The requests and recommendations made in this
paragraph are contingent upon approval and acceptance of both bills in their
present form by the All-Industry Committee before action is taken by the full
Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations and the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners at Portland.
Respectfully submitted,
Charles F. J. Harrington (Mass.), Chairman
NewALL R. Johnson (Minn.)
Robert E. Dineen (N. Y.)
New York, N. Y.
May 23, 1946.
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REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON
RATES AND RATING ORGANIZATIONS
NEW YORK, N. Y.
MAY 17-18, 1946
The Sub-Committee of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations met
with the Conference Committee of the All Industry Committee in New York on
May 17 and 18 to give further consideration to the matter of uniform rating legis-
lation. The following members of the Sub-Committee were present:
Hon. Charles F. J. Harrington, Massachusetts, Chairman
Hon. Newell R. Johnson, Minnesota
Hon. Robert E. Dineen, New York
Also present was Deputy Superintendent A. J. Bohlinger of New York.
A redraft of those sections of the bill on which agreement had been reached at
the meeting held in Atlantic City April 29— May 2, 1946 was submitted to your
Committee. It was also reported that the various proposals regarding coopera-
tive action among rating organizations, joint underwriting operations, assigned
risks and activities of organizations engaged in assisting rating organizations
had been redrafted. It was further reported that the various modifications and
suggestions had been integrated into a new draft of the Casualty and Surety
Rating Regulatory bill as well as the Fire and Marine Regulatory Bill, both
dated May 2, 1946. The said drafts were discussed particularly with reference
to the proposed sections covering assistance to rating organizations, joint under-
writing operations, cooperative action among rating organizations and assigned
risks.
There was also discussed at considerable length Section 3-a-3 of the Fire and
Marine Rating Bill, with particular reference to the rate making factor "reason-
able margin for underwriting profit".
Following a full exchange of views, your Committee went into executive ses-
sion. At the conclusion thereof, your Committee met with the All Industry Com-
mittee and the various points still open for consideration were disposed of as
follows
:
Section 2 of the Fire and Casualty Bills.
This Section covers the scope of the Act. At previous meetings there had
been left open for final determination the matter of overlapping coverage.
The question involved concerned itself primarily with the question of which
branch of the industry should exercise rating functions over automobile busi-
ness. After consultation it was agreed with the industry that such function
should be exercised by the casualty branch of the insurance business. Accord-
ingly it was agreed that all reference to motor vehicle insurance as con-
tained in the draft of the Fire and Marine Bill should be deleted therefrom
and same should be covered by the Casualty Bill.
Section 3 of the Fire and Casualty Bills.
In reference to the factors to be taken into consideration the use of the
words "underwriting profit" was considered at great length. Your Com-
mittee had reviewed considerable data which disclosed that there was some
question as to the meaning to be given to the word "underwriting" and as
to what elements should be taken into consideration in determining profit.
The All Industry Committee felt that the word "underwriting" should be
included in the draft. It was finally agreed that the said word would be
omitted and that an asterisk should precede the word "profit" with a foot-
note comment to read: "The All Industry Conference believes the word 'un-
derwriting' should precede the word 'profit'. The National Association of
Insurance Commissioners is giving further study to this matter."
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In the same section the use of the word "contingencies" had been left open
for discussion. After explanation had been made, and the common practice
in the business concerning loading contingencies had been discussed, it was
agreed that the said word should remain in the bill.
Section 10 of the Casualty and Fire Bills.
At the meeting held in Atlantic City April 29— May 2 the All Industry
Committee submitted a draft covering the activities of organizations which
assisted insurers or rating organizations by the collection and furnishing of
loss and expense statistics or by the submission of recommendations. Con-
sideration of this section had been held in abeyance and was given further
consideration by your Committee. Such organizations were designated in
the draft as "Service Organizations". It was felt by your Committee that
the title "Service Organizations" would be confusing particularly in view of
the fact that some states already have statutory enactments covering service
organizations which would not come within the purview of the section sub-
mitted by the All Industry Committee. Your Committee therefore suggested
that the title of the section be changed to read "Advisory Organizations"
which suggestion was agreed to by the All Industry Committee. Section
10(a) limited advisory organizations to an organization of insurers. Your
Committee felt that this limitation was restrictive inasmuch as advisory
groups which were not groups of insurers might be active in connection
with rate making. The definition was accordingly broadened to include
"every group, association or other organization of insurers".
Section 11 of the Casualty and Fire Bills.
The subject of joint underwriting operations by insurers was submitted
as a new amendment to Section 11 of both the casualty and the fire bills.
After consideration it was agreed that the said section as drafted would be
acceptable.
Section 12 of the Casualty and Fire Bills.
At previous meetings the examination of rating organizations had been
discussed and it had been agreed that such organizations should be subject
to examination by the commissioner. At the meeting held in New York
May 17 and 18 there was a discussion with reference to examining advisory
organizations and joint underwriting operations. Your Committee felt that
all organizations of the said character should be subject to examination. It
was agreed that a new section should be drawn which would in omnibus
form cover this subject. The All Industry Committee submitted a proposed
draft which was accepted by your Committee.
Section 7 of the Casualty Bill.
This section covers deviations. It has consistently been the contention of
your Committee that the section as drafted by the All Industry Committee
was too restrictive in its scope. Your Committee informed the All Industry
Committee that it would not accept the section as presented unless deviations
could be obtained on a broader scale than that provided for in the draft sub-
mitted by the All Industry Committee. Upon being apprised of your Com-
mittee's views, the All Industry Committee redrafted the said section. As
redrafted, your Committee agreed to accept the same.
Section 15 of the Casualty Bill.
This section covers assigned r
2nd your committee felt that the
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in that any assigned risk plans which operate voluntarily under an agree-
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ment could operate only after approval of the plan by the commissioner. The
All Industry Committee conceded, however, that in some states it might be
desirable to have assigned risk plans operate only under specific statutory
authorization. A further objection raised by your Committee w^as to the
fact that the section, as drafted, authorized surcharges. Your Committee
was of the opinion that in some instances surcharges would not be applied.
After discussion it was agreed to substitute in place of the word "surcharges"
the words "reasonable rate modifications." It was therefore agreed between
your Committee and the All Industry Committee that the section, as sub-
mitted in the draft of May 2, would be accepted with the words "reasonable
rate modifications" in place of "surcharges" subject, however, to the provi-
sion that a footnote appear in any draft submitted to a state legislature
calling attention to the fact that if assigned risk plans were to operate only
pursuant to statutory authority adequate legislation should be presented for
legislative consideration.
Section 2 of the Fire and Marine Bill.
The matter of the definition of inland marine insurance contained in Sec-
tion 2 of the Fire Bill was discussed and it was agreed the definition as ori-
ginally drafted and as contained in the Fire and Marine Bill of May 2, 1946
would be acceptable. Accordingly the definition as contained in the said bill
was agreed upon.
Section 6 f of the Fire Bill.
In the draft of May 2 the subject of the purchase by a rating organization
of actuarial, technical or other services was discussed in relation to Section
10 covering advisory organizations. Your Committee agreed that the sec-
tion as submitted would be acceptable.
Representatives of the National Association of Insurance Brokers attended
the meeting and suggested that the following language be included in the
bill:
"Nothing in this Act shall abridge the right of an insurer freely to con-
tract with agents and brokers with respect to the matter of commissions,
or with others with respect to matters of internal management".
The subject was discussed at considerable length and it was considered ad-
visable to omit reference thereto. However, it was agreed that the same will
be covered in a memorandum which will accompany the bill on submission
to any legislative body so this question may be decided in each jurisdiction
in accordance with such legislative action as might be deemed advisable or
desirable.
Respectfully submitted,
Charles F. J. Harrington (Mass.), Chairman
NewALL R. Johnson (Minn.)
Robert E. Dineen (N. Y.)
New York, N. Y.'
May 18, 1946
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REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON
RATES AND RATING ORGANIZATIONS
ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY
April 29 to May 2, 1946
The Sub-Committee of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations met
with the All-Industry Committee at Atlantic City, New Jersey, on April 29, 30,
May 1 and 2, to give further consideration to the matter of uniform rating legis-
lation.
The following members of the Sub-Committee were in attendance
:
Hon. Charles F. J. Harrington, Massachusetts, Chairman
Hon. Newell R. Johnson, Minnesota
Hon. Robert E. Dineen, New York
Hon. Hugh Christie, as proxy for Hon. J. Edwin Larson, Florida
Also present were
:
Hon. William A. Sullivan, Washington
Hon. Walter Dressel, Ohio
Deputy Superintendent Walter F. Martineau, New York
Deputy Superintendent Alfred J. Bohlinger, New York
Examiner G. A. Corso, Ohio
The All-Industry Committee presented three proposals for additional sections
to be added to the Casualty Bill as follows
:
(a) A section to bring assigned risk plans within the supervisory power of
commissioners.
(b) A provision authorizing cooperation among rating organizations or
among rating organizations and insurers.
(c) A provision bringing within the scope of the law underwriting pools,
such as the Grain Pool, the Cotton Pool, F.I.A. and others, and also
bringing within the scope of rating laws organizations which assist in-
surers or rating organizations in rate making by the collection and
furnishing of loss and expense statistics or the submission of recom-
mendations.
With the exception of the proposed section covering assigned risk plans the fore-
going proposals were also submitted for consideration in connection with the
Fire and Marine Rating Bill.
The said proposals were discussed with the All-Industry Committee. Your
Committee indicated that as to the proposal covering underwriting pools and
organizations engaged in assisting insurers and rating organizations the same
was on its face unacceptable. Your Committee suggested that the All-Industry
Committee endeavor to redraft the said proposals for later consideration at a sub-
sequent session of the meeting. Your Committee informed the All-Industry Com-
mittee that all of the foregoing proposals would have to be given further consider-
ation by the Commissioners.
The foregoing matters were then taken up by your Committee in executive
session with the following results : As to the proposed section covering assigned
risks, it was felt that the proposal was defective in that it did not provide for
adequate supervision ; it did not provide for approval of the plan by the Com-
missioner ; it did not provide any appeal machinery. Your Committee agreed to
submit these criticisms to the All-Industry Committee for further consideration.
As to the balance of the foregoing proposals, it was the unanimous opinion of
your Committee that in the form presented by the All-Industry Committee, the
sections were open to criticism in that they placed a cloak around activities in
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concert without adequate regulatory safeguards. Your Committee informed the
All-Industry Committee of its objections. The All-Industry Committee having
redrafted the provisions with regard to underwriting pools and organizations
which assist insurers or rating organizations submitted the revised proposals.
Your Committee decided to hold the same in abeyance until determination of the
various questions hereinbefore referred to.
With further reference to the Casualty Bill, the following matters were con-
sidered :
Section 2 a (3) of the Casualty Bill. At the meeting held in Chicago on
April 23-26, the All-Industry Committee submitted a revision of Section 3 a
(3) of the Casualty Bill by adding thereto further wording to produce
greater flexibility in rating plans. After consideration by your Committee,
the section as revised was accepted and agreed to by the All-Industry Com-
mittee.
Section 7 of the Casualty Bill. This section covering deviations was dis-
cussed by your Committee in executive session and with the All-Industry
Committee. It was agreed by your Committee that Section 7, as contained
in the All-Industry draft of April 19, 1946, would not be acceptable and the
said section was held over for further consideration.
With specific reference to the Fire and Marine Bill, the following subjects
were considered at the meeting
:
Section 2 of the Fire Bill. At previous meetings your Committee indi-
cated that the definition of Inland Marine Insurance should be clarified.
Upon reconsideration of the matter, the All-Industry Committee stated that
it could not improve upon the definition and the matter was left for future
consideration.
Section 2 a (1) and 2 a (2) of the Fire Bill. At the meeting held in Chi-
cago, the omission of the reference to "basic classifications" in Section 3 a
(1) was discussed. The origin of the language could not be ascertained,
nor could its meaning be definitely established. It was agreed between your
Committee and the All-Industry Committee that the reference to basic classi-
fications, as one of the factors in the making of rates, should be omitted.
Your Committee also resumed discussion with the All-Industry Committee
with reference to the factor set forth in 3 a (3) of the draft of April 19,
regarding a "reasonable margin for underwriting profit". The All-Industry
Committee advised your Committee that the words had a definite meaning;
had been judicially interpreted and that they were sufficiently clear. Your
Committee decided to hold the matter in abeyance pending investigation into
the judicial decisions construing the said words.
Section 4 (a) of the Fire Bill. Section 4 a of the draft of April 19, was
taken up with the All-Industry Committee. It was the unanimous opinion
of your Committee that supporting information should accompany all rate
filings. After consideration, the All-Industry Committee advised that they
had agreed to adopt the language contained in Section 4 a of the Casualty
Bill which language had previously been agreed upon and was acceptable to
your Committee.
Section 6 f of the Fire Bill. Section 6 f, which provides that any rating
organization may subscribe for or purchase actuarial or other technical
service, was discussed at the Chicago meeting held on April 23-26. At the
meeting held in Atlantic City, the All-Industry Committee presented the
proposals covering pools, etc., hereinbefore referred to. It was the unani-
mous opinion of your Committee that Section 6 f, as contained in the All-
Industry draft, was irrevocably tied up with the aforementioned proposals
and that disposition of all questions in connection with Section 6 f should
await further study.
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The following- subjects, which apply to both the Casualty Bill and the Fire
Bill, were discussed at the meeting:
Section 2 of the Casualty and Fire Bills. This section, which covers the
subject of overlapping coverage, was discussed. The All-Industry Com-
mittee had not reached any accord and the matter was continued for dis-
cussion at future meetings.
Section 4 f of the Casualty and Fire Bills. At the previous meetings, there
had been left open for future consideration this section of both the Casualty
and Fire Bills. This section covers the matter of waiving of filings. After
further consideration, your Committee decided to adopt the entire wording
of the section as submitted in the draft of April 19, 1946.
Section 5 d of the Casualty and Fire Bills. At previous meetings the
matter of appeals by aggrieved persons had been the subject of discussion.
As a result of suggestions made by your Committee, the All-Industry Com-
mittee prepared a draft numbered Section 5 d in both the Casualty and Fire
Bills providing for an appeal by any aggrieved person or organization with
respect to any filing. The section as drafted provided the safeguards urged
by your Committee. The said section was in acceptable form and was agreed
upon between your Committee and the All-Industry Committee.
Section 10 of the Casualty and Fire Bills. Section 10 a of the drafts of
April 19, 1946, provided that loss and countrywide expense experience
should be made available to the Commissioners at least biennially. It was
felt by your Committee that such experience should be made available at
least annually. The matter was submitted to the All-Industry Committee
and the said Committee agreed with your Committee's recommendations.
The matter of factors to be taken into consideration in the making of rates and
more particularly the use of the word "contingencies" (3 a (1) of the Casualty
Bill and 3 a (3) of the Fire Bill) was again discussed but no agreement was
reached.
At the close of the meeting, it was decided that a further meeting would be
held in New York City, May 17, and May 18, 1946.
Sub-Committee of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations
Charles F. J. Harrington, Chairman, Massachusetts
Robert E. Dineen, New York
Newell R. Johnson, Minnesota
REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON
RATES AND RATING ORGANIZATIONS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
April 23-26, 1946
The Sub-Committee of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations met
with the Drafting Committee of the All-Industry Committee at Chicago, on April
23, 24, 25 and 26, for further consideration of the matter of uniform rating legis-
lation.
The following members of the Sub-Committee were in attendance
:
Hon. Charles F. J. Harrington, Chairman, Massachusetts
Hon. Newell R. Johnson, Minnesota
Hon. Robert E. Dineen, New York
also present were Deputy Superintendent Alfred J. Bohlinger of New York and
William C. Green, Assistant Attorney General of Minnesota.
cxiv P.D. 9
The All-Industry Committee reported that it had given consideration to the
various points and had endeavored to redraft the proposed Casualty and Surety
Rate Regulatory Bill, dated February 28, 1946, which had been the subject of
the discussion of the meeting held at French Lick. They reported that in an
effort to meet the objections raised by your Committee, the various sections in
question had been redrafted. The All-Industry Committee presented a new draft
of the Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Bill dated February 28, 1946. The
various points were as follows :
1. Section 1 of the Draft which covers the purposes of the Act had pre-
viously provided that the Act was intended among other things " * * * to
authorize and regulate cooperative action among insurers * * * ". The All-
Industry Committee reported that it was the consensus that the purpose of
the bill was not only to authorize cooperative action, but that the essence of
the bill included comprehensive rate regulation as well as regulation of co-
operative action and that therefore the words "and regulate" were not only
feasible but necessary in order that the Section might be truly descriptive.
Your Committee felt that the explanation was essentially correct and
agreed to withdraw its previous objection. Consequently the words previ-
ously objected to, to wit: "and regulate" are now included as part of the
Section.
2. Sub-section D of Section 4 of the Draft provided for a waiting period
of 15 days before a filing should become effective, with a further provision
that the period could be extended by the Commissioner for an additional
period not to exceed 15 days, in the event that the Commissioner required
additional time for the filing. The All-Industry Committee stated that
further consideration had been given to extend the period of time in each in-
stance as requested by your Sub-Committee in French Lick. Attention was
called to the fact that the draft of the Commissioners' bill of January 18,
1946, a 30 day limit had been fixed. The counter proposals made by the
All-Industry Committee indicated an overwhelming sentiment for the preser-
vation of the 30 day period.
After reconsidering the matter, your Committee was of the opinion that
the 30 day period was consistent with the action taken at the meeting of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners at Grand Rapids in De-
cember, 1945, and accordingly agreed to withdraw its previous objection.
As the draft now stands it is agreed that the draft of the bill dated April 19,
1946, insofar as the waiting period is concerned, will be acceptable. It is
believed by your Committee that the Industry will continue the practice of
submitting material concerning rate filings in advance of the official filing.
The continuance of this practice will afford the Commissioner the oppor-
tunity for preliminary consideration which the additional 15 day period in
the law would have accomplished.
3. A further point of difference between your Sub-Committee and the
All-Industry Committee at French Lick, Indiana, had reference to the waiv-
ing of the filing of rates. The differences between the All-Industry Com-
mittee and the Sub-Committee were not resolved at the Chicago meeting and
therefore this matter was left open for consideration at the next session at
Atlantic City.
4. Subsection G of Section 4, of the draft of April 19, covered the matter
of the charging of a rate in excess of that provided by a filing insofar as any
specific risks might be concerned. It further provided that such excess rate
could be charged upon the written application of the insured, stating his
reasons therefor, filed with and approved by the Commisioners. The section
provided further "such approval shall be given if the Commissioner is satis-
fied that the insured knows the rate otherwise applicable and consents to the
excess rate".
Part I
As previously explained this section was designed to cover the situation
of a sub-standard risk. Your Sub-Committee was of the opinion that the
last sentence of the proposed section which required the Commissioner's
approval placed a mandatory obligation upon the Commissioner without jus-
tification. It was suggested by your Committee and agreed to by the All-
Industry Commitee that the latter provision be omitted. Your Committee
suggested that an explanation of the intent of this section should be contained
in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the bill.
5. As previously reported, the section covering deviations as contained in
your Committee's proposed draft of January 18, 1946, provided approval of
a uniform percentage decrease or increase in premiums. Considerable time
was devoted to a discussion of this section, but no agreement was reached.
Your Committee requested that the industry give further consideration to
the improvement of this section in the interest of competition. This matter
was left for consideration at the next meeting.
6. In the January 18, 1946, draft of the Commissioners' bill, the Commis-
sioner was empowered to issue an order affirming or reversing the action of
a rating organization in connection with an appeal by a minority group or
groups. Since the meeting held at French Lick, the All-Industry Committee
had given further consideration to the objections raised by your Committee
to the fact that the bill proposed by the latter limited the Commissioner to
affirmance and provided that if the Commissioner was not in accord he could
only send the matter back to the rating organization for further considera-
tion. At that time, it was pointed out by your Committee that if a rating
organization should reject a solitary change in or an addition to the filing of
a rating organization the Commissioner should not be limited in protecting
interests of a minority having a meritorious suggestion. The latter consti-
tuted the principal objection to the All-Industry's draft. In an effort to
meet your Committee's objection on this score, the draft of April 19, 1946,
submitted to your Committee for its consideration included the power to re-
verse in those cases where the rating organization had rejected a proposed
addition to its filings.
After discussion your Committee agreed to the provision as contained in
the draft of Section 8, dated April 19, 1946.
7. In the Commissioner's draft of January 18, 1946, it was provided that
any person or organization aggrieved by the action of the Commissioner
with respect to any filing might make written request to the Commissioner
for a hearing. At the French Lick meeting, the All-Industry Committee
presented a draft of the bill in which a request for a hearing was limited to
an insurer, a rating organization or an insured person. The All-Industry
Committee was informed that in the opinion of your Committee, the public
interest would best be served if any aggrieved person were accorded the
privilege of obtaining a hearing. The All-Industry Committee at the present
meeting did not offer any suggestion for meeting this problem. Therefore
your Committee drafted a proposed sub-section to cover the situation. The
same was submitted to the All-Industry Committee which in turn prepared
a further draft which was presented to your Committee at the conclusion of
the meeting. No action could be taken thereon and the matter has been held
over for further consideration by your Committee.
8. At the meeting held in French Lick, Section 2 of the Commissioners'
draft of January 18, 1946, with respect to types of coverage subject to regu-
lation by more than one regulatory act was discussed with the All-Industry
Committee. At that time your Committee informed the All-Industry Com-
mittee that the provisions contained in the Commissioners' draft with respect
to this matter was preferable to that contained in the draft of April 19, 1946.
At the said meeting, the All-Industry Committee indicated that there was
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not complete accord among the members of the All-Industry Committee, even
as to the provisions proposed in the Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory
Bill of April 19, 1946. At the present meeting, your Committee inquired as
to the status of the matter and was informed that the members of the All-
Industry Committee had not yet been able to resolve the various questions
among themselves and that they were still not in complete accord. They
stated that they were giving the matter their further consideration and hoped
to be able to present an acceptable provision to your Committee at the next
meeting on the bill.
9. At the meeting held in French Lick, your Committee discussed with
the All-Industry Committee the matter of Section 11 of the Commissioners'
draft of January 18, 1946, covering penalties imposed for violation of the
Act. The All-Industry Committee felt that no penalty should be imposed for
a violation other than a wilful violation, and requested your Committee to
permit an amendment which would provide for penalty only where a vio-
lation was committed wilfully. Your Committee informed the All-Industry
Committee that the request could not be acceded to. Accordingly, Section
11 of the Commissioners' draft has been agreed upon, except that the
amounts have been reduced from $250 and $1,000 to $50 and $500 respec-
tively.
10. In the Casualty draft dated April 19, 1946, a section prohibiting re-
bates was proposed. Your Committee called to the attention of the All-In-
dustry Committee the fact that in many States the Insurance Laws contained
prohibitions against rebates and that therefore the model rating bills should
not carry such a section. Your Committee suggested to the All-Industry
Committee that it would be preferable to have any proposed section dealing
with rebates submitted as an addendum to the model bill so that each State
could take such action as it wished to make its own determination as to
whether it should continue the present rebate laws or adopt a prohibition
against rebating as part of its rating law. It was also suggested that the
form of addendum submitted by the All-Industry Committee with the draft
of February 28, 1946, should be used. The All-Industry Committee agreed
to both these suggestions made by your Committee.
IL In the draft of April 19, 1946, the All-Industry Committee made cer-
tain changes in connection with the forms of insurance which were to be
excluded from the Act. The matter of the exclusion of aircraft was dis-
cussed at considerable length. Your Committee informed the All-Industry
group that it did not favor the exclusion for the reason, among others, that
the business should be susceptible to the regulation by States and that no
State should relinquish its right to carry out the supervision. The All-In-
dustry Committee was further advised that in the opinion of your Committee
the pool operations in the aviation branch of the business might well be held
to be in contravention of the Anti-Trust Laws against price fixing by com-
panies, and that therefore the aviation insurance underwriters would be most
vulnerable to any charges of violation of the Anti-Trust Laws. Your Com-
mittee informed the All-Industry Committee that it was cognizant of the fact
that reliable experience is not now available and that the general situation
regarding aircraft insurance militated against satisfactory rate regulation at
this time. The All-Industry Committee stated that the views of the Com-
missioners were cogent but that the industry itself was in a position where
it could not resolve the question. It was thereupon agreed that the exclusion
of aircraft would remain in the Act but that submission of the bill should be
accompanied by an explanatory memorandum embodying the foregoing
points.
12. Section 3- (a) of the draft of April 19, 1946, requires that all rates
shall be made in accordance with certain standards. Section 3-(a)-(l),
among other standards, includes a factor for "contingencies". Your Sub-
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Committee was of the opinion that the word "contingencies" was indefinite
and possibly unnecessary in view of the reference to "all other relevant fac-
tors" set forth later in the same sub-section. Certain illustrations were given
as to possible contingencies but the Sub-Committee reached no final decision
as to this phase of the matter. It was agreed that the matter would be given
further consideration and would be discussed at the next meeting with the
All-Industry Committee.
At the meeting held at French Lick, it was decided that the form of the Fire,
Marine and Inland Marine Rate Regulatory Bill would follow the Casualty and
Surety Rate Regulatory Bill with such changes, however, as would be necessi-
tated by differences in the manner of operations of the business. In accordance
with that understanding, a Fire, Marine and Inland Marine Rate Regulatory Bill,
dated April 19, 1946, was considered by your Sub-Committee and the differences
between the proposed draft and the Casualty Bill of April 19, 1946, were dis-
cussed and explained by the industry group. Following this explanation, your
Sub-Committee caused a comparison to be made between the Commissioners'
bill approved at the Grand Rapids meeting and subsequently amended by the
draft of January 18, 1946, and the Fire, Marine and Inland Marine Rate Regula-
tory Bill, dated April 19, 1946, submitted at this meeting and hereinafter referred
to as the Fire, Marine and Inland Marine draft of April 19, 1946. Eighteen
points of difference were found to exist. The differences were taken up with the
All-Industry Committee, as a result of which the All-Industry Committee agreed
to amend the bill in accordance with your Sub-Committee's recommendations.
After these differences had been reconciled, there still remained for discussion
five points, as follows :
1. In the Commissioners' draft of January 18, 1946, Section 2, covering
the scope of the act, provided that the act should apply to fire and marine in-
surance and allied lines. In the draft of April 19, 1946, submitted to your
Committee the words "allied lines" were omitted and in place thereof the
All-Industry Committee attempted specifically to cover the matter of inland
marine insurance and set up what in effect was a definition of the lines em-
braced within that subject. The All-Industry suggestion read as follows:
"Inland marine insurance shall be deemed to include insurance now or
hereafter defined by statute, or by interpretation thereof, or if not so de-
fined or interpreted, by ruling of the Commissioner * * *, or as estab-
lished by general custom of the business, as inland marine insurance."
The Sub-Committee raised the point that possibly a better definition of in-
land marine insurance could be devised and so reported to the All-Industry
Committee, which agreed to give the matter further consideration.
2. The draft of April 19, 1946, contained a provision with respect to
rates subject to more than one rate regulatory act and contained the same
provision as is contained in the Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Bill.
The matter of this alleged "overlapping coverage" has been covered herein-
before under point 8.
3. Basic classifications. See Section 3- (a). The All-Industry Committee
explained that the foregoing language had been omitted because of doubt
concerning the meaning of same. Your Committee decided to do some re-
search on its own account and to consider the desirability of omitting the
language at its next meeting.
4. Under Section 3- (a) -(3) of the draft of April 19, 1946, which covers
the factors to be taken into consideration in connection with the making of
rates, provision is made for a "reasonable margin for underwriting profit
and contingencies". In some rate regulatory statutes the word "under-
writing" is omitted. There are different and conflicting philosophies as to
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what factors should be considered in determining profits for rate regulatory-
purposes. A sub-committee of the Fire and Marine Committee of the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners is now engaged in reconsid-
ering the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' 1921 profit
formula for use in fire rate making. This subject was explored by your sub-
committee with the All-Industry Committee and is to receive further con-
sideration. No final action was taken. With regard to the word "contin-
gencies" this matter has been hereinbefore discussed under point 12 of this
report.
5. Section 6-(f) of the draft of April 19, 1946, provides that "any rating
organization may subscribe for or purchase actuarial, technical or other
services and such services shall be available to all members and subscribers
without discrimination." One of the major questions confronting the All-
Industry Committee and your Sub-Committee is that of dealing with organi-
zations which assist and make recommendations to rating bureaus in regard
to rates and other activities of rating bureaus. The legislative treatment of
these organizations is tied in directly with Section 6-(f) and it was decided
to defer any action on 6-(f) at this time until the Sub-Committee had had
an opportunity to consider that section along with the proposed method of
dealing with organizations which assist and make recommendations to rating
bureaus. The same observations apply with equal force to groups, associa-
tions or organizations of insurers engaged in joint underwriting or reinsur-
ance of property or risks.
The Sub-Committee deems it unnecessary to set forth in detail in this report
those matters upon which agreement was reached by the Sub-Committee and the
All-Industry Committee and which will be reflected in a revised draft. The re-
vised draft, when submitted, will be compared with the recommendations made
by your Sub-Committee to ascertain whether there has been substantial compli-
ance therewith. An explanatory memorandum will accompany the final draft if
agreed upon between your Committee and the All-Industry Committee.
Your Sub-Committee will confer with the Drafting Committee of the All-In-
dustry group and the All-Industry Committee at Atlantic City on April 29, to
May 2, inclusive.
Sub-Committee of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations
Charles F. J. Harrington, Chairman, Massachusetts
Robert E. Dineen, New York
Newell R. Johnson, Minnesota
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
RATES AND RATING ORGANIZATIONS
FRENCH LICK, INDIANA
March 11-14. 1946
The Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations met with the All-Industry
Committee at French Lick, Indiana, on March 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946, for the
purpose of giving further consideration to the matter of uniform rating legisla-
tion. The following members of the Committee were in attendance
:
Hon. Charles F. J. Harrington, Massachusetts, Chairman
Hon. Robert E. Dineen, New York
Hon. Newell R. Johnson, Minnesota
Hon. James M. McCormack, Tennessee
Hon. Seth B. Thompson, Oregon
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Also present were the following members of the National Association of In-
surance Commissioners
:
Hon. W. EUery Allyn, Connecticut
Hon. Walter Dressel, Ohio
Hon. David A. Forbes, Michigan
Hon. Nelis A. Parkinson, Illinois
Hon. John D. Pearson, Indiana
as well as a number of Department representatives of various states.
In our report to the semi-annual session of the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners on December 5, 1945, your Committee made the following
comment : — "The Committee makes no claim that the proposed bills represent
the ultimate or last word in rating bills. It is recognized that the science of rate
regulation is a progressive one and that changes in thinking will occur as our
experience and stock of knowledge increase". With this comment in mind, your
Committee gave consideration to an alternative approach to the prior approval of
rates which had been given consideration at a previous meeting of the All-In-
dustry Committee held at the Hotel New Yorker, New York City, January 23-25,
1946 ; at which time, six points were outlined for discussion and report. The six
points are as follows :
(1) A waiting period to be specified.
(2) A mandate to the Commissioner to review filings submitted to him.
(3) In the event that he requires further time for review then time limit to
be specified.
(4) If he does not approve or disapprove, then it will be assumed that the
filing meets the standards of the act.
(5) He may authorize any filing to become effective before the waiting
period provided for in the act expires.
(6) Any subsequent disapproval by the Commissioner would not be retro-
active.
Commissioner Harrington inquired regarding the said six points and was in-
formed that the members of the All-Industry Committee had agreed upon the
same and had incorporated the said points in a proposed casualty and surety
rating bill. Mr. Hugh Harbison then presented to the Commissioners the pro-
posed bill which, in addition to incorporating the six points, was to some extent
a revision of the bill prepared by your Committee under date of January 18, 1946,
a copy of which had previously been sent to the members of the National Associ-
ation of Insurance Commissioners. The draft used by your Committee at this
meeting was dated February 28, 1946, and included changes agreed upon through
that date. Mr. Harbison proceeded to point out wherein the All-Industry Com-
mittee had incorporated in its draft the six points. After this presentation and
in view of the fact that the Commissioners had not had the benefit of studying
the proposed bill in advance of the meeting, your Committee went into executive
session.
A comparison was made between your Committee's draft of January 18, 1946,
and the proposed bill submitted by the All-Industry Committee. It was found
that there were eighteen points of difference between the two drafts. Your Com-
mittee then met with the All-Industry Committee and the eighteen points were
submitted with the request that the All-Industry Committee consider the same.
Thereafter the All-Industry Committee reported back and agreed to the Com-
missioners' views on eleven of the points raised. The area of disagreement was
thereby narrowed to seven points as follows :
(1) Section 1 of the draft covers the purposes of the act which includes as
one of the purposes, " * * * ^q authorize and regulate cooperative action
among insurers in ratemaking and in other matters within the scope
of this act".
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Your Committee was hesitant to use language which might be construed as an
omnibus approval of all cooperative action in ratemaking. Your Committee sug-
gested that the reference to regulation be omitted.
(2) Among the provisions contained in Section 4, the All-Industry Com-
mittee submitted a clause which concerned itself with the date when a
filing should become effective. The All-Industry Committee draft pro-
vided that " * * * each filing shall be on file for a waiting period of
fifteen days before it becomes effective, which period may be extended
by the Commissioner for an additional period not to exceed fifteen days
* * * " in the event that a Commissioner needed additional time for con-
sideration of the filing.
Your Committee felt that the waiting period before the rate became effective
should be thirty days rather than fifteen days with an additional priod of fifteen
days in the event that the Commissioner required further time for consideration
of the filing, in all a total of forty-five days.
(3) A further point of difference between the Commissioners and the All-
Industry Committee concerned itself with the waiving of the filing of
rates. The All-Industry draft provided that "Under such rules and reg-
ulations as he shall adopt the Commissioner may, by written order, sus-
pend or modify the requirement of filing as to any kind of insurance,
subdivision or combination thereof, or as to classes of risks, the rates
for which cannot practicably be filed before they are used".
Your Committee suggested that a further provision be added authorizing the
Commissioner to waive a filing in any case where he considered the same un-
necessary, or impractical as to kind, class, subdivision or combination of in-
surance.
(4) Under section 4, of the draft submitted by the All-Industry Committee,
it was provided "A rate in excess of that provided by a filing otherwise
applicable may be used on any specifific risk with the written consent of
the Commissioner and the insured".
Upon inquiry the representatives of the All-Industry Committee explained that
this section was intended to cover the situation of a sub-standard risk. Your
Committee was of the opinion that a reference should be embodied in the section
to establish the intent more clearly.
(5) Under the heading of "Deviations'" your Committee in its proposed
draft of January 18, 1946, provided for approval of a uniform percent-
age decrease or increase on premiums produced by a rating system for
a kind, class or classes of insurance or for a sub-divison or combination
thereof for which the application of separate expense provisions had
been approved by the Commissioner. In the All-Industry Committee
draft it was provided that application could be made for a uniform per-
centage decrease or increase " * * * to be applied to the premiums pro-
duced by the rating system so filed for a kind of insurance, or for a
sub-division or combination thereof for which sub-division or combina-
tion separate expense provisions are applicable"
.
The attention of the ,All-Industry Committee was called to the fact that in its
draft the reference to class or classes of insurance had been omitted and that a
material change had been made with regard to deviations in connection with
rates to which separate expense provisions were applicable. It was suggested to
the All-Industry Committee that they reconsider the section in order to make
the same more elastic in order to meet the problem administratively and provide
"that competitive rates on a sound, financial basis" be made available to the pub-
lic under this section.
(6) In the January 18, 1946, draft of Commissioners' bill, the Commis-
-sioner was empowered to make an order affirming or reversing the ac-
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tion of the rating organization. The All-Industry Committee in its draft
covering the same subject omitted the provision for affirmance or re-
versal and in its place substituted a provision authorizing the Commis-
sioner to " * * * issue an order approving the action or decision of such
rating organization or directing it to give further consideration to such
proposal".
Your Committee felt that in dealing with appeals by minorities the elimination
of the power to reverse in fact emasculated the section ; that the absence of any
power of reversal would for all practical purposes make the appeal procedure a
mere gesture insofar as the Commissioner was concerned.
(7) The Commissioner's draft of January 18th provided that any person or
organization aggrieved by the action of the Commissioner with respect
to any filing might make written request to the Commisioner for a hear-
ing thereon. In the All-Industry draft of the bill a request for a hearing
was limited to an insurer, a rating organization or insured person.
Your Committee was of the opinion that the suggestion advanced by the All-
Industry Committee resulted in too great a restriction and that any aggrieved
person should have the right to request a Commissioner to grant a hearing.
The foregoing points of the difference were discussed at considerable length
between Commissioners and the All-Industry Committee and a full exchange of
views was had. The All-Industry Committee reported that it could not agree at
that time with the views expressed by your Committee. However, the All-In-
dustry Committee did not foreclose further discussion and it was suggested that
the various representatives of the industry reconsider the points with their re-
spective principals and among themselves, and be prepared to renew conferences
with your Committee at a later date.
Under section 2, of the Commissioners' draft of January 18, 1946, it was pro-
vided that if a kind of insurance or type of coverage subject to the act is also
subject to regulation by another rate regulatory act of the State, the insurer with
the consent of the Commissioner might designate which regulatory act would be
applicable. The All-Industry Committee in its draft proposed to omit the consent
of the Commissioner, but indicated that among its own members there was not a
complete accord on the proposal contained in the All-Industry bill. The matter
was left for further consideration.
Section 5, of the Commissioners' draft of January 18, provides for the licensing
of rating organizations and states that if the Commissioner finds that the organi-
zation is competent, trustworthy and otherwise qualified and that its constitution,
articles of agreement, etc., governing the conduct of its business are reasonable
and conform to the requirements of law and that a granting of a license is in
the public interest, he shall issue a license. The All-Industry Committee draft
omitted reference to reasonableness and the public interest. Your Committee
took the position that it would not be in the public interest to permit rating organ-
izations to adopt constitutions, by-laws, etc., which permitted boycott, coercion
or intimidation in violation of United States Public Law 15. However, since the
Industry adopted the words "of law" instead of the words "this act", it may be
assumed it is the intent of this provision that the constitutions, by-laws, etc., will
conform to the provisions of all laws. State as well as Federal. After discussion
it was agreed that in the event of introduction in any State of the model rating
bill, the bill would be accompanied by a memorandum explaining the significance
of the words "of law".
In the course of the meeting and at the request of your Committee, the mem-
bers of the All-Industry Committee present at the meeting unanimously adopted
a resolution in support of the six points hereinbefore referred to. The only mem-
ber of the All-Industry Committee missing was Mr. Floyd Jacobs representing
the Reciprocals. It was stated by Mr. Alfred Gruhn that he anticipated the
agreement of the Reciprocals to the six points.
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The matter of a bill to cover the fire insurance business was also discussed. It
was agreed that your Committee should conclude its deliberations in connection
with the casualty and surety bill ; after reaching an accord the casualty and
surety bill will be used for the fire insurance business with such changes as may
be necessary to make the bill applicable. It was suggested that representatives
of the fire insurance industry present a proposed draft of a bill for discussion in
advance of the next meeting of the Drafting Sub-Committee.
On motion made by Commissioner Thompson, a resolution was adopted em-
powering the Drafting Sub-Committee of the Committee on Rates and Rating
Organizations, to take such action as it may determine in connection with the
completion of the drafting of rate regulatory legislation.
The members of the All-Industry Committee have labored diligently to reduce
areas of disagreement concerning the solution of the rating problems. It can be
stated without fear of contradiction that astonishing success has been achieved.
Your Committee has been the beneficiary of a prodigious amount of research
undertaken by the insurance industry. We acknowledge gratefully the intelligent
and gracious contribution of the All-Industry Committee.
In conclusion, let us reiterate our previous comment that even the bill we are
now discussing does not represent "the ultimate or last word in rating bills. It
is recognized that the science of rate regulation is a progressive one and that
changes in thinking will occur as our experience and stock of knowledge in-
crease".
Charles F. J. Harrington, Chairman, Massachusetts
Robert E. Dineen, New York
Newell R. Johnson, Minnesota
J. Edwin Larson, Florida
James M. McCormack, Tennessee
Seth B. Thompson, Oregon
CASUALTY AND SURETY RATE REGULATORY BILL
Draft of May 18, 1946
AN ACT relative to the regulation of rates for certain casualty insurance in-
cluding fidelity, surety and guaranty bonds and for all other forms of motor
vehicle insurance, and to rating organizations [and repealing sections ].
BE IT ENACTED [By J :
Sec. 1 — Purpose of Act
The purpose of this Act is to promote the public welfare by regulating insur-
ance rates to the end that they shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly dis-
criminatory, and to authorize and regulate cooperative action among insurers in
rate making and in other matters within the scope of this Act. Nothing in this
Act is intended (1) to prohibit or discourage reasonable competition, or (2) to
prohibit, or encourage except to the extent necessary to accomplish the afore-
mentioned purpose, uniformity in insurance rates, rating systems, rating plans or
practices. This Act shall be liberally interpreted to carry into effect the provi-
sions of this Section.
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Sec. 2— Scope of Act
This Act applies to casualty insurance O, including fidelity, surety and guar-
anty bonds, and to all other forms of motor vehicle insurance, on risks or opera-
tions in this state, except
:
(a) reinsurance, other than joint reinsurance to the extent stated in Section 11
;
(b) accident and health insurance;
(c) insurance against loss of or damage to aircraft or against liability, other
than workmen's compensation and employers' liability, arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of aircraft
;
(d) insurance against (")
If any kind of insurance, subdivision or combination thereof, or type of cover-
age, subject to this Act, is also subject to regulation by another rate regulatory
act of this state, an insurer to which both acts are otherwise applicable shall file
with the [commissioner of insurance], hereinafter referred to as [commissioner],
a designation as to which rate regulatory act shall be applicable to it with respect
to such kind of insurance, subdivision or combination thereof, or type of coverage.
Sec. 3— Making of Rates
(a) All rates shall be made in accordance with the following provisions:
1. Due consideration shall be given to past and prospective loss experience
within and outside this state, to catastrophe hazards, if any, to a reasonable mar-
gin for (^) profit and contingencies, to dividends, savings or unabsorbed premium
deposits allowed or returned by insurers to their policyholders, members or sub-
scribers, to past and prospective expenses both countrywide and those specially
applicable to this state, and to all other relevant factors within and outside this
state
;
2. The systems of expense provisions included in the rates for use by any in-
surer or group of insurers may differ from those of other insurers or groups of
insurers to reflect the requirements of the operating methods of any such insurer
or group with respect to any kind of insurance, or with respect to any subdivision
or combination thereof for which subdivision or combination separate expense
provisions are applicable
;
3. Risks may be grouped by classifications for the establishment of rates and
minimum premiums. Classification rates may be modified to produce rates for
individual risks in accordance with rating plans which establish standards for
measuring variations in hazards or expense provisions, or both. Such standards
may measure any differences among risks that can be demonstrated to have a
probable effect upon losses or expenses
;
4. Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.
(b) Except to the extent necessary to meet the provisions of subdivision 4 of
subsection (a) of this Section, uniformity among insurers in any matters within
the scope of this Section is neither required nor prohibited.
Sec. 4— Rate Filings
(a) Every insurer shall file with the [commissioner] every manual of classifi-
cations, rules and rates, every rating plan and every modification of any of the
(i)The words "casualty insurance" are used herein in their generally accepted trade sense.
The wording of the section should be fitted to any laws of the state which classify insurance.
(2)Here list any other kinds of casualty insurance to which this Act does not apply.
(3)The All-Industry Conference Committee believes the word "underwriting" should precede
the word "profit." The National Association of Insurance Commissioners is giving further study
to this matter.
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foregoing which it proposes to use. Every such filing shall state the proposed
effective date thereof, shall indicate the character and extent of the coverage
contemplated and shall be accompanied by the information upon which the insurer
supports the filing. A filing and supporting information shall be open to public
inspection after the filing becomes effective.
(b) An insurer may satisfy its obligation to make such filings by becoming a
member of, or a subscriber to, a licensed rating organization which makes such
filings, and by authorizing the [commissioner] to accept such filings on its behalf;
provided, that nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as requiring any
insurer to become a member of or a subscriber to any rating organization.
(c) The [commissioner] shall review filings as soon as reasonably possible
after they have been made in order to determine whether they meet the require-
ments of this Act.
(d) Subject to the exception specified in subsection (e) of this Section, each
filing shall be on file for a waiting period of fifteen days before it becomes effec-
tive, which period may be extended by the [commissioner] for an additional pe-
riod not to exceed fifteen days if he gives written notice within such waiting
period to the insurer or rating organization which made the filing that he needs
such additional time for the consideration of such filing. Upon written applica-
tion by such insurer or rating organization, the [commissioner] may authorize a
filing which he has reviewed to become effective before the expiration of the
waiting period or any extension thereof. A filing shall be deemed to meet the
requirements of this Act unless disapproved by the [commissioner] within the
waiting period or any extension thereof.
(e) Any special filing with respect to a surety or guaranty bond required by
law or by court or executive order or by order, rule or regulation of a public
body, not covered by a previous filing, shall become effective when filed and shall
be deemed to meet the requirements of this Act until such time as the [commis-
sioner] reviews the filing and so long thereafter as the filing remains in effect.
(f) Under such rules and regulations as he shall' adopt the [commissioner]
may, by written order, suspend or modify the requirement of filing as to any kind
of insurance, subdivision or combination thereof, or as to classes of risks, the
rates for which cannot practicably be filed before they are used. Such orders,
rules and regulations shall be made known to insurers and rating organizations
affected thereby. The [commissioner] ma}^ make such examination as he may
deem advisable to ascertain whether any rates affected by such order meet the
standards set forth in subdivision 4 of subsection (a) of Section 3.
(g) Upon the written application of the insured, stating his reasons therefor,
filed with and approved by the [commissioner], a rate in excess of that provided
by a filing otherwise applicable may be used on any specific risk.
(h) Beginning ninety days after the effective date of this Act no insurer shall
make or issue a contract or policy except in accordance with filings which are in
effect for said insurer as provided in this Act or in accordance with subsections
(f ) or (g) of this Section.
Sec. 5 — Disapproval of Filings
(a) If within the waiting period or any extension thereof as provided in sub-
section (d) of Section 4, the [commissioner] finds that a filing does not meet the
requirements of this Act, he shall send to the insurer or rating organization
which made such filing written notice of disapproval of such filing specifying
therein in what respects he finds such filing fails to meet the requirements of this
Act and stating that such filing shall not become effective.
(b) If within thirty days after a special surety or guaranty filing subject to
subsection (e) of Section 4 has become effective, the [commissioner] finds that
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such filing does not meet the requirements of this Act, he shall send to the in-
surer or rating organization which made such filing written notice of disapproval
of such filing specifying therein in what respects he finds that such filing fails to
meet the requirements of this Act and stating when, within a reasonable period
thereafter, such filing shall be deemed no longer effective. Said disapproval shall
not affect any contract made or issued prior to the expiration of the period set
forth in said notice.
(c) If at any time subsequent to the applicable review period provided for in
subsection (a) or (b) of this Section, the [commissioner] finds that a filing does
not meet the requirements of this Act, he shall, after a hearing held upon not less
than ten days' written notice, specifying the matters to be considered at such
hearing, to every insurer and rating organization which made such filing, issue
an order specifying in what respects he finds that such filing fails to meet the
requirements of this Act, and stating when, within a reasonable period thereafter,
such filings shall be deemed no longer effective. Copies of said order shall be
sent to every such insurer and rating organization. Said order shall not affect
any contract or policy made or issued prior to the expiration of the period set
forth in said order.
(d) Any person or organization aggrieved with respect to any filing which is
in effect may make written application to the [commissioner] for a hearing
thereon, provided, however, that the insurer or rating organization that made the
filing shall not be authorized to proceed under this subsection. Such application
shall specify the grounds to be relied upon by the applicant. If the [commis-
sioner] shall find that the application is made in good faith, that the applicant
would be so aggrieved if his grounds are established, and that such grounds
otherwise justify holding such a hearing, he shall, within thirty days after receipt
of such application, hold a hearing upon not less than ten days' written notice to
the applicant and to every insurer and rating organization which made such
filing.
If, after such hearing, the [commissioner] finds that the filing does not meet
the requirements of this Act, he shall issue an order specifying in what respects
he finds that such filing fails to meet the requirements of this Act, and stating
when, within a reasonable period thereafter, such filing shall be deemed no longer
effective. Copies of said order shall be sent to the applicant and to every such
insurer and rating organization. Said order shall not affect any contract or
policy made or issued prior to the expiration of the period set forth in said order.
Sec. 6— Rating Organizations
(a) A corporation, an unincorporated association, a partnership or an indi-
vidual, whether located within or outside this state, may make application to the
[commissioner] for license as a rating organization for such kinds of insurance
or subdivisions thereof as are specified in its application and shall file therewith
(1) a copy of its constitution, its articles of agreement or association or its cer-
tificate of incorporation, and of its by-laws, rules and regulations governing the
conduct of its business, (2) a list of its members and subscribers, (3) the name
and address of a resident of this state upon whom notices or orders of the [com-
missioner] or process affecting such rating organization may be served and (4)
a statement of its qualifications as a rating organization. If the [commissioner]
finds that the applicant is competent, trustworthy and otherwise qualified to act
as a rating organization and that its constitution, articles of agreement or associ-
ation or certificate of incorporation, and its by-laws, rules and regulations gov-
erning the conduct of its business conform to the requirements of law, he shall
issue a license specifying the kinds of insurance or subdivisions thereof for which
the applicant is authorized to act as a rating organization. Every such appli-
cation shall be granted or denied in whole or in part by the [commissioner]
within sixty days of the date of its filing with him. Licenses issued pursuant to
this Section shall remain in effect for three years unless sooner suspended or re-
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voiced by the [commissioner]. The fee for said Hcense shall be twenty-five
dollars. Licenses issued pursuant to this Section may be suspended or revoked
by the [commissioner] , after hearing upon notice, in the event the rating organi-
zation ceases to meet the requirements of this subsection. Every rating oraniza-
tion shall notify the [commissioner] promptly of every change in (1) its consti-
tion, its articles of agreement or association or its certificate of incorporation, and
its by-laws, rules and regulations governing the conduct of its business, (2) its
list of members and subscribers and (3) the name and address of the resident of
this state designated by it upon whom notices or orders of the [commissioner]
or process affecting such rating organization may be served.
(b) Subject to rules and regulations which have been approved by the [com-
missioner] as reasonable, each rating organization shall permit any insurer, not
a member, to be a subscriber to its rating services for any kind of insurance or
subdivision thereof for which it is authorized to act as a rating organization.
Notice of proposed changes in such rules and regulations shall be given to sub-
scribers. Each rating organization shall furnish its rating services without dis-
crimination to its members and subscribers. The reasonableness of any rule or
regulation in its application to subscribers, or the refusal of any rating organiza-
tion to admit an insurer as a subscriber, shall, at the request of any subscriber or
any such insurer, be reviewed by the [commissioner] at a hearing held upon at
least ten days' written notice to such rating organization and to such subscriber
or insurer. If the [commissioner] finds that such rule or regulation is unreason-
able in its application to subscribers, he shall order that such rule or regulation
shall not be applicable to subscribers. If the rating organization fails to grant
or reject an insurer's application for subscribership within thirty days after it
was made, the insurer may request a review by the [commissioner] as if the
application had been rejected. If the [commissioner] finds that the insurer has
been refused admittance to the rating organization as a subscriber without justi-
fication, he shall order the rating organization to admit the insurer as a sub-
scriber. If he finds that the action of the rating organization was justified, he
shall make an order affirming its action.
(c) No rating organization shall adopt any rule the effect of which would be
to prohibit or regulate the payment of dividends, savings or unabsorbed premium
deposits allowed or returned by insurers to their policyholders, members or sub-
scribers.
(d) Cooperation among rating organizations or among rating organizations
and insurers in rate making or in other matters within the scope of this Act is
hereby authorized, provided the filings resulting from such cooperation are sub-
ject to all the provisions of this Act which are applicable to filings generally.
The [commissioner] may review such cooperative activities and practices and if,
after a hearing, he finds that any such activity or practice is unfair or unreason-
able or otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, he may issue a
written order specifying in what respects such activity or practice is unfair or
unreasonable or otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, and re-
quiring the discontinuance of such activity or practice.
Sec. 7— Deviations
Every member of or , subscriber to a rating organization shall adhere to the
filings made on its behalf by such organization except that any such insurer may
make written application to the [commissioner] for permission to file a uniform
percentage decrease or increase to be applied to the premiums produced by the
rating system so filed for a kind of insurance, or for a class of insurance which
is found by the [commissioner] to be a proper rating unit for the application of
such uniform percentage decrease or increase, or for a subdivision of a kind of
insurance (1) comprised of a group of manual classifications which is treated
as a separate unit for rate making purposes, or (2) for which separate expense
provisions are included in the filings of the rating organization. Such appli-
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cation shall specify the basis for the modification and shall be accompanied by
the data upon which the applicant relies. A copy of the application and data
shall be sent simultaneously to such rating organization. The [commissioner]
shall set a time and place for a hearing at which the insurer and such rating
organization may be heard and shall give them not less than ten days' written
notice thereof. In the event the [commissioner] is advised by the rating organi-
zation that it does not desire a hearing he may, upon the consent of the applicant,
waive such hearing. The [commissioner] shall issue an order permitting the
modification for such insurer to be filed if he finds it to be justified and it shall
thereupon become effective. He shall issue an order denying such application if
he finds that the modification is not justified or that the resulting premiums would
be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory. Each deviation permitted
to be filed shall be effective for a period of one year from the date of such per-
mission unless terminated sooner with the approval of the [commissioner].
Sec. 8— Appeal by Minority
Any member of or subscriber to a rating organization may appeal to the [com-
missioner] from the action or decision of such rating organization in approving
or rejecting any proposed change in or addition to the filings of such rating
organization and the [commissioner] shall, after a hearing held upon not less
than ten days' written notice to the appellant and to such rating organization,
issue an order approving the action or decision of such rating organization or
directing it to give further consideration to such proposal, or, if such appeal is
from the action or decision of the rating organization in rejecting a proposed
addition to its filings, he may, in the event he finds that such action or decision
was unreasonable, issue an order directing the rating organization to make an
addition to its filings, on behalf of its members and subscribers, in a manner con-
sistent with his findings, within a reasonable time after the issuance of such
order.
If such appeal is based upon the failure of the rating organization to make a
filing on behalf of such member or subscriber which is based on a system of ex-
pense provisions which differs, in accordance with the right granted in subdivi-
sion 2 of subsection (a) of Section 3, from the system of expense provisions in-
cluded in a filing made by the rating organization, the [commissioner] shall, if
he grants the appeal, order the rating organization to make the requested filing
for use by the appellant. In deciding such appeal the [commissioner] shall apply
the standards set forth in Section 3.
Sec. 9— Information to be Furnished Insureds; Hearings and Appeals
OF Insureds
Every rating organization and every insurer which makes its own rates shall,
within a reasonable time after receiving written request therefor and upon pay-
ment of such reasonable charge as it may make, furnish to any insured affected
by a rate made by it, or to the authorized representative of such insured, all per-
tinent information as to such rate.
Every rating organization and every insurer which makes its own rates shall
provide within this state reasonable means whereby any person aggrieved by the
application of its rating system may be heard, in person or by his authorized rep-
resentative, on his written request to review the manner in which such rating
system has been applied in connection with the insurance afforded him. If the
rating organization or insurer fails to grant or reject such request within thirty
days after it is made, the applicant may proceed in the same manner as if his
application had been rejected. Any party affected by the action of such rating
organization or such insurer on such request may, within thirty days after written
notice of such action, appeal to the [commissioner], who, after a hearing held
upon not less than ten days' written notice to the appellant and to such rating
organization or insurer, may affirm or reverse such action.
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Sec. 10— Advisory Organizations
(a) Every group, association or other organization of insurers, v^hether lo-
cated within or outside this state, which assists insurers which make their own
fihngs or rating organizations in rate making, by the collection and furnishing of
loss or expense statistics, or by the submission of recommendations, but which
does not make filings under this Act, shall be known as an advisory organization.
(b) Every advisory organization shall file with the [commissioner] (1) a
copy of its constitution, its articles of agreement or association or its certificate
of incorporation and of its by-laws, rules and regulations governing its activities,
(2) a list of its members, (3) the name and address of a resident of this state
upon whom notices or orders of the [commissioner] or process issued at his
direction may be served, and (4) an agreement that the [commissioner] may
examine such advisory organization in accordance with the provisions of Section
12 of this Act.
(c) If, after a hearing, the [commissioner] finds that the furnishing of such
information or assistance involves any act or practice which is unfair or unrea-
sonable or otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, he may issue
a written order specifying in what respects such act or practice is unfair or un-
reasonable or otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, and requir-
ing the discontinuance of such act or practice.
(d) No insurer which makes its own filings nor any rating organization shall
support its filings by statistics or adopt rate making recommendations, furnished
to it by an advisory organization which has not complied with this Section or
with an order of the [commissioner] involving such statistics or recommendations
issued under subsection (c) of this Section. If the [commissioner] finds such
insurer or rating organization to be in violation of this subsection he may issue
an order requiring the discontinuance of such violation.
Sec. 11— Joint Underwriting or Joint Reinsurance
(a) Every group, association or other organization of insurers which engages
in joint underwriting or joint reinsurance, shall be subject to regulation with
respect thereto as herein provided, subject, however, with respect to joint under-
writing, to all other provisions of this Act and, with respect to joint reinsurance,
to Sections 12 and 16 to 20 of this Act.
(b) If, after a hearing, the [commissioner] finds that any activity or practice
of any such group, association or other organization is unfair or unreasonable
or otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, he may issue a written
order specifying in what respects such activity or practice is unfair or unreason-
able or otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, and requiring the
discontinuance of such activity or practice.
Sec. 12— Examinations (*)
The [commissioner] shall, at least once in five years, make or cause to be
made an examination of each rating organization licensed in this state as pro-
vided in Section 6 and he may, as often as he may deem it expedient, make or
cause to be made an examination of each advisory organization referred to in
Section 10 and of each group, association or other organization referred to in
Section 11. The reasonable costs of any such examination shall be paid by the
rating organization, advisory organization,, or group, association or other organi-
zation examined upon presentation to it of a detailed account of such costs. The
officers, manager, agents and employees of such rating organization, advisory
(4)Under the laws of several of the states, reports of examinations are not made public until
the organization examined has an opportunity to review the proposed report and to have a hear-
ing with reference thereto, after which hearing the report is filed for public inspection and be-
comes admissible in evidence as a public record. In any state that has no such law, it is
suggested that provisions to this effect be adopted.
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organization, or group, association or other organization may be examined at
any time under oath and shall exhibit all books, records, accounts, documents, or
agreements governing its method of operation. In lieu of any such examination
the [commissioner] may accept the report of an examination made by the insur-
ance supervisory official of another state, pursuant to the laws of such state.
Sec. 13— Rate Administration
(a) Recording and Reporting of Loss and Expense Experience.
The [commissioner] shall promulgate reasonable rules and statistical plans,
reasonably adapted to each of the rating systems on file with him, which may be
modified from time to time and which shall be used thereafter by each insurer in
the recording and reporting of its loss and countrywide expense experience, in
order that the experience of all insurers may be made available at least annually
in such form and detail as may be necessary to aid him in determining whether
rating systems comply with the standards set forth in Section 3. Such rules and
plans may also provide for the recording and reporting of expense experience
items which are specially applicable to this state and are not susceptible of de-
termination by a prorating of countrywide expense experience. In promulgating
such rules and plans, the [commissioner] shall give due consideration to the
rating systems on file with him and, in order that such rules and plans may be
as uniform as is practicable among the several states, to the rules and to the
form of the plans used for such rating systems in other states. No insurer shall
be required to record or report its loss experience on a classification basis that
is inconsistent with the rating system filed by it. The [commissioner] may desig-
nate one or more rating organizations or other agencies to assist him in gathering
such experience and making compilations thereof, and such compilations shall be
made available, subject to reasonable rules promulgated by the [commissioner],
to insurers and rating organizations.
(b) Interchange of Rating Plan Data.
Reasonable rules and plans may be promulgated by the [commissioner] for the
interchange of data necessary for the application of rating plans.
. (c) Consultation with Other States.
In order to further uniform administration of rate regulatory laws, the [com-
missioner] and every insurer and rating organization may exchange information
and experience data with insurance supervisory officials, insurers and rating
organizations in other states and may consult with them with respect to rate
making and the application of rating systems.
(d) Rules and Regulations.
The [commissioner] may make reasonable rules and regulations necessary to
effect the purposes of this Act.
Sec. 14— False or Misleading Information
No person or organization shall wilfully withhold information from, or know-
ingly give false or misleading information to, the [commissioner], any statistical
agency designated by the [commissioner], any rating organization, or any in-
surer, which will affect the rates or premiums chargeable under this Act. A vio-
lation of this Section shall subject the one guilty of such violation to the penalties
provided in Section 16 of this Act.
Sec. 15 — Assigned Risks (^)
Agreements may be made among insurers with respect to the equitable appor-
(5)This section does not purport to deal with the question as to whether assigned risk plans
should be voluntary or statutory, nor as to what features, including judicial review, should be
contained in such plans. If these questions are to be dealt with by statutory provision such pro-
vision should preferably be in another statute.
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tionment among them of insurance which may be afforded applicants who are in
good faith entitled to but who are unable to procure such insurance through ordi-
nary methods and such insurers may agree among themselves on the use of
reasonable rate modifications for such insurance, such agreements and rate modi-
fications to be subject to the approval of the [commissioner].
Sec. 16— Penalties
The [commissioner] may, if he finds that any person or organization has vio-
lated any provision of this Act, impose a penalty of not more than fifty dollars
($50) for each such violation, but if he finds such violation to be wilful he may
impose a penalty of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) for each such vio-
lation. Such penalties may be in addition to any other penalty provided by
law C).
The [commissioner] may suspend the license of any rating organization or
insurer which fails to comply with an order of the [commissioner] within the
time limited by such order, or any extension thereof which the [commissioner]
may grant. The [commissioner] shall not suspend the license of any rating
organization or insurer for failure to comply with an order until the time pre-
scribed for an appeal therefrom has expired or if an appeal has been taken, until
such order has been affirmed. The [commissioner] may determine when a sus-
pension of license shall become effective and it shall remain in effect for the
period fixed by him, unless he modifies or rescinds such suspension, or until the
order upon which such suspension is based is modified, rescinded or reversed.
No penalty shall be imposed and no license shall be suspended or revoked ex-
cept upon a written order of the [commissioner], stating his findings, made after
a hearing held upon not less than ten clays' written notice to such person or
organization specifying the alleged violation.
Sec. 17— Hearing Procedure and Judicial Review
(a) Any insurer or rating organization aggrieved by any order or decision of
the [commissioner] made without a hearing, may, within thirty days after notice
of the order to the insurer or organization, make written request to the [com-
missioner] for a hearing thereon. The [commissioner] shall hear such party or
parties within twenty days after receipt of such request and shall give not less
than ten days' written notice of the time and place of the hearing. Within fifteen
days after such hearing the [commissioner] shall affirm, reverse or modify his
previous action, specifying his reasons therefor. Pending such hearing and de-
cision thereon the [commissioner] may suspend or postpone the effective date of
his previous action.
(b) Nothing contained in this Act shall require the observance at any hearing
of formal rules of pleading or evidence.
(c) Any order or decision of the [commissioner] shall be subject to review
(here insert language indicating scope of the reviezv)
by [appeal]* [writ of certiorari]* to [the
court] * at the instance of any party in interest.
The court shall determine whether the filing of the [appeal]* [petition for
such writ]* shall operate as a stay of any such order or decision of the [com-
missioner]. The court may, in disposing of the issue before it, modify, affirm or
reverse the order or decision of the [commissioner] in whole or in part.
(6)In some states the imposition of fines by administrative officers is prohibited by basic law.
It may be necessary to modify this section to provide for the imposition of fines and penalties
by some other appropriate state authority.
*Consideration should be given to the practice and procedure in each state.
Part I
Sec. 18— Laws Repealed
Sections of the statutes of this state are hereby repealed. All
other laws or parts of laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed.
Sec. 19— Constitutionality
If any section, subsection, subdivision, paragraph, sentence or clause of this
Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, such decision shall not affect the remain-
ing portions of this Act.
Sec. 20— Effective Date
This Act shall take effect C)
ADDITIONAL SECTION RECOMMENDED FOR STATE WHICH HAS
INADEQUATE ANTI-REBATE LAW OR HAS NO SUCH LAW
Sec. ( ) — Rebates Prohibited
No broker or agent shall knowingly charge, demand or receive a premium for
any policy of insurance except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. No
insurer or employee thereof, and no broker or agent shall pay, allow, or give, or
offer to pay, allow, or give, directly or indirectly, as an inducement to insurance,
or after insurance has been effected, any rebate, discount, abatement, credit or
reduction of the premium named in a policy of insurance, or any special favor
or advantage in the dividends or other benefits to accrue thereon, or any valuable
consideration or inducement whatever, not specified in the policy of insurance,
except to the extent provided for in an applicable filing. No insured named in a
policy of insurance, nor any employee of such insured shall knowingly receive
or accept, directly or indirectly, any such rebate, discount, abatement, credit or
reduction of premium, or any such special favor or advantage or valuable con-
sideration or inducement. Nothing in this Section shall be construed as prohibit-
ing the payment of commissions or other compensation to duly licensed agents
and brokers, nor as prohibiting any insurer from allowing or returning to its
participating policyholders, members or subscribers, dividends, savings or un-
absorbed premium deposits.
As used in this Section the word "insurance" includes suretyship and the word
"policy" includes bond.
FIRE, MARINE AND INLAND MARINE RATE REGULATORY BILL
Draft of May 18, 1946
AN ACT relative to the regulation of rates for fire, marine and inland marine
insurance, and to rating organizations [and repealing sections ].
BE IT ENACTED [By ] :
Sec. 1 — Purpose of Act
The purpose of this Act is to promote the public welfare by regulating insur-
ance rates to the end that they shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly dis-
(7)The effective date of this Act should be set sufficiently ahead to allow the insurance depart-
ment, the companies and the rating organization to prepare themselves with necessary personnel
and procedures to carry out the purposes of the Act. Under the provisions of subsection (h) of
section 4, the provisions of the Act go into effect as to the use of regulated rates 90 days after
the effective date of the Act. It is, therefore, recommended that such effective date should be
not later than October 1, 1947, which is 90 days prior to January 1, 1948, when the moratorium
under Public Law 15 ends.
cxxxii P.D. 9
criminatory, and to authorize and regulate cooperative action among insurers in
rate making and in otlier matters within the scope of this Act. Nothing in this
Act is intended (1) to prohibit or discourage reasonable competition, or (2) to
prohibit, or encourage except to the extent necessary to accomplish the afore-
mentioned purpose, uniformity in insurance rates, rating systems, rating plans or
practices. This Act shall be liberally interpreted to carry into effect the provi-
sions of this Section.
Sec. 2— Scope of Act
This Act applies to fire, marine and inland marine insurance,^ on risks located
in this state. Inland marine insurance shall be deemed to include insurance now
or hereafter defined by statute, or by interpretation thereof, or if not so defined
or interpreted, by ruling of the [commissioner of insurance], hereinafter referred
to as [commissioner], or as established by general custom of the business, as in-
land marine insurance.
This Act shall not apply
:
(a) To reinsurance, other than joint reinsurance to the extent stated in Sec-
tion 1 1
;
(b) To insurance of vessels or craft, their cargoes, marine builders' risks,
marine protection and indemnity, or other risks commonly insured under marine,
as distinguished from inland marine, insurance policies ;
(c) To insurance of hulls of aircraft, including their accessories and equip-
ment, or against liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of air-
craft
;
(d) To motor vehicle insurance nor to insurance against liability arising out
of the ownership, maintenance or use of motor vehicles.
If any kind of insurance, subdivision or combination thereof, or type of cover-
age, subject to this Act, is also subject to regulation by another rate regulatory
act of this state, an insurer to which both acts are otherwise applicable shall file
with the [commissioner], a designation as to which rate regulatory act shall be
applicable to it with respect to such kind of insurance, subdivision or combina-
tion thereof, or type of coverage.
Sec. 3— Making of Rates
(a) Rates shall be made in accordance with the following provisions:
1. Manual, minimum, class rates, rating schedules or rating plans, shall be
made and adopted, except in the case of specific inland marine rates on risks
specially rated.
2. Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.
3. Due consideration shall be given to past and prospective loss experience
within and outside this state, to the conflagration and catastrophe hazards, to a
reasonable margin for- profit and contingencies, to dividends, savings or un-
absorbed premium deposits allowed or returned by insurers to their policyholders,
members or subscribers, to past and prospective expenses both countrywide and
those specially applicable to this state, and to all other relevant factors within and
outside this state ; and in the case of fire insurance rates consideration shall be
1 The words "fire, marine and inland marine insurance" are used herein in their generally
accepted trade sense. The wording of the section should be fitted to any laws of the state which
classify insurance.
2 The All-Industry Conference Comrnittee believes the word "underwriting" should precede
the word "profit." The National Association of Insurance Commisioners is giving further study
to this matter.
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given to the experience of the fire insurance business during a period of not less
than the most recent five year period for which such experience is available.
(b) Except to the extent necessary to meet the provisions of subdivision 2 of
subsection (a) of this Section, uniformity among insurers in any matters within
the scope of this Section is neither required nor prohibited.
(c) Rates made in accordance with this Section may be used subject to the
provisions of this Act.
Sec. 4— Rate Filings
(a) Every insurer shall file with the [commissioner], except as to inland ma-
rine risks which by general custom of the business are not written according to
manual rates or rating plans, every manual, minimum, class rate, rating schedule
or rating plan and every other rating rule, and every modification of any of the
foregoing which it proposes to use. Every such filing shall state the proposed
effective date thereof, shall indicate the character and extent of the coverage con-
templated and shall be accompanied by the information upon which the insurer
supports the filing. A filing and supporting information shall be open to public
inspection after the filing becomes effective. Specific inland marine rates on
risks specially rated, made by a rating organization, shall be filed with the [com-
missioner].
(b) An insurer may satisfy its obligation to make such filings by becoming a
member of, or a subscriber to, a licensed rating organization which makes such
filings, and by authorizing the [commissioner] to accept such filings on its be-
half
;
provided, that nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as requiring
any insurer to become a member of or a subscriber to any rating organization.
(c) The [commissioner] shall review filings as soon as reasonably possible
after they have been made in order to determine whether they meet the require-
ments of this Act.
(d) Subject to the exception specified in subsection (e) of this section, each
filing shall be on file for a waiting period of fifteen days before it becomes effec-
tive, which period may be extended by the [commissioner] for an additional
period not to exceed fifteen days if he gives written notice within such waiting
period to the insurer or rating organization which made the filing that he needs
such additional time for the consideration of such filing. Upon written applica-
tion by such insurer or rating organization, the [commissioner] may authorize a
filing which he has reviewed to become effective before the exxpiration of the
waiting period or any extension thereof. A filing shall be deemed to meet the
requirements of this Act unless disapproved by the [commissioner] within the
waiting period or any extension thereof.
(e) Specific inland marine rates on risks specially rated by a rating organiza-
tion shall become effective when filed and shall be deemed to meet the require-
ments of this Act until such time as the [commissioner] reviews the filing and so
long thereafter as the filing remains in eft'ect.
(f) Under such rules and regulations as he shall adopt the [commissioner]
may, by written order, suspend or modify the requirement of filing as to any
kind of insurance, subdivision or combination thereof, or as to classes of risks,
the rates for which cannot practicably be filed before they are used. Such orders,
rules and regulations shall be made known to insurers and rating organizations
affected thereby. The [commissioner] may make such examination as he may
deem advisable to ascertain whether any rates affected by such order meet the
standards set forth in subdivision 2 of subsection (a') of Sec. 3.
(g) Upon the written application of the insured, stating his reasons therefor,
filed with and approved by the [commissioner], a rate in excess of that provided
by a filing otherwise applicable may be used on any specific risk.
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(h) Beginning ninety days after the effective date of this Act no insurer shall
make or issue a contract or policy except in accordance with the filings which
are in effect for said insurer as provided in this Act or in accordance with sub-
sections (f) or (g) of this section. This subsection shall not apply to contracts
or policies for inland marine risks as to which filings are not required.
Sec. 5 — Disapproval of Filings
(a) If within the waiting period or any extension thereof as provided in sub-
section (d) of Section 4, the [commissioner] finds that a filing does not meet the
requirements of this Act, he shall send to the insurer or rating organization
which made such filing, written notice of disapproval of such filing specifying
therein in what respects he finds such filing fails to meet the requirements of this
Act and stating that such filing shall not become effective.
(b) If within thirty days after a specific inland marine rate on a risk specially
rated by a rating organization, subject to subsection (e) of Section 4 has be-
come effective, the [commissioner] finds that such filing does not meet the re-
quirements of this Act, he shall send to the rating organization which made such
filing written notice of disapproval of such filing specifying therein in what
respects he finds that such filing fails to meet the requirements of this Act and
stating when, within a reasonable period thereafter, such filing shall be deemed no
longer effective. Said disapproval shall not affect any contract made or issued
prior to the expiration of the period set forth in said notice.
(c) If at any time subsequent to the applicable review period provided for in
subsection (a) or (b) of this section, the [commissioner] finds that a filing does
not meet the requirements of this Act, he shall, after a hearing held upon not less
than ten days' written notice, specifying the matters to be considered at such
hearing, to every insurer and rating organization which made such filing, issue
an order specifying in what respects he finds that such filing fails to meet the
requirements of this Act, and stating when, within a reasonable period thereafter,
such filing shall be deemed no longer effective. Copies of said order shall be sent
to every such insurer and rating organization. Said order shall not affect any
contract or policy made or issued prior to the expiration of the period set forth
in said order.
(d) Any person or organization aggrieved with respect to any filing which is
in effect may make written application to the [commissioner] for a hearing there-
on, provided, however, that the insurer, or rating organization that made the
filing shall not be authorized to proceed under this subsection. Such application
shall specify the grounds to be relied upon by the applicant. If the [commis-
sioner] shall find that the application is made in good faith, that the applicant
would be so aggrieved if his grounds are established, and that such grounds
otherwise justify holding such a hearing, he shall, within thirty days after receipt
of such application, hold a hearing upon not less than ten days' written notice to
the applicant and to every insurer and rating organization which made such
filing. If, after such hearing, the [commissioner] finds that the filing does not
meet the requirements of this Act, he shall issue an order specifying in what re-
spects he finds that such filing fails to meet the requirements of this Act, and
stating when, within a reasonable period thereafter, such filing shall be deemed
no longer effective. Copies of said order shall be sent to the applicant and to
every such insurer and rating organization. Said order shall not affect any con-
tract or policy made or issued prior to the expiration of the period set forth in
said order.
Sec. 6— Rating Organizations
(a) A corporation, an unincorporated association, a partnership or an indii
vidual, whether located within or outside this state, may make application to the'
[commissioner] for license as a rating organization for such kinds of insurance,
J
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or subdivision or class of risk or a part or combination thereof as are specified
in its application and shall file therewith ( 1 ) a copy of its constitution, its articles
of agreement or association or its certificate of incorporation, and of its by-laws,
rules and regulations governing the conduct of its business, (2) a list of its
members and subscribers, (3) the name and address of a resident of this state
upon whom notices or orders of the [commissioner] or process affecting such
rating organization may be served and (4) a statement of its qualifications as a
rating organization. If the [commissioner] finds that the applicant is competent,
trustworthy and otherwise qualified to act as a rating organization and that its
constitution, articles of agreement or association or certificate of incorporation,
and its by-laws, rules and regulations governing the conduct of its business con-
form to the requirements of law, he shall issue a license specifying the kinds of
insurance, or subdivision or class of risk or part or combination thereof for which
the applicant is authorized to act as a rating organization. Every such appli-
cation shall be granted or denied in whole or in part by the [commissioner]
within sixty days of the date of its filing with him. Licenses issued pursuant to
this section shall remain in effect for three years unless sooner suspended or re-
voked by the [commissioner]. The fee for said license shall be twenty-five
dollars. Licenses issued pursuant to this section may be suspended or revoked
by the [commissioner], after hearing upon notice, in the event the rating organi-
zation ceases to meet the requirements of this subsection. Every rating organiza-
tion shall notify the [commissioner] promptly of ever}^ change in ( 1 ) its consti-
tution, its articles of agreement or association, or its certificate of incorporation,
and its by-laws, rules and regulations governing the conduct of its business, (2)
its list of members and subscribers and (3) the name and address of the resident
of this state designated by it upon whom notices or orders of the [commissioner]
or process affecting such rating organization may be served.
(b) Subject to rules and regulations which have been approved by the [com-
missioner] as reasonable, each rating organization shall permit any insurer, not
a member, to be a subscriber to its rating services for any kind of insurance,
subdivision, or class of risk or a part or combination thereof for which it is
authorized to act as a rating organization. Notice of proposed changes in such
rules and regulations shall be given to subscribers. Each rating organization
shall furnish its rating services without discrimination to its members and sub-
scribers. The reasonableness of any rule or regulation in its application to sub-
scribers, or the refusal of any rating organization to admit an insurer as a sub-
scriber, shall, at the request of any subscriber or any such insurer, be reviewed
by the [commissioner] at a hearing held upon at least ten days' written notice
to such rating organization and to such subscriber or insurer. If the [commis-
sioner] finds that such rule or regulation is unreasonable in its application to
subscribers, he shall order that such rule or regulation shall not be applicable to
subscribers. If the rating organization fails to grant or reject an insurer's appli-
cation for subscribership within thirty days after it was made, the insurer may
request a review by the [commissioner] as if the application had been rejected.
If the [commissioner] finds that the insurer has been refused admittance to the
rating organization as a subscriber without justification, he shall order the rating
organization to admit the insurer as a subscriber. If he finds that the action of
the rating organization was justified, he shall make an order affirming its action.
(c) No rating organization shall adopt any rule the effect of which would De
to prohibit or regulate the payment of dividends, savings or unabsorbed premium
deposits allowed or returned by insurers to their policyholders, members or sub-
scribers.
(d) Cooperation among rating organizations or among rating organizations
and insurers in rate making or in other matters within the scope of this Act is
hereby authorized, provided the filings resulting from such cooperation are sub-
ject to all the provisions of this Act which are applicable to filings generally.
The [commissioner] may review such cooperative activities and practices and
if, after a hearing, he finds that any such activity or practice is unfair or un-
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reasonable or otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, he may-
issue a written order specifying in what respects such activity or practice is un-
fair or unreasonable or otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, and
requiring the discontinuance of such activity or practice.
(e) Any rating organization may provide for the examination of policies,
daily reports, binders, renewal certificates, endorsements or other evidences of
insurance, or the cancellation thereof, and may make reasonable rules governing
their submission. Such rules shall contain a provision that in the event any in-
surer does not within sixty days furnish satisfactory evidence to the rating organ-
ization of the correction of any error or omission previously called to its attention
by the rating organization, it shall be the duty of the rating organization to notify
the [commissioner] thereof. All information so submitted for examination shall
be confidential.
(f ) Any rating organization may subscribe for or purchase actuarial, technical
or other services, and such services shall be available to all members and sub-
scribers without discrimination.
Sec. 7— Deviations
Every member of or subscriber to a rating organization shall adhere to the
filings made on its behalf by such organization except that any such insurer may
make written application to the [commissioner] for permission to file a devia-
tion from the class rates, schedules, rating plans or rules respecting any kind of
insurance, or class of risk within a kind of insurance, or combination thereof.
Such application shall specify the basis for the modification and a copy thereof
shall also be sent simultaneously to such rating organization. The [commis-
sioner] shall set a time and place for a hearing at which the insurer and such
rating organization may be heard and shall give them not less than ten days'
written notice thereof. In the event the [commissioner] is advised by the rating
organization that it does not desire a hearing he may, upon the consent of the
applicant, waive such hearing. In considering the application for permission to
file such deviation the [commissioner] shall give consideration to the available
statistics and the principles for rate making as provided in Section 3 of this Act.
The [commissioner] shall issue an order permitting the deviation for such in-
surer to be filed if he finds it to be justified and it shall thereupon become effec-
tive. He shall issue an order denying such application if he finds that the result-
ing premiums would be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory. Each
deviation permitted to be filed shall be effective for a period of one year from
the date of such permission unless terminated sooner with the approval of the
[commissioner].
Sec. 8— Appeal by Minority
Any member of or subscriber to a rating organization may appeal to the [com-
missioner] from the action or decision of such rating organization in approving
or rejecting any proposed change in or addition to the filings of such rating
organization and the [commissioner] shall, after a hearing held upon not less
than ten days' written notice to the appellant and to such rating organization,
issue an order approving the action or decision of such rating organization or
directing it to give further consideration to such proposal, or, if such appeal is
from the action or decision of the rating organization in rejecting a proposed
addition to its filings, he may, in the event he finds that such action or decision
was unreasonable, issue an order directing the rating organization to make an
addition to its filings, on behalf of its members and subscribers, in a manner con-
sistent with his findings, within a reasonable time after the issuance of such order.
Sec. 9— Information to be Furnished Insureds. Hearings and Appeals
OF Insureds
Every rating organization and every insurer which makes its own rates shall,
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within a reasonable time after receiving written request therefor and upon pay-
ment of such reasonable charge as it may make, furnish to any insured affected
by a rate made by it, or to the authorized representative of such insured, all per-
tinent information as to such rate. Every rating organization and every insurer
which makes its own rates shall provide within this state reasonable means
whereby any person aggrieved by the application of its rating system may be
heard, in person or by his authorized representative, on his written request to
review the manner in which such rating system has been applied in connection
with the insurance afforded him. If the rating organization or insurer fails to
grant or reject such request within thirty days after it is made, the applicant may
proceed in the same manner as if his application had been rejected. Any party
affected by the action of such rating organization or such insurer on such request
may, within thirty days after written notice of such action, appeal to the [com-
missioner], who, after a hearing held upon not less than ten days' written notice
to the appellant and to such rating organization or insurer, may affirm or reverse
such action.
Sec. 10— Advisory Organizations
(a) Every group, association or other organization of insurers, whether lo-
cated within or outside this state, which assists insurers which make their own
filings or rating organizations in rate making, by the collection and furnishing of
loss or expense statistics, or by the submission of recommendations, but which
does not make filings under this Act, shall be known as an advisory organization.
(b) Every advisory organization shall file with the [commissioner] (1) a
copy of its constitution, its articles of agreement or association or its certificate
of incorporation and of its by-laws, rules and regulations governing its activities,
(2) a list of its members, (3) the name and address of a resident of this state
upon whom notices or orders of the [commissioner] or process issued at his
direction may be served, and (4) an agreement that the [commissioner] may
examine such advisory organization in accordance with the provisions of Section
12 of this Act.
(c) If, after a hearing, the [commissioner] finds that the furnishing of such
information or assistance involves any act or practice which is unfair or unrea-
sonable or otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, he may issue a
written order specifying in what respects such act or practice is unfair or un-
reasonable or otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, and requir-
ing the discontinuance of such act or practice.
(d) No insurer which makes its own filing nor any rating organization shall
support its filings by statistics or adopt rate making recommendations, furnished
to it by an advisory organization which has not complied with this section or
with an order of the [commissioner] involving such statistics or recommenda-
tions issued under subsection (c) of this section. If the [commissioner] finds
such insurer or rating organization to be in violation of this subsection he may
issue an order requiring the discontinuance of such violation.
Sec. 11
—
Joint Underwriting or Joint Reinsurance
(a) Every group, association or other organization of insurers which engages
in joint underwritings or joint reinsurance, shall be subject to regulation with
respect thereto as herein provided, subject, however, with respect to joint under-
writing, to all other provisions of this Act and, with respect to joint reinsurance,
to Sections 12 and 15 to 19 of this Act.
(b) If, after a hearing, the [commissioner] finds that any activity or practice
of any such group, association or other organization is unfair or unreasonable or
otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, he may issue a written
order specifying in what respects such activity or practice is unfair or unreason-
able or otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, and requiring the
discontinuance of such activity or practice.
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Sec. 12— Examinations^
The [commissioner] shall, at least once in five years, make or cause to be made
an examination of each rating organization licensed in this state as provided in
Section 6 and he may, as often as he may deem it expedient, make or cause to be
made an examination of each advisory organization referred to in Section 10
and of each group, association or other organization referred to in Section 11.
The reasonable costs of any such examination shall be paid by the rating organi-
zation, advisory organization, or group, association or other organization exam-
ined upon presentation to it of a detailed account of such costs. The officers, man-
ager, agents and employees of such rating organization, advisory organization,
or group, association or other organization may be examined at any time under
oath and shall exhibit all books, records, accounts, documents, or agreements gov-
erning its method of operation. In lieu of any such examination the [commis-
sioner] may accept the report of an examination made by the insurance super-
visory official of another state, pursuant to the laws of such state.
Sec. 13— Rate Administration
(a) Recording and Reporting of Loss and Expense Experience.
The [commissioner] shall promulgate reasonable rules and statistical plans,
reasonably adapted to each of the rating systems on file with him, which may be
modified from time to time and which shall be used thereafter by each insurer
in the recording and reporting of its loss and countrywide expense experience,
in order that the experience of all insurers may be made available at least annu-
ally in such form and detail as may be necessary to aid him in determining
whether rating systems comply with the standards set forth in Section 3. Such
rules and plans may also provide for the recording and reporting of expense ex-
perience items which are specially applicable to this state and are not susceptible
of determination by a prorating of countrywide expense experience. In promul-
gating such rules and plans, the [commissioner] shall give clue consideration to the
rating systems on file with him and, in order that such rules and plans may be as
uniform as is practicable among the several states, to the rules and to the form of
the plans used for such rating systems in other states. No insurer shall be re-
quired to record or report its loss experience on a classification basis that is in-
consistent with the rating system filed by it. The [commissioner] may designate
one or more rating organizations or other agencies to assist him in gathering
such experience and making compilations thereof, and such compilations shall be
made available, subject to reasonable rules promulgated by the [commissioner],
to insurers and rating organizations.
(b) Interchange of Rating Plan Data.
Reasonable rules and plans may be promulgated by the [commissioner] for the
interchange of data necessary for the application of rating plans.
(c) Consultation with Other States.
In order to further uniform administration of rate regulatory laws, the [com-
missioner] and every insurer and rating organization may exchange information
and experience data with insurance supervisory officials, insurers and rating
organizations in other states and may consult with them with respect to rate
making and the application of rating systems.
(d) Rules and Regulations.
The [commissioner] may make reasonable rules and regulations necessary to
effect the purposes of this Act.
3 Under the laws of several of the states, reports of examinations are not made public until
the organization examined has an opportunity to review the proposed report and to have a hear-
ing with reference thereto, after which hearing the report is filed for public inspection and be-
comes admissible in evidence as a public record. In any state that has no such law, it is sug-
gested that provisions to this effect be adopted.
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Sec. 14— False or Misleading Information
No person or organization shall wilfully withhold information from, or know-
ingly give false or misleading information to, the [commissioner], any statistical
agency designated by the [commissioner], any rating organization, or any in-
surer, which will affect the rates or premiums chargeable under this Act. A vio-
lation of this section shall subject the one guilty of such violation to the penalties
provided in Section 15 of this Act.
Sec. 15 — Penalties
The [commissioner] may, if he finds that any person or organization has vio-
lated any provision of this Act, impose a penalty of not more than fifty dollars
($50) for each such violation, but if he finds such violation to be wilful he may
impose a penalty of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) for each such vio-
lation. Such penalties may be in addition to any other penalty provided by law.*
The [commissioner] may suspend the license of any rating organization or in-
surer which fails to comply with an order of the [commissioner] within the time
limited by such order, or any extension thereof which the [commissioner] may
grant. The [commissioner] shall not suspend the license of any rating organi-
zation or insurer for failure to comply with an order until the time prescribed
for an appeal therefrom has expired or if an appeal has been taken, until such
order has been affirmed. The [commissioner] may determine when a suspension
of license shall become effective and it shall remain in effect for the period fixed
by him, unless he modifies or rescinds such suspension, or until the order upon
which such suspension is based is modified, rescinded or reversed.
No penalty shall be imposed and no license shall be suspended or revoked
except upon a written order of the [commissioner], stating his findings, made
after a hearing held upon not less than ten da3's' written notice to such person oi
organization specifying the alleged violation.
Sec. 16-
—
Hearing Procedure and Judicial Review
(a) Any insurer or rating organization aggrieved by any order or decision of
the [commissioner] made without a hearing, may, within thirty days after notice
of the order to the insurer or organization, make written request to the [com-
missioner] for a hearing thereon. The [commissioner] shall hear such party or
parties within twenty days after receipt of such request and shall give not less
than ten days' written notice of the time and place of the hearing. Within fifteen
days after such hearing the [commissioner] shall aff.rni, reverse or modify his
previous action, specifying his reasons therefor. Pending such hearing and de-
cision thereon the [commissioner] may suspend or postpone the effective date of
his previous action.
(b) Nothing contained in this Act shall require the observance at any hearing
of formal rules of pleading or evidence.
(c) Any order or decision of the [commissioner] shall be subject to review
(here insert language indicating scope of the review) by
[appeal] ° [writ of certiorari]* to [the court]* at the instance of
any party in interest.
The court shall determine whether the filing of the [appeal]* [petition for such
writ]* shall operate as a stay of any such order or decision of the [commis-
sioner]. The court may, in disposing of the issue before it, modify, affirm or
reverse the order or decision of the [commissioner] in whole or in part.
4 In some states the imposition of fines by administrative officers is prohibited by basic law.
It may be necessary to modify this section to provide for the imposition of fines and penalties
by some other appropriate state authority.
5 Consideration should be given to the practice and procedure in each state.
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Sec. 17— Laws Repealed
Sections of the statutes of this state are hereby repealed. All
other laws or parts of laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed.
Sec. 18— Constitutionality
If any section, subsection, subdivision, paragraph, sentence or clause of this
Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, such decision shall not affect the remain-
ing portions of this Act.
Sec. 19— Effective Date
This Act shall take effect^
ADDITIONAL SECTION RECOMMENDED FOR STATE WHICH HAS
INADEQUATE ANTI-REBATE LAW OR HAS NO SUCH LAW
Sec. [ ] — Rebates Prohibited
No broker or agent shall knowingly charge, demand or receive a premium for
any policy of insurance except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. No
insurer or employee thereof, and no broker or agent shall pay, allow, or give, or
offer to pay, allow, or give, directly or indirectly, as an inducement to insurance,
or after insurance has been effected, any rebate, discount, abatement, credit or
reduction of the premium named in a policy of insurance, or any special favor or
advantage in the dividends or other benefits to accrue thereon, or any valuable
consideration or inducement whatever, not specified in the policy of insurance,
except to the extent provided for in an applicable filing. No insured named in
a policy of insurance, nor any employee of such insured shall knowingly receive
or accept, directly or indirectly, any such rebate, discount, abatement, credit or
reduction of premium, or any such special favor or advantage or valuable con-
sideration or inducement.
Nothing in this Section shall be construed as prohibiting the payment of com-
missions or other compensation to duly licensed agents and brokers, nor as pro-
hibiting any insurer from allowing or returning to its participating policyholders,
members or subscribers, dividends savings or unabsorbed premium deposits. As
used in this section the word "insurance" includes suret>'ship and the word
"polic}'"' includes bond.
6 The effective date of this Act should be set sufficiently ahead to allow the insurance depart-
ment, the companies and the rating organizations to prepare themselves with necessary per-
sonnel and procedures to carry out the purposes of the Act. Under the provisions of subsection
(h) of Section 4, the provisions of the Act go into effect as to the use of regulated rates 90 days
after the effective date of the Act. It is, therefore, recommended that such effective date should
be not later than October 1, 1947, which is 90 days prior to January 1, 1948, when the moratorium
under Public Law 15 ends.
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APPENDIX "D"
REPORT OF THE JOINT ^lEETING OF RATES AND RATING
ORGANIZATIONS COMMITTEE AND FEDERAL
LEGISLATION COMMITTEE
A joint meeting of the Rates and Rating Organizations Committee and Fed-
eral Legislation Committee was held at 3:00 p.m. Tuesday, June 11, 1946. The
Sub-Committee of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations submitted
its complete report. Opportunity was given to the Industry for extended dis-
cussion of the report, a stenographic copy of which is in the record of the Com-
mittees. At the conclusion of the discussion the Committees went into executive
session. After further discussion the Sub-Committee report was unanimously
adopted, upon motion duly made, seconded and passed.
Pursuant to a motion duly made, seconded and passed the Committee will con-
tinue to give consideration to the subject of the Sub-Committee report, including
consideration of the suggestions made at the meeting and such further sugges-
tions for improvement or modification of the model rating bills as are received.
The Committees will continue their consideration of other applicable federal acts
and report to the December, 1946 meeting.
Chas. F. J. Harrington, Chairman, ^Massachusetts
Robert E. Dineen, New York
Newell R. Johnson, Minnesota
James M. ^McCormack, Tennessee
Seth B. Thompson, Oregon
J. Edwin Larson, Florida
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APPENDIX "E"
JOINT REPORT OF COMMITTEES ON RATES AND RATING
ORGANIZATIONS AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION OF
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COM-
MISSIONERS ON MEETING HELD AT
HOTEL COMMODORE, NEW YORK,
OCTOBER 23-26, 1946.
The following members of the committees were present at this meeting:
Charles F. J. Harrington, Massachusetts, Chairman
Maynard Garrison, California
J. Edwin Larson, Florida
Newell R. Johnson, Minnesota
Robert E. Dineen, New York
Seth B. Thompson, Oregon
The following Commisioners were also present
:
W. Ellery Allyn, Connecticut
David A. Forbes, Michigan
Walter Dressel, Ohio
J. Austin Carroll, Rhode Island
The following departmental personnel also attended
:
E. A. Faircloth, Florida
Alfred J. Bohlinger, New York
Thomas C. Morrill, New York
Victor Cohen, New York
George McAteer, Washington
William C. Green, Assistant Attorney General of the State of Minnesota, was
also in attendance.
The All-Industry Committee was in session at the same time and a number of
consultations were held between that group and this committee.
The subjects considered by this committee were as follows:
1. Treatment of the Robinson-Patman Act on a state level.
2. Treatment of the Federal Trade Commission Act on a state level.
3. Proposals for the regulation of the accident and health business.
The committee was also asked to consider the regulation of the title insurance
business but the pressure of other business prevented that particular problem
from being considered at this meeting. Other aspects of the rating problem were
likewise not considered for the same reason.
Robinson-Patman Act
The committee had before it and gave consideration to the reports of the Rob-
inson-Patman Act Subcommittee of the All-Industry Committee dated September
19, 1945, October 19, 1945 and September 6, 1946. Copies of these reports are
attached hereto, made a part hereof and marked Exhibits "A", "B" and "C".
These reports were unanimously approved by the All-Industry Committee and
for the purpose of this report are treated as the reports of the All-Industry
Committee. •
The committee voted unanimously to accept these reports. It was the opinion
of the committee that the suggested legislative procedure provided an adequate
and satisfactory method of dealing with the Robinson-Patman Act on a state
level and the committee recommends for use in the states the proposals therein
contained.
Federal Trade Commission Act.
Numerous proposals as to how this problem should be treated were considered.
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In general and in brief, the following proposals were submitted to your com-
mittee :
(1) No legislation on a state level should be enacted and the regulation
of unfair practices should be left to the Federal Trade Commission.
(2) Each state should enact a so-called "baby federal trade commission
act" paralleling the language, in general, of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.
(3) Each state should enact a "baby federal trade commission act" with
the exception that all prohibited practices should be promulgated by the
Commissioner in the form of rules, following notice and hearing to all in-
terested parties. This suggested modification is along the lines of the pro-
cedure contained in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (Public Law
404, 79th Congress).
(4) Each state should pass an act giving the Commissioner the power to
restrain and enjoin unfair practices by the use of cease and desist orders.
To the extent possible, the legislature should set forth in definitive form the
prohibited acts or practices. To the extent that it was not possible for the
legislature to do this, the Commissioner should be entrusted with the power
to define the additional prohibited acts and practices under the procedure set
forth in (3) above.
(5) The Commissioner should be entrusted with the power to issue cease
and desist orders in connection with unfair acts and practices. However,
all unfair acts and practices are defined by rules promulgated by the Com-
missioner following notice and hearing, along the lines of the Federal Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. This is a so-called "baby federal trade com-
mission act". It becomes a definitive plan, in effect, upon promulgation of
rules by the Commissioner.
(6) Under this plan all unfair acts and practices are prohibited. The
statute itself contains a list of prohibited acts or practices. Since this list is
not all-inclusive, the Commissioner is empowered in all other cases to con-
duct hearings as to whether or not an act or practice complained of consti-
tutes an unfair act or practice. If it does, the Commissioner makes a report
in writing stating his findings. Thereafter, the Commissioner may, through
the Attorney General, file a petition in court to restrain the violation. If
the court adopts the Commissioner's contention, a cease and desist order is
issued by the court. The Commissioner has no power under this proposal
to do more than make a finding as to whether or not an act or practice is
unfair and he may not issue the cease and desist order himself. With the
exception of those prohibited acts or practices specifically enumerated in the
statute, the actual definition of an unfair act or practice is by judicial rather
than administrative determination, and the issuance of all cease and desist
orders, whether or not the practices are enumerated, is entrusted to the
courts.
(7) This plan is similar to (6) except that the authority to determine the
unenumerated unfair practices and to issue cease and desist orders in all
cases is entrusted in the first instance to the Commissioner rather than to
the courts.
A refinement of plans (6) and (7) contemplated that the Commissioner should
have the power to issue cease and desist orders as to the acts and practices spe-
cifically enumerated in the act but not as to those of which he was the arbitrator.
All of the plans considered contained provisions for judicial review.
The merits and demerits of these plans were exhaustively explored and dis-
cussed by members of your committee and by other interested parties.
Your committee was unanimous upon the proposition that the regulation of
unfair acts and practices should not be left to the Federal Trade Commission in
Washington. Its views on this subject have been outlined in previous reports
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and in the supporting memoranda of the Commissioners' legislative proposal sub-
mitted to the Congress in 1944.
The committee looked with favor upon two alternative methods of dealing with
this problem, copies of which are attached and marked Exhibits "D" and "E".
In both alternatives unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts
and practices are prohibited. The general idea of these two proposals is based
upon the so-called definitive approach, namely, to enumerate specific unfair acts
and practices in the business which are generally known. The committee recog-
nized, however, that the enumeration of specific acts and practices would not
completely occupy the field and that therefore provision had to be made for an
omnibus section to cover unenumerated acts and practices.
The proposals differ, however, in the following respects. One plan (Exhibit
"D") follows the procedure outlined in the Federal Trade Commission Act and
empowers the Commissioner, after hearing, to determine unfair acts and prac-
tices other than those specifically enumerated and to issue cease and desist orders
as to all unfair practices whether enumerated or not. Under the alternative pro-
posal (Exhibit "E") the power to make adjudications as to unfair acts and prac-
tices and to issue cease and desist orders in connection therewith is given to the
courts through the medium of the Attorney General.
These bills are receiving additional study by the members of the committee
and will be the subject of further consideration at the committee's next meeting,
which will be held some time before the December meeting of the Association in
New York.
Accident and Health
I
Certain conditions in the- accident and health business have been a source of
grave concern to the members of the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners and to the members of this committee. For years many states have'
passed upon the forms used in the accident and health field. It has been sug-
gested, however, that supervision of forms is not enough and that rates should
likewise be supervised, possibly under the ordinary rate regulatory bill. While
the committee recognized that this is a possible solution to the problem, the com-
plexities of the accident and health business and the fact that it is transacted by
different types of carriers induced the committee to consider first the merits of
a separate approach.
The committee is agreed that legislation should be enacted prescribing stand-
ards not only for the forms but for the premiums because there is a direct rela-
tionship between the coverage and the premium charged. The problem is further
complicated because certain companies act in concert and desire to continue that
procedure. If these companies are to continue these activities, the committee
recognizes that legislation is necessary in this respect.
In addition to regulation of rates under a rate regulatory law, three additional
proposals were considered. One was submitted by the Bureau of Personal Acci-
dent and Health Underwriters under date of October 16, 1946; another was
submitted by the Health and Accident Underwriters Conference under date of
October 17, 1946 and a third was developed as a result of a study of these two
and legislation now in force in certain states. The first two plans have been
widely circularized among the Insurance Departments of the several states and
for that reason no copies are attached hereto. While this committee was in
session, a telegram was received from Zone 3 expressing its opposition to the
proposal of the Health and Accident Underwriters Conference. A copy of the
third proposal is attached hereto and marked Exhibit "F".
In substance, the third proposal provides that no policy can be issued unless
policy forms, applications, endorsements, classifications of risks and premium
charges therefor are filed with the Commissioner. It contains standards for both
the forms and the premiums. The standards for the premiums are the customary
ones, namely, that they shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discrimina-
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tory. The standards for the forms are likewise customary, namely, that they
shall not be unjust, unfair, inequitable, misleading, contrary to law or to the
public policy of the state.
Under this proposal the Commissioner is empowered, following notice and
hearing,, to prevent any company from using any policy form if he finds that it
does not meet the standards. It also empowers the Commissioner to call for sta-
tistical information from the insurer to enable him to determine whether the
standards have been met. Furthermore, it contains provisions authorizing con-
cert of action and subjecting those organizations of insurers which operate in
concert to the same supervisory processes substantially contained in the model
rate regulatory bills recommended by your committee in so far as licensing,
examination, admission to membership, etcetera, are concerned.
It will be noted that this third proposal does not require affirmative approval
in advance of forms and rates. The multiplicity of forms in the accident and
health business, combined with certain other peculiarities of the business, seemed
to make such a requirement impractical at this time. This proposal imposes no
burdensome administrative details for dealing with policy contracts which on
their face are fair and reasonable ; on the other hand, it does provide police power
to deal with those policies where, bcause of inadequacy of coverage or excessive-
ness of rate, or both, the result is unconscionable and not in the public interest.
The practice of approving policy forms in advance is widespread and the optional
character of the language employed would enable a Commissioner to adhere to
this program under this bill ; in short, the bill does not preclude that practice.
The committee has reached no final determination in the matter and is not pre-
pared to express any views upon any of the proposals until the conclusion of its
further studies. Further consideration of the whole problem will be given by
the committee at its next meeting which, as stated above, v/ill be held prior to
the December meeting of the Association in New York.
Title Insurance
The committee received communications from Commissioner Larson of Florida
and former Superintendent Scheufler of Missouri requesting the committee to
consider the question of regulation of title insurance rates in view of the fact that
in certain sections of the country such rates are made in concert. Time did not
permit the committee to consider this problem. The committee will be prepared
to hear anyone interested in this problem at its next meeting.
Clayton Act
At the conclusion of its labors a memorandum was submitted to the committee
dealing with this subject, a copy of which is annexed hereto and marked Exhibit
"G". The contents of this memorandum will be considered by the committee at
its next meeting.
The A. I. C. Bills
A communication was received from the Risk Research Institute expressing
certain views with respect to the legislative proposals previously adopted by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners. While the views contained
in the letter and memorandum have not been formally approved by the member-
ship of the Risk Research Institute, it was nevertheless read and considered by
the Committee and filed in its records.
Respectfully submitted,
Charles F. J. Harrington, Massachusetts, Chairman
Robert E. Dineen, New York
Newell R. Johnson, Minnesota
James M. McCormack, Tennessee
Seth B. Thompson, Oregon
J. Edwin Larson, Florida
Maynard Garrison, California
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EXHIBIT "A"
REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT TO THE ALL-INDUSTRY COMMITTEE
(Submitted at September 19-20, 1945 Meeting of All-Industry Committee)
A. NATURE OF ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
At the time the Sherman Act was adopted, in 1890, the country had witnessed
phenomenal growth of producer (seller) enterprises and it was believed that the
unrestricted development of such enterprises would result in such concentration
of power in comparatively few corporations as to make impossible the continu-
ance of competitive enterprises. The Sherman Act approached the problem by
prohibiting combinations in restraint of trade, and further prohibited the setting
up of a monopoly through the dealings of a single corporation or individual.
The Sherman Act was later found to be inadequate to deal with the problem
for the reason that the purposes of the Act were frequently circumvented by in-
direct means which were held by the Courts not to be within the specific prohibi-
tions of the Act. As a result, in 1914, the Clayton Act was adopted. This Act
continued the Sherman Act approach by way of proscribing certain activities in
the producer (seller) field, and attempted to prohibit the indirect methods of
"committing" monopoly by making illegal certain price discrimination practices
and the acquisition, under certain circumstances, of stock in competing companies,
and by limiting the growth of interlocking directorates.
By 1936 it had become apparent that the attempts which Congress had made
to deal with the problem of maintaining free trade and commerce were still in-
adequate, because, being designed to control the activities of sellers primarily,
they did not prevent the development of monopolistic practices on the part of
buyer organizations in the consumer goods field. These buyer organizations
were typified by the chain stores.^ It was felt that while the Clayton Act con-
tained a prohibition against price discriminations, the prohibition was largely
ineffective because it permitted quantity discounts which were not based on actual
cost differentials and because it permitted indirect discriminations through bro-
kerage and advertising allowances.
The Robinson-Patman Act attempted to deal with the evils still permitted
under the Clayton Act by requiring quantity discounts to be based on actual costs
and by prohibiting, subject to certain exceptions, brokerage, advertising and
other allowances for services and facilities. An examination of the specific pro-
visions of the Act is necessary to an understanding of its position- in the body of
anti-trust legislation and its effect on the insurance business.
Section 1 of the Act amends the Clayton Act by striking out Section 2 of the
Clayton Act and by substituting for the stricken section six new paragraphs.
The first of the new paragraphs (Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act) prohibits
certain price discriminations and quantity discounts.^ The exceptions to the pro-
hibition of quantity discounts are of considerable importance. Quantity discounts
or differentials are permitted provided they make due allowance for differences
in cost of manufacture, sale or delivery resulting from differing methods or quan-
tities in which the commodities are sold or delivered. Therefore, discounts which
reflect actual and provable differences in cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery
are permitted.^
1 See Patman, "The Robinson-Patman Act," Pages 3-5.
2 Section 2(a) reads as follows:
"That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such com-
merce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchasers involved in
such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption,
or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or
any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
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Also, discounts which do not substantially lessen competition or tend to the
creation of a monopoly are permitted even though they may not be based upon
actual difference in cost. If, in the event a complaint is filed alleging violation
of this Section and it is proved that a price discrimination exists, the burden is
on the seller to justify the discriminatory discount or differential. Section 2(b)
of the Clayton Act as amended makes this clear.*
Section 2(c) of the Clayton Act as amended by Robinson-Patman prohibits
the allowance of brokerage, except for services rendered, to the other party to
the transaction or to an agent of the other party. ^ It will be noted that this pro-
hibition does not carry the usual qualification to the effect that it applies only
where the acts prohibited may substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly. The prohibition is absolute to the extent that it applies.^
customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differ-
entials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or
delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to
such purchasers sold or delivered: Provided, however, That the Federal Trade Commission
may, after due investigation and hearing to all interested parties, fix and establish quantity
limits, and revise the same as it finds necessary, as to particular commodities or classes of
commodities, where it finds that available purchasers in greater quantities are so few as to
render differentials on account thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly in
any line of commerce; and the foregoing shall then not be construed to permit differentials
based on differences in quantities greater than those so fixed and established: And provided
further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods,
wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transac-
tions and not in restraint of trade: And provided further. That nothing herein contained
shall prevent price changes from time to time where in response to clianging conditions
affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned, such as but not limited
to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, absolescence of seasonal goods, dis-
tress sales under court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance of business in the
goods concerned." USCA Sec. 13(a).
3 Three types of discounts are defined as follows:
"Quantity discounts (non-cumulative discounts based upon the dollar amount bought at a
single time, and usually delivered at a single place),
"Cumulative or volume discounts (cumulative discounts based upon the total dollar purchases
over a period of time, often for delivery at a number of different places), and
"Functional or trade discounts (discounts which depend upon the distributional status or
classification of the customer)."
— 80 Congressional Record, Pages 7969, 7970; May 21, 1936.
4 Section 2(b) reads as follows:
"Upon proof being made at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that there has
been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the
prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with
a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commis-
sion is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, however, That
nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by
showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or
purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the serv-
ices or facilities furnished by a competitor." USCA Sec. 13(b)
5 Section 2(c) reads as follows:
"That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such com-
merce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage,
or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services ren-
dered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the
other party to such transaction or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein
where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or in-
direct control, of any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such compen-
sation is so granted or paid. USCA Sec. 13(c)
6 Federal Trade Commission rulings are summarized as follows in Supplement 3 to Volume
VII. N.A.M. Law Digest (May 1945):
1. Direct or indirect brokerage payments by a seller to a buyer are unlawful regardless of
the effect on competition.
2. A brokerage house, even though independently owned and managed, is the agent of the
buyer in purchasing transactions.
3. Price discrimination is a burden on commerce and brokerage to buyers often hides price
discrimination. In regulating commerce by making certain brokerage payments illegal,
the Congress did not violate the prescriptions of the Fifth Amendment.
4. A broker, serving the buyer, often renders service to the seller but for this he cannot be
paid by the seller, for such service is merely incidental to his service for the buyer.
5. To come within the language "except for services rendered," a seller's payment to a
buyer or his agent must be for services which the seller was bound to render in connec-
tion with the sale.
6. The prohibition against brokerage or allowances in lieu thereof to buyers is absolute.
7. The defense allowed for "meeting competition" (Section 2(b)) relates to price and service
discrimination by a seller and does not relate to brokerage or pay for a buyer's services.
8. The brokerage section (2(c)) applies only to transactions in interstate commerce, while
price discriminations are covered if either of the purchases is in interstate commerce.
(Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC (2nd Circuit), 96 F. (2d) 687; Oliver Bros. Inc. v. FTC (4th Cir-
cuit), 102 F. (2d) 763; The Great A & P Tea Co. v. FTC (3rd Circuit), 106 F. (2d) 667; Webb-
Crawford Co. V. FTC (Sth Circuit), 109 F. (2d) 268; Quality Bakers of America v. FTC (1st Cir-
cuit, 114 F. (2d) 393; Fitch & Kentucky v. Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F. (2d) 12.
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Under the language of the Section, payment of brokerage to a representative
of the buyer is condemned even though the allowance may never reach the buyer.
It is for this reason that this Section has an important bearing upon insurance
in view of long established practices. While brokers in the insurance business
do represent the buyer, they receive commissions from the seller, which commis-
sions are not passed on to the buyer but are retained by the broker as payment
for service rendered. In the insurance business brokers are independent con-
tractors and are not a part of the staff of a buyer's organization. This fact argues
for a different application of Section 2(c) in the insurance business than to in-
dustry generally.
Section 2(d) prohibits payments to or for the benefit of a customer in consider-
ation for services or facilities furnished by or through the customer in connection
with the sale, etc., of products or commodities. The prohibition does not apply
where the payments are available on proportionally equal terms to all customers.'^
This Section is designed to eliminate the practice of large buyers of demanding
allowances which purport to compensate the buyer for advertising and other
sales promotional services.
Section 2(e) prohibits discriminations between purchasers of commodities
bought for resale. Since insurance is not bought for resale it appears to have
no application to insurance.®
Section 2(f) provides that it is unlawful for any person engaged in commerce
to receive a prohibited price discrimination.^
Section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act applied only to litigation pending at
the time of enactment.
Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act is not amendatory of the Clayton Act.
It is frequently referred to as the criminal section. This section has not been in-
voked by the Department of Justice. Inasmuch as it relates to price discrimina-
tions, its applicability to the business of insurance will presumably be governed
by principles similar to those hereinafter referred to in connection with Section
2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by Robinson-Patman. However, Section 3
differs considerably from Section 2(a). ^° Section 3 does not contain the limiting
language of Section 2(a) which requires that the discrimination must be such
that it may "substantially . . . lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly."
7 Section 2(d) reads as follows:
"That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract for the
payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such person in the course
of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for any services or facilities furnished
by or through such customer in connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for
sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person,
unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to all other
customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities." USCA Sec. 13(d).
s Section 2(e) reads as follows:
"That it shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against
another purchaser or purchaser of a commodity bought for resale, with or without processing,
by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of, any services
or facilities connected with the processing, liandling, sale, or offering for sale of such com-
modity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal
terms." USCA Sec. 13(e).
9 Section 2(f) reads as follows:
"That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the_ course of such corn-
merce knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this
section." USCA Sec. 13(f).
10 Section 3 reads as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
to be a party to, or assist in, any transaction of sale, or contract to sell, which discriminates
to his knowledge against competitors of the purchaser, in that any discount, rebate, allow-
ance, or advertising service charge is granted to the purchaser over and above any discount,
rebate, allowance, or advertising service charge available at the time of such transaction to
said competitors in respect to a sale of goods of like grade, quality, and quantity; to sell, or
contract to sell, goods in any part of the United States a prices lower than those exacted by
said person elsewhere in the United States for the purpose of destroying competition, or
eliminating a competitor in such part of the United States; or to sell, or contract to sell,
goods at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a
competitor." USCA Sec. 13(a).
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It makes the discrimination itself unlawful provided that the goods are "of like
grade, quality, and quantity." The omission of the qualifying language contained
in Section 2(a) may raise interesting questions as to the enforceability of Section
3 under the Due Process amendment. On the other hand, the language of Sec-
tion 3 may require such an interpretation of "like quantity" as to render the Act
innocuous.
Section 4 of the Act expressly eliminates from the prohibitions of the Act the
return of a portion of the net earnings or surplus to members by cooperative
associations.^^ It is believed that this Section requires no special examination.
B. APPLICABILITY OF ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT TO INSURANCE
Irrespective of the treatment of the Robin son-Patman Act in Public Law 15,
hereinafter discussed, it is necessary to determine whether and to what extent
Robinson-Patman applies to the insurance business.
The Act was aimed at specific practices in the consumer goods field. These
practices had to do with the sale in commerce of "commodities" (Section 2(a)),
"goods, wares or commodities" (Section 2 (c)), "products or commodities"
(Section 2(d)), and "goods" (Section 3). With reference to the varying lan-
guage in the different sections, it will be noted that each of the sections contains
either the word "commodity" or the word "goods."
It is necessary, therefore, to determine whether the words "commodity" and
"goods" include insurance. The word "commodity," is now generally understood
in its commercial sense in which it denotes that which affords advantage or profit,
that which affords convenience or advantage, especially in commerce, including
everything movable which is bought or sold, an article of trade or commerce,
something that is produced or used and is the subject of barter and sale, some-
thing movable and tangible, almost any description of article called movable or
personal estate goods, ware, and merchandise of any kind, property. In referring
to commerce, it may comprehend everything movable, that is bought or sold, ex-
cept animals. ^-
The cases construing "commodity" as related to insurance are not in agree-
ment. In Palatine Insurance Company v. Griffen, (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) 202
S. W. 1014, insurance was held not to be a commodity under a statute prohibiting
any agreement to refuse to buy from or sell to any person an article of merchan-
dise, produce, or commodity. A similar decision was made in Duggan Abstract-
ing Company vs. Moore, (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) 139 S. W. (2d) 198, where the
business of compiling abstracts of title was held not to be an article of merchan-
dise, produce or commodity.
The case most frequently referred to as holding "commodity" not to include
insurance is Queen Insurance Co. v. State Attorney General, (Tex. 1893) 24
S. W. 397, 22 L.R.A. 483. The Court held that the statute which prohibited
making or performing "any agreement not to sell or dispose of any article or
commodity of trade, use, merchandise, commerce or consumption below a com-
mon standard so as to prevent free competition" did not apply to a combination
of Fire Insurance companies to use uniform rates of insurance and agents' com-
missions throughout the state. The Court stated that the word "commodity" is
"ordinarily used in the commercial sense as any movable or' tangible thing that
is ordinarily produced or used as the subject of barter or sale."
Insurance was held to be a "commodity" in Beechley vs. Mulville (1897) 102
la. 602, 70 N. W. 107. In this case, a group of insurance agents were charged
11 Section 4 reads as follows:
"Nothing in this Act shall prevent a cooperative association from returning to its members,
producers, or consumers the whole or any part of, the net earnings or surplus resulting from
its trading operations, in proportion to their purchases or sales from, to, or through the asso-
ciation." USCA Sec. 13(b).
12 See 12 Corpus Juris, Page 153.
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with violating a statute which prohibited "combinations to fix the price of oil,
lumber, coal, grain, flour, provisions or any other commodity or article whatever."
The Court referred to Anderson's Law Dictionary, which defined the word "com-
modity" as "convenience, privilege, profit or gain."
In State ex rel. Taylor vs. Ross (1906) 4 Ohio N. P. N. S. 337, an indictment
under the antitrust law against insurance companies for unlawfully combining to
fix prices, etc., was sustained on the ground that insurance was a commodity, and
insurance companies were engaged in barter and trade within the meaning of
this law. The Court refused to follow the earlier Ohio case of Runck v. Cloud
(1901) 8 Ohio N. P. 448. Two subsequent nisi prius cases have refused to
follow Taylor vs. Ross. See State vs. Beovee (1917) 6 Ohio N. P. N. S. 337,
and Foster vs. Anken Bauer (1913) 14 Ohio N. P. N. S. 637.
The fact that the United States Supreme Court has now taken the position
that insurance is commerce may have a tendency to encourage state courts as
well as Federal courts to construe the word "commodity" more broadly. ^^
The applicability of Section 2(c) to the insurance business involves a construc-
tion of the words "goods, wares or merchandise." Many of the cases construing
these words arose in connection with the Statutes of Frauds of the various states,
and are not particularly helpful as to insurance. The word "goods" has been held
to be limited to property which has an intrinsic value. On the other hand, it has
been held to include movables not having any intrinsic value in themselves such
as choses in action as well as those in possession, evidence of debt, bank bills and
notes, bonds, mortgages, etc."
While it is possible to argue rather effectively that Section 2(c) relating to
brokerage does not apply to the insurance business for the reason that the word
"commodity" is not used and that the words "goods, wares or merchandise" do
not apply to insurance, there nevertheless remains a possibility that they might
be considered to include insurance. There is little uniformity in the decisions
interpreting these words. They are variously interpreted according to the con-
text and subject matter. Those decisions holding the word "goods" to be limited
in meaning to property which has an intrinsic value may be used in support of
the argument that the brokerage section does not apply to insurance. On the
other hand, the decisions holding that the word "goods" includes things which
have no intrinsic value in themselves such as choses in action, etc., may be con-
strued to afford the ground work for decisions specifically holding the brokerage
section applicable to insurance.
C. THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT AND PUBLIC LAW 15 (Insurance
Antitrust Moratorium Act of the 79th Congress, first session, approved
March 9, 1945.)
It may be argued that Congress intended, by adopting Public Law 15, that the
Robinson-Patman Act is to apply to the business of insurance after Jan. 1, 1948.
Section 3(a) of Public Law 15 provides in part: "Until January 1, 1948 . . .
the Act of June 19, 1936, known as the Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination
Act, shall not apply to the business of insurance or to acts in the conduct thereof."
This language implies that after January 1, 1948, the Robinson-Patman Act will
appl}^ to the business of insurance to the extent that other sections of the Act fail
to limit such application. It is necessary, therefore, to examine other sections of
Public Law 15 to determine how and to what extent the Robinson-Patman Act
will apply to insurance after January 1, 1948.
13 See 21 A.L.R. at Page S51.
14 See Keyser v. Sunapee School District #8, 35 N. H. 477. 483.
See also U. S. vs. Moulton 27 F. Cas. No. IS, 827, S Mason 537, 544; Gibbs vs. Usher, 10 F.
Cas. No. 5387, Holmes 348, 351; Epping v. Robinson, 21 Fla. 36, 52.
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Section 2(b) reads in part as follows : "No Act of Congress shall be construed
to invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any state for the purpose
of regulating the business of insurance or shall impose a fee or tax upon such
business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance
;
pro-
vided, that after January 1, 1948 . . . the Act of October 15, 1914 as amended,
known as the Clayton x\ct . . . shall be applicable to the business of insurance
to the extent that such business is not regulated by state law."
Nowhere in this section is there a specific reference to the Robinson-Patman
Act. However, the proviso specifically refers to the Clayton Act "as amended".
The amendments to the Clayton Act necessarily include those amendments con-
tained in the Robinson-Patman Act. It seems, therefore, that Section 1 of the
Robinson-Patman Act, which amends Section 2 of the Clayton Act, and which
includes the price discrimination and brokerage sub-sections and the sub-sections
referring to other allowances, is included within the specific language of the pro-
viso. Accordingly, after January 1, 1948, Section 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act
will apply to the business of insurance only "to the extent that such business is
not regulated by state law."
This fails to dispose of Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Robinson-Patman. Section 2 is
completely inapplicable to insurance and Section 4 is believed to be unimportant
from the standpoint of our present discussion. Section 3, however, must be con-
sidered. It may be argued that by reason of the failure of Congress to include
a specific reference to Robinson-Patman in the proviso of Section 2(b) of Public
Law 15, it was intended that the sections of Robinson-Patman which are not
amendatory of the Clayton Act should not apply in any manner to the business
of insurance after January 1, 1948. It may, on the other hand, be argued that
since Section 3(a) of Public Law 15 implies that after January 1, 1948 the Rob-
inson-Patman Act shall apply to the business of insurance, and since the applica-
tion of Robinson-Patman to insurance after January 1, 1948 is not limited by
specific reference in Section 2(b), Section 3 of Robinson-Patman will apply to
insurance after January 1, 1948 irrespective of any regulatory laws enacted by
the states. It is believed that neither of these alternative interpretations is sound.
Effect must be given to that portion of Section 2(b) of Public Law 15 which pre-
cedes the proviso.
Since the Robinson-Patman Act does not specifically relate to the business of
insurance, it cannot be construed to invalidate or to impair or to supersede any
law enacted by a state for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance. In
other words, assuming a state law exists which regulates the business of insur-
ance, Section 3 of Robinson-Patman would not affect the operation of the state
law because it could not be construed to invalidate, impair or supersede the state
law. However, the state law must be such that it affects activities comprehended
within Section 3 of Robinson-Patman, otherwise there would be no occasion to
consider whether Section 3 invalidates, impairs or supersedes it.
Our conclusion is that since Section 1 of Robinson-Patman amends the Clayton
Law, it is included within the proviso of Section 2(b) of Public Law 15. Being
within the proviso, the price discrimination, brokerage and other allowances sub-
sections apply to insurance "to the extent" that there is no state law regulating
the specific activities prohibited by these sections. With reference to Section 3
of Robinson-Patman, while it is not included within the proviso, it is included
within the language of Section 2(b) preceding the proviso from the standpoint
that it may not invalidate any state law which regulates activities included under
Section 3.
D. THE IMPACT OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT ON
INSURANCE
Since Public Law 15 may make the Robinson-Patman Act generally applicable
to insurance transactions, after January 1, 1948 the question arises whether there
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are practices in the insurance business which might be considered vulnerable
under some one of the Sections of that Act. Considering first the price discrimi-
nation sections (Section 2(a) of Clayton as amended by Robinson-Patman and
Section 3 of Robinson-Patman), it should be noted that the Act applies to indi-
vidual sellers and does not require any combination as between companies. In
this respect it must be distinguished from the Sherman Act.^^
The activities of individual companies may violate any one of the Sections of
the Robinson-Patman Act. Various practices in the insurance field should be
considered in this connection. Among these practices are
;
( 1 ) charging varying rates by size of risk
(2) retrospective rating available to risks of certain size
(3) graduated expense by size of risk
(4) fleet rates available to risks covering a specified number of cars
(5) expense constants applied to risks of certain size
(6) loss constants applied to risks of certain size
(7) experience rating and other adjustments by size of risk
(8) policy forms (comprehensive) restricted to risks of certain size
(9) minimum premium by size of risk
(10) "equity" (competitive) rating
These practices might be questioned under Paragraph 2(a) or under Section 3
of Robinson-Patman. Additional activities might be questioned under Section 3.
For example: (1) territorial classifications, (2) general reductions in rates by
territory, (3) differences in rates between states when considered in the light of
the fact that the Robinson-Patman Act applies on a national level.
As to the test of legality, there are differences between Section 2(a) of Clayton
as amended by Robinson-Patman, and Section 3 of Robinson-Patman. Under
Section 2(a) the basic question which must first be passed upon is whether in
fact a discrimination exists. On this point retrospective rating may be cited as
an illustration. Assuming that retrospective rating is available to risks where
the premium is $1,000 or more, it may be argued that such a plan does discrimi-
nate against a risk with a premium of $990 in favor of a risk with a premium of
$1,010. If discrimination is present, the burden of defending the discriminatory
practice is on the accused and the defense may be either that the effect of the
retrospective rating plan cannot be to substantially lessen competition or to tend
to the creation of monopoly, or that due allowance for cost of manufacture, sale
or delivery resulting from differing methods or quantities has been made in the
plan. A further defense [contained in section 2(b)] is that the price was set in
good faith to meet that of a competitor.
15 Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Act of July 2, 1890, Chapter 647, 26 Stat. 209, as
amended; 15 U. S. Code, Section 1 et seq.) reads in part as follows:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be
illegal . . ." (Emphasis ours). The reference to combinations and conspiracies necessarily
includes more than one person or more than one corporation.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act reads in part as follows:
"Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire with
any other person or perspns to monopolize . . ." This section applies to the activities of an
individual person or corporation and to the activities of persons or corporations acting in
combination.
Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by Robinson-Patman reads in part as follows:
"That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ..." The reference is to
"person" and not to a combination of persons or a conspiracy participated in by more than
one person.
Section 2(c) of the Cayton Act as amended by Robinson-Patman reads in part as follows:
"That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . ." It will be noted that
this language does not refer to combinations of persons or to conspiracies.
Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of Clayton as amended by Robinson-Patman also refer to "any per-
son" and thus do not include combinations of persons or conspiracies between persons.
Section 3 of Robinson-Patman also refers to "persons engaged in commerce" and does not
include combinations or conspiracies.
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With reference to Section 3 of Robinson-Patman, it has been pointed out that
the burden on the government or other complainant is greatly increased. "In-
tent" must be shown. It also must be shown affirmatively that the goods were
of like grade, quality and quantity. Thus, while Section 3 may seem somewhat
broader than Section 2(a) in its prohibitions, it would seem that the obligation
on the complainant under Section 3 is considerably greater and the obligation on
the respondent correspondingly less.
Another section which must be considered is Section 2(c) of Clayton as
amended by Robinson-Patman, which deals with brokerage. For convenience,
this section will be referred to as 2(c).
It is difficult to arrive at any definite conclusion as to whether or not an insur-
ance broker would come under Section 2(c) of the Act or whether he would be
exempted as a legitimate intermediary. It is true that in the insurance business
brokers are considered to represent the buyer. In some instances, the state stat-
utes specifically contemplate that the broker shall represent the buyer. For ex-
ample. Section 6015, Missouri Insurance Laws, reads in part as follows: "Who-
ever for compensation, acts or aids in any manner in negotiating contracts of
insurance or reinsurance, or placing risks or effecting insurance or reinsurance
for any person other than himself, and not being the appointed agent or officer of
the company in which insurance or reinsurance is effected, shall be deemed an
insurance broker . . ." Similarly, Section 141 of the Insurance Laws of Nevada
reads in part as follows : "The term 'non-resident broker' as used in this article
means any person, partnership, association or corporation, not a resident of or a
domiciled company in this state, who or which for money, commission, brokerage,
or anything- of value acts or aids in any manner any solicitation or negotiation,
on behalf of the assured, or contracts of any of the kind or kinds enumerated in
Section 5" (Emphasis ours). Under such state laws it cannot well be claimed
that the broker does not represent the buyer. Section 2(c) of Clayton as amended
by Robinson-Patman carries a specific exception which reads as follows : "Ex-
cept for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares
or merchandise . . ." Notwithstanding the exception, we believe that since
brokers generally claim to be the representative of the buyer and to serve on his
behalf, and the laws generally give the broker that legal status, it must be con-
cluded that if the Robinson-Patman Act applies to insurance it does preclude the
payment of a commission to a broker by an insurance company, except as relief
may be sought pursuant to Public Law 15.^*^
Section 2(d) may be construed to affect practices in the insurance business
which have to do with price allowances made to specific risks for services per-
formed by the insured which would otherwise be performed by the insurer. It is
believed that these practices are not numerous or of serious consequence to the
business. It may be considered practicable and proper to eliminate them. On
the other hand, it may be well to proceed on the basis of adopting state legislation
of such character that no section of the Robinson-Patman Act will apply to the
business of insurance. The comments just made apply to Section 2(e) although
it may be questioned whether there are transactions in the insurance business
which come within the language referring to "commodities bought for resale".
In order to determine the extent of state regulation necessary to exempt com-
panies from the operation of the Robinson-Patman Act, it is necessary to consider
the various Sections of Robinson-Patman separately. We cannot assume that
regulation which exempts the companies from the operation of one section of
Robinson-Patman will be effective to exempt the companies from the operation
of other sections dealing with different subject matter. Accordingly, the im-
portant sections of Robinson-Patman will be separately treated
:
Section 2(a) of Clayton as amended by Robinson-Patman relates to prices or
16 See cases cited under footnote 6.
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rates. Discounts from established prices are prohibited under certain circum-
stances. The most logical and perhaps the only way by which states may accom-
plish the ouster of this section of the Robinson-Patman Act and at the same time
permit the insurance business to operate effectively and in the public interest is
through the passage of rate regulatory laws. It is believed that there should be
included in such laws anti-rebate and anti-discrimination sections.
Section 2(c) of Clayton Act as amended by Robinson-Patman is the brokerage
section. It is believed that state regulation sufficient to protect the companies
and brokers against prosecution under this section should provide for the licens-
ing of brokers and for the revocation of license, should specifically authorize the
payment of commissions to licensed brokers and should specify the conditions
under which brokerage may be paid to out-of-state brokers. It may be questioned
whether state regulation which goes only to the extent indicated is adequate for
the reason that even though the state law specifically authorizes payment of bro-
kerage, it does not protect the public against the harmful effects of improper
rebates by brokers. It would seem however, that the adoption of anti-rebate pro-
visions applicable to companies, agents and brokers would certainly accomplish
the desired result.
Section 2(d) of Clayton Act as amended by Robinson-Patman Act is the sec-
tion designed to eliminate alowances which purport to compensate the buyer or
advertising and other sales promotional services. A broad anti-rebate provision
will render this section inoperative.
The comment made with reference to Section 2(d) of the Clayton Act as
amended by Robinson-Patman is believed also to apply to Section 2(e) which
prohibits discrimination in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser in
connection with services or facilities having to do with the sale of a commodity
bought for resale. The section probably has no direct bearing on insurance
practices.
Section 3 of Robinson-Patman prohibits certain price discriminations and is
commonly referred to as the criminal section. There is considerable question as
to the meaning and enforceability of its provisions. A rating law such as that
herein recommended together with an anti-rebate section would constitute a valid
ouster.
The remaining sections of the Robinson-Patman Act are unimportant from an
insurance standpoint.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The enactment in each State of rating laws that meet the reqiiirements of
Public Lazu 15.
2. The enactment in each State— either as an integral part of the rating law
or independently— of statutes (a) prohibiting unfair rate discriminations and
(b) prohibiting rebates.
Typical statutory provisions prohibiting rate discrimination and rebating are
found in the New York Insurance Law, Sections 183(c), 188 and 209.
3. hi the absence of a statutory regulation of rates, the insurer affected, for
protection against the impact of the Robinson-Patman Act, must rely exclusively
upon State lazvs prohibiting discriynination and rebates. In such case our recom-
mendation is the enactment, if it is possible, of necessary exceptions to the dis-
criinination and rebating sttautes to enable the insurer to operate effectively.
For example, without the aid of rating laws and in the face of severe discrimi-
nation and rebating statutes, life insurers have relied upon express statutory pro-
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visions to enable the issuing of group policies at rates less than the usual rates
and to enable the granting of other differentials
:
Maine Insiirauce Lazus, Section 140
"Nothing in the three preceding sections shall be so construed as to pro-
hibit any company issuing non-participating life insurance from paying
bonuses to policy-holders or otherwise abating their premiums in whole or
in part, out of surplus accumulated from non-participating insurance ; nor to
prohibit any company transacting industrial insurance on the weekly pay-
ment plan from returning to policy-holders who have made premium pay-
ments for a period of at least one year directly to the company at its home
or branch offices, a percentage of the premium which the company would
have paid for the weekly collection of such premiums ; nor to prohibit any
life insurance company doing business in this state from issuing policies of
life or endowment insurance with or without annuities at rates less than the
usual rates of premiums for such policies, insuring members of organizations
or employes of any employer who through their secretary or employer may
take out insurance in an aggregate of not less than fifty members and pay
their premiums through such secretary or employer ; nor to prohibt an agent
from receiving commissions from his company for insurance on himself.
Nezv York Insurance Law, Section 204 (2)
"No domestic, foreign or alien life insurance company shall be permitted
to do business in this state if it hereafter issues, within or without this state,
any policy of group life insurance on which the premium shall be less than
the net premium based on the American Men Ultimate Table of Mortality,
with interest at three and one-half per centum per annum, plus a loading
computed in accordance with a formula which shall be determined by the
superintendent. Anything in this chapter to the contrary notwithstanding,
any group life insurance policy issued or delivered in this state may provide
for readjustment of the rate of premium based on the experience thereunder,
at the end of the first year or of any subsequent year of insurance there-
under, and such readjustment may be made retroactive only for such policy
year."
4. The enactment in each State of statutes recognising insurance brokers and
delineating the rights and duties thereof, specifically authorising the payment of
commissions to licensed brokers and specifying the conditions under which bro-
kerage may be paid to ont-of-State brokers.
Because, as pointed out in the foregoing analysis, the applicability of the Rob-
inson-Patman Act to insurance is uncertain and because the intent of Congress,
as expressed in Public Law 15, is by no means clear, our recommendation is that
the applicability of the Robinson-Patman Act be included in any discussion that
may be held with the Insurance Subcommittees appointed by the Senate Judiciary
Committee and by the House Judiciary Committee.
Respectfully submitted,
John M. McFall, Chairman
Joseph B. Beach
Harry E. Moore
W. Ray Thomas
Felix Hebert
Robert L. Hogg
John R. Cooney
September 19, 1945
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EXHIBIT "B"
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
(Submitted at October 18-19, 1945 meeting of All-Industry Committee and
amended at November 26-27, 1945 and at March 11-15, 1946 meetings
of All-Industry Committee)
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
1. RATING LAWS
The subject of rating laws that meet the requirements of Public Law 15 is not
discussed herein, because it is a matter for consideration in connection with the
Sherman Act.
2. PROVISIONS TO ACCOMPANY STATE RATING LAW
(a) Anti-discrimination
Rating laws usually contain appropriate anti-discrimination provisions as
essential parts of rate making. The following, adapted from existing stat-
utes, are recommended as a basis for anti-discrimination provisions to accom-
pany State rating laws
:
(1) Casualty and Surety Rating Lazv:
"Rates shall be reasonable, adequate and not unfairly discriminatory."
(2) Fire Rating Lazv:
"No insurer, nor any rating bureau, shall fix or change any rate which
discriminates unfairly between risks in the application of like charges
and credits, or which discriminates unfairly between risks of essentially
the same hazard, territorial classification, and having substantially the
same degree of protection."
(b) Anti-Rebate
The following, adapted from existing statutes, are recommended as a basis
for anti-rebate provisions to accompany state rating laws
:
"No insurer or employee thereof, and no broker or agent shall pay, allow, or
give, or offer to pay, allow, or give, directly or indirectly as an inducement
to insurance, or after insurance has been effected, any rebate, discount,
abatement, credit, or reduction of the premium named in a policy of insur-
ance, or any special favor or advantage in the dividends or other benefits to
accrue thereon, or any valuable consideration or inducement whatever, not
specified in the policy of insurance, except to the extent that such rebate,
discount, abatement, credit, reduction, favor, advantage or consideration may
be provided for in rating systems (*). No insured named in a pol-
icy of insurance, nor any employee of such insured shall knowingly receive
or accept, directly or indirectly, any such rebate, discount, abatement, or re-
duction of premium, or any special favor or advantage or valuable consider-
ation or inducement. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as pro-
hibiting the payment of commissions or other compensation to regularly
appointed and licensed agents and to brokers duly licensed by this State, nor
as prohibiting any participating insurer from distributing to its policyholders
dividends, savings or the unused or unabsorbed portion of premiums and
premium deposits."
(*) Insert appropriate words to describe authorized rating system under the terms of the
Rating Law.
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3. STATUTES IN THE ABSENCE OF RATING LAWS
(a) Anti-discrimination
The following are recommended as a basis for appropriate independent
anti-discrimination statutes
:
(1) Fire
"No insurer doing in this State the business specified in Section ....
shall promulgate or use any schedule of rates, any form or any under-
writing rule or classification system which discriminates unfairly be-
tween risks of essentially the same hazard, territorial classification, and
having substantially the same degree of protection."
(2) Casualty and Surety
"No insurer doing in this State the business specified in Sections ....
shall promulgate or use any schedule of rates, any underwriting rule or
classification system which discriminates unfairly between risks or
classes of risks."
(A specific Statute for Workmen's Compensation is not included for the
reason that Workmen's Compensation insurance is so completely regu-
lated as to rates that it seems unnecessary to suggest a provision to be
used independently of a rating law).
(3) Life
"No insurer doing in this State the business specified in Section ....
shall promulgate or use any rate or system of rating which discriminates
unfairly between insurants of the same class and equal expectation of
life in the amount or payment of premiums or in any return of premium,
dividends, or other advantages."
(4) Accident and Health
"No insurer doing in this State the business specified in Section ....
shall make or permit any unfair discrimination between individuals of
the same class in the amount of premiums, policy fees, or rates charged
for any policy or contract of insurance, or in the benefits payable there-
under."
(b) Anti-rebate
The following is recommended as a basis for an appropriate independent
anti-rebate statute
:
"No insurer or employee thereof, and no broker or agent shall pay, allow,
or give, or offer to pay, allow, or give, directly or indirectly, as an induce-
ment to insurance, or after insurance has been effected, any rebate, discount,
abatement, credit or reduction of the premium named in a policy of insur-
ance, or any special favor or advantage in the dividends or other benefits to
accrue thereon, or any valuable consideration or inducement whatever, not
specified in the policy of insurance. No insured named in a policy of insur-
ance, nor any employee of such insured shall knowingly receive or accept,
directly or indirectly, any such rebate, discount, abatement, or reduction of
premium, or any special favor or advantage or valuable consideration or in-
ducement. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as prohibiting the
payment of commissions or other compensation to regularly appointed and
licensed agents and to brokers duly licensed by this State ; nor as prohibiting
any participating insurer from distributing to its policyholders dividends,
savings or the unused or unabsorbed portion of premiums and premium de-
posits."
(c) Necessary Exceptions
In the absence of a statutory rating law, the anti-discrimination and anti-
rebate statutes must contain specific exceptions to enable the insurer affected
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to operate efficiently. Uniform exceptions cannot be set forth in the statutes
because different classes of insurance require different exceptions. In the
case of life insurance, the following statute prohibits discrimination and re-
bates and contains typical exceptions for Life Insurance Companies
:
"No Life Insurance company doing business in this State shall make or per-
mit any distinction or discrimination in favor of individuals between insur-
ants of the same class and equal expectation of life in the amount or pay-
ment of premiums or rates charged for policies of insurance, or in the divi-
dends or other benefits payable thereon, or in any other of the terms and
conditions of the contracts it makes ; nor, except as otherwise expressly pro-
vided by law, shall any such company or any agent thereof make any con-
tract of insurance or agreement as to such contract, other than as plainly
expressed in the policy issued thereon ; nor shall any company or agent pay
or allow, or offer to pay or allow, as inducement to insurance, any rebate of
premium payable on the policy, or any special favor or advantage in the
dividends or other benefits thereon, or any valuable consideration or induce-
ment not specified in the policy contract of insurance ; or give, or sell, or
purchase or offer to give, sell or purchase, as inducement to insurance or in
connection therewith, any stocks, bonds, or other securities of any insurance
company or other corporation, association, or partnership, or any dividends
or profits accrued thereon, or anything or value thatsoever not specified in
the policy."
"No person shall receive or accept from any company or agent, sub-agent,
broker, or any other person any such rebate or premium payable on the
policy, or any special favor or advantage in the dividend or other benefits to
accrue thereon, or any valuable consideration or inducement not specified in
the policy of insurance."
"Nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prohibit any company
issuing non-participating life insurance, from paying bonuses to policy-
holders or otherwise abating their premiums in whole or in part out of sur-
plus accumulated from non-participating insurance, nor to prohibit any com-
pany transacting industrial insurance from returning to policyholders who
have made premium payments for a period of at least one year directly to
the company at its home or district offices, a percentage of the premium
which the company would have paid for the collection of such premiums ; nor
shall anything in this section be construed as prohibiting the delivery of any
group life insurance policy in this State which provides for the readjustment
of the rate of premium based on the claim and expense experience there-
under, at the end of the first year or of any subsequent year of insurance
thereunder, provided such readjustment is made retroactive only for such
policy year."
4. BROKERS ACT
The following, adapted from existing statutes, is recommended as a basis for
appropriate Brokers Act:
Sec. 1. This Act shall apply to all brokers as defined herein.
Sec, 2. The term "broker" as used in this Act, means any person, partner-
ship, association or corporation, who or which, for money, commission, brok-
kerage, or anything of value, acts or aids in any manner in the solicitation
or negotiation, on behalf of the assured, of contracts for insurance of any of
the following kinds as specified in Sec. .. .
.
, namely : Life, Accident, Health,
Casualty, Fidelity, Surety, Fire and Marine.
Sec. 3. No person, partnership, association or corporation shall act as a
broker without first procuring a license so to act from the (Commissioner).
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Sec. 4. Application for a broker's license shall be filed with the (Commis-
sioner) in writing and in the form prescribed by him.
Sec. 5. The (Commissioner) shall issue a broker's license to an applicant
when (a) an application provided for in Sec. 4 has been filed with and
approved by the (Commissioner) and the (Commissioner) shall have de-
termined the applicant to be competent and trustworthy, (b) the applicant
has paid an annual fee as follows : If the applicant is a resident of this State,
dollars ; if the applicant is a non-resident of this State,
dollars.
Sec. 6. Whenever the (Commissioner) upon notice and hearing is satisfied
that any applicant for license or any broker acting under his supervision and
holding a license from him is violating or has violated any provision of the
insurance laws of this State, or that he is incompetent or untrustworthy,
he shall proceed to issue an order denying or revoking the license of such
broker.
Sec. 7. An insurance company or agent thereof may pay money, commission
or brokerage, or give or allow anything of value, for or on account of the
solicitation or negotiation of contracts for insurance of the kind or kinds
enumerated in Sec. 2 of this Act, to a duly licensed broker.
( Detailed provisions for notice, hearings and review of orders and finding should
be integrated with the general State statutes.)
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EXHIBIT "C"
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT
(Submitted by John M. McFall, Chairman, in behalf of Robinson-Patman Act
Subcommittee, at September 4-6, 1946 meeting of All-Industry Committee)
As requested, I have reviewed with the members of the Subcommittee on the
Robinson-Patman Act the Legislative Proposals heretofore submitted to the All-
Industry Committee.
There is still some question as to the applicability of the Robinson-Patman Act
to insurance because of the content of the Robinson-Patman Act and because of
the uncertain terms of Public Law 15. But our opinion is that insurance cannot
afford to proceed on the assumption that the Robinson-Patman Act is inappli-
cable and run the risk of the federal penalties, namely, action by the Federal
Trade Commission, suits for treble damages, and in some cases criminal prose-
cution.
Our problem is to determine the State legislative program that will protect the
insurance industry from the impact of the Robinson-Patman Act.
L Payment of commission to brokers
We recommend that a Brokers Act in substantially the form submitted in our
Legislative Proposals be passed in each State whose laws recognize insurance
brokers but which do not specifically authorize the insurer to pay commissions to
such brokers. For example, in Arizona, brokers are defined by statute and are
licensed but the law does not authorize the insurer to pay commissions to brokers.
From our preliminary examination we believe that legislation (in many cases
simply an additional provision authorizing payment of commissions) is required
in the following States }
Arizona Massachusetts Pennsylvania Washington
Idaho Missouri Rhode Island West Virginia
Indiana Nebraska Tennessee Wyoming
Louisiana New Hampshire Utah Alaska
Maine Oregon Vermont Puerto Riccf
2. Provisions to accompany State Rating Law
(a) Anti-discrimination
The provisions of the Casualty and Fire Rate Regulatory Bills ("Rates
shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory") are recom-
mended.
(b) Anti-rebate
The anti-rebate section attached to the Rate Regulatory Bills is recom-
mended.
3. Absence of Rating Law
(a) Anti-discrimination
Independent anti-discrimination statutes as suggested in Legislative
Proposals are recommended for each kind of insurance unregulated as to
rates.
(b) Anti-rebate
The anti-rebate section attached to the Fire and Casualty Rate Bills is
recommended as a basis for appropriate independent anti-rebate statute.
(c) Necessary exceptions
The independent anti-discrimination and anti-rebate statutes must con-
tain exceptions as suggested in Legislative Proposals.
1 In Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, N.
Dakota, Oklahoma, S. Dakota, Texas and Wisconsin brokers are not recognized. In Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Maryland,
Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, Nevada, New Jersey, N. Carolina, Ohio, S. Carolina and
Virginia, brokers are recognized but statiites already enacted are believed to be sufficiently defi-
nite to authorize the payment of commissions to the kinds of brokers recognized.
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EXHIBIT "D"
AN ACT RELATING TO UNFAIR PRACTICES IN THE BUSINESS
OF INSURANCE
Section 1 — Purpose.
The purpose of this Act is to regulate the trade practices in the business of in-
surance, in accordance with the intent of Congress as expressed in Pubic Law
15— 79th Congress, by defining, or providing for the determination of, all acts,
methods, and practices which constitute unfair methods of competition and un-
fair or deceptive acts and practices in this state, and to prohibit the same.
Section 2— Unfair Methods and Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices Pro-
hibited.
No person-*^ engaged in the business of insurance shall engage in this state in
unfair methods of competition or in unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the
conduct of such business.
Section 3— Methods, Acts and Practices Which Are Defined Herein as Unfair
or Deceptive.
The following are declared to be unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts and practices in the business of insurance
:
(a) Misrepresentations and False Advertising of Policy Contracts. No
person engaged in the business of insurance in this state shall make, issue,
or circulate, or cause to be made, issued or circulated, any estimate, illustra-
tion, circular, or statement of any sort misrepresenting the terms of any
policy issued or to be issued or the benefits or advantages promised thereby,
or the dividends or share of the surplus to be received thereon, or shall use
any name or title of any policy or class of policies misrepresenting the true
nature thereof. Nor shall any such person make any misrepresentation to
any person insured in any company for the purpose of inducing or tending
to induce a policyholder in any company to lapse, forfeit, or surrender his
insurance.
(b) False Information and Advertising Generally. No person engaged
in the business of insurance in this state shall make, publish, disseminate,
circulate, or place before the public, or cause, directly or indirectly, to be
made, published, disseminated, circulated, or placed before the public, in a
newspaper or other publication, or in the form of a notice, circular, pamphlet,
letter or poster, or over any radio station, or in any other way, an advertise-
ment, announcement or statement of any sort containing any assertion, rep-
resentation or statement with respect to the business of insurance or with
respect to any person in the conduct of his insurance business, which is un-
true, deceptive or misleading.
(c) Defamation. No person engaged in the business of insurance in this
state shall make, publish, disseminate, or circulate, directly or indirectly, or
aid, abet or encourage the making, publishing, disseminating or circulating
of any oral or written statement or any pamphlet, circular, article or litera-
ture which is false or maliciously critical and which is calculated to injure
any other such person.
(d) Boycott J Coercion and Intimidation. No person engaged in the busi-
ness of insurance in this state shall enter into any agreement to commit, or
by any concerted action, commit, any act of boycott, coercion or intimidation
1 "Person" — Whenever used in this Act shall include individuals, corporations, associations,
partnerships, reciprocal exchanges, inter-insurers, Lloyds insurers, fraternal benefit societies,
and any other legal entity engaged in the business of insurance.
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resulting or tending to result in unreasonable restraint of, or a monopoly in,
trade or commerce.
(e) False Financial Statements. No person engaged in the business of
insurance in this state shall file with any supervisory or other public official,
or shall make, publish, disseminate, circulate or deliver to any person, or
place before the public, or cause directly or indirectly, to be made, published,
disseminated, circulated, delivered to any person, or placed before the public,
any financial statement of an insurer which does not accurately state its true
financial condition.
(f ) Stock Operations and Advisory Board Contracts. No insurance com-
pany doing business in this state shall issue, nor permit its agents, officers,
or employees to issue or deliver, agency company stock or other capital stock,
or benefit certificates or shares in any common-law corporation, or securities
or any special or advisory board or other contracts of any kind promising
returns and profits as an inducem.ent to insurance ; and no corporation or
stock company acting as agent of an insurance company nor any of its
agents, officers, or employees shall be permitted to sell, agree or offer to sell,
or give or offer to give, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever,
any share of stock securities, bonds, or agreement of any form or nature
promising returns and profits as an inducement to insurance or in connection
therewith.
(g) Discrimination. No life insurance company doing business in this
state shall make or permit any distinction or discrimination in favor of indi-
viduals between those of the same class and equal expectation of life in the
rates charged for contracts of insurance or of life annuity or in the divi-
dends or other benefits payable thereon, or in any other of the terms and
conditions of the contracts it makes, nor shall it discriminate unfairly be-
tween other risks involving essentially the same hazards and expense ele-
ments or between risks in the application of like rates and credits.
(h) Rebates. (1) Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no
life insurance company or its agent shall make any contract of insurance or
agreement as to such contract, other than as plainly expressed in the policy
issued thereon ; nor shall any such company or agent pay or allow, or offer
to pay or allow, as inducement to insurance, any rebate of premiums payable
on the policy, or any special favor or advantage in the dividends or other
benefits thereon, or any valuable consideration or inducement not specified
in the policy contract of insurance ; or give, or sell, or purchase or offer to
give, sell, or purchase as inducement to insurance or in connection therewith,
any stocks, bonds, or other securities of any insurance company or other
corporation, association, or partnership, or any dividends or profits accrued
thereon, or anything of value whatsoever not specified in the policy.
(2) Nothing in this or the preceding subsection shall be so construed as
to prohibit any company issuing non-participating life insurance from paying
bonuses to policyholders or otherwise abating their premiums in whole or
in part out of surplus accumulated from non-participating insurance; nor to
prohibit any company transacting industrial insurance from returning to
policyholders who have made premium payments for a period of at least one
year directly to the company at its home or district offices, a percentage of
the premium which the company would have paid for the collection of such
premiums ; nor to prohibit the readj ustment of the rate of premium for a
group life insurance policy based on the loss or expense experience there-
under, at the end of the first year or of any subsequent year of insurance
thereunder, such readjustment to be made retroactive only for such policy
year.
(i) Any violation of any one of Sections is also here-
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by declared to be an unfair method of competition and an unfair or deceptive
act and practice in the business of insurance."
(j) The enumeration in this Act of specific unfair methods of competition
and unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the business of insurance is not
exclusive or restrictive or intended to limit the powers of the (commis-
sioner) or any court of review under the provisions of Section 4 of this Act.
(Note: Each state may add such additional definitive acts as may be considered neces-
sary or desirable.
Section 4— Other Unfair Competition, Acts and Practices.
(a) If the (commissioner) shall have reason to believe that any person en-
gaged in the business of insurance is engaging in this state in any method of
competition or in an act or practice in the conduct of such business, other than
those enumerated in subdivisions (a) to (i) inclusive of Section 3, and that such
method is an unfair method of competition, or that such act or practice is unfair
or deceptive, or if he shall have reason to believe that any such person is engag-
ing in this state in any method of competition or in any act or practice enumer-
ated in Section 3, and that a proceeding by him in respect thereof would be to
the interest of the public, he may issue and serve upon such person a statement
of the charges and a notice of a hearing thereon to be held at a time and place
fixed in the notice which shall not be less than .... days from the date of service
thereof. The person so complained of shall have the right to appear at the place
and time so fixed and show cause why an order should not be entered by the
(commissioner) requiring such person to cease and desist from the violation of
the law charged in the complaint.
If after such hearing the (commissioner) shall be of the opinion that the
method of competition or the act or practice in question is prohibited by this Act,
he shall reduce his findings to writing and shall issue and cause to be served on
the person charged with the violation of law an order requiring such person to
cease and desist from such method, act or practice. Until the expiration of the
time allowed for filing a (notice of appeal) (petition for writ of certiorari), if
no such (notice of appeal) (petition for such writ) has been duly filed within
such time, or, if a (notice of appeal) (petition for such writ) has been filed
within such time, then until the transcript of the record in the proceeding has
been filed in the court, as hereinafter provided, the (commis-
sioner) may at any time, upon such notice and in such manner as he shall deem
proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any report or any order made or
issued by him under this section. After the expiration of the time allowed for
filing a (notice of appeal) (petition for writ of certiorari), if no such (notice of
appeal) (petition for such writ) has been duly filed within such time, the (com-
missioner) may at any time, after notice and opportunity for hearing, reopen and
alter, modify, or set aside, in whole or in part, any report or order made or
issued by him under this section, whenever in his opinion conditions of fact or
of law have so changed as to require such action or if the public interest shall so
require.
(b) Any order of the (commissioner) directing any person to cease and desist
from using any method of competition or act or practice shall be subject to review
(here insert language describing scope of review)
by (appeal) (writ of certiorari) to (the court) of
county^. The court shall determine whether the filing of the (appeal) (petition
_2 Insert section numbers of any other sections of the Insurance Law which it is deemed de-
sirable or necessary to include as an unfair trade practice.
3 The county in which the seat of government is located. If time within which appeal must
be taken should be limited, insert such provision.
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for such writ) shall operate as a stay of such order of the (commissioner). The
court may, in disposing of the issue before it, modify, afifirm, or reverse the order
of the (commissioner) in whole or in part. To the extent that the order of the
(commissioner) is afiirmed or modified, the court shall issue its own order com-
manding obedience to the terms of the order of the (commissioner).
(c) No order of the (commissioner) or judgment of the court to enforce the
same shall in any wise relieve or absolve any person from any liability under any
other laws of this state.
(d) An order of the (commissioner) to cease and desist shall become final—
(1) upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a (notice of appeal)
(petition for writ of certiorari), if no such (notice of appeal) (petition
for such writ) has been duly filed within such time ; or
(2) upon a final decision of the court if a judicial review has been sought
of the order of the (commissioner).
(e) If the report of the (commissioner) does not charge a violation of this
Act, then any party to the proceeding, including any intervener, may within ....
days after the service of such report cause a like petition to be filed in the
court of . county for a view of the report of the (com-
missioner).*
Section 5— Power of (Commissioner).
The (commissioner) shall have power to examine and investigate into the
affairs of every person engaged in the business of insurance in order to determine
whether such person has been or is engaged in any unfair method of competition
or in any unfair act or practice.
Section 6— Hearing, Witnesses, Production of Books.
At the time and place fixed for the hearing before the (commissioner), such
person shall have an opportunity to be heard. The (commissioner) upon such
hearing may administer oaths, examine and cross-examine witnesses, receive oral
and documentary evidence, and shall have the power to subpoena witnesses, com-
pel their attendance, and require the production of books, papers, records, corre-
spondence, or other documents which he deems relevant to the inquiry. The
(commissioner) upon such hearing may, and upon the request of any party shall,
cause to be made a written record of all the evidence offered or introduced and
proceedings had at such hearing.
Nothing in this Act contained shall require the observance at any hearing of
formal rules of pleading or evidence.
Section 7— Appearance.
Upon good cause shown, the (commissioner) may permit any person to inter-
vene, appear and be heard at such hearing.
Section 8— Procedure Additional.
The powers vested in the (commissioner) by this Act, shall be in addition to
any other powers to enforce any penalties, fines or forfeitures authorized by law
with respect to the methods, acts and practices hereby declared to be unfair or
deceptive.
Section 9— Penalty.
Any person who violates an order of the (commissioner) to cease and desist
after it has become final, and while such order is in effect, shall forfeit and pay
to the state of a civil penalty of not more than $5,000 for each vio-
lation, which may be recovered in a civil action.
4 Set forth judicial review statutes and procedures in each state.
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Section 10— Punishment for Failure to Obey Subpoena.
In case of refusal of any person to comply with any subpoena issued here-
under or to testify to any matter to which he may be lawfully interrogated, the
court of any county on application of the (commissioner) may
issue an order requiring such person to comply with such subpoena and to testify
;
and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by the court as
a contempt thereof.
Section 11 — Constitutionality.
If any section, subsection, subdivision, paragraph, sentence or clause of this
Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, such decision shall not affect the remain-
ing portions of this Act.
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EXHIBIT "E"
AN ACT RELATING TO UNFAIR PRACTICES IN THE BUSINESS
OF INSURANCE
Section 1 — Purpose.
The purpose of this Act is to regulate the trade practices in the business of in-
surance, in accordance with the intent of Congress as expressed in Pubhc Law
15— 79th Congress, by defining, or providing for the determination of, all acts,
methods, and practices which constitute unfair methods of competition and un-
fair or deceptive acts and practices in this state, and to prohibit the same.
Section 2— Unfair Methods and Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices Pro-
hibited.
No person-^ engaged in the business of insurance shall engage in this state in
unfair methods of competition or in unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the
conduct of such business.
Section 3— Methods, Acts and Practices Which Are Defined Herein as Unfair
or Deceptive.
The following are declared to be unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts and practices in the business of insurance
:
(a) Misrepresentations and False Advertising of Policy Contracts. No
person engaged in the business of insurance in this state shall make, issue,
or circulate, or cause to be made, issued or circulated, any estimate, illustra-
tion, circular, or statement of any sort misrepresenting the terms of any
policy issued or to be issued or the benefits or advantages promised thereby,
or the dividends or share of the surplus to be received thereon, or shall use
any name or title of any policy or class of policies misrepresenting the true
nature thereof. Nor shall any such person make any misrepresentation to
any person insured in any company for the purpose of inducing or tending
to induce a policyholder in any company to lapse, forfeit,, or surrender his
insurance.
(b) False Information and Advertising Generally. No person engaged
in the business of insurance in this state shall make, publish, disseminate,
circulate, or place before the public, or cause, directly or indirectly, to be
made, published, disseminated, circulated, or placed before the public, in a
newspaper or other publication, or in the form of a notice, circular, pamphlet,
letter or poster, or over any radio station, or in any other way, an advertise-
ment, announcement or statement of any sort containing any assertion, rep-
resentation or statement with respect to the business of insurance or with
respect to any person in the conduct of his insurance business, which is un-
true, deceptive or misleading.
(c) Defamation. No person engaged in the business of insurance in this
state shall make, publish, disseminate, or circulate, directly or indirectly, or
aid, abet or encourage the making, publishing, disseminating or circulating
of any oral or written statement or any pamphlet, circular, article or litera-
ture which is false or maliciously critical and which is calculated to injure
any other such person.
(d) Boycott, Coercion and Intimidation. No person engaged in the busi-
ness of insurance in this state shall enter into any agreement to commit, or
1 "Person" — Whenever used in this Act shall include individuals, corporations, associations,
partnerships, reciprocal exchanges, inter-insurers, Lloyds insurers, fraternal benefit societies,
and any other legal entity engaged in the business of insurance.
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by any concerted action, commit, any act of boycott, coercion or intimidation
resulting or tending to result in unreasonable restraint of, or a monopoly in,
trade or commerce.
(e) False Financial Statements. No person engaged in the business of
insurance in this state shall file with any supervisory or other public official,
or shall make, publish, disseminate, circulate or deliver to any person, or
place before the public, or cause directly or indirectly, to be made, published,
disseminated, circulated, delivered to any person, or placed before the public,
any financial statement of an insurer which does not accurately state its true
financial condition.
(f) Stock Operations and Advisory Board Contracts. No insurance
company doing business in this state shall issue, nor permit its agents, offi-
cers, or employees to issue or deliver, agency company stock or other capital
stock, or benefit certificate or shares in any common-law corporation, or
securities or any special or advisory board or other contracts of any kind
promising returns and profits as an inducement to insurance ; and no corpo-
ration or stock company acting as agent of an insurance company nor any
of its agents, officers, or employees shall be permitted to sell, agree or offer
to sell, or give or offer to give, directly or indirectly,, in any manner what-
soever, any share of stock securities, bonds, or agreement of any form or
nature promising returns and profits as an inducement to insurance or in
connection therewith.
(g) Discrimination. No life insurance company doing business in this
state shall make or permit any distinction or discrimination in favor of indi-
viduals between those of the same class and equal expectation of life in the
rates charged for contracts of insurance or of life annuity or in the dividends
or other benefits payable thereon, or in any other of the terms and conditions
of the contracts it makes, nor shall it discriminate unfairly between other
risks involving essentially the same hazards and expense elements or between
risks in the application of like rates and credits.
(h) Rebates. (1) Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no life
insurance company or its agent shall make any contract of insurance or
agreement as to such contract, other than as plainly expressed in the policy
issued thereon ; nor shall any such company or agent pay or allow, or offer
to pay or allow, as inducement to insurance, any rebate of premiums payable
on the policy, or any special favor or advantage in the dividends or other
benefits thereon, or any valuable consideration or inducement not specified
in the policy contract of insurance ; or give, or sell, or purchase or offer to
give, sell, or purchase as inducement to insurance or in connection therewith,
any stocks, bonds, or other securities of any insurance company or other cor-
poration, association,' or partnership, or any dividends or profits accrued
thereon, or anything of value whatsoever not specified in the policy.
(2) Nothing in this or the preceding subsection shall be so construed as
to prohibit any company issuing non-participating life insurance from paying
bonuses to policyholders or otherwise abating their premiums in whole or in
part out of surplus accumulated from non-participating insurance ; nor to
prohibit any company transacting industrial insurance from returning to
policyholders who have made premium payments for a period of at least one
year directly to the company at its home or district offices, a percentage of
the premium which the company would have paid for the collection of such
premiums; nor to prohibit the readjustment of the rate of premium for a
group life insurance policy based on the loss or expense experience there-
under, at the end of the first year or of any subsequent year of insurance
thereunder, such readjustment to be made retroactive only for such policy
year.
(i) Any violation of any one of Sections is also here-
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by declared to be an unfair method of competition and an unfair or deceptive
act and practice in the business of insurance."
(Note: Each state may add such additional definitive acts as may be considered neces-
sary or desirable.)
(j) The enumeration in this Act of specific unfair methods of competition
and unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the business of insurance is not
exclusive or restrictive or intended to limit the powers of the (commis-
sioner) or any court of review under the provision of Section 4 of this Act.
Section 4— Other Unfair Competition, Acts and Practices.
(a) If the (commissioner) shall have reason to believe that any person en-
gaged in the business of insurance is engaging in this state in any method of com-
petition or in an act or practice in the conduct of such business, other than those
enumerated in subdivisions (a) to (i) inclusive of Section 3, and that such
method is an unfair method of competition, or that such act or practice is unfair
or deceptive, or if he shall have reason to believe that any such person is engag-
ing in this state in any method of competition or in any act or practice enumer-
ated in Section 3, and that a proceeding by him in respect thereof would be to
the interest of the public he may issue and serve upon such person a statement of
the charges and a notice of a hearing thereon to be held at a time and place fixed
in the notice which shall not be less than ... days from the date of service
thereof. The (commissioner) shall, after such hearing, make a report in writing
in which he shall state his findings as to the facts, and serve a copy thereof upon
such person.
(b) If such report charges a violation of this Act and if such method of com-
petition, act or practice has not been discontinued, the (commissioner) may,
through the Attorney General of this State, at any time after .... days after the
service of such report cause a petition to be filed in the court of
this state within the district wherein the person resides or has his principal place
of business, to enjoin and restrain such person from engaging in such method,
act or practice. The court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and shall
have power to make and enter appropriate orders in connection therewith and to
issue such writs as are ancillary to its jurisdiction or are necessary in its judg-
ment to prevent injury to the public pendente lite.
(c) A transcript of the proceedings before the (commissioner) including all
evidence taken and the report and findings shall be filed with such petition. If
either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and
shall show, to the satisfaction of the court, that such additional evidence is ma-
terial and there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence
in the proceeding before the (commissioner) the court may order such additional
evidence to be taken before the (commissioner) and to be adduced upon the hear-
ing in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the court may
seem proper. The (commissioner) may modify his findings of the facts or make
new findings by reason of the additional evidence so taken, and he shall file such
modified or new findings with the return of such additional evidence.
(d) If the court finds that the method of competition, act or practice com-
plained of is enumerated in subdivisions (a) to (i) inclusive of Section 3, or, if
not so enumerated, that' in the judgment of the court, the method of competition
complained of is unfair, or the act or practice complained of is unfair or decep-
tive, and in either case the continuance of such method of competition, act or
practice whether or not enumerated in Section 3 would result in substantial in-
jury to the public and that the findings of the (commissioner) are supported by
the weight of the evidence, it shall issue its order enjoining and restraining the
continuance of such method of competition, act or practice.
2 Insert section numbers of any other sections of the Insurance Law which it is deemed de-
sirable or necessary to include as an unfair trade practice.
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(e) If the report of the (commissioner) does not charge a violation of this
Act, then any party to the proceeding, including any intervenor, may within ....
days after the service of such report cause a like petition to be filed in the
court of county for a review of the report of the (com-
missioner).^
Section 5— Pozver of (Commissioner).
The (commissioner) shall have power to examine and investigate into the
affairs of every person engaged in the business of insurance in order to determine
whether such person has been or is engaged in any unfair method of competition
or in any unfair act or practice.
Section 6— Hearing, Witnesses, Production of Books.
At the time and place fixed for the hearing before the (commissioner), such
person shall have an opportunity to be heard. The (commissioner) upon such
hearing may administer oaths, examine and cross-examine witnesses, receive oral
and documentary evidence, and shall have the power to subpoena witnesses, com-
pel their attendance, and require the production of books, papers, records, corre-
spondence, or other documents which he deems relevant to the inquiry. The
(commissioner), upon such hearing may, and upon the request of any party shall,
cause to be made a written record of all the evidence offered or introduced and
proceedings had at such hearing.
Nothing in this Act contained shall require the observance at any hearing of
formal rules of pleading or evidence.
Section 7— Appearances.
Upon good cause shown, the (commissioner) may permit any person to inter-
vene, appear and be heard at such hearing.
Section 8— Procedure Additional.
The powers vested in the (commissioner) by this Act, shall be in addition to
any other powers to enforce any penalties, fines or forfeitures authorized by law
with respect to the methods, acts and practices hereby declared to be unfair or
deceptive.
Section 9— Punishment for Failure to Obey Subpoena
In case of refusal of any person to comply with any subpoena issued hereunder
or to testify to any matter to which he may be lawfully interrogated, the
court of any county on application of the (commissioner) may issue an
order requiring such person to comply with such subpoena and to testify ; and any
failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by the court as a con-
tempt thereof.
Section 10— Constitutionality.
If any section, subsection, subdivision, paragraph, sentence or clause of this
Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, such decision shall not affect the remain-
ing portions of this Act.
3 Set forth judicial review statutes and procedures in each state.
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EXHIBIT "F"
AN ACT RELATIVE TO THE FILING AND APPROVAL OF FORMS
OF POLICIES OF ACCIDENT AND HEALTH INSURANCE,
ENDORSEMENTS, RIDERS AND APPLICATIONS WHICH
ARE ATTACHED THERETO AND RATE MANUALS
(AND REPEALING SECTIONS )
Be It Enacted (By )
Section 1 — Filing of Forms and Rate Manuals.
(a) No policy of insurance against loss or expense resulting from the bodily
injury or death of the insured by accident or from the sickness of the insured
shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state, nor shall any form of en-
dorsement, rider or application which becomes a part of any such policy be used,
until a copy of such forms and the rate manual showing rules, classification of
risks and premium rates, if any, pertaining thereto have been filed with the Com-
missioner of Insurance ; and every such filing shall state the proposed effective
date thereof. The (commissioner) may require that no policy shall be delivered
or issued for delivery in this state and no applications, riders, endorsements or
rates shall be used in connection therewith unless approved by him as conform-
ing to the requirements of this Act and of other provisions of the Insurance Law
of this state.
(b) An insurer may satisfy its obligation to make such filings by becoming a
member of^ or a subscriber to, a licensed rating organization which makes such
filings, and by authorizing the (commissioner) to accept such filings on its be-
half; provided, that nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as requiring
any insurer to become a member or subscriber to any rating organization.
(c) No such policy shall contain provisions which are unjust, unfair, inequi-
table, contrary to law or to the public policy of this state or calculated to mislead
the insured or encourage misrepresentation of such policy and no such premium
shall be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory and no classification
shall produce a premium rate which is excessive, inadequate or unfairly dis-
criminatory.
Section 2 — JVithdrazual of Filings.
(a) If at any time, the (commisioner) finds that a filing of forms or rate
manual does not meet the requirements of this Act, or of other provisions of the
Insurance Law of this state, he shall after a hearing held upon not less than . . .
days' written notice, specifying the matters to be considered at such hearing, to
every insurer or rating organization which made such filing, issue an order speci-
fying in what respects he finds that such filing fails to meet the requirements of
this Act or other provisions of the Insurance Law of this state, and stating when,
within a reasonable period thereafter, such filing shall be deemed no longer
effective. Copies of said order shall be sent to every such insurer or rating
organization. Said order shall not affect any policy made or issued prior to the
expiration of the period set forth in said order.
(b) An insurer or rating organization may at any time amend or withdraw
any filing made by it by giving written notice to the (commissioner), and may
make new filings of forms, rules, premium rates and classifications with respect
to the same or different policies. Every such amended filing or new filing shall
be subject to all the provisions of this Act.
Section 3— Information To Be Furnished Commissioner.
Every insurer or rating organization so filing any form, rule, premium rate or
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classification shall furnish to the (commissioner) on his request, information as
to the loss exxperience, expense factors and other matters to enable him to de-
termine whether the requirements of this Act have been met.
Section 4— Rating Organizations.
(a) A corporation, an unincorporated association, a partnership or an indi-
vidual, whether located within or outside this state, may make application to the
(commissioner) for license as a rating organization for insurance against loss
or expense resulting from the bodil}' injury or death of the insured by accident
or from the sickness of the insured and shall file therewith ( 1 ) a copy of its con-
stitution, its articles of agreement or association or its certificate of incorpora-
tion, and of its by-laws, rules and regulations governing the conduct of its busi-
ness, (2) a list of its members and subscribers, (3) the name and address of a
resident of this state upon whom notices or orders of the (commissioner) or
process affecting such rating organization may be served and (4) a statement
of its qualifications as a rating organization. If the (commissioner) finds that
the applicant is competent, trustworthy and otherwise qualified to act as a rating
organization and that its constitution, articles of agreement or association or
certificate of incorporation, and its by-laws, rules and regulations governing the
conduct of its business conform to the requirements of law, he shall issue a license
to act as a rating organization. Every such application shall be granted or
denied in whole or in part by the (commissioner) within sixty days of the date
of its filing with him. Licenses issued pursuant to this Section shall remain in
effect for three years unless sooner suspended or revoked by the (commissioner).
The fee for said license shall be twenty-five dollars. Licenses issued pursuant to
this Section may be suspended or revoked by the (commissioner), after hearing
upon notice, in the event the rating organization ceases to meet the requirements
of this subsection. Every rating organization shall notify the (commissioner)
promptly of every change in ( 1 ) its constitution, its articles of agreement or
association or its certificate of incorporation, and its by-laws rules and regula-
tions governing the conduct of its business, (2) its list of members and sub-
scribers and (3) the name and address of the resident of this state designated by
it upon whom notices or orders of the (commissioner) or process affecting such
rating organization may be served.
(b) Subject to rules and regulations which have been approved by the (com-
missioner) as reasonable, each rating organization shall permit any insurer, not
a member, to be a subscriber to its rating services. Notice of proposed changes
in such rules and regulations shall be given to subscribers. Each rating organi-
zation shall furnish its rating services without discrimination to its members and
) subscribers. The reasonableness of any rule or regulation in its application to
subscribers, or the refusal of any rating organization to admit an insurer as a
subscriber, shall, at the request of any subscriber or any such insurer, be re-
; viewed by the (commissioner) at a hearing held upon at least ten days' written
notice to such rating organization and to such subscriber or insurer. If the
j
(commissioner) finds that such rule or regulation is unreasonable in its applica-
\ tion to.subscribers, he shall order that such rule or regulation shall not be appli-
!| cable to subscribers. If the rating organization fails to grant or reject an in-
I sured's application for subscribership within thirty days after it was made, the
;! insurer may request a review by the (commissioner) as if the appplication had
\ been rejected. If the (commissioner) finds that the insurer has been refused
\ admittance to the rating organization as a subscriber without justification, he
! shall order the rating organization to admit the insurer as a subscriber. If he
) finds that the action of the rating organization was justified, he shall make an
i order affirming its action.
i (c) No rating organization shall adopt any rule the effect of which would be
to prohibit or regulate the payment of dividends, savings or unabsorbed premium
deposits allowed or returned by insurers to their policyholders, members or sub-
scribers.
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(d) Cooperation among rating organizations or among rating organizations
and insurers in rate making or in other matters within the scope of this Act is
hereby authorized, provided the fihngs resulting from such cooperation are sub-
ject to all the provisions of this Act which are applicable to filings generally.
The (commissioner) may review such cooperative activities and practices and
if, after a hearing, he finds that any such activity or practice is unfair or un-
reasonable or otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, he may issue
a written order specifying in what respects such activity or practice is unfair or
unreasonable or otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, and re-
quiring the discontinuance of such activity or practice.
Section 5 — Appeal By Minority.
Any member of or subscriber to a rating organization may appeal to the (com-
missioner) from the action or decision of such rating organization in approving
or rejecting any proposed change in or addition to the filings of such rating
organization and the (commissioner) shall, after a hearing held upon not less
than ten days' written notice to the appellant and to such rating organization,
issue an order approving the action or decision of such rating organization or
directing it to give further consideration to such proposal, or, if such appeal is
from the action or decision of the rating organization in rejecting a proposed
addition to its filings, he may, in the event he finds that such action or decision
was unreasonable, issue an order directing the rating organization to make an
addition to its filings, on behalf of its members and subscribers, in a manner con-
sistent with his findings, within a reasonable time after the issuance of such
order.
Section 6— Information To Be Furnished Insurers: Hearings And Appeals of
Insurers.
Every rating organization and every insurer which makes its own rates shall,
within a reasonable time after receiving written request therefor and upon pay-
ment of such reasonable charge as it may make, furnish to any insured affected
by a rate made by it, or to the authorized representative of such insured, all
pertinent information as to such rate. Every rating organization and every in-
surer which makes its own rates shall provide within this state reasonable means
whereby any person aggrieved by the application of its rating system may be
heard, in person or by his authorized representative, on his written request to
review the manner in which such rating system has been applied in connection
with the insurance afforded him. If the rating organization or insurer fails to
grant or reject such request within thirt)^ days after it is made, the applicant may
proceed in the same manner as if his application had been rejected. Any party
affected by the action of such rating organization or such insurer on such re-
quest may, within thirty days after written notice of such action, appeal to the
- (commissioner), who, after a hearing held upon not less than ten days' written
notice to the appellant and to such rating organization or insurer, may affirm or
reverse such action.
Section 7— Examination.
The (commissioner) shall, at least once in five years, make or cause to be
made an examination of each rating organization licensed in this state as pro-
vided in Section 4. The reasonable costs of any such examination shall be paid
by the rating organization examined upon presentation to it of a detailed account
of such costs. The officers, manager, agents and employees of such rating organ-
ization may be examined at any time under oath and shall exhibit all books,
records, accounts, documents, or agreements governing its method of operation.
In lieu of any such examination the (commissioner) may accept the report of an
examination made by the insurance supervisory official of another state, pursuant
to the laws of such state.
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Section 8— Rate Administration.
The (commissioner) may make reasonable rules and regulations necessary to
effect the purposes of this Act.
Section 9— False or Misleading Information.
No person or organization shall wilfully withhold information from, or know-
ingly give false or misleading information to, the (commissioner), any rating
organization, or any insurer, which will affect the rates or premiums chargeable
under this Act. A violation of this Section shall subject the one guilty of such
violation to the penalties provided in Section 10 of this Act.
Section 10— Penalties.
The (commissioner) may, if he finds that any person or organization has vio-
lated any provision of this Act, impose a penalty of not more than fifty dollars
($50) for each such violation, but if he finds such violation to be wilful he may
impose a penalty of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) for each such vio-
lation. Such penalties may be in addition to any other penalty provided by law.*
The (commissioner) may suspend the license of any rating organization or in-
surer which fails to comply with an order of the (commissioner) within the time
limited by such order, or any extension thereof which the (commissioner) may
grant. The (commissioner) shall not suspend the license of any rating organi-
zation or insurer for failure to comply with an order until the time prescribed
for an appeal therefrom has expired or if an appeal has been taken, until such
order has been affirmed. The (commissioner) may determine when a suspension
of license shall become effective and it shall remain in effect for the period fixed
by him, unless he modifies or rescinds such suspension, or until the order upon
which such suspension is based is modified, rescinded or reversed.
No penalty shall be imposed and no license shall be suspended or revoked ex-
cept upon a written order of the (commissioner), stating his findings, made after
a hearing held upon not less than ten days' written notice to such person or
organization specifying the alleged violation.
Section 11 — Hearing Procedure and Judicial Review.
(a) Nothing contained in this Act shall require the observance at any hearing
of formal rules of pleading or evidence.
(b) Any order or decision of the (commissioner) shall be subject to review
(here insert language indicating scope of the review)
by (appeal)** (writ of certiorari)** to (the court)** at the instance
of any party in interest.
The court shall determine whether the filing of the (appeal)** (Petition for
such writ)** shall operate as a stay of any such order or decision of the (com-
missioner). The court may, in disposing of the issue before it, modify, affirm or
reverse the order or decision of the (commissioner) in whole or in part.
* In some states the imposition of fines by administrative officers is prohibited by basic law.
It may be necessary to modify this section to provide for the imposition of fines and penalties by
some other appropriate state authority.
** Consideration should be given to the practice and procedure in each state.
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Section 12— Non-Application to Certain Policies.
Nothing in this Act shall apply to or affect ( 1 ) any policy of Workmen's Com-
pensation Insurance or any policy of liability insurance with or without supple-
mentary expense coverage therein; or (2) any policy or contract of reinsurance;
or (3) life insurance, endowment or annuity contracts, or contracts supplemental
thereto which contain only such provisions relating to accident and health insur-
ance as (a) provide additional benefits in case of death by accident, and as (b)
operate to safeguard such contracts against lapse, or to give a special surrender
value or special benefit or an annuity in the event that the insured or annuitant
shall become totally and permanently disabled, as defined by the contract or sup-
plemental contract.
Section 13— Lazvs Repealed.
Sections of the statutes of this state are hereby repealed. All
other laws or parts of laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed.
Section 14— Constitutionality.
If any section, subsection, subdivision, paragraph, sentence or clause of this
Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, such decision shall not affect the remain-
ing portions of this Act.
Section 15— Effective Date.
This Act shall take effect***
*** The effective date of this Act should be set sufficiently ahead to allow the insurance de-
partment, the companies and the rating organizations to prepare themselves with necessary per-
sonnel and procedures to carry out the purposes of the Act. It is recommended that such effec-
tive date should be not later than October 1, 1947, which is 90 days prior to January 1, 1948, when
the moratorium under Public Law 15 ends.
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EXHIBIT "G"
MEMORANDUM
QUESTION
DOES SECTION 3 OF THE CLAYTON ACT (TYING CONTRACTS
SECTION) PROHIBIT AN AGREEMENT WHEREBY AN INSURANCE
COMPANY AGREES TO ACCEPT UNPROFITABLE BUSINESS FROM
AN AGENT ONLY IF IT RECEIVES A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF PROF-
ITABLE BUSINESS?
OPINION
The right of one in business to exercise reasonable discretion in respect to his
own business methods has been jealously guarded by the courts.
Smiley v. Kansas ; 196 U. S. 447
Locker vs. American Tobacco Co. 195 N. Y. 565
This right includes the power to discontinue dealing with another for any
reason satisfactory to the one exercising the right, or for no reason at all.
Raymond Brothers Clark Co. vs. Federal Trade Commission ; 263 U. S. 565,
aflfirming 280 Fed. 529 (8 CCA.) which has vacated an order of the Federal
Trade Commission.
A fortiori, continued dealing with another, may be conditioned on certain re-
quirements being met. In fact the Clayton Act itself in one section expressly
preserves the right to select one's own customers. (Title 15 U.S.C.A. — Com-
merce and Trade Sec. 13 (a) p. 187). Therefore in the absence of a clear with-
drawal of this right by some specific provision of the Clayton Act we must con-
clude the right remains unimpaired.
Section 3 of the Clayton Act (so-called Tying Contracts Section) reads as
follows
:
"Sec. 14. Sale, etc. on agreement not to use goods of competitor. It shall
be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such com-
merce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods ; wares, mer-
chandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or
unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any
territory thereof, or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or
other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a price charged
therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition,
agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not
use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other
commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the
effect of such lease, sale or contract for sale or such condition, agreement,
or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce."
At the outset we are confronted with the question of whether the language
above quoted is applicable to the insurance business, or to the relationship of in-
surance company principal with its agents.
The section deals with leases and contracts of sale for goods, wares, merchan-
dise, machinery, supplies or other commodities. In an insurance transaction there
is no question of leasing, and there is a split of authority on whether or not in-
surance is a commodity. There would appear to be no sale of goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery or supplies ; but even if the language could be stretched
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to apply to insurance, it does not appear to be susceptible of application to the
relation of insurance company principal with its agent.
"The v/ords 'lease,' 'sale,' 'contract of sale,' 'lessee' and 'purchaser,' being
the words used, and no other relation than lease and sale being mentioned,
there is no expressed purpose in the clause quoted to make it cover any other
subject than leases, sales, or contracts for sales, and to embrace no other
persons than lessees and purchasers. The words are so clear they require
no construction, and to needlessly construe, in order to broaden the scope of
the section, whether done by the Trade Commission in administering, or by
the court in supervising the administration of, the statute, would be for
either or both such agencies to write into it what Congress has not expressly
written.
(Curtis Publishing Co. vs. Federal Trade Commission CCA. Pa. 1921, 270
Fed. 881, affirmed 260 U. S. 568.)"
The tying contract section was intended to prevent one seller or lessor from
closing the market to other sellers or lessors. It was intended to prevent tying
the purchaser or lessee to one seller or lessor.
International Business Machines vs. U. S. ; 298 U. S. 131
It is obvious that the agreement in question does not tie the agent to the insurer
in any sense. It tends to the other result since it encourages the agent to find
other underwriting facilities.
However, even assuming that the language in question would apply to insur-
ance and to the relationship of insurance company principal and its agent, it is
still difficult to see how this section prohibits the contract in question. Making
the assumptions in the preceding sentence, the section would prohibit an insur-
ance company principal furnishing its underwriting facilities to an agent on con-
dition that the agent was not to use the underwriting facilities of an insurer who
is a competitor of the insurance company principal, when the effect of such agree-
ment may be to substantially lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce. This obviously is not the contract stated in the question.
In view of the foregoing it is our opinion that Section 3 of the Clayton Act
does not apply to the contract set forth in the question.
Respectfully submitted,
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APPENDIX "F"
REPORT OF ALL-INDUSTRY COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO
CASUALTY AND SURETY AND FIRE, MARINE AND INLAND
MARINE RATE REGULATORY BILLS, AT CONVENTION
OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE
COMMISSIONERS, PORTLAND, OREGON,
JUNE 11, 1946
To THE Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
The All-Industry Committee met in open session duly called, at the Junior
Ball Room, Hotel Multnomah, Portland, Oregon, Monday, June 10, 1946,
at 9 :45 A. M.
All of the constituent organizations of the All-Industry Committee were
present, except one, which was represented by proxy.
A report of the All-Industry Committee Conference Committee with re-
spect to Casualty and Surety, and Fire and Marine and Inland Marine Rate
Regulatory Bills was submitted, pertaining to bills heretofore considered by
the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations, N. A. I. C, or sub-com-
mittee thereof, since the Grand Rapids meeting of the N. A. I. C, in Decem-
ber, 1945, which bills have been the subject of frequent conference since that
time of representatives of the All-Industry Committee, and the aforemen-
tioned sub-committee of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations.
The All-Industry Committee was advised by the Acting Chairman of the
Conference Committee, Mr. Marryott, that the sub-committee of the Com-
mittee on Rates and Rating Organizations, (N. A. I. C.) would at this Con-
vention report to that Committee with respect to the aforementioned bills,
and that the requests and recommendations of the sub-committee with respect
thereto were "contingent upon approval and acceptance of both bills in their
present form by the All-Industry Committee before action is taken by the
full Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations and the National Associ-
ation of Insurance Commissioners at Portland".
Upon submission of the Report of the Conference Committee, and con-
sideration and discussion thereof, the following motion was made by Mr.
Walter Bennett, representative of the National Association of Insurance
Agents
:
"I move that the All-Industry Committee approve and accept the Casualty
and Surety Rate Regulatory Bill and the Fire, Marine and Inland Marine
Rate Regulatory Bill, each dated May 18, 1946, including the footnotes con-
tained therein ; I further move that the Committee recognize that the science
of rate-making is a progressive one and that as time passes, changes and
improvements will no doubt suggest themselves as being of sufficient impor-
tance to require additional consideration of this Commitee."
The motion was seconded by Mr. David Satterfield, representative of the
Life Insurance Association of America.
Upon roll call vote on the motion constituent organizations voted as
follows
American Institute of Marine Underwriters
by Mr. J. Raymond Berry Aye
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American Life Convention
by Mr. Hogg Aye
American Mutual Alliance
by Mr. Eaton Aye
American Reciprocal Association
by Mr. Jacobs Aye
Associated Factory Mutual Fire Insurance Cos.
by Mr. Lord Aye
Association of Casualty and Surety Executives
by Mr. Murphy Aye
Bureau of Personal Accident and Health Underwriters
by Mr. Follmann Aye
Health and Accident Underwriters Conference
by Mr. Fraizer Aye
Inland Marine Underwriters Association
by Mr. Wayne Aye
Insurance Executives Association
by Mr. Williams Aye
Life Insurance Association of America
by Mr. Satterfield Aye
National Association of Independent Insurers
by Mr. Moser Aye
National Association of Insurance Agents
by Mr. Bennett Aye
National Association of Mutual Insurance Agents
by Mr. Eaton (proxy) Aye
National Association of Insurance Brokers
by Mr. Sawyer Aye
The National Board of Fire Underwriters
by Mr. Berry Aye
National Fraternal Congress of America
by Mr. Ekern Aye
Surety Association of America
by Mr. McFall Aye
National Assn. of Casualty and Surety Agents
by Mr. Sawyer Aye
The motion was therefore declared unanimously carried.
It will have been noted, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen of the committee,
that the aforementioned motion is in such form as to comply with exactitude
to the requirements of the sub-committee of your committee, in that, as
adopted, it carries with it the "approval and acceptance" of the bills by each
and all of the constituent organizations of the All-Industry Committee.
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Mr. Chairman, it would hardly be fitting if opportunity were not taken at
this time to express the appreciation of the All-Industry Committee collec-
tively and individually, for the unfailing aid and cooperation that your com-
mittee has given to the All-Industry Committee during the thirteen months
of its labors— by no means completed. We look forward to continued co-
operation, and indeed, rely upon it, in a good faith effort to meet the prob-
lems that confront the industry. We feel that you may agree with us that
the efforts thus far made, and to be made, mark a new era in cooperative
endeavor within the industry. Assuredly this cooperative endeavor on a
national scale and of such a scope, is unique in insurance history. That it
will continue not merely as a convenience but as a necessity and by common
accord, seems assured.
Again thanking you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, this
report, on behalf of the All-Industry Committee, is respectfully submitted.
Ray Murphy, Chairman, All-Industry Committee
Portland, Oregon, June 10-11, 1946
Henry G. Wood, Secretary.
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APPENDIX "G"
FIRST REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE OF LAWYERS TO THE
COMMITTEE ON LAWS OF THE NATIONAL BOARD OF
FIRE UNDERWRITERS PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION
ADOPTED AT MAY 9, 1945, MEETING
On June 5, 1944, the Supreme Court of the United States held the business of
insurance to be commerce, and where it crosses State lines, interstate commerce.
This decision
(a) raised broad doubts as to the validity of many aspects of State regu-
lation and taxation of the insurance business, and
(b) presented to the insurance business the far-reaching problem of ad-
justment to Federal laws passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution of the United States (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3).
On March 9, 1945, the President signed the following Act of Congress (Public
Law No. 15, 79th Congress) :
AN ACT
To express the intent of the Congress with reference to the regulation
of the business of insurance.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress hereby declares that the
continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insur-
ance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall
not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such
business by the several States.
Sec. 2. (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation
or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of in-
surance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance : Provided, That after January 1,
1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the
Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of
September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended,
shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business
is not regulated by State law.
Sec. 3. (a) Until January 1, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known
as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the
Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade
Commission Act, as amended, and the Act of June 19, 1936, known as the Robin-
son-Patman Anti-discrimination Act, shall not apply to the business of insurance
or to acts in the conduct thereof.
(b) Nothing contained in this Act shall render the said Sherman Act inappli-
cable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, co-
ercion, or intimidation.
Sec. 4. Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to affect in any
manner the application to the business of insurance of the Act of July 5, 1935,
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as amended, known as the National Labor Relations Act, or the Act of June 25,
1938, as amended, known as the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, or the Act
of June 5, 1920, known as the Merchant Marine Act, 1920.
Sec. 5. As used in this Act, the term "State" includes the several States,
Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.
Sec. 6. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to
any person or circumstances, shall be held invalid, the remainder of the Act, and
the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than those
as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected.
This Act discloses
:
(1) A congressional declaration that the continued regulation and taxation by
the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest.
(2) That the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act
and, insofar as acts or agreements of boycott, coercion or intimidation are in-
volved, the Sherman Act, are presently applicable to the business of insurance.
(3) That until January 1, 1948, the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Rob-
inson-Patman Act, the Clayton Act and, except for acts or agreements of boycott,
coercion or intimidation, the Sherman Act, shall not apply to the business of
insurance.
(4) That after January 1, 1948, the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the
Federal Trade Commission Act, all as amended, shall apply to the business of
insurance "to the extent that such business is not regulated by State Law," but
State regulation will not render the Sherman Act inapplicable to boycott, coercion
or intimidation.
No express mention is made as to the applicability of the Robinson-Patman Act
after January 1, 1948, to the business of insurance.
The questions considered are :
(1) The effect of the immediate applicability of the Sherman Act to the busi-
ness of insurance, insofar as acts or agreements of boycott, coercion or intimida-
tion are concerned.
(2) The impact of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade
Commission Act and the Robinson-Patman Act on the business of insurance after
January 1, 1948, apart from State regulation, and the possibilities through State
legislation of removing or lessening that impact.
THE IMMEDIATE APPLICABILITY OF THE SHERMAN ACT
The Sherman Act provides for fine or imprisonment, or both, of every person
( 1 ) who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign na-
tions, or (2) who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons to monopolize such trade or commerce.
In addition to the criminal penalties, the United States by suit in equity may
prevent or restrain violations of the Sherman Act. Such violations may also be
enjoined and triple damages may be recovered in suits by persons injured as a
result of such violations.
Public Law 15, Section 3(b) provides:
"(b) Nothing contained in this Act shall render the said Sherman Act
inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boy-
cott, coercion, or intimidation."
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This provision does not enlarge or expand the Sherman Act. Public Law 15
does not itself prohibit boycott, coercion or intimidation, it preserves the appli-
cability of the Sherman Act to boycott, coercion and intimidation used as a means
of achieving a restraint of trade or a monopoly.
Coercion as used in Public Law 15 does not apply to a command or restraint
imposed by a State as an act of government.-'^ Therefore a State law which re-
quired insurers, for example, to act in concert, would not constitute the coercion
which if practiced by private persons would under Sec. 3(b) of Public Law 15
make the Sherman Act applicable. This does not mean that a State may author-
ize coercion by private persons, for a State may not grant immunity to those who
so violate the Sherman Act by declaring that their action is lawful.
Meaning of the words "boycott, coercion or intimidation"
Decisions of the courts as to the meaning and application of the words "boy-
cott, coercion or intimidation" are far from uniform. While in many situations
counsel will be able to advise definitely as to whether boycott, coercion or intimi-
dation is present, in many others there will be considerable doubt.
In general, boycott is a concerted refusal to deal with others. It may be a
primary boycott, where members of the combination to promote their own in-
terests agree to refrain from dealing with others ; or a secondary boycott, where
they agree to exert pressure on third persons, who may have no interest in the
original dispute, to do likewise.
The words coercion and intimidation are generally used together, although
they may have slightly different meanings. Where one is present, usually both
exist. Therefore, for the purpose of this report, they will be considered together.
While coercion is defined by the dictionaries as involving the application of
force either physical or moral," the courts have broadened this to include "co-
ercion by economic pressure"^ as, for example, implanting a belief in the party
coerced that if he did not follow the course of action proposed to him he "would
suffer some serious and appreciable financial loss."*
"Intimidate" is defined as "to render timid, inspire with fear; to overawe, cow;
now, esp. to force to or deter from some action by threats or violence."® But here
again in the sense used in Public Law 15 it includes fear of unfavorable economic
results."
Interpretation of the Sherman Act
Boycott, coercion and intimidation do not in and of themselves necessarily con-
stitute violations of the Sherman Act. The violation, if any, exists when boycott,
coercion or intimidation constitutes or contributes to a monopoly or combination
in restraint of trade. In determining whether a violation exists in any such case,
however, there must be applied the standards established by the courts in in-
terpreting the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court has held that under the so-called "rule of reason" not all
restraints of trade are violations of the Sherman Act. With certain exceptions,
restraints are not held ,to constitute violations of the Act, if they are found to be
T- Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943).
2 Webster's International Dictionary.
3 United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 71 (1936).
4 United States v. American Naval Stores, Inc., 172 Fed. 45S (Circuit Ct., S. D. Georgia, 1909).
5 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.
6 "The clear weight of authority undoubtedly is that man may be intimidated into doing, or re-
fraining from doing, by fear of loss of business, property, or reputation, as well as by dread of loss
of life, or injury to health or limb; and the extent of this fear need not be abject, but only such as
to overcome his judgment, or induce him not to do or to do that which otherwise he would have done
or have left undone." — Sorr v. Essex Trades Council, 30 Atl. 881, 889 (Ct. Ch. N. J., 1894).
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reasonable restraints. The standards of reasonableness which have been applied
by the Supreme Court are not, however, met by merely showing that the restraint
will prevent practices injurious to the business. Generally speaking, it must be
established that the restraint will not be prejudicial to the public interest.
The Court has said in many cases (though in none involving insurance) that
it will not inquire into the reasonableness of price-fixing as such— "Price-fixing,
reasonable or unreasonable, is 'unlawful per se.' " ^
In the words of the Madison Oil Case^
"Any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in an
unlawful activity."
and again,
"Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with
the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of
a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se."
Because of the differences between the price-fixing dealt with in the adjudi-
cated cases, and rate-making to determine a proper insurance premium, it is pos-
sible that the Supreme Court might distinguish such rate-making from price-fix-
ing. It is interesting that the Court in the South-Eastern Underwriters case^
did not characterize the joint rate-making charged in the Atlanta indictment as
price-fixing illegal per se.
To repeat, even though boycott, coercion or intimidation is present, there is
not a violation of the Sherman Act (at least in the absence of price-fixing) if the
restraint of trade involved is reasonable. No absolute tests can be laid down to
determine the reasonableness of a restraint of trade. Each situation must be
examined on all its facts and with its collateral activities.
However, if there be a violation of the Sherman Act because of the presence
of illegal boycott, coercion or intimidation, the question is suggested as to
whether the Government might attack not only the particular activity involved
in the boycott, coercion or intimidation but also other related activities which,
standing alone, would be entirely legal. Under Public Law 15 there is a mora-
torium until January 1, 1948, except for acts or agreements of boycott, coercion
or intimidation and this may be a sufficient answer during the moratorium period
to the suggestion in the preceding sentence. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has held that the existence of a restraint violating the Act justifies an injunction
not only against the restraint itself but also against continuance of activities
which in themselves are entirely legal but which are engaged in as an integral
part of the forbidden restraint.*
Examination of Specific Activities
The rules and activities discussed below are of the type which the Government
has charged (in the S. E. U. A. indictment) or might charge involve boycott,
coercion or intimidation. No general conclusion can be drawn as to whether a
particular rule or activity will be found to be in violation of the Sherman Act
without relating the rule or activity to the surrounding circumstances, particu-
larly to determine whether any restraint which may be involved is merely ancil-
lary to the main purpose of a lawful group activity.®
1. The separation rule and the rule prohibiting reinsurance of non-organiza-
tion companies were terminated generally before enactment of Public Law 15.
The Government has charged that these two rules involved boycott and that their
1 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707, 720 (1944).
2 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. ISO, 221, 223 (1940).
3 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
4 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707 (1944).
5 Cf
.
U. S. V. Addyston Pipe & Steel Company (1898), 85 Fed. 271, 282.
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application in practice often involved coercion and intimidation. The repeal of
these rules alone is insufficient. To avoid attack it is important that any organi-
zation practices directed to enforcement of such rules, which may have survived
the repeal of the rules, be terminated.
2. Many local boards have rules and practices which may be claimed to in-
volve boycott, coercion or intimidation.
These rules and practices are primarily the concern of the local boards, but in
some instances the companies may have become involved either by membership
in the local board or by participation in or support of its activities. Whatever
may be the status under the Sherman Act of such organizations standing alone,
participation by companies writing interstate business might be held to remove
the local character of the organization. The fact that the companies have no
control over the actions of these boards and had no voice in the adoption of their
rules may not in every case free the companies from responsibilty.
Among such rules which might be attacked are the following
:
(a) an "in and out" rule, under which members of the local board may not
represent any insurance company unless all that company's local agents are mem-
bers of the local board. In other words all agents of a company must be in the
local board or all must be out. If a company appoints a non-member agent, or
refuses to cancel its appointment of an agent who has withdrawn from or been
dropped by the local board, all member agents are compelled to give up their
representation of that company.
(b) A non-intercourse rule,, which prohibits member agents exchanging bro-
kerage business with non-member agents.
(c) A rule forbidding any member agent writing insurance at other than the
rate established by an official rating bureau. This has been interpreted to forbid
writing insurance at lower rates even though such lower rates are deviations filed
with the rating bureau and permitted by State law.
(d) A rule forbidding any member agent to represent any insurance company
which returns to the insured any part of its premium or profit.
(e) A rule limiting the number of agents in the territory or otherwise restrict-
ing the right of a company to appoint agents.
(f) Rules setting up qualifications for membership. The validity of such rules
depends on the particular qualifications, required, the nature of the limitations
and restrictions and on the purpose and structure of the board. A purely social
organization may establish entirely arbitrary membership qualifications while an
organization not purely social may not have the same freedom.
Even where a local board does not have a written rule as outlined above, the
practices of the board may give the same result. These practices should be con-
sidered to be the same as though set forth in the constitution or by-laws of the
board.
3. Fieldmen's associations may in the past have participated in the enforce-
ment of the separation rule and local board rules. Fieldmen are company em-
ployees and the companies might in some circumstances be held responsible for
their actions even though unauthorized. By cooperation with local boards they
might involve their companies in responsibility for the effects of the board rules.
4. Some company associations and committees have rules limiting the number
of agents which any one company may appoint in a particular territory or other-
wise restricting the appointment of agents. These rules restrict the freedom of
the member companies to deal with agents and could be charged to involve boy-
cott, coercion or intimidation. Even so some such rules might be defensible
under the rule of reason as not unreasonable restraints under the Sherman Act.
Such rules also establish different classes of agents, such as general agents,
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policy writing agents and non-policy writing- agents, and these classes become
an integral part of the commission rules.
The rules of such associations and committees take many forms and apply to
a variety of situations. Whether or not a particular rule can be justified can be
determined only by consideration of the rules and practices of the association.
Company associations have varying membership qualifications and restrictions.
Some associations restrict membership to stock companies ; others admit only
companies that carry on their business according to the standards set by the asso-
ciation. These restrictions in some associations could be construed to constitute
boycott where certain companies or classes of companies are entirely excluded
from the benefits of membership, or as coercion or intimidation where a company
feels it necessary to comply with the restrictions in order to obtain membership.
No general rule can be laid down as to permissible membership restrictions. The
ability of the members to exclude others depends on the purpose and operations
of the association and the effect on others of exclusion from benefits of member-
ship.
5. Regional associations' constitutions, by-laws, rules and practices may pre-
sent other questions of boycott, coercion and intimidation which can be answered
only after a detailed study of each.
One such question is presented by the agency balance rule. Under that ruK,
all member companies must report agency delinquencies to the association, and
if by a specified date the delinquency is not cleared the association notifies all
companies in interest and appoints a supervisory committee to supervise the
operation of the agency. While an agency is under the jurisdiction of such a
committee, no member of the association may enter the agency, and if the delin-
quent agent fails to cooperate with the committee, the companies then represented
in the agency may not continue to accept business from it.
Another question is presented by agreements made by members to live up to
the rules of an association, with fines and other penalties including expulsion, for
violation. Where membership is open to all and is voluntary, no question of
boycott would seem to exist, but some situations may give rise to a charge thait
insurers are being coerced or intimidated to join or remain in the association.
Again no general rule can be laid down — the results may depend on the purposv
of the organization and the business value of membership.
Further facts and study may disclose additional problems involving boycott
coercion or intimidation.
June 20, 1945.
SECOND REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE OF LAWYERS TO THE
COMMITTEE ON LAWS OF .THE NATIONAL BOARD OF FIRE
UNDERWRITERS PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION ADOPTED
AT MAY 9, 1945 MEETING
In our first report we considered the effect of the immediate applicability of
the Sherman Act to the business of insurance, in so far as acts or agreements of
boycott, coercion or intimidation are concerned.
This report discusses the impact of the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act and the Robinson-Patman Act on the business of insurance after
January 1, 1948, apart from State regulation, and the possibilities through State
legislation of removing or lessening the impact of the Federal Trade Commission
Act and the Robinson-Patman Act.
The impact of the Sherman Act after January 1, 1948 will be dealt with in a
subsequent report.
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Unlike the Sherman Act, a violation of which in most instances involves a
combination or conspiracy, the prohibitions of the Clayton Act, the Federal
Trade Commission Act and the Robinson-Patman Act are directed primarily at
individual action.
I.
CLAYTON ACT
The Clayton Act^ is included in the moratorium provisions of Public Law 15,
so that it is inapplicable to insurance until 1948. Section 2(b) of Public Law 15
provides that after January 1, 1948, the Clayton Act shall be applicable to the
business of insurance "to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
law."
This report deals with those sections of the Act which are of present interest
to the insurance business.
Under the Clayton Act, a private person may bring a suit for an injunction or
for triple damages. The Federal Trade Commission may issue cease and desist
orders and the Department of Justice may bring civil proceedings for injunctions.
Section 2 of the Clayton Act was amended by Section 1 of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act and is dealt with later in this report in the discussion of the Robinson-
Patman Act.
Section 3 of the Act makes it unlawful to lease or sell goods, wares, merchan-
dise or other commodities, or fix a price therefor or discount therefrom, on the
condition that the lessee or purchaser shall not use or deal in the goods, wares,
merchandise or other commodities of a competitor of the lessor or seller, where
the effect may be to substantial^ lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.
For reasons given in the discussion of the Robinson-Patman Act, we do not
think that insurance is within the meaning of the words "goods, wares, merchan-
dise or commodities."
Section 7 of the Act prohibits the acquisition by one corporation of stock of
one or more other corporations where the effect may be to substantially lessen
competition between any of the corporations whose stock is acquired and the
corporation making the acquisition or between the corporations whose stock is
acquired, or to restrain commerce in any section or community or tend to create
a monopoly.
This section does not apply to corporations purchasing stock solely for invest-
ment and not voting or otherwise using it to bring about a substantial lessening
of competition, nor does it prevent corporations from forming subsidiary corpo-
rations for the actual carrying on of their immediate lawful business when the
effect is not to substantially lessen competition.
In the interpretation of this section, the courts apply a "rule of reason" similar
to that which has been applied in connection with the Sherman Act. In a case
decided in 1930" the United States Supreme Court said
:
"Mere acquisition by one corporation of the stock of a competitor, even
though it result in some lessening of competition, is not forbidden; the act
deals only with such acquisitions as probably will result in lessening compe-
tition to a substantial degree, Standard Fashion Co. v. Magran-Honston Co.,
258 U. S. 346, 357; that is to say, to such a degree as will injuriously affect
the public."
In subsequent decisions under Section 7 the courts have frequently cited this
1 Act of October 15, 1914, 15 U. S. C. A., §§ 12, 13, 14-21, 22-27.
2 International Shoe Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 U. S. 291, 298 (1930).
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language and have given weight to the effect of the acquisition of stock on the
pubHc interest, and there has been some tendency to direct the inquiry to the
question of whether the acquisition results in a reduction of competition gen-
erally, rather than to that of lessened competition between the acquired and
acquiring corporations."*^ However, it cannot be said that the test of competition
between the acquired and acquiring corporations (or between two acquired cor-
porations) has been discarded.- Moreover, it should be noted that there may be
a violation of the Act even though there is no effect on nation-wide competition,
if there is a substantial lessening of competition in a particular geographic area
or as to a particular product.^
It does not necessarily follow from the acquisition by one corporation of a
large percentage or all of the stock of one or more other corporations that com-
petition between them has been substantially lessened,* but the question of the
continuance of competition between a parent and its subsidiary, where both are
engaged in the same type of business, should be examined with care.
Fleets of insurance companies present varying degrees of competition between
the companies of which they are composed. In most instances the companies in
a fleet are represented by different agents, between whom there is active compe-
tition. At the same time the existence of a single top management with vary-
ing degrees of control should be considered in each case to determine whether
this has resulted in a substantial lessening of competition between the various
members of the fleet. Also important is the historical background of each fleet,
for subsidiary corporations may have been acquired without the purpose, or the
effect, of lessening competition. There are substantial differences between one
fleet and another, so that each fleet must be considered on the basis of its own
practices and methods of operation.
Section 7 deals only with acquisition of stock and does not apply to merger,
consolidation or other acquisition of assets of another corporation. The Supreme
Court has held that even though an acquisition of the stock of a competitor was
in violation of Section 7, if the assets of the acquired company are transferred to
the parent corporation before the Commission brings proceedings under Section
7, the Commission may not order the corporation to divest itself of those assets.®
Assuming an acquisition of stock which resulted in a substantial lessening of
competition, the application of Section 7 to the insurance business presents sev-
eral other questions. Does the decision in the South-Eastern Underwriters case
have a retroactive effect, so that the provisions of the Clayton Act apply from
October 15, 1914, the date of its enactment? Can proceedings still be brought
in respect to acquisitions which occurred years ago ? May an acquisition of stock
during the moratorium provided for in Public Law 15 be subject to attack after
January 1, 1948? For present purposes it will be safer to assume that the court
would answer each of these questions in the affirmative, although we recognize
that there are strong arguments to the contrary.
1 United States v. Republic Steel Corporation, 11 Fed. Supp. 117 (D. C, N. D. Ohio, 1935); V.
Vivaudou, Inc. v. F. T. C, 54 F. (2d) 273 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1931); Moody & Waters Co. v. Case-
Moody Pie Corporation, 187 N. E. 813 (111., 1933). State statute involved was substantially a re-
enactment of Sec. 7 of the Clayton Act.
^Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 66 F. (2d), 37 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1933),
aff'd 291 U. S. 651 (1934); Temple Anthracite Coal Co. v. F. T. C, 51 F. (2d), 656 (C. C. A.
3rd, 1931); V. Vivaudou, Inc. v. F. T. C, supra; National Supply Co. v. Hillman, 57 Fed. Supp. 4
(D. C.„ W. D. Pa., 1944).
S Indiana Farmer's Guide Co. v. Prairie Company, 293 U. S. 268 (1934). This was a Sherman
Act case; Swift & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 8 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925). Reversed
on other grounds 272 U. S. 554; Western Meat Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 1 Fed. (2) 95
(C. C. A. 9th, 1924), form of order modified 4 Fed. (2) 223, Commission's order restored 272 U. S.,
554.
'i Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, supra; Temple Anthracite Coal Co. v.
F. T. C, supra.
5 F
.
T. C. V. Western Meat Company; Thacher Manufacturing Company v. F. T. C; Swift &
Company v. F. T. C, 272 U. S. 554 (1926). Chief Justice Taft and Justices Holmes, Brandeis and
Stone dissented.
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Section 8 of the Act provides that no person shall at the same time be a director
in two or more corporations (with certain exceptions such as banks), any one
of which has capital surplus and undivided profits aggregating more than one
million dollars, if such corporations are or have been competitors, so that the
elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a viola-
tion of any of the anti-trust laws.
The test of whether the elimination of competition by agreement between the
companies involved would constitute a violation of any of the anti-trust laws
brings into the interpretation of this section the standards of the Sherman Act,
since that is the Act which might be violated by such an agreement. It is there-
fore necessary that each fleet or group of companies examine its own arrange-
ments and practices to determine whether its activities involve such an elimina-
tion of competition as would result in an undue restraint of trade, or whether its
arrangements and operations have an effect on competition so small as not to
constitute an undue or unreasonable restraint within the prohibitions of the
Sherman Act.
Section 10 of the Act provides that no common carrier shall have any dealings
in securities, supplies or other articles of commerce, to the amount of more than
$50,000 in one year, with another corporation, firm or association when the com-
mon carrier has on its board of directors or as its president, manager or pur-
chasing or selling offlcer, or agent in the particular transaction, any one who is
a director, manager, or purchasing or selling officer of, or who has any substan-
tial interest in, such other corporation, firm, or association, unless such dealings
are pursuant to competitive bidding. The section specifies penalties which may
be imposed on the common carrier or on the directors, agents, managers or offi-
cers of the common carrier involved in the violation.
For the protection of its own directors, officers and employees, an insurance
company which underwrites risks of railroads or other common carriers will
wish to review the question of possible applicability of this section in its case.
Relief Through State Legislation
Since the Clayton Act supplements the Sherman Act, we are postponing dis-
cussion of State legislation to meet Clayton Act problems until we have developed
the Sherman Act problems.
II.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
The Federal Trade Commission Act^ is declared by Public Law 15 to be in-
applicable to the business of insurance until January 1, 1948 and thereafter to be
applicable "to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law."
Section 5 of the Act declares unfair methods of competition and unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices in interstate or foreign commerce to be unlawful.
The Act created the Federal Trade Commission and empowered it to prevent
the use of unfair methods of competition.
Under Section 6 of the Act the Commission is given broad independent rights
of investigation, among which are powers to
gather and compile information and investigate the organization, business,
conduct, practices and management of any corporation
;
require corporations to file reports, either annual or special, including
answers to detailed questionnaires
;
investigate compliance with anti-trust decrees
;
1 Act of September 26, 1914, 15 U. S. C. A., 41 et seq.
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investigate and report facts relating to suspected violations of the anti-trust
Acts;
make recomriiendations for the readjustment of the business of a corporation
alleged to be violating the anti-trust Acts.
The Commission is also charged with enforcement of the Robinson-Patman
Act and of Sections 2, 3, 7 and 8 of the Clayton Act, which are the sections deal-
ing with discrimination, agreements not to use goods of competitors, acquisition
of stock of competitors and interlocking directorates.
The Commission, after investigation, may issue a cease and desist order, which
is reviewable and enforceable by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. The
penalty for each violation of an order to cease and desist is $5,000, to be recov-
ered by the United States in a civil proceeding.
The findings of the Commission as to facts, if supported by testimony, are de-
clared to be conclusive.
The purpose of the Act is to implement the anti-trust Acts by anticipating and
preventing violations.
"Instead of attempting to inflict punishment for having done prohibitea
acts, instead of enjoining the continuance of prohibited combinations and
compelling disintegration of those formed in violation of law, the act under-
took to preserve competition through supervisory action of the Commission.
The potency of accomplished facts had already been demonstrated. The task
of the Commission was to protect competitive business from further inroads
by monopoly. It was to be ever vigilant. If it discovered that any business
concern had used any practice which would be likely to result in public in-
jury— because in its nature it would tend to aid or develop into a restraint
of trade— the Commission was directed to intervene, before any act should
be done or condition arise violative of the Anti-Trust Act.""^
Congress did not attempt to define what methods and practices should be
deemed unfair, but left that determination to the Commission.^
Methods and practices which the Commission has in the past found to be un-
fair offer some guide to what it might hereafter hold to be unfair in the business
of insurance, but these are only a guide since what constitutes unfair methods
may vary greatly from one industry to another or even within the same^industry
under different circumstances.^ Furthermore, methods which might be unobjec-
tionable where there are a number of competitors of substantially the same size
and power may become objectionable when used by a competitor which dominates
the field.*
The Commission in its Annual Report for 1938 (pp. 70-75), summarized 27
methods of competition which it condemned as violative of the Act, exclusive of
specific practices outlawed by the Clayton Act. We list below those which are
of such broad application that they should be brought to the attention of the in-
surance business.
False advertising and mis-branding :
False and misleading advertising calculated to mislead or deceive the pur-
chasing public to their damage and to the injury of competitors.
1 Justice Brandeis dissenting in F. T. C. v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 434-5 (1920).
2 "The Committee gave careful consideration to the question as to whether it would attempt to de-
fine the many and variable unfair practices which prevail in commerce and to forbid their continu-
ance or whether it would, by a general declaration condemning unfair practices, leave it to the com-
mission to determine what practices were unfair. It concluded that the latter course would be the
better.
. .
." — Report Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, June 13, 1914, 63d ConR., 2d
Sess., No. 597, p. 13.
3 Mr. Justice Brandeis, F. T. C. v. Grats, 153 U. S. 421, 436.
4 Report of the Board of Corporations on the International Harvester Co., March 3, 1913, p. 30.
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Commercial bribery:
Bribing buyers or other employees of the customers to secure or hold patronage.
Trade secrets:
Procuring the business or trade secrets of competitors by espionage or bribery.
Inducing breach of employment contracts:
Enticing away employees of competitors in such numbers or under such cir-
cumstances as to hamper or embarrass the competitor.
Disparagement
:
Making false and disparaging statements respecting competitors' products,
their value and safety, and respecting competitor's business and financial credit.
Passing off:
Passing off goods for well and favorably known products of competitors.
Bogus independents:
Using concealed subsidiaries ostensibly independent to obtain competitors' busi-
ness advantages.
Price misrepresentations
:
Schemes to create the impression in the mind of the prospective customer that
he is being offered an opportunity to make a purchase under unusually favorable
conditions when such is not the case. This includes sales plans where the seller
falsely represents his price to be a special reduction.
Advantage of dealing with seller:
Misrepresenting the necessity or desirability or the advantages to the customer
of dealing with the seller.
Fraud:
Obtaining business through undertakings not intended to be carried out and
through deceptive, dishonest and oppressive devices calculated to entrap the cus-
tomer.
Sales below cost:
Selling below cost with the intent and effect of hindering, stifling and sup-
pressing competition.
Misrepresentation of product:
Employing false and misleading representations to give products a standing,
merit and value which they would not otherwise possess, tending to mislead the
public into purchasing the products in the erroneous beliefs engendered by the
false representations.
The Commission also listed other condemned practices which are in substance
violations of the Sherman Act, such as
Trade boycotts or combinations of traders to prevent certain middlemen or
classes of them from procuring goods on the same terms as others, or to
coerce the trade policy of competitors.
Resale price maintenance (in the absence of a State fair trade law under the
Miller-Tydings amendment to the Sherman Act).
Combinations or agreements of competitors to enhance or maintain prices,
bring about substantial uniformity in prices, or divide territory or business,
or to close markets to competitors.
Use by association of methods tending to result in uniform prices or practices.
It must be emphasized that the Commission's powers of investigation under
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Section 6 are not necessarily limited to situations involving unfair methods or
violations of the anti-trust acts. The Commission has conducted many broad in-
vestigations either at the behest of Congress or on its own motion and, except as
the power may be limited under Public Law 15, such investigation of the insur-
ance industry or a branch of it might be made by the Commission at any time
after January 1, 1948.
Relief Through State Legislation:
A State statute, whether it vests broad power in an insurance official to order
insurance companies to terminate improper or unfair practices, or whether it
parallels the Federal Trade Commission Act and applies to all types of business
within that State, would seem to make Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act (the power to issue cease and desist orders) inapplicable in that State.
Relief through State legislation from the broad investigating powers of the
Commission under Section 6 presents a more difficult problem. The existence in
a State of a commission, or an insurance official, having as broad powers of in-
vestigation as those vested in the Federal Trade Commission under Section 6 of
the Act, might be held to render that section inapplicable to the insurance busi-
ness in that State, and thereby deprive the Federal Trade Commission of power
to conduct an investigation in that State. On the other hand, it might be held
that the Federal Trade Commission's investigatory powers under Section 6, in-
so-far as Section 6 provides for the gathering of information, can co-exist with
such State powers on the theory that the mere gathering of information by a
State does not constitute regulation within the meaning of Public Law 15. Fur-
thermore, Congress can at any time order the Federal Trade Commission to con-
duct an investigation, irrespective of Public Law 15.
III.
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
The Robinson-Patman Act^ was passed in 1936, to prevent unfair price dis-
crimination, direct or indirect, which affects interstate or foreign commerce. It
was the result of the Federal Trade Commission's report on advantages enjoyed
by chain stores.
The Robinson-Patman Act seeks to protect the competitive equality of the in-
dividual, whereas the Sherman Act seeks to protect competition generally.
Section 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act, which amends Section 2 of the Clayton
Act, and is part of that Act, makes it unlawful for any person to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality where
the effect may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.
Differentials are permissible to make allowance for differences in costs of manu-
facture, sale or delivery and the section contains certain other qualifications.
The Act contains a provision under which a seller may show that his lower
price was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. It is
not clear to what extent such a showing constitutes a defense.
It is also made unlawful knowingly to induce or receive a prohibited discrimi-
nation in price.
In order to prevent indirect discrimination Section 1 makes it unlawful
(a) to pay any commission or other compensation to purchasers or to inter-
mediaries not under the control of the seller, except for services rendered, or to
receive such commissions or brokerage
;
(b) to give any compensation for services or facilities furnished by the cus-
1 Act of June 19, 1936, 15 U. S. C. A. 13, 13a, 13b, 21a.
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tomer or to furnish any services or facilities to the customer unless made avail-
able on proportionally equal terms to all competitors of that customer.
The prohibition referred to in (a) has been construed as absolutely forbidding
the payment by the seller of a commission or brokerage to an agent or broker
representing the buyer.
^
Section 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act being a part of the Clayton Act, a
private person may bring a suit for an injunction or for triple damages. The
Federal Trade Commission may issue cease and desist orders, and the Depart-
ment of Justice may bring civil proceedings for injunctions.
Sections 2 and 4 of the Robinson-Patman Act are not material to the present
discussion.
Section 3, the remaining section of the Robinson-Patman Act (which section
is not part of the Clayton Act) makes unlawful
(a) Any discrimination against competitors of the purchaser by granting to
the purchaser any allowance not available to such competitors "in respect of a
sale of goods of like grade, quality, and quantity"
;
(b) sales of goods in one part of the United States at prices lower than else-
where or at unreasonably low prices, in either case for the purpose of destroying
competition.
Violation of this section is punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both.
Applicability to the Business of Insurance
This report does not deal with purchases and sales of tangible goods by an in-
surance company.
The applicability of the Robinson-Patman Act to insurance depends on whethei
its terms are broad enough to include insurance. The key words in the Act are
"commodities" and "goods, wares and merchandise." , The Act is not applicable
unless insurance be found to be within the meaning of those words as used in the
Act.
The dictionary definitions of these words indicate that while they can be used
in a broad sense to cover all personal property, the more general use is limited to
tangibles.
That Congress used them in their usual sense of tangible personal property is
evident by the use in the Act of the following expressions which normally relate
only to tangibles
:
"where such commodities are sold for use, consumption or resale"
;
"cost of manufacturing, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods
or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or de-
delivered"
;
"fix and establish quantity limits"
;
"marketability of the goods concerned, such as but not limited to actual or
imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods";
"the processing, handling, sale or offering for sale of any products or com-
modities manufactured, sold or offered for sale by such person"
;
"a commodity bought for resale with or without processing".
None of these phrases is an apt expression for use in describing or referring i^ ,
insurance.
1 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 106 F. 2d 667 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1939); Webb-Crawford Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 109 F. 2d 268 (C. C. A. Sth, 1940);
Quality Bakers v. Federal Trade Commission, 114 F. 2d 393 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940); Fitch v. Ken-
tucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F. 2d 12 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943); Modern Marketing Service
V. Federal Trade Commission, CCH Trade Regulation Service, Par. 57, 383 (C. C. A. 7th, June 13,
1945).
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Writing insurance is very different from the sale of a commodity where iden-
tical units in quantity are sold to many customers. The view that insurance is
not within the scope of the Act is supported by decisions on the meaning of the
word commodity.
In Paul V. Virginia^ the United States Supreme Court said that insurance
policies "are not commodities to be shipped or forwarded from one State to
another." The decision in the Southeastern Underwriters case did not express
a contrary view on this point.
A United States Circuit Court of Appeals held that the transportation of pas-
sengers by bus was not the sale of commodities within the meaning of Section 2
of the Clayton Act.^ The Court said that the Act "clearly refers to a commodity
such as merchandise" (p. 762)).
A District Court of the United States held that a construction contract under
which the price varied according to the type of brick selected was not within the
Robinson-Patman Act, even though it involved commodities in that there was a
transfer of title to the materials.^
The Federal Trade Commission held that a sale of advertising space was not
a sale of a commodity within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act.^
A number of State courts have held that insurance is not a commodity^ or
merchandise'' within the meaning of those terms as used in State statutes.
Since Section 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act is part of the Clayton Act, which
Section 2(b) of Public Law 15 makes applicable to insurance after January 1,
1948, it may be argued that the effect of Section 2(b) is to declare insurance to
be a commodity. However, we think that this is not the correct construction of
Public Law 15.
While the question cannot be definitely settled until the Supreme Court passes
upon it, we believe that the reference in the Robinson-Patman Act to commod-
ities, goods, wares and merchandise does not embrace the business of insurance.
// Insurance Held to he Commodity
The Robinson-Patman Act is included in the moratorium provisions of Public
Law 15, and therefore is definitely inapplicable to insurance until 1948.
The following paragraphs deal with questions which will arise after January
1, 1948 if insurance is held to be a "commodity" or "goods, wares or mer-
chandise."
The effect of Section 2(b) of Public Law 15 is to treat Sections 1 and 3 of
the Robinson-Patman Act differently as regards their relation to State law.
The proviso at the end of Section 2(b) states that the Clayton Act, Section 2
of which is Section 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act, shall be applicable to the busi-
ness of insurance after January 1, 1948 "to the extent that such business is not
regulated by State law."
18 Wall. 168 (1869).
^ Fleetway Inc. v. Public Service Trans. Co., 72 Fed. 2d 761 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1934); Cert. Den.
293 U. S. 626. This case was decided prior to the Robinson-Patman amendment' of Section 2 of the
Clayton Act, but the language was similar.
^General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598 (D. C. W. D., Ky., 1941).
4 Informal opinion of F. T. C, 81 Cong. Rec, 8/25/37, C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv'., Par. 2212.
5 Werth V. Fire Companies Adj. Bureau, 171 S. E. 255 (Va., 1933). Cert. Den. 290 U. S., 659-
Brock V. Hardie, 154 So. 690 (Fla., 1934); Queens Ins. Co. v. State, 24 S. W. 397 (Tex 1893)'
Palatine Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 202 S. W. 1014 (Tex., 1918); State v. Bovee, 6 Ohio N. P. (NS) 337'Common Pleas, Loraine County (1907); Contra Beechley v. Mulville, 70 N. W. 107 (Iowa, 1897).'
^ Aetna Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 864, 51 S. W. 624 (1899); Harris v Commonwealth
113 Va. 746, 73 S. E. 561 (1912).
cxciv P.D. 9
This proviso does not mention the Robinson-Patman Act, and therefore, of
course, does not cover the status after January 1, 1948 of Section 3 of the Robin-
son-Patman Act, which is not part of the Clayton Act. Section 3 is, hovi^ever, as
is Section 1, within the first clause of Section 2(b) of Public Law 15 which pro-
vides that no Act of Congress, unless specifically relating to insurance, shall be
construed to invalidate, impair or supersede any State law enacted for the pur-
pose of regulating insurance.
It is not clear what significance is to be attached to the different treatment of
the two sections of the Robinson-Patman Act or whether there will ultimately
prove to be a difference in their relation to State law.
The great majority of the States have laws forbidding discrimination in insur-
ance rates and barring rebates of premiums. Since they were drawn to cover
the situations found in the insurance business they deal with discrimination in
terms relating specifically to insurance. The Robinson-Patman Act being for
the sale of commodities generally is drawn in more general terms.
We believe that State anti-discrimination and anti-rebate laws and State law
providing for the licensing of brokers and recognizing the propriety of payment
of commissions to them constitute regulatory legislation within the meaning of
Public Law 15 and, therefore, to the extent that they deal with the practices
against which the Robinson-Patman Act is directed, will make Section 1 of the
Robinson-Patman Act inapplicable. Moreover, the application of the Robinson-
Patman Act to insurance would result in impairing or superseding such State
laws in cases where it conflicts with them.
In view of these considerations and of the declaration of policy in Public Law
15 that the business of insurance and every person engaged therein shall be sub-
ject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation of such busi-
ness, we believe that if insurance is held to be a commodity. State laws will, in
the field which they cover, give a large degree of immunity from the Robinson-
Patman Act.
To the extent that premium rates are regulated under State law within the con-
templation of Public Law 15, some additional measure of protection is afforded
against the Robinson-Patman Act. Where rates are thus regulated, a finding
that such rates were discriminatory so as to constitute a violation of the Robin-
son-Patman Act might involve an encroachment on State regulation or an im-
pairment of the State law.
Relief Through State Legislation
We believe that insurance will not be held to be a commodity or goods, wares
or merchandise, and therefore the Robinson-Patman Act will not apply to the
business of insurance. However, if it should be held to apply, the State anti-
discrimination and anti-rebate laws and laws relating to the licensing of brokers
and payment of commissions will give a substantial degree of immunity from the
Robinson-Patman Act to that part of the insurance business covered by those
State laws ; and State regulation of rates will give additional protection against
a finding that such rates are discriminations in violation of the Robinson-Patman
Act.
July 17, 1945.
THIRD REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE OF LAWYERS TO THE
COMMITTEE ON LAWS OF THE NATIONAL BOARD OF
FIRE UNDERWRITERS PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION
ADOPTED AT MAY 9, 1945 MEETING
In our first report we considered the effect of the immediate applicability oi
the Sherman Act to the business of insurance, in-so-far as acts or agreements of
boycott, coercion or intimidation are concerned.
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In our second report we considered the impact of the Clayton Act, the Federal
Trade Commission Act and the Robinson-Patman Act on the business of insur-
ance after January 1, 1948, apart from State legislation and the possibilities
through State legislation of removing or lessening the impact of the Federal
Trade Commission Act and the Robinson-Patman Act.
This report discusses the impact of the Sherman Act on the business of insur-
ance after January 1, 1948, apart from State legislation and the possibilities,
through State legislation, of removing or lessening that impact.
Scope of This Report
After a discussion of the Sherman Act and relevant cases, the following spe-
cific activities and practices in the fire insurance business will be considered in
light of the Sherman Act
:
1. Joint rate making p. 31
as to risks located in a single State
;
as to risks in a single State where the rates cannot be filed in ad-
vance
;
as to risks located in more than one State
;
as to risks which are transported from one State to another ; and
agreements to maintain rates.
2. Stamping and audit bureaus p. 32
3. Policies and forms ' p. 33
4. Commissions, as they are controlled or affected by concerted action . . p. 33
5. Limitations on appointment of local agents , p. 34
6. Joint action through participation in pools and syndicates p. 38
7. Reinsurance p. 40
8. Agency balances and other credit rules p. 41
9. Joint action in relation to adjustment of losses p. 42
THE LAW APART FROM STATE LEGISLATION
The Sherman Act
The Sherman Act provides for fine or imprisonment, or both, of every person
(1) who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations,
or (2) who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons to monopolize such trade or commerce. In
addition to the criminal penalties, the United States by suit in equity may prevent
or restrain violations of the Sherman Act. Such violations may also be enjoined
and triple damages may be recovered in suits by persons injured as a result of
such violations.
Price
While the Supreme Court has held that under the so-called "rule of reason"
not all restraints of trade are violations of the Sherman Act, the court has said
in many cases (though in none involving insurance) that it will not inquire into
the reasonableness of price fixing as such— "Price-fixing, reasonable or unrea-
sonable, is 'unlawful per se' "
}
In the words of the Madison Oil Case-
"Any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in an un-
lawful activity."
and again,
1 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707, 720 (1944).
2 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 221, 223 (1940).
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"Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the
effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabihzing the price of a
commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se."
Because of the differences between price-fixing dealt with in the adjudicated
cases, and joint activities to determine a proper insurance premium, it is possible
that the Supreme Court might distinguish such joint activities from price-fixing.
Without minimizing the possibility that the Supreme Court will make this dis-
tinction, the following discussion is based on an assumption that the ordinary
rules as to price-fixing will be applied to joint rate making activities in the in-
surance business.
Parts of Price
The rule against price-fixing has been applied not only to the ultimate price
but to its component parts. The Supreme Court in the Sugar Institute case^
affirmed an injunction against restrictions as to commissions, quantity discounts
and absorption of freight charges. The Federal Trade Commission has con-
demned uniformity as to discounts," freight charges^ and terms of sale.*
However, with few exceptions^ the condemned agreements were part of a
broader price-fixing scheme® and in at least one case where it was not part of
such a scheme, such an agreement was upheld.'^ Moreover, the Federal Trade
Commission in its Report on Open Price Association (1929) said:
"It is, of course, not approximate uniformity or stabilization of prices as
such that is illegal, but the bringing about of such a result by agreement. An
agreement may be tacit and difficult to prove. Furthermore, as regards ele-
ments oT price, as distinguished from the complete price, it is possible there
is less of strict constructionism in the law than there was a few years ago.
If the actual purpose is standardization and simplification of trade practices,
the fact that there is an agreement with regard to certain price elements in
order to further this purpose may not be considered decisive, even though
the standards might be instituted or engineered to serve the purpose of
agreement on prices— if the latter does not appear as a fact." (p. 256)
In view of the Sugar Institute case, decided since the above statement was made,
it is today not clear that an agreement as to a component part of the price even
in the absence of any fixing of the ultimate price would be upheld under the
Sherman Act.
Statistics
This does not mean that all joint activities relating to rates are illegal. Under
Supreme Court decisions® members of an industry may file with a trade associa-
tion past prices and general statistical information, and the trade association may
analyze the information thus received and distribute the results to the members.
Subsequently the Supreme Court permitted the members of the Sugar Institute
to file their current and future prices,^ the Court there saying:
"As free competition means a free and open market among both buyers
and sellers, competition does not become less free merely because of the dis-
tribution of knowledge of the essential factors entering into commercial
^ Sugar Institute v. U. S., 297 U. S. 553 (1936).
2 U. S. Gold Leaf Manufacturers Association, 1 F. T. C. 173 (1918); Stipulation No. 127, 10 F.
T. C. 568 (1926); California Rice Industry, 26 F. T. C. 968 (1938).
3 Stipulation No. 143, 10 F. T. C. 587 (1926).
i The Rubber Manufacturers Association, Inc., 21 F. T. C. 176 (1935); Edes Manufacturing Com-
pany, 22 F. T. C. 447 (1936).
5 Stipulation No. 143, 10 F. T. C. 587 (1926); Retail Furniture Dealers Association of St. Louis,
106 CCH, Par. 8747 (1936).
6 Sugar Institute v. U. S., supra.
T Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Commission, 13 F. (2d), 673 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
S Maple Flooring Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 563 (1925); Cement Manufacturers Assn. v.
United States, 268 U. S. 588 (1925).
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transactions. The natural effect of the acquisition of the wider and more
scientific knowledge of business conditions on the minds of those engaged in
commerce, and the consequent stabilizing of production and price, cannot be
said to be an unreasonable restraint or in any respect unlawful. Maple
Flooring Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, 582, 583. In that case, we
decided that trade associations which openly and fairly gather and dissemi-
nate information as to the cost of their product, the volume of production,
the actual price which the product has brought in past transactions, stocks
of merchandise on hand, approximate costs of transportation, without reach-
ing or attempting to reach an agreement or concerted action with respect to
prices or production or restraining competition, do not fall under the inter-
diction of the Act. Id., p. 586. See, also. Cement Manufacturers Assn. v.
United States, 268 U. S. 588, 604, 606." (pp. 598-9)
The members may not, however, agree to adhere to the price schedules which
they file, but must be free to deviate without prior notice."
The members apparently may not agree to file information under an arrange-
ment imposing penalties for failure to file.^ Industry members may not file, nor
may their association circulate price and statistical information in such detail as
to specific transactions as to indicate that the information is sought to check up
on the observance of a price understanding.'*
While the trade association need not make public all of the information gath-
ered, it is necessary to make available such of the information as is of legitimate
interest to the public.^
In the Maple Flooring case the Supreme Court upheld circulation among the
members of average costs which included a distribution of the aggregate cost
among the different types and grades of finished flooring. The Court said
:
"It cannot, we think, be questioned that data as to the average cost of
flooring circulated among the members of the Association, when combined
with a calculated freight rate which is either exactly or approximately the
freight rate from the point of shipment, plus an arbitrary percentage of
profit, could be made the basis of fixing prices or for an agreement for price
maintenance which, if found to exist, would, under the decisions of this
Court, constitute a violation of the Sherman Act. But, as we have already
said, the record is barren of evidence that the published list of costs and the
freight-rate book have been so used by the present Association." (p. 572)
Standardisation and Simplification
Standardizations of product are encouraged by the Federal Trade Commission.
The Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Open-Price Trade Associ-
ations (1929) said:
"Some of the most valuable kinds of association work may be classed as
measures looking to greater economy and efiiciency in business. Among
these are standardization, simplification, and grading and inspection." (p.
204)
The attitude of the Commission towards standardization and simplification is
illustrated in two of its cases brought against trade groups.
While an order issued against the members of the Lead Pencil Association^
ordered that they cease consulting with each other with respect to a standardiza-
'^ Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553 (1936).
2 Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553 (1936).
3 U. S. V. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371 (1923).
'^American Column &• Lumber Co. v. U. S., 257 U. S. 377 (1921); U. S. v. A^merican Linseed'
Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371 (1923).
5 Sugar Institute v. United States, supra.
6 The Joseph Dixon Crucible Co. et al, 29 F. T. C. 749, Dicket 3643, Aug. 28, 1939.
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tion program having as its objective the limitation of the styles, grades or quali-
ties of pencils, the Commission added that nothing in the order should prevent
the members from investigating or consulting with one another for the purpose
of attempting to work out a simplification program for the pencil industry.
In another case against a group of milk and ice-cream can manufacturers^ the
Commission charged that the group had standardized the cans so they were of
uniform material, weight and construction, but said it was not complaining
against the standardization as such but only against its use as a means of carry-
ing out a price-fixing conspiracy.
It should be noted that approval by the Federal Trade Commission, while help-
ful, does not give immunity from proceedings under the Sherman Act.
Standardization has been upheld by the courts as fair and reasonable in some
cases^ even though the result was to deprive the buyer of an opportunity to buy
the products eliminated.
The Southern Pine Association established a committee on lumber standards,
which set specifications as to sizes and grades of lumber, the seasoning and mois-
ture content. The Association was charged to have violated the Sherman Act
by using the grading system to destroy competition from non-members and by
charging excessive fees to non-members for so-called services. A consent decree^
allowed the grading activities to be continued, but ordered them carried on in a
separate bureau open to all producers on equal terms, with control of the bureau
in the hands of a representative of each pine lumber producing State with addi-
tional representatives of trade associations.
Two State Court decisions have upheld estimating and surveying activities by
trade associations where the purpose was to save the expense involved in indi-
vidual surveys and to obtain more accurate data. In both cases it was clear that
there was no conspiracy to fix prices. In one of these cases'^ six manufacturers
of sprinkler systems formed a bureau to make an engineering survey of each pro-
posed installation to secure the information necessary for figuring the bids. Each
member independently made its bid from the engineering information thus se-
cured. The Court held this did not violate either the State anti-trust act or the
Sherman Act.
In the other case,^ a planing mill association advised its members of the exact
items and quantities to be furnished under the plans and specifications of pro-
posed buildings. The association guaranteed the accuracy of its lists. Each
member then fixed his own bid. The association also required uniform forms of
bids. The Court held that this activity did not violate the State anti-trust statute,
saying
:
"If competitors are not permitted to agree upon measures to eliminate, or
at least to lessen, mistakes as to items and quantities, upon which bids are
based, individuals, exercising ordinary business sagacity and acting alone,
must recognize the possibility of mistakes and make allowance in their bids
to meet such contingency. They will add such allowance in making up their
bids, and the building public will ultimately foot the bill." (p. 786)
1 Keiner Williams Stamping Company, 33 F. T. C. 1634, Docket 2199, July 31, 1941.
2 Maple Flooring Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 563 (1925) ; Cement Manufacturers
Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 588 (1925).
3 United States v. Southern Pine Asso. (U. S. D. C, E. D., La., 1940), CCH Trade Reg. Serv.
Vol. 3, 8th Ed., Par. 25, 394.
iBerenson v. H. G. Vogel Co., 253 Mass. 185, 148 N. E. 450 (1925); cert. den. 269 U. S. 577
(1925).
5 State v._ Carondelet Planing Mill Co., 309 Mo. 353, 274 S. W. 780 (1925). See also the Southern
Pine Association case (supra) where the bureau maintained an inspection service.
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Government Attitude in S. E. U. A. Case
The Government in its brief before the Supreme Court in the S. E. U. A. case
recognized that cooperation in certain fields was permitted, saying:
"(a) There is, of course, a large area in which insurance companies may
cooperate on matters of joint interest which do not extend to the fixing of
rates. Some of the writers quoted by the appellees in support of cooperation
in rate-fixing were referring in part to such other advantages of cooperation
as joint action for more adequate supervision of risks, the study of hazards
and reduction of incendiarism. The Government does not take issue with
any such forms of cooperation. Nor is there any prohibition in the Sher-
man Act against the exchange of experience by companies and their cooper-
ation in the classification and evaluation of this experience and the compila-
tion of statistical data therefrom. (Cf. Maple Flooring Assn. v. United
States, 268 U. S. 563.) It may be highly desirable for the loss experience of
fire insurance companies to be pooled and analyzed in order that the scien-
tific basis of the industry may approach the accuracy of life insurance. A
legitimate function of a joint bureau, such as the present rating bureaus, may
well be the formation of burning tables similar to the mortality tables of life
insurance, showing the probability of loss on a property with given char-
acteristics. It may also be conceded as desirable to have such joint bureaus
inspect and classify risks, both to reduce costs, and to get more uniform data
for scientific rating of hazards. Classification of the risk based on such joint
inspection would not mean, however, that the price charged for insuring it
would necessarily be the same for all companies.
"(b) (i) Even if it be assumed that the rating bureaus scientifically de-
termine the probability of loss on particular properties, this would not justify
the establishment of uniform premium rates for all companies. The final
premium rates should be sufficient to cover ( 1 ) the amount necessary to pay
losses, including an amount sufficient to maintain adequate reserves against
conflagrations, (2) the administrative expenses, and (3) profits. It is only
the first of these factors which is not subject to the control of the individual
company, and as to which the joint use of common experience would result
in uniformity." (Footnotes omitted) (pp. 109-111) (pp. 84, 85 in reprint.)
SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES AND PRACTICES UNDER THE SHERMAN
ACT, APART FROM STATE LEGISLATION
1. Joint Rate Making
As shown above, any tampering with the price structure in interstate com-
merce has been declared by the Supreme Court to be per se a violation of the
Sherman Act.
Applied literally, this principle would make illegal any joint rate making with
the purpose and effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing the
premium rates, regardless of whether the risks involved were located in a single
State, in more than one State, or transported from one State to another. Agree-
ments to maintain rates would likewise be illegal.
To constitute a violation, it is not necessary to have any agreement or under-
standing to maintain the price. The Supreme Court has held to be a violation
an agreement to adhere to announced prices until notice of change is given, even
though each member was free to give such notice of change at any time.^
We believe, however, that the fire insurance industry may, with reasonable
assurance that such activities would not be held to violate the Sherman Act, act
in concert to
:
'^ Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553 (1936).
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Establish reasonable classifications for reporting premiums and losses, but
there should not be a limitation that insurance written be confined to those
classes.
Report premium rates, past and current, but each insurer should be free
from any obligation not to vary with or without prior notice.
Report commissions and other expenses.
Analyze and distribute statistics collected, so long as the public has access
to that part which is of interest to it.
Classify cities as to fire protection.
Inspect and classify risks.
The compilation of figures giving the average burning loss on for example
cotton gins, which would be legal as indicated above, would be of little help to
an individual company in fixing a proper rate on a particular gin. The average
burning rate is only an average and the particular gin in question might have
features that doubled or halved the risk. To make the figures useful the insurer
must know the physical characteristics of the average cotton gin risk. Joint ac-
tivity in establishing the specifications of such an average cotton gin, representa-
tive of the average burning loss, and the physical features that are significant
variations from that average cotton gin, would seem to be only reporting physical
facts rather than constituting price fixing or an unreasonable restraint.
However, the further step of joint determination of the percentage effect on
the rate resulting from each such variation raises more of a problem. It might
be said to be tampering with the price structure. While the Maple Flooring,
Berenson and Carondelet Plaining Mill cases would tend to uphold such a joint
activity, we are not prepared at this time to advise as to its legality.
In considering the permissible joint activities as to rates or any other matters,
it should be borne in mind that an activity legal in itself may become illegal if a
part of a program to fix or stabilize prices.
Mr. Justice Holmes,^ in upholding an Iowa statute forbidding insurance com-
panies to enter into any agreement relating to rates, commissions or their method
of transacting business, said
:
"The (Appellant's) bill seems to assume that the statute forbids insurance
companies to obtain and use each other's experience, or to employ the same
person to work up the results. It does not. It simply forbids an agreement
between the companies relating to the rates which may be based upon those
results. No doubt an agreement betzveen the companies readily would be
inferred, if they zvere found all to charge the same rates; but an agreement
between the companies is the only thing aimed at, and if they avoid that they
escape the law. So it was suggested in argument that they could not employ
the same adjuster in case of loss. We do not perceive anything to hinder
their doing so, although it may be that they would have to be careful about
the terms of his authority." (Italics supplied.) (pp. 411, 412)
2. Stamping and Audit Bureaus
In the absence of joint rate making, the functions of a stamping and audit
bureau would be limited to acting in a purely clerical capacity for the detection
of errors. Companies for protection against violations of State laws against dis-
crimination and to detect errors may wish to check their policies. This would be
expensive if done by each company for itself. The stamping and auditing bureau
provides this service at lower cost and in addition, because it is independent, gives
greater protection against charges of discrimination.
1 Carroll v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 199 U. S. 401, 411-12 (1905).
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Continuation of such service for companies which choose to file their own rates
with such a bureau would not seem to involve any restraint of competition^ so
long as not part of a price fixing scheme.
3. Policies and Forms
Standardization and simplification activities in other industries have been en-
couraged by government agencies and upheld by the courts, so long as they are
not steps in an illegal price fixing plan or do not constitute unreasonable re-
straints.
In the fire insurance business reliable statistics are a necessity, and these can-
not be compiled without some standardization. Accordingly, we believe that an
industry committee could legally develop recommended (but not obligatory)
standard policies and forms, so long as they were not in aid of any illegal rate-
making activity, were not designed to stabilize the ultimate premium, and met the
reasonable needs of the insuring public.
4. Commissions
Fixing of commissions by joint action of insurers might be said to involve two
restraints : first, as it affects the agents or brokers through limitation on their
compensation and, second, as it affects the insured through the effect on the
premium.
Since a combination fixing the price to be paid to sellers is as much a violation
of the Sherman Act as a combination of sellers," an agreement of insurers fixing
the compensation to be paid to agents and brokers, i. e., the sellers, might be said
to be price fixing, and thus not open to defense under the rule of reason.
In the Sugar Institute case,^ an agreement fixing commissions to be paid to
brokers was held to be a violation of the Sherman Act but on the ground that
the commission was an important element in the cost of sugar. The court said
there had been active competition for brokerage service prior to the regulation
of commissions, and the regulation substantially restrained interstate commerce
:
"Fairness in the commission rate does not validate an agreement, other-
wise illegal." (p. 903)
On the other hand, in a prior case decided by a lower court (Circuit Court of
Appeals), a rule of a Chamber of Commerce in support of a rule fixing commis-
sions to be charged by its members for handling grain was upheld as reasonable.*
The court said that abolition of the rule as sought by the Federal Trade Com-
mission would reduce the commission to a point where only the strongest com-
mission could survive.
"It seems evident that the careful protection of the uniform commission
rule has preserved and developed the commission business and that business
has, in turn, created and developed the selling end of the terminal market.
The greatest beneficiary thereof is the producer, for he is always a seller."
(p. 694)
The court concluded
:
" * * * that the purpose of the rules attacked was innocent; that the ends
sought to be accomplished therethrough were proper; that the means were
reasonable ; that there is no substantial evidence that such restriction as
necessarily results therefrom is undue or unfair." (p. 695)
1 The Federal Trade Commission in a cease and desist order against the Metal Window Institute
and its members forbade submitting estimates to be used as a basis of bids to a clearing bureau for
any purpose other than detecting errors in interpretation of statistics or in the preparation of the
estimates and forbade in any case submitting to the bureau the prices to be quoted. In the matter of
Metal Window Institute et al, 25 F. T. C. 1478, Docket 2978, Nov. 30, 1937.
2 United States v. Borden Co.,, 308 U. S. 188 (1939); Live Poultry Dealers Protective Ass'n v.
United States, 4 F. (2d) 840 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
3 United States v. Sugar Institute, 15 F. Supp. 817, 903 (1934), affirmed 297 U. S. 553 (1936).
'i: Chamber of Commerce v. Fed. Trade Com., 13 F. (2d) 673, 688-696 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
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The Chamber of Commerce case was distinguished by the lower court in the
Sugar Institute case on the ground that the legaHty of the commission rule itself
did not seem to have been in issue. However, the Chamber of Commerce case
did uphold a uniform commission rule and— while obviously weakened by the
Sugar Institute case— has never been overruled specifically.
5. Limitations on Appointment of Local Agents
This section will consider company agreements and company association rules
as to the appointment of local agents.
Rules restricting the appointment or eligibility of agents and brokers have been
passed on by State courts in a number of cases. These cases did not involve the
Sherman Act and some of them considered local board rules ; however, they are
of value in showing the attitude of the courts as to the reasonableness of such
limitations.
The Supreme Court of Texas, ^ as late as 1942, upheld a rule of the Insurance
Exchange of Houston excluding from membership persons engaged in the mort-
gage loan business, even where coupled with an in-and-out rule.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts^ refused to enjoin a group of
insurance companies which established approved lists of brokers from whom they
would accept business.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky^ held invalid a rule of the Louisville Board
of Underwriters prohibiting members from employing more than one solicitor,
saying
:
"The majority of the members, under the guise of producing harmony in
this business association, have taken from their individual members the right
to determine how many men they shall employ in their private business, and
then only such as the association may think fit for the position, (p. 868)
"The common law rule * * * condemned all such restrictions upon trade
and business intercourse with men as is found to exist in this case. * * * In
all classes of business the employer and employee should be allowed to con-
tract with each other unrestrained by others who may demand that the one
shall give more or the other receive less, and as a general rule, whenever
restrictions are placed on their right by combinations or associations of men,
they will be regarded as a violation of law and void." (p. 869)
This case was later specifically overruled,* but by a case which did not involve
a limitation on the number of agents. The court there said it would uphold rules
and regulations for the government of members if not unreasonable, arbitrary or
oppressive.
Similar rules of other organizations have been before the courts with varying
results.
The Supreme Court of Illinois''^ held invalid a rule of the Live-Stock Exchange
prohibiting employment of more than three solicitors, who had to be members of
the Exchange and be paid a salary, not a commission. The Court said this was
a restraint of competition in that it prohibited an individual from contracting and
engaging in business and using such agencies and means as he may desire.
1 Cline V. Insurance Exchange of Houston, 166 S. W. (2d) 677 (1942).
2 Neustadt v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 21 N. E. (2) 538 (1939).
3 Houston V. Rentlinger, 15 S. W. 867; 91 Ky. 303 (1891).
'i Louisville Bd. of Fire Underwriters v. Johnson, 119 S. W. 153; 133 Ky. 797 (1909).
^People V. Chicago Live-Stock Exchange, 170 111. 556; 48 N. E. 1062 (1897). On the other hand
that court had previously refused to enjoin a rule of the same live stock exchange fixing commissions,
forbidding members dealing with non-members and barring the plaintiff from membership because it
returned part of the commissions to the sellers who were its stockholders. American Live-Stock
Commission Co. v. Chicago Live-Stock Exxchange, 143 Til. 210; 32 N. E. 274 (1892).
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The Supreme Court in 1898 considered in two cases restrictive rules of a
Live-Stock Exchange. Because of their age and because of the grounds for the
decisions, neither is particularly helpful. In one""^ the court held that a rule for-
bidding members dealing with non-members was not a restraint of trade since
anyone could become a member. In the other" rules forbidding members dealing
with non-members and fixing commissions was held not in violation of the Sher-
man Act on the ground that the activities of the members were not interstate
commerce.
In the Sugar Institute case,^ the court enjoined a rule of the Sugar Institute
wiiich, to prevent secret concessions, forbade dealing with anyone who combined
the functions of broker and warehouseman. This was a change from past prac-
tice and necessitated changes in the operations of many brokers and warehouse-
men. The lower court said: "Defendants have failed to show that less drastic
methods, not so injurious to innocent third persons, would not have afforded them
full protection against frauds" (p. 901). The court held that this concerted re-
fusal to deal was not justified since other methods not involving material damage
to innocent third persons were readily available, (p. 900)
The court indicated that on other facts it might have been justified, saying:
"If defendants had demonstrated, as they have not, that in the long run
it would be economically wise and conducive to fairer competition, to create
or maintain a distribution set-up composed of brokers, warehousemen, and
merchandisers, each independent of the other, a different situation would be
presented; then the 'freezing' of a particular set-up might be legally justi-
fiable." (p. 900)
The court rejected the argument that the course of dealing with brokers and
warehousemen was legally justified by the special relationship in which the re-
finers stood to those parties, saying that the test of the legality of such concerted
action is its reasonableness.
Three States have attempted by statute to impose similar restrictions on the
appointment of agents, but all three were declared unconstitutional.
The New York Court of Appeals* held unconstitutional a statutory require-
ment that to obtain a broker's license the applicant must certify that he intended
to engage principally in the insurance business or intended to conduct his insur-
ance business in connection with a real estate business. The court said that this
was not in the public interest, but was in the interests of a limited class, was an
arbitrary interference with a citizen's business pursuits and deprived him of that
equal opportunity which the Constitution guarantees to him. The court said
:
"There is no good reason, and no public interest can, conceivably, be sub-
served, in prohibiting persons from conducting the business of an insurance
agent, or broker, in connection with any other lawful business, or occupation,
in which they may be engaged." (pp. 461-2)
The Supreme Court of Washington'' held unconstitutional a State statute limit-
ing the number of agents for one company to one in cities of 50,000 or less and
two in cities over 50,000. The court said
:
"The right of every individual to engage in any lawful business cannot be
prohibited, unless that prohibition is based upon some condition existing in
the business which the court finds to be interfering with the public morals,
health, safety or welfare.
'i- Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604 (1898).
2 Hopkins V. United States, 171 U. S. 578 (1898).
3 United States v. Siipar Institute, 15 F. Supp. 817, 899-903 (1934).
^ Hauser v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 206 N. Y. 455 (1912).
^Northwestern National Ins. Co. v. Fishback, 130 Wash. 490; 228 Pac. 516, 517 (1924).
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"It (the Act) is in effect nothing more than the creation of a favored class
who are permitted to engage in the lawful business of acting as insurance
agents to the exclusion of everyone else from that business * * * ."
The Supreme Court of New Mexico held a similar law unconstitutional. -"^
As will be seen from the foregoing the courts have in general not looked with
favor on rules limiting the opportunity for men to engage in a business" and it
would seem that any such rule would require justification to be sustained.
The Supreme Court recognized that such a limitation was justified in some
situations, when it approved a provision of a consent decree under the Sherman
Act against the International Harvester Co. limiting the company to one agent
or dealer in any city or town. The Supreme Court said^ apropos of this pro-
vision :
"And, in general, it clearly appears that the single-dealer limitation in the
consent decree has greatly enlarged the field of activity of its competitors,
and has proved to be, as had been anticipated, an effective means of pro-
viding competitive conditions." (p. 706)
In considering the reasonableness of such rules in the insurance business, no
absolute tests can be laid down. The courts would not necessarily reach the
same conclusion as to the validity of each of the limitations in question. Limi-
tation on the number of agents would involve different considerations from those
involved in the rule restricting appointment as agents of persons engaged in other
lines of business. Each situation must be examined on all its facts and in the
light of the effect produced.
6. Joint Action Through Participation in Pools and Syndicates
The Supreme Court in considering the validity of a combination to bid at a
sale of property, laid down a general rule which is applicable to the question of
joint participation in insurance pools and syndicates. The Court said:*
"We must, therefore, look beyond the mere fact of an association of per-
sons formed for the purpose of bidding at this sale, as it may be not only
unobjectionable, but oftentimes meritorious, if not necessary, and examine
into the object and purposes of it; and if, upon such examination, it is
found that the object and purpose are, not to prevent competition, but to
enable, or as an inducement to the persons composing it, to participate in
the biddings, the sale should be upheld— otherwise if for the purpose of
shutting out competition, and depressing the sale, so as to obtain the prop-
erty at a sacrifice.
"Each case must depend upon its own circumstances ; the courts are quite
competent to inquire into them, and to ascertain and determine the true
character of each." (p. 520)
The Court also said
:
"It is true that in every association formed to bid at the sale, and who
appoint one of their number to bid in behalf of the company, there is an
agreement, express or implied, that no other member will participate in the
bidding; and hence, in one sense, it may be said to have the effect to pre-
vent competition. But it by no means necessarily follows that if the associ-
ation had not been formed, and each member left to bid on his own account,
that the competition at the sale would be as strong and efficient as it would
by reason of the joint bid for the benefit and upon the responsibility of all.
^Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Montoya, 32 N. M. 88; 251 Pac. 390 (1926).
; :
2 Cf. Associated Press v. United States, 65 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1416 (1945).
3 United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693, 706 (1927).
i Kearney v. Taylor, 56 U. S. 493 (1853). To the same effect, see Hyer v. Richmond Traction i
Co., 168 U. S. 471 C1897).
The Kearney case was decided under the common law, before passage of the Sherman Act. How-
ever, the restraints of trade prohibited by that Act were the restraints known under the common law
(Ape-v Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 494-5, 1940). It is believed that the tests laid down
by this case would be applied todaj'.
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The property at stake might be beyond the means of the individual, or might
absorb more of them than he would desire to invest in the article, or be of
a description that a mere capitalist, without practical men as associates,
would not wish to encumber himself with." (Italics supplied.) (pp. 519-20)
Where the association is formed with its principal purpose to restrain compe-
tition between its members, it becomes illegal.^
Under the principles of these cases competing insurance companies may join to
underwrite risks beyond the capacity of individual companies, or which, through
lack of experience, insufficient spread of risk, or other such factors, the member
companies would not be interested in writing individually,^ or could not, acting
alone, efficiently or economically service. The test is whether the pool is formed
for the purpose or with the effect of restraining competition— or whether instead
the formation of the pool is reasonably necessary to write the proposed insurance.
We believe that such a pool could write the smaller as well as the larger risks
of the class where the underwriting requires special knowledge, or servicing, or
where the inclusion of all risks of the class is necessary to obtain a sufficient
spread of risk.
Some limitation should be put on the size of such pools, i. e., that they should
not be greater than is reasonably necessary, nor should the size of a pool be such
as to restrict the opportunity for other companies to form similar competing
pools. ^ ^
The existence of an ulterior motive such as to injure a competing company or
pool, might render unlawful an otherwise lawful pool.
Agreements or understandings between two or more such pools would be sub-
ject to the same legal principles as in the case of competing companies.
7. Reinsurance
Common reasons for reinsurance are: the risk is larger than one company
wants to retain ; a company has too many risks in one place ; the risk may be un-
usually hazardous ; a company may be retiring from an agency or territory.
All these are lawful purposes and in themselves present no anti-trust problems.
Reinsurance with a reinsurance company which does no direct writing, or ex-
cess of loss reinsurance normally would not seem to raise questions of restraint
of trade under the Sherman Act.
Reinsurance between competitors must be examined in view of possible attack
as price fixing.
1 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 293 (1898); McMullen v. Hoffman,
174 U. S. 639 (1899),
2 The Securities and Exchange Commission has expressed the opinion that the formation of an
underwriting group to bid for a security issue, with provisions for a fixed offering price, price main-
tenance and stabilization of prices, is not unlawful per se. They said:
"We have already noted certain factors by which the lawfulness of the syndicate may bejudged. Among these are: the size of the group in relation to the size of the issue, the sup-
pression of competition in bidding or negotiating for the business, and the duration of a syndi-
cate dictated by the manager and major underwriters." {In the Matter of National Association
of Securities, Inc., S. E. C. Release No. 3700, June 13, 1945, p. 45.)
3 The Securities and Exchange Commission disapproved the sale of a block of common stock by a
public utility where only one syndicate bid for the issue, on the ground that competitive conditions
had not been maintained. One factor was the excessive size of the syndicate and the doubt that the
remaining banking houses could have organized a rival syndicate. The Commission said:
"And finally, maintenance of competitive conditions does not mean, in any event, that under-
writing strength may be combined indefinitely and indiscriminately, beyond the needs of the sit-
uation
. .
." {In the Matter of The North American Company, S. E. C. Release No 5870
June 19, 1945, p. 13.)
'
'
4 Where a risk is so large as to require the combined capacity of the industry or the major part of
It, It could not, of course, be restricted in size so as to permit formation of a competing pool. Such
a pool should, however, be formed only for the specific risk involved.
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Where the only agreement as to rate between the ceding and assuming com-
panies is as to the reinsurance premium, the ceding company either having al-
ready written the business or being free to fix its own premium rate, there would
seem to be no reasonable chance of a claim of price fixing or other unlawful re-
straint.
Where the ceding and assuming companies agree in advance on the premium
rate at which the risks are to be written by the ceding company, but the purpose
of the reinsurance agreement is simply to spread the risk and not part of a plan
to stabilize premium rates, the agreement as to rates would be ancillary to a law-
ful agreement. We do not believe it would be held to be a violation of the Sher-
man Act.
There would be danger of attack by the government if exchange of reinsurance
on a uniform basis resulted in uniformity of the direct premium rates charged by
a large number of competing companies. This might be charged to be price fix-
ing, even though the purpose was only to spread the risk. This danger would
not be present if joint rate making were legal.
8. Agency Balances and Other Credit Rules
An association may gather credit information and circulate credit lists show-
ing those who are delinquent in payments to members of the association.^
It is not a violation of the Sherman Act for the association to recommend that
no member extend credit to a delinquent.^
Some courts have held that it is not a violation of the Sherman Act for mem-
bers of an association to agree not to extend credit to a delinquent,^ but there is
language in the Sugar Institute case which indicates the lower court thought such
an agreement would be illegal. It said
:
"There is evidence indicating that refiners did not deem themselves bound
by this recommendation, but exercised their own individual discretion in de-
termining whether or not credit should be withdrawn." (15 F. Supp. 817,
892)
A recommendation or an agreement not to extend credit is very different from
an agreement or understanding not to deal with the delinquent debtor even for
cash. Such an agreement is a concerted refusal to deal and has been held to vio-
late the Sherman Act.^
The Supreme Court in 1930^ held illegal an agreement by motion picture dis-
tributors not to deal with any purchaser of a theatre who did not either assume
any defaulted contract entered into by his predecessor or make a cash deposit
specified by the group. The purpose was to prevent theatre owners from trans-
ferring their theatres to avoid carrying out their contracts and thus defraud the
distributors. The concerted refusal to deal was not based on a default by the
particular theatre owner but by the previous owner, technically a stranger, and
the case can be distinguished on this ground from the ordinary credit rule. How-
ever, the court used broad language, saying
:
"The obvious purpose of the arrangement is to restrict the liberty of those
who have representatives on the Film Boards and secure their concerted ac-
tion for the purpose of coercing certain purchasers of theatres by excluding
them from the opportunity to deal in a free and untrammeled market." (p. 54)
1 Cement Manufacturers Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 588 (192S).
2 Sugar Institute v. United States, IS F. Supp. 817 (1934) affirmed 297 U. S. 553 (1936). The
lower court said: "Plaintiff (United States) apparently does not contend that it would be improper
for the Institute to recommend withdrawal of credit in such circumstances" (p. 892).
3 United States v. Fur Dressers' &r Fur Dyers' Ass'n, 5 F. (2d) 869 (S. D. N. Y., 192S) ; Put-
nal V. Inman, 76 Fla. 553; 80 So. 316 (1918); Woodhouse v. Powles, 43 Wash. 617; 86 Pac. 1063
(1906).
^ Swift and Company v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905).
5 United States v. First National Pictures, Inc., 282 U. S. 44 (1930).
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Group action by a group of creditors against their common debtor (the usual
creditors' committee), to compel him to put his business in order under threat
of bankruptcy, has in itself never been considered to be an unlawful combination.
Under the decided cases we believe that an insurance association may without
violating the Sherman Act, provide for reporting agency delinquencies and for
the appointment of a creditors' committee to supervise the affairs of an agency
until its indebtedness is paid.
However, any rule or understanding that no other companies will enter an
agency while it is in the hands of a committee, would seem to be a concerted re-
fusal to deal (as distinguished from a refusal to extend credit) and difficult to
justify legally.
9. Joint Action in Relation to Adjustment of Losses
There would seem to be no restraint of competition in the employment by a
number of insurers of an expert to ascertain facts as to the loss in a given case
and make recommendations to the insurers involved as to the amount of the loss
payable to the insured.
Mr. Justice Holmes,^ in a case which involved an Iowa anti-campact law, said
:
"So it was suggested in argument that they (the insurers) could not em-
ploy the same adjuster in case of loss. We do not perceive anything to
hinder their doing so, although it may be that they would have to be careful
about the terms of his authority." (p. 412)
An agreement between insurers on a risk that in case of loss one or more of
them should select a common adjuster, while possibly involving some restraint,
would seem to be reasonable and justified by the necessities of the situation aris-
ing from the joint interest of the insurers.
The organization by the industry of an adjustment company presents the ques-
tion of a possible restraint on the independent adjusters. At the time of the
formation of the Fire Companies' Adjustment Bureau, and independent adjuster
brought suit complaining that the Bureau constituted a conspiracy to monopolize
the fire-loss-adjustment business by excluding plaintiff and others engaged in
the business. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia" in a case not involv-
ing the Sherman Act, upheld the Bureau saying:
"We perceive in the plan no element of force or compulsion. Any member
of the National Board of Fire Underwriters may employ an independent ad-
juster. It is true that the purpose of the corporation is to effect the cooper-
ation of the member companies to have the defendant adjust fire losses, for
reasons lawful in themselves and by means not unlawful. Neither the plan
nor the evidence show that any member company is compelled to employ the
defendant to adjust its losses. The fact is, the plaintiff is still employed by
a number of such companies. Applying the law, as we conceive it to be, to
the facts in the case in judgment, the complaint of the plaintiff of the exist-
ence of a common-law conspiracy is unsupported by the record." (p. 259)
In view of the emphasis placed by the Virginia Court on the freedom of action
reserved to each insurer, company association rules, or agreements between in-
surers, requiring the use of a company-sponsored adjustment bureau or making
the loss adjustment as determined by the adjuster binding on each insurer would
be open to question and more difficult to justify.
The presence of boycott, coercion or intimidation or the use of loss adjustment
as part of an illegal scheme, might render illegal an otherwise legal plan of loss
adjustment.^
^Carroll v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 199 U. S. 401 (1905).
^ Werth V. Fire Companies Adjustment Bureau, 160 Va. 845; 171 S. E. 255, Cert. Den. 290
U. S. 659 (1933).
3 See Palatine Ins. Co. v. Griffin, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 202 S. W. 1014 (1918).
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REMOVING OR LESSENING THE IMPACT OF THE SHERMAN
ACT THROUGH STATE LEGISLATION
We believe that most if not all of the problems raised by the application of the
Sherman Act to the insurance business can be solved legally by State
legislation
conforming to the requirements of Public Law 15 This conclusion is necessarily
based on the assumption that such legislation will be upheld as
constitutional.
The question of v
the Sherman Act wi
September 12, 1945
what legislation is necessary to solve the problems raised by
ll be considered further and be covered by a later report.
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APPENDIX "H"
FOURTH REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE OF LAWYERS TO THE
COMMITTEE ON LAWS OF THE NATIONAL BOARD OF
FIRE UNDERWRITERS PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION
ADOPTED AT MAY 9, 1945, MEETING
In our earlier reports we pointed out that after January 1, 1948 the Sherman
Act, the Clayton Act (including Section 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act, which
amended Section 2 of the Clayton Act) and the Federal Trade Commission Act
will, under Section 2(b) of Public Law 15, be applicable to the business of in-
surance "to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law". (As to
the status of Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act after January 1, 1948, refer-
ence is made to Part III of our Second Report.)
In this report we discuss the interpretation of Section 2(b) of Public Law 15,
and the general nature and extent of State regulation which would meet the re-
quirements of the clause quoted above. We also consider, with reference to the
Sherman Act, specific types of State regulation of joint rate-making activities
and their effectiveness in removing such activities from the impact of that Act.
It should, of course, be borne in mind that under the provisions of Public Law
15, State regulation will not render the Sherman Act inapplicable to boycott,
coercion or intimidation. -"^
As in our previous reports, we are basing our discussion on the assumption
that Public Law 15 is a constitutional exercise of Congressional power and per-
mits valid State legislation incorporating the principles set forth below.
I.
Section 2(b) of Public Lazv 15
Section 2(b) of Public Law 15, which is preceded by declarations in Section
1 and 2(a) affirming the regulation and taxation of the business of insurance by
the States, reads as follows
:
"(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, un-
less such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance : Provided,
That after January 1, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as
the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as
the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal
Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business of
insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law."
The first clause of this section (herein referred to as the impairment clause)
appeared, in substance, in the bill recommended by the Insurance Commissioners
in November 1944, in the compromise bill which was agreed to by the industry
in January 1945 and in the bills which were reported by the Judiciary Commit-
tees of the Senate and House of Representatives in January and February 1945.
The proviso was added by the Committee of Conference of the two Houses,
which did not, however, give any explanation of it in the Conference Report.
The debate in the Senate included some discussion of the proviso but, in view
of the diversity of opinions, the limited range of the discussion and the uncer-
tainty as to the extent to which those participating in the debate expressed the
1 Section 3(b) of Public Law IS provides:
"(b) Nothing contained in this Act shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any
agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion or intimidation."
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views of their colleagues who were silent or absent, this debate does not furnish
any very clear light on the interpretation of the proviso. The Conference Report
was agreed to by the House without debate. There is accordingly a paucity of
legislative history to aid in the construction of the proviso.
The occasion for the insertion of the proviso was the endeavor to reconcile the
differences in the bills as originally adopted by the Senate and House, particu-
larly with respect to a clause inserted by amendment on the floor of the Senate,
which would have made the Sherman and Clayton Acts fully applicable to the
business of insurance after January 1, 1948 regardless of State laws. That clause
was rejected in conference. The conferees did not state why the impairment
clause alone was not then regarded as sufficient, but they apparently considered
it necessary to state affirmatively the extent of the applicability of the Sherman
Act, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.
The relation between the impairment clause and the proviso is not entirely
clear, but we think that, in considering the problems with which we have to deal,
it would be well to assume that the applicability of the Sherman Act, the Clayton
Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act to the business of insurance after
January 1, 1948 is to be determined by the proviso rather than by the impairment
clause.
The three Acts named above are the only Federal acts to which the following
discussion relates and they are referred to in this Fourth Report as the "Federal
Acts".
Since the enactment of Public Law 15, there have been one or two suggested
interpretations of the proviso which, although they probably have not gained any
wide acceptance, we think should be mentioned in order to cover the subject as
completely as possible.
It has been suggested that to gain exemption from the Federal Acts in any
State, there must be regulation in all 48 states. We find no basis for such an in-
terpretation, either in the history or language of Public Law 15. We believe it
is clear that regulation by one State affords exemption for the regulated activities
in that State.
The same suggestion has been made as to regulation in a single State, that the
regulation to give any exemption from the Federal Acts must cover every phase
of the business in that State. This, too, we believe to be without foundation.
Regulation by a State of one phase of the business gives protection to that phase,
regardless of whether the regulatory laws cover any other phase of the business.
Another interpretation which has been advanced is that the applicability of the
Federal Acts will depend on the effectiveness with which State insurance com-
missioners carry out their functions and duties under the State regulatory laws.
We do not agree with this interpretation. We cannot believe the Supreme Court
would so interpret Public Law 15 as to hold that the application of the Federal
Acts depends on the diligence or lack of it on the part of individual State officials
particularly in view of the constitutional difficulties this would present. Such an
interpretation would result in applying the Federal Acts for one period and not
for another. The immunity granted by Public Law 15 would be turned off and
on, based on the efficiency of a State official. Such an interpretation would be a
strained construction since the Act refers to regulation "by State law", it does
not say "regulation under State law", or "regulation by public officials".
On the other hand, it must be recognized that if the regulation of insurance by
the States should be ineffective or half-hearted, this might very well have some
influence upon the result reached by the courts in the interpretation of Public
Law 15. Questions which reach the Supreme Court can seldom be answered by
reference to established legal principles or logical analysis alone; the Court is
conscious of social and political trends. If the Court had doubts as to whether
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the pattern of regulation established by State law met the requirements of Public
Law 15, a showing that the regulation did not work successfully would tend to
confirm these doubts.
In addition, the ineffectiveness of State regulation would influence the attitude
of Congress and public opinion towards the policy established by Public Law 15.
That, however, is an aspect of the subject which is beyond the scope of this
report.
The central problem in the interpretation of the proviso is the meaning of "to
the extent that such business is not regulated by State law". This is discussed
in II below.
IL
The meaning of—"to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law".
The word "regulate" is derived from the Latin word "rego", which means "to
guide or direct" through a rule.^ "To regulate" has been defined as to adjust,
order, govern or control by rule or regulation, method or established mode;^ to
adjust, maintain or manage with respect to a desired rate, degree and condition
and according to certain standards or rules f to fix or control the manner in
which a thing is to be done.*
"Regulation" has been defined as a rule or order prescribed by a superior for
the management or government of some business, company or society f a govern-
ing direction, precept or law ;'^ a supervision by a legislative authorized agency ;''^
the arranging in proper order and the control of that which already exists.^
Regulation therefore connotes a controP under established standards over the
thing regulated. It does not ordinarily mean complete prohibition— rather re-
straint and check,-^*^ as contrasted with freedom from restraint.-^^
Regulation has received a broader interpretation in cases arising under the
Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. The prohibition of inter-
state transportation of lottery tickets was held to be an exercise of the power to
regulate.^^
The Supreme Court has gone so far as to hold^^
1 Conlin v. Bd. of Sup'rs. of City and County of San Francisco, 114 Cal. 404; 46 Pac. 279 (1896);
Hollywood Jockey Club v. Stein, 133 Fla. 530; 182 So. 863 (1938).
2 Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language 2d Ed. (Unabridged) (1938);
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. 2 (1914); Citv of Butte v. Paltrovich, 30 Mont. 18; 75 Pac. 521,
(1904); Van Ingen v. The Hudson Realty Co., 106 A.D. 444; 94 N. Y. Supp. 645 (1905); Churchill
V. Common Council, 153 Mich. 931; 116 N.W. 558 (1908); Ogden City v. Leo, 54 Utah 556; 182
Pac. 530 (1919); State ex rel. Wagner v. Fields, Mayor, 218 Mo. App. 155; 263 S.W. 853 (1924);
Simpkins v. State, 35 Okla. Cr. 143; 249 Pac. 168 (1926); State v. Tippet, 317 Mo. 319; 296 S.W.
132 (1927); Marsh v. Bartlett, 343 Mo. 526; 121 S.W. 2d. 737 (1938); State ex rel. Saperstein v.
Bass, Mayor, 177 Tenn. 609; 152 S.W. 2d. 236 (1941).
3 Webster's New International Dictionary, supra; Marsh v. Bartlett, supra.
i Southern Ry. Co. v. Russell, 133 Va. 292; 112 S.E. 700 (1922); Ogden City v. Leo, supra;
State V. Tippet, supra.
5 Webster's International Dictionary; City of West Palm Beach v. Ryder, 74 So. 602 (1917).
6 Webster's International Dectionary.
Tin re Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co., 201 Ind. 667; 171 N.E. 65 (1930).
&Cote V. City of Island Park, 173 Mich. 201; 139 N.W. 69 (1912).
9 The Supreme Court in Georgia v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 65 S.C.R. 716 (1945), indi-
cated that while the railroads are a regulated industry through the control by tlie Interstate (Com-
merce Commission of rates and certain activities, the regulation did not extend to the rate bureaus.
The Court said:
"It (Congress) has not placed these combinations under the control and supervision of the
Commission. Nor has it empowered the Commission to proceed against such combinations and
through cease and desist orders or otherwise to put an end to their activities." (p. 725) (Italics
supplied).
w Thousand Island Park Assoc, v. Tucker, 173 N.Y. 203; 65 N.E. 975 (1903).
11 "It (regulation) negatives the idea that all acts which would ordinarily be performed in connec-
tion therewith may be so performed without any restraint or prohibition whatever . . ." City of
Tacoma v. Keisel, 68 Wash. 685; 124 Pac. 137, 139 (1912).
^2 Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (1903).
13 r/ie Passenger Cases, 48 U. S. 282, 463 (1849).
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"That Congress has regulated commerce and intercourse with foreign na-
tions and between the several States by willing that it shall be free."
It does not follow that what is held to be regulation under a constitutional grant
of power would be held to be regulation under a statute, particularly one such as
Public Law 15 which divides the field between State regulation and the prohibi-
tions of the Federal anti-trust acts.
The words "regulate" and "regulation" have been defined or discussed in nu-
merous other cases but none has been found which sheds further light on our
question.
In view of the variety of meanings given by the Courts to the word "regulate",
it is not possible to give a precise meaning to the word as used in Public Law 15.
It is therefore essential to consider the probable purpose of Congress. Since
Congress declared that in the absence of regulation by the States or to the extent
not so regulated, the Federal Acts shall apply to the business of insurance, it seems
a logical conclusion that Congress wished to protect the public by making certain
that the acts and practices against which the Federal Acts are directed will be
subject either to the prohibitions of the Federal Acts or to the provisions of State
law.
Some light is thrown on the probable intent of Congress by examination of
other situations in which Congress granted exemption from the anti-trust acts.
Instances in which Congress granted outright exemption, as for example, to labor
organizations, are not pertinent in view of the requirement of Public Law 15 of
regulation as a prerequisite to immunity.
In a number of instances. Congress has granted either express or implied im-
munity from its anti-trust acts, conditioned on control or review by a govern-
mental agency or official, in accordance with established standards.
Under the Interstate Commerce Act,^ carriers may, with the approval of the
Commission, pool freights, divide earnings, and acquire competing carriers.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933^ permits marketing agreements to
which the Secretary of Agriculture is a party.
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938^ permits agreements between air carriers
as to pooling rates, fares and classifications, subject to approval by the Civil
Aeronautics Board.
The Capper-Volstead Act* permits farmers and others engaged in the produc-
tion of agricultural products to combine for processing, handling and marketing
their products. The Secretary of Agriculture may issue a cease and desist order
if he finds any such association is monopolizing or restraining trade or com-
merce to such an extent that the prices of the products are unduly enhanced.
The Fisheries Cooperative Marketing Act" grants fishermen the same rights as
the Capper-Volstead Act grants to farmers, giving the Secretary of Agriculture
the same right to issue cease and desist orders.
The Maloney Act'' (Sec. ISA of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934)
grants broad privileges to associations of security brokers or dealers subject to
registration with the Securities Exchange Commission, and to review by the
Commission of disciplinary action against members or denial of admission to
membership.
148 U. S. C. A. 1.
27 U. S. C. A. 608.6.
3 49 U. S. C. A. 492, 494.
4 7 U. S. C. A. 291, 292.
5 15 U. S. C. A. 521, 522.
6 15 U. S. C. A. 78(a)-78(jj).
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In each case, Congress authorized activities that might otherwise violate the
anti-trust acts but substituted governmental control of the exempted activities.
It does not follow that a State must adopt any particular kind of control, or
necessarily provide an administrative body or official to supervise every activity.
Our conclusion is that to constitute regulation within the meaning of Public
Law 15, a State statute must provide for control according to standards set by
the State.
The next question is— what type of control is necessary. It seems clear that
Congress did not have in mind any particular type or pattern of regulation—
otherwise this would have been set forth in the Statute. As shown above, Con-
gress itself has adopted different systems in different situations it has dealt with.
The preamble to Public Law 15 declares that the continued regulation by the
several States is in the public interest, indicating a Congressional recognition
that at least some of the existing patterns of State insurance law constitute regu-
lation.
The Supreme Court in both the prevailing and dissenting opinions in the
S.E.U.A. case^ also recognized that regulation is to be found among existing
State laws.
Mr. Justice Black, in the prevailing opinion, said,
"The argument that the Sherman Act necessarily invalidates many State
laws regulating insurance we regard as exaggerated. Few States go so far
as to permit private insurance companies, without State supervision, to
agree upon and fix uniform insurance rates." (p. 562)
Chief Justice Stone, dissenting said,
"*** the States have developed extensive and effective systems of regulation
of the insurance business, ***" (p. 580)
and again,
"*** vast efforts have gone into the development of schemes of State regu-
lation and into the organization of the insurance business in conformity to
such regulatory requirements." (p. 581)
Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in part, said,
"Since 1851 the several States *** have been building up systems of regu-
lation to discharge this duty towards their inhabitants." (p. 584)
We conclude that a State is free to choose the types of control it feels will
achieve the desired result in the particular situation, so long as the one chosen is
reasonably adequate for the purpose.
Since Congress has left to each State the right to adopt its own system of regu-
lation, the choice by a State of a particular system as constituing regulation, is
entitled to be given great weight by the courts, but would not preclude the courts
from holding that the system chosen did not in fact constitute regulation within
the meaning of Public Law 15.
The final question is, what degree of control must be provided to render the
Federal Acts inapplicable. This involves not only the meaning of the word
"regulation", but also the effect of the phrase "to the extent", since Public Law
15 makes the Federal Acts applicable "to the extent that such business is not
regulated by State law".
This inquiry falls into two parts.
First, assuming a State undertakes regulation of a part of the business,
what degree of control is necessary to constitute regulation of that part ; and
1 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association et al, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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Second, what immunity does regulation of one part of the business give to
acts and practices not specifically covered by the regulation ?
No precise answer can be given to the first question. The necessary State
laws will contain many provisions dealing with the different phases of the insur-
ance business, and no one test can be laid down to determine the degree of control
required in every situation to meet the requirements of Public Law 15. The de-
gree of danger to the public from the particular act or practice would influence
the degree of control necessary. A tight control of one practice might permit a
loosening of control of some related act or practice. The pattern of regulation
must be examined as a whole.
As to the second question, we have already indicated in I above that regulation
of one part of the business will not give immunity to another part not regulated.
"To the extent" is not synonymous with "if regulated". On the other hand,
where there is regulation of a part of the business, we do not believe that the
words "to the extent" should be interpreted so literally as to make the Federal
Acts apply to every detail not specifically dealt with by the State law. In any
regulatory system, there are sure to be some relatively unimportant practices
existing within the framework of the part of the business regulated, for which
no specific control can be readily provided. These must be left to be dealt with
under the investigatory powers of the Commissioner. We do not believe the
courts should hold that the Federal Acts are to search out every nook and cranny
of a regulatory system and apply wherever the State cannot point to a specific
provision covering a particular act or practice. The mere threat of such inter-
ference with a State's regulation would make a regulatory system unworkable.
Neither the language nor the purpose of Public Law 15 supports such an inter-
pretation.
The purpose of Public Law 15 is to allow the States to take a dififerent
approach to the business of insurance from the approach of the Federal Acts.
The very acts and practices forbidden by the Federal Acts may be permitted.
The essential requirement is that the State deal with the acts and practices pro-
hibited by the Federal Acts, and provide such control as is reasonably designed to
effect the policy adopted by the State for the protection of the public interest.
IIL
REGULATION OF RATES AND RATE-MAKING
We now come to consideration of the question of what specific types of State
regulation are necessary, under Section 2(b) of Public Law 15, to make the
Sherman Act inapplicable (except as to boycott, coercion and intimidation). We
begin with the subject of rates, and in order to limit the scope of the initial dis-
cussion, we deal in this report with rates for risks located in a single State.
We will discuss only the principles involved and will not attempt to set forth
the detailed provisions for putting them into effect or provisions for the protec-
tion of insurers, such as the right to hearings and judicial review, which should
be included in any State regulatory system.
It would seem that, .generally speaking, the most practicable form of regulation
of rates is that of statutory standards with supervisory powers in an administra-
tive body or official. Under such a system, there are three features which we
regard as of primary importance.
First, the State must establish standards by which the lawfulness of the rates
may be measured; for example, that rates be reasonable, adequate and not un-
fairly discriminatory.
Second, the insurance commissioner should have power to investigate and de-
termine whether the rates meet the statutory standards and to forbid their use if
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they do not.^ We do not mean to imply, however, that the commissioner must be
given povi^er, upon finding that a rate fails to meet the statutory standards, to
name a rate v^^hich does meet them.
Third, the commissioner should have control not only of the rates but also,
through his licensing power or otherwise, of the operation of bureaus establishing
such rates."
These three features we regard as fundamental in what will probably be the
usual type of regulation. It does not follow, however, that each is essential in
every situation or under all circumstances.
There are numerous other possible provisions, varying greatly as to their im-
portance in a system of State regulation of rates. It is impossible to judge each
feature independently and determine that it is or is not a necessary element of
State regulation of rates. The weight to be attached to a particular feature may
depend not only upon its own merits but upon the degree of regulation repre-
sented by other features and by the State's regulatory system as a whole.
In order to crystallize the comparison of different possible forms of State regu-
lation, we think it may be helpful to consider several alternatives, representing
in broad terms the possibilities that are most frequently considered as far as the
basic method of control of the rates themselves is concerned
:
1. A statute containing the three fundamental features mentioned above and,
in addition, requiring that filings^ be made with and approved by the commis-
sioner before they may be used, subject to judicial review.
2. A statute containing the same provisions as in No. 1 above, except that
filings become effective after a specified reasonable time unless during such time
the commissioner disapproves them.
3. A statute containing the three fundamental features and requiring that
filings be made with the commissioner, but permitting their use immediately upon
such filing. If the commissioner should, after hearing, order discontinuance of
the use of a filing, his order would be effective when issued or on any subsequent
date named in the order, but would be subject to judicial review.
4. A statute containing the same provisions as in No. 3 above, except that
filings be made only as required by the commissioner.
5. A statute setting standards for rates and imposing penalties for failure to
observe them, but leaving the determination of whether the statute has been vio-
lated to be made by the courts in actions brought by the Attorney General or by
private parties, and not providing for supervision by a commissioner or other
administrative authority.
We believe that the methods referred to in paragraphs Nos. 1 and 2 represent
a greater degree of control than is requisite to satisfy the requirements of Public
Law 15.^
1 This presupposes that information be available and kept in such form as to permit the commis-
sioner to reach an intelligent conclusion.
2 See Note (5), p. 8, supra, in regard to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company.
Control of a rating bureau would probably require filing with the commissioner its constitution, by-
laws and rules, and such other information as he may call for, and include a statutory standard as
to the nature of the constitution, by-laws and rules (e.g., that they must be fair and reasonable), with
power in the commissioner to require their modification if he finds that they do not meet the statutory
standard.
3 Filings would include rate manuals, classification of risks, rating plans, rating schedules and
other rating rules, and information concerning their application.
1 The rating bill adopted in 1944 by Congress for regulation of fire insurance rates in the District
of Columbia, passed before the enactment of Public Law 15, compels all insurers to be members of
the one rating organization and provides for filing and prior approval. We do not believe that this
imposes any compulsion on the States to adopt such provisions. Public Law 327, 58 Stat. 224.
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Taking up the other extreme, we feel that it would not be safe to rely upon the
method mentioned in paragraph No. 5 as a general pattern of State regulation.
It is difficult to select a particular method as representing the probable mini-
mum degree of control which the courts would approve as a general pattern, but
we believe that method No. 4, giving the commissioner power to require filings,
would have a reasonable likelihood of being upheld as sufficient.
We feel, however, that in judging the regulatory system as a whole, a grea-,
deal of importance should be attached to the matter of filing, since filing places
the commissioner in a better position to pass judgment on the rates and to exer-
cise his powers of control. Even if a State should determine that a requirement
of filing is not appropriate in all cases, it might be advisable for it to combine
methods Nos. 3 and 4, by requiring filing with power in the commissioner to
waive filings in certain classes, or requiring filing only in certain classes, wittt
power in the commissioner to require filing in other classes.
Our belief as to the sufficiency under Public Law 15 of the suggested contrei
to be given to a commissioner is intended to cover the general situation. Varia-
tions may be found necessary to meet special situations.
We discuss below other provisions which are advisable or necessary to protect
acts and practices which may be desired in rating systems.
Rating Organisations:
The following statutory provisions would be advisable in any legislation re-
lating to rating organizations, if the specified activity is desired
:
1. Authority to insurers to act in concert through a rating organization for
rate making and related activities.
2. Authority to limit the membership to companies doing business on the same
basis. Such a limitation of membership raises the question of the necessity of
admitting subscribers because of a possible charge of boycott. The right of a
bureau to refuse to sell its services to non-members might turn largely on the
seriousness of the business disadvantage to non-members. If in fact the refusal
constituted a serious restraint on the ability of non-members to compete, it would
be safer to provide for their admission as subscribers, provided they meet specified
conditions, and for appeal to the commissioner from a refusal to admit or an
expulsion of a member or subscriber.
3. Authority to require members and subscribers to become such for all rates
made by the bureau which the insurer is authororized to write. To guard against
a charge that in some circumstances this would be an unreasonable restraint, pro-
vision for appeal to the commissioner should be included.
4. Authority to operate a stamping and audit bureau and to require all mem-
bers and subscribers to submit daily reports for examination.
Rate Stabilisation:
In view of the provisions of Public Law 15 making the Sherman Act appli-
cable to acts or agreements of boycott, coercion or intimidation, it will be safer
as a general rule to have the State statutes require rate adherence rather than
authorize the adoption by an organization of rules to accomplish this. Any com-
pulsion is then that of the State, not that of the group.
^
1 The Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 431 (1943), said,
"The State in adopting and enforcing the prorate program made no contract or agreement and
entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish monopoly but, as sovereign, im-
posed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit."
(p. 3S2) (Italics supplied).
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With such a statutory requirement, we beHeve a State could authorize enforce-
ments in the first instance by the industry, so long as there was provision for
review by the commissioner.^
If a State preferred to authorize a rating organization to adopt its own rules
as to adherence to rates, we believe that provision for approval by the commis-
sioner of the proposed rules and for deviations would go far to eliminate the
danger of charges of boycott, coercion or intimidation.-
If there be a requirement of rate adherence, it would be advisable to provide
for appeal to the commissioner from the action of a rating organization with re-
spect to a rate manual, classification of risks, rating plan, rating schedule or other
rating rule.
1 This follows the pattern of the Maloney Act, which requires the associations of security dealers
to police their rules, subject to review by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
2_The Maloney Act requires the associations to adopt their own rules for self-regulation, subject to
review by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Senate and House reports referred to the
Act as "cooperative regulation". This is persuasive but not conclusive, since Congress may do what
it has not authorized a State to do.
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FIFTH REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE OF LAWYERS TO THE
COMMITTEE ON LAWS OF THE NATIONAL BOARD OF
FIRE UNDERWRITERS PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION
ADOPTED AT MAY 9, 1945, MEETING OF THE
COMMITTEE ON LAWS
In our Fourth Report, we discussed the interpretation of Section 2(b) of Pub-
lic Law 15 and the types of State regulation necessary under that Law to make
the Sherman Act inapplicable to joint activities as to rates for risks located in a
single State.
In this report, we continue that discussion to cover rates as to properties lo-
cated in more than one State and properties which are transported from one State
to another. We also discuss types of State regulation necessary or advisable to
make the Sherman Act inapplicable to other activities and practices in the fire
insurance business referred to in our Third Report.
As in the Fourth Report, we deal only with principles involved, not with de-
tailed provisions for putting them into effect. The following discussion pre-
supposes that rating bureaus dealing with risks located within a single State are
subject to regulation in accordance with the principles set forth in the Fourth
Report.
Coverage in more than one State:
We begin with joint rate-making where a single coverage extends to properties
located in more than one State. A central organization which performs rating
functions as to such risks may be a rating organization and if so, can bring itself
under the necessary State regulation by qualifying under the statutes regulating
rating bureaus in each of the States involved. If this course is followed, no addi-
tional legislation would seem necessary so long as the State statutes establishing
regulation of rating bureaus are so drawn as to permit the qualification of such
a multiple State organization.
A central organization may, however, take some part in or assist in rate-
making, but not be a rating bureau within the meaning of a State rating statute
and thus not be regulated under that statute. A policy decision may play as im-
portant a part in rate-making as the actual making of the rate itself.
The roles played in rate-making by such organizations will vary greatly. The
activities of some will represent such a minor participation in the rate-making
process as to make regulation unnecessary, while the activities of others will re-
quire the protection of regulation.
We believe that where the activities of a central organization which does not
qualify as a rating bureau are nevertheless such as to require the protection of
regulation, it can be provided by a State statute authorizing review by the com-
missioner of the rating activities of any organization which participate in estab-
lishing rates in his State, with power to issue cease and desist orders as to any
such activity, insofar as it affects his State, if he finds it to be contrary to the
public interest.
In many cases, such' an organization will operate from a central office, and thus
not be directly subject to the jurisdiction of commissioners of other States. This
raises the question of whether in those cases where the participation of the central
organization in rate-making is such as to require regulation, the commissioner
can effectively supervise the central organization by means of his control over
local rating bureaus and insurers doing business in his State, or whether that
organization must affirmatively subject itself to the jurisdiction of each com-
missioner by obtaining a license or otherwise. We believe that where the central
organization plays a major part in the rate-making, it would be safer to have that
organization affirmatively subjected to the jurisdiction of each commissioner.
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The discussion so far has deah only with organizations which participate in
rate-making where a single coverage extends to properties located in more than
one State. The principles set forth are equally applicable to an organization
(operating in one or several States) which, while not qualifying as a rating
bureau, does participate in making rates as to properties located within a single
State, or as to properties located in several States but not under one coverage as
in the case discussed above. -
Property in transit:
The next question is regulation of rate-making as to property being transported
from one State to another. Regulation by more than one State would be in most
cases impracticable, and we believe that regulation by one State would probably
be held sufificient to meet the requirements of Public Law 15.
Where the property is customarily located in one State and its interstate move-
ment is only incidental, that State would normally be the one which would regu-
late the rate-making. Where the property has no customary location, regulation
might be undertaken by the State where the property happened to be at the time
the policy is written, or by the State where the assured has his principle place of
business, or in some instances by the State in which the policy is written.
Activities other than rating:
We now turn to other joint activities and practices as to policies and forms,
pools and syndicates, reinsurance, agency balance rules, and adjustment of losses.-*-
The organizations through which these activities and practices are carried on
may be limited to a single State or may function in several States, but in either
case the activities and practices can be considered as carried on in each State as
a unit. Each State is therefore interested in those activities and practices as they
affect the business in that State.
We indicated in our Third Report that certain of these activities and practices
can be carried on to some extent at least without State regulation. We concluded
that some of these activities would involve no restraint if carried on within the
limits suggested, and that others, while involving some restraint, might be justi-
fiable as not unreasonable. However, as we have pointed out repeatedly in our
earlier reports, under the Sherman Act no precise line can be drawn between
legal and illegal activities, and no definite tests can be laid down as to the reason-
ableness of restraints. This means that without regulation such as to make the
Sherman Act inapplicable, even with constant vigilance to guard against over-
stepping the permissible limits or against restraints becoming unreasonable, there
would be no assurance that the courts would hold that the activities in the par-
ticular case are permissible or reasonable. Proceedings under the Sherman Act,
by the Government or by individuals, involve expense and disruption of the busi-
ness regardless of the outcome.
Public Law 15 provides a means by which, if deemed desirable, the Sherman
Act can be made inapplicable to these activities and practices (except where boy-
cott, coercion or intimidation is involved), thus not only resolving many of the
uncertainties as to the permissible limits and as to the reasonableness of re-
straints, but also permitting activities and practices which in the absence of
regulation would be forbidden.
We believe that such regulation could be provided in most cases by broadening
the provisions of the statute suggested above for organizations which take part
in establishing rates but do not qualify as rating bureaus, to include organizations
which formulate rules or establish standards. This statute would afford protec-
tion if such rules or standards caused restraints as to policies and forms, reinsur-
1 This Report does not cover control of commissions or limitation on appointment of local agents.
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ance, agency balances or loss adjustment. In case similar protection is desired
for pools or syndicates, the statute could be enlarged to cover their operations.
The statute would give the commissioner power to review the rules and practices
of such an organization, and issue a cease and desist order insofar as they affect
his State where he finds them not in the public interest or unreasonably burden-
some.
In the absence of further instructions, we will consider that this Report com-
pletes our duties under the Resolution adopted at the May 9, 1945 meeting of the
Committee on Laws.
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APPENDIX "I"
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS RE
UNDERWRITING PROFIT OR LOSS AND THE
COMMISSIONERS' 1921 STANDARD
PROFIT FORMULA
Robert E. Dineen, New York, Chairman
W. Ellery Allyn, Connecticut
C. F. J. Harrington, Massachusetts
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS
OFFICERS
Robert E. Dineen, New York, President
Seth B. Thompson, Oregon, Vice-President
N. P. Parkinson, Illinois, Secretary-Treasurer
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
J. Edwin Larson, Florida, Chairman
James M. McCormack, Tennessee, Vice-Chairman
William P. Hodges, North Carolina
Maynard Garrison, California
W. Ellery Allyn, Connecticut
Gregg L. Neel, Pennsylvania
Wade O. Martin, Jr., Louisiana
David A. Forbes, Michigan
Luke J. Kavanaugh, Colorado
Oscar W. Carlson, Utah
Walter Dressel, Ohio
November 22, 1946
Hon. J. Austin Carroll
Chairman, Fire and Marine Committee
National Association of Insurance Commissioners
State House
Providence, R. I.
My dear Chairman Carroll
:
As chairman of the special subcommittee of the Fire and Marine Com-
mittee appointed to study the determination of underwriting profit or loss
and the Commissioners' 1921 formula on profit, I enclose the report of the
subcommittee dated November 22, 1946.
Copies of this report are being sent to all members of your Committee and
to all other members of the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners ; they are likewise being released to the industry and the public.
Sincerely yours,
Robert E. Dineen
Chairman, Special Suh-Committee
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REPORT OF SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON
FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE
The subcommittee has held three meetings at which it has considered the prob-
lem which results from the lack of agreement between the All-Industry Confer-
ence Committee and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners as to
the proper standard for profit in the making of insurance rates. This is the
single portion of the All-Industry— Commissioners Rate Regulatory Bills in
which a conflict of opinions between the All-Industry Committee and the Com-
mittee on Rates and Rating Organizations was not resolved, and both the Casu-
alty and Surety Rate Regulatory Bill and the Fire, Marine and Inland Marine
Rate Regulatory Bill, in the drafts approved at the Portland meeting of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, June, 1946, contained a foot-
note to Section 3— Making of Rates, reading as follows :
"The All-Industry Conference Committee believes the word 'underwriting'
should precede the word 'profit'. The National Association of Insurance
Commissioners is giving further study to this matter."
The footnote as quoted applies to the following portions of the respective bills at
the point indicated by the asterisk (*).
Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Bill— Section (3)
"(a) All rates shall be made in accordance with the following provisions:
"1. Due consideration shall be given to past and prospective loss experi-
ence within and outside this state, to catastrophe hazards, if any, to a reason-
able margin for *profit and contingencies, to dividends, savings or un-
absorbed premium deposits allowed or returned by insurers to their policy-
holders, members or subscribers, to past and prospective expenses both coun-
trywide and those specially applicable to this state, and to all other relevant
factors within and outside this state."
Fire, Marine and Inland Marine Rate Regulatory Bill— Section (3)
"(a) Rates shall be made in accordance with the following provisions:
"3. Due consideration shall be given to past and prospective loss experi-
ence within and outside this state, to the conflagration and catastrophe haz-
ards, to a reasonable margin for *profit and contingencies, to dividends, sav-
ings or unabsorbed premium deposits allowed or returned by insurers to
their policyholders, members or subscribers, to past and prospective expenses
both countrywide and those specially applicable to this state, and to all other
relevant factors within and outside this state; and in the case of fire insur-
ance rates, consideration shall be given to the experience of the fire insur-
ance business during a period of not less than the most recent five year
period for which such experience is available."
The primary point at .issue is the propriety of including all or part of the in-
vestment earnings of an insurance company in the profit factor allowed in the
making of rates. The All-Industry Conference Committee, it appears, would re-
strict the element of profit in ratemaking to that derived from insurance under-
writing operations, while the Commissioners preferred to re-examine the entire
problem. Considerable research has been undertaken at the direction of this sub-
committee, to aid it in its consideration of the problem.
The profits of an insurance company are derived from two sources : ( 1 ) From
insurance or "underwriting" transactions, and (2) from the investment of capital
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funds and moneys accumulated as a part of the insurance operations.-'- The con-
tention of the industry that only "under-writing profit" be considered in the mak-
ing and regulating of rates has required a careful study of the method of deter-
mining under-writing profit. Such a study is also required if "profit" alone is to
be established as the standard, for "profit" necessarily -would include profit from
underwriting.
Actions by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
The "Convention" form annual statement blank adopted by the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commisioners has long contained an Underwriting and In-
vestment Exhibit which provides a method of calculating underwriting profit or
loss. This exhibit, simply described, calls for the deduction of incurred losses
and incurred expenses from earned premiums, the remainder being the under-
writing profit, or, if there is a deficit, the underwriting loss. This method has
been staunchly defended by the fire insurance industry throughout the history of
rate regulation. It was given authority by the National Convention of Insurance
Commissioners in December, 1921, when the Convention by a roll-call vote of 18
to 2 adopted a majority report of the Committee on Fire Insurance which set
forth "what constitutes a reasonable underwriting profit and a proper and uni-
form method of arriving at same."^ The principles set forth in that report follow
:
"1. Underwriting profit (or loss) is arrived at by deducting from earned
premiums, all incurred losses and incurred expenses.
"2. No part of the so-called banking profit (or loss) should be considered
in arriving at the underwriting profit (or loss).
"3. Five years is the minimum period over which a dependable experience
can be established.
"4. A conflagration is any loss in excess of a million dollars.
"5. The first million dollars of loss is chargeable to the State in which it
originates, the balance being pro rated to all the States (including the one
in which it originates), in proportion to the premium income of each State.
"6. A reasonable underwriting profit is 5 per cent, plus 3 per cent, for
conflagrations. The 3 per cent, allowance for conflagrations is subject to
revision if and when the records of confl_agrations to be collected by the
National Board show that such 3 per cent, is excessive or inadequate."
The majority report stated that the committee had met in frequent and lengthy
conferences for the preceding two years with a committee of the National Board
f
of Fire Underwriters, and that the principles set forth were agreed to by the
: committtes at a final joint meeting. The fact that these principles constituted a
I
voluntary agreement between the regulators and the regulated was emphasized
I
in the concluding paragraphs of the report, reading in part as follows
:
"This committee should not close its report without a reference to the fine
spirit with which the companies have entered into the discussion and settle-
ment of the many perplexing questions involved.
"We are of the opinion that the voluntary agreement herein effected is
equitable both to the insurance companies and to the buyers of fire insurance
* * * this new voluntary agreement for a limitation of profits on their under-
writing operations, in our judgment established the system on a sound and
defensible basis ''' * *."^
1 See Best's Insurance Reports— Fire and Marine, (1946), page -VI.
i 2 Proceedings of the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners, 1922, page 20.
II
3 Ibid., page 21.
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A minority report was presented at the same time by Commissioner Bruce T.
Bullion of Arkansas, differing with the majority on practically every feature, and
recommending, in brief, that the rule for calculating underwriting profit or loss
be "the difference between net premiums received and actual paid losses plus
actual paid expenses."*
The 1921 formula was attacked in a lengthy paper and resolution presented by
Superintendent Ben C. Hyde of Missouri to the National Convention of Insur-
ance Commissioners meeting at Minneapolis in August, 1923.^ The resolution
asked that the 1921 action be rescinded and the matter referred to the Committee
on Fire Insurance for further study. That committee considered Superintendent
Hyde's views in the course of the meeting, and on the next day submitted a ma-
jority report to the effect that Superintendent Hyde should submit his views to
the individual members of the Convention, and that the matter should be consid-
ered at the December meeting. A minority report, signed by Superintendent
Hyde and Commissioner Bullion, asked instead for immediate action. The minor-
ity report was supported during this discussion by Commissioner J. J. McMahan
of South Carolina, who, after identifying himself as one of the two who had voted
against the 1921 formula in order that he might become better informed on the
subject, said
:
"I feel now that I voted more wisely than I knew * * * because * * *
since then, to my utter astonishment, I have been told by one, or more mem-
bers, of that majority that he joined in the recommendation without due
consideration and thereafter felt ashamed of himself when he read the record
and saw what he had subscribed to. Upon inquiry of others, he was told by
one or more of them that they had not duly considered all the matters in-
volved and really could not fully justify the action taken.
"I then didn't know much of the merits, but upon the discussion yesterday
I felt clear for the first time that the convention had laid down an erroneous
r*ii]p ^ sp 5JC ' b
Further support to this position was given by Commissioner G. Waldon Smith
of Maine, who described the 1921 resolution as "absolutely indefensible."'^
After much discussion, the minority report was tabled by a roll call vote of 27
to 5, and the majority report was adopted.
One of those who spoke for the majority point of view was Superintendent F.
R. Stoddard, Jr., of New York. The following are extracts from his remarks
:
"I don't claim that the rule reached by the Convention is perfect. I don't
know that anybody does claim that it is perfect. The utmost that is claimed
for it is that it was the best that could have been worked out at the time.
* * * I sympathize with my friend, Ben Hyde, but * * *. I want to make
up my mind definitely as to this question so that we won't have to change
again what we do here today. * * * So far as repealing, rescinding is con-
cerned, are we prepared to publish to the world that our men, supposedly as
able supervisors as can be found, that this organization made such a wretched
mistake, and are we prepared to toss it overboard and acknowledge to the
world that with two in the minority this Convention didn't know what it was
doing, that the resolution passed by us was so flagrantly wrong that we are
going to spurn it? * * * Three months isn't going to do any harm( ;) leaving
this until December isn't going to hurt anybody. The question is whether
we are going to repudiate what this Convention did and stigmatize the men
who passed that resolution. * * * As I said, I don't think it is perfect. The
4 Ibid., page 22.
5 "Proceedings," 1923, page 115, et seq.
6 Ibid., page 151.
7 Ibid., page 152.
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purpose of that (majority) resolution is * * * to give an opportunity * * *
to have Mr. Hyde's views presented to us * * * when we meet in convention
in December we will then have the facts before us and each one of us will
be prepared to vote for a result that v^on't have to be changed because of
any hasty action."^
At the December, 1923, meeting the Fire Insurance Committee reported^ that
it had defeated the Hyde resolution by a vote of eight to two, and after delibera-
tion had appointed a subcommittee of three to investigate the 3% allowance for
conflagrations and a subcommittee of five to "look into the matter at length and
whether there were any other weaknesses in the formula." A minority report,
signed by Messrs. Bullion and Hyde concurred in the appointment of the sub-
committee of five, but asked that the 1921 resolution be rescinded at once. The
minority report was rejected by a roll call vote of 26 to 5, and the majority report
adopted.
At the December, 1928, meeting of the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners in New York City, the Committee on Fire Insurance asked to be dis-
charged from further consideration of underwriting profit. In putting the mo-
tion, Superintendent James A. Beha, New York, who was acting as chairman of
the meeting, said : "You are adopting something that has been discussed for a
long time, this underwriting profits and fire insurance. I don't think it has ever
been settled. "^° The motion carried, and no further action on this subject has
been taken by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
Legal Authorities
Commissioner Bullion, at the time of the 1921 resolution, was engaged in liti-
gation with the fire insurance companies as to the propriety of a fire insurance
rate reduction order which he had issued on May 13, 1920. The opinion of the
court was handed down January 30, 1922, Bullion v. Aetna Insurance Company,
151 Ark. 519, 523, 237 S.W. 716, in what is described as the first insurance rate
case.-"^-^ The majority opinion states "We think the undisputed evidence shows
that the term 'underwriting profit' has long had a definite, certain and well-known
meaning' in insurance circles * * * underwriting profit is arrived at by deducting
from earned premiums all incurred losses and incurred expenses." In reaching
this conclusion the court relied upon the 1921 action of the National Convention
of Insurance Commissioners and upon the fact that the underwriting exhibit con-
structed upon this basis had been in use in Arkansas for more than ten years.
The court also made clear that in so holding it was construing the language of
the particular Arkansas statute from which the Commissioner derived his rate
regulatory powers and upon the accepted canon of construction that "where a
word which has a known legal meaning is used in a statute, it must be assumed
that the term is used in its legal sense in the absence of an indication of a con-
trary intent." 26 A. & E. Enc. of Lazu {2nd Edition) 607 . From this it may
fairly be assumed that the approval of the earned premium less losses and ex-
penses incurred formula was based upon a legal construction of a particular
statute relying, in turn, upon actions of the National Convention of Insurance
Commissioners, and was not based upon an original consideration of the funda-
mental merit of the formula.
In the same month that the Bullion v. Aetna decision was rendered (January,
1922) Superintendent of Insurance Ben C. Hyde of Missouri issued the fire in-
surance rate reduction order which, after much litigation in the state courts of
Missouri, the Federal District Court and the U. S. Supreme Court, led to the
impounding of millions of dollars of excess premiums and, eventually, to a
8 Ibid., page 152, et seq.
9 "Proceedings," 1924, page 46, et seq.
10 "Proceedings," 1929, page 20.
11 Reply Brief of Respondent Fire Insurance Companies, page 7, Commissioner of Virginia ex rel
Aetna Insurance Co., before the State Corporation Commission, 1929.
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bribery scandal of far-reaching effects. The htigation is cited here, because it
led the Supreme Court of Missouri to consider the methods of determining under-
writing profit. In a lengthy and studied opinion, the court, using vigorous lan-
guage, approved the method contended for by Superintendent Hyde, by which
losses and expenses paid are subtracted from premiums actually received. Aetna
Insurance Co. v. Hyde, 315 Mo. 113, 285, S. W. 65 (1926). A writ of certiorari
was granted by the U. S. Supreme Court, but after hearing the writ was dis-
missed on the ground that no federal question was presented. 275 U. S. 440, 72
L. Ed. 357 (1928).
During the pendency of this litigation, the stock fire insurance companies
sought to enjoin enforcement of the Superintendent's rate reduction order
through an action brought in the Federal District Court. This court also up-
held the premiums received less losses and expenses paid basis. Aetna Insurance
Co. V. Hyde, 34 F. (2d) 185 (D.C. Mo. 1929). On appeal, the U. S. Supreme
Court considered only procedural questions. National Fire Insurance Co. v.
Thompson, 281 U. S. 331, 74 L. Ed. 881 (1930).
The earned-incurred formula was also held to be erroneous in a Kansas rate
action. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Travis, 124 Kan. 350, 259 Pac. 1068 (1927),
but the opinion of the Kansas Supreme Court reveals a misconception of insur-
ance accounting principles so great as to invalidate any authority that it might
otherwise have had. For example :
"Plaintiffs contend that in determining underwriting profits earned pre-
miums only, less incurred losses and expenses, should be considered. This
contention is erroneous as to both items.
"Incurred losses and expenses are losses and expenses as originally
claimed, and average from year to year from 10 per cent to 12^^ per cent
more than losses and expenses actually paid. In determining the profits of
any business there can be no reason for computing the outgo greater than it
actually is. This error alone goes far toward requiring a reversal in this
case."
The definition of incurred losses and expenses will be considered later in this
report, but that given by the Court is wholly erroneous.
A wealth of reasoning and argument as to rate regulation is to be found in the
briefs, opinions and orders in the Virginia State Corporation Commission Fire
Insurance Rate Case, which resulted from an order entered June 18, 1928, by the
Commission withholding its approval of rates, etc., filed by the Virginia Inspec-
tion and Rating Bureau. The Commission eventually was upheld by the Supreme
Court of Appeals. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth, 169 S.E. 859 (Va.
1933). In this litigation, the Commission found it necessary to modify the
earned-incurred formula in a manner which is clearly described by counsel for
the stock fire insurance companies as follows :^~
"The National Convention of Insurance Commissioners, a body composed
of state officials having charge of the regulation and control of insurance
companies, adopted in 1921 as a result of years of consideration, a report of
its Fire Insurance Committee as to the method for determining a reasonable
underwriting profit. for fire insurance companies. * * * The 'Earned and In-
curred' method was approved by the Convention and a formula adopted for
determining underwriting profit, and Section 1 of the formula— which is
the only section with which we are concerned at present— is as follows
:
"'1. Underwriting profit (or loss) is arrived at by deducting from
earned premiums all incurred losses and incurred expenses.'
12 Brief for the Appellants, Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, Aetna Insurance Co. v. Com-
monwealth, pages 121-24.
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"This formula is known in the insurance world as the Standard Profit
Formula and is in general use by the companies, and it is the contention of
the appellants that it is the proper formula for ascertaining underwriting
profit, or profits from rates charged under the Virginia statute.
'Tt will be seen that under this formula three factors enter into the calcu-
lation of underwriting profit, viz : earned premiums, incurred losses and in-
curred expenses, and, therefore, in turn the definitions of these three terms
must be considered, and the formula for ascertaining each of them followed
in applying the formula for ascertaining underwriting profit. To the terms
'incurred losses' and 'incurred expenses' we will devote no discussion, be-
cause Commissioner Epes in the formula adopted by him for determining
profits from the premium income only has incorporated losses and expenses,
which are substantially the technical 'incurred losses' and 'incurred expenses'
of the companies. But the factor in the formula, which he has radically
changed, is the factor of 'earned premiums'. The companies' formula for
ascertaining earned premiums for any year (and the formula could of course
be made applicable to any period by substituting the word 'period' for the
word 'year') is as follows * * *:
"
'Earned Premiums— From the amount of gross premiums written
on insurance contracts during the year, deduct return premiums and
premiums paid for reinsurance. To the result so obtained add Unearned
Premiums on outstanding business at the end of the preceding year and
deduct Unearned Premiums on outstanding business at the end of the
year.'
"Therefore the convention profit formula— the Standard Profit Formula
— used by the companies can be expressed as follows :
"1. Net premiums written during the period.
"2. Add aggregate unearned premiums at the beginning of the period.
"3. Deduct aggregate unearned premiums at the end of the period.
"4. Deduct losses incurred during the period.
"5. Deduct expenses incurred during the period.
"But the corresponding formula adopted by Commissioner Epes is as
follows * * * :
"1. Net premiums written during the period.
"2. Add— Aggregate 'Liability on Unexpired Policies' at the be-
ginning of the period.
"3. Deduct— Aggregate 'Liability on Unexpired Policies' at the end
of the period.
"4. Deduct— Losses incurred by fires occurring during period.
"5. Deduct— Expenses incurred during period.
"It is therefore seen that the radical change made by the State Corporation
Commission in the formula is the substitution of 'Liability on Unexpired
Policies' for 'Unearned Premiums' at both the beginning and the end of the
period in order to arrive at the 'earned premiums,' from which the incurred
losses and incurred expenses for the period are to be deducted to ascertain
the resulting profit."
The Commission found that "Liability on Unexpired Policies" was only 55%
of "Unearned Premiums." Because of the substantial growth of unearned pre-
miums during the period under review, the substitution of the smaller figure at
the beginning and end of the accounting term increased the Commission's esti-
mate of profits during the test period by $669,316.
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In the recent District of Columbia rate case, American Eagle v. Jordan, de-
cided U. S. District Court, D. of C, October 9, 1946, the merit of the earned-
incurred formula was not at issue.
The cases here cited are the only legal authorities which deal with the sound-
ness of the Commissioners' 1921 Formula. Bullion v. Hyde upheld the method
because it provided the "known meaning" of the term "underwriting profit" in
the business, based upon the 1921 action of the Commissioners and the under-
writing exhibit in the Convention Statement. Aetna v. Hyde and Aetna v.
Travis reject the Commissioners' formula. Aetna v. Commonwealth offers a
substitute method. It is obvious that the legal authorities are in conflict and
provide little guidance for judging the inherent worth of the earned-incurred
formula.
Expert Authorities
The Commissioners' 1921 formula for determining underwriting profit or loss
is accepted in certain fire insurance texts as the proper method. Crobaugh,
Handbook of Insurance, (1931), page 1328, says:
'Tn fire insurance, underwriting profit or loss, as the case may be, is the
difference between earned premiums and losses incurred, plus expenses in-
curred." (Italics in original).
The method is often referred to as the statutory formula, and the resultant
profit or loss figure as the statutory underwriting profit or loss, presumably be-
cause of the statutes or other legal authority supporting the convention state-
ment blank, which contains the underwriting exhibit on the earned-incurred basis.
Such expert authorities, however, appear to be devoid of arguments in support
of the earned-incurred formula, accepting it, in effect, as an established principle
in insurance accounting.
The authorities which take issue with the earned-incurred formula, however,
contain more comprehensive statements as to their reasoning.
The publications of Alfred M. Best Company, Inc., have long carried state-
ments as to the necessity for correcting the statutory underwriting profit or loss
figures reported by companies in order to arrive at the "true" profit. Alfred M.
Best, in a pamphlet entitled "Facts and Fallacies Concerning the Analysis of In-
surance Company Statements," published in 1938 said :^^
"The insurance companies have no choice in preparing these figures
;
although they give an incomplete picture of underwriting results, they must
be filed in this form.
"Two very important items must be considered in connection with the
statutory underwriting profit or loss in order to arrive at the true result,
which may be better or worse than the statutory figure indicates.
"The first of these is the increase or decrease in the equity in the unearned
premiums * * *. In periods when premium writings are increasing, the
amount added to unearned premium liability, (based upon the entire pre-
mium, with no allowance for expenses of operation), frequently results in
showing a statutory underwriting loss ; but the increase of the equity in
unearned premiums reduces the apparent loss, or turns it into a profit. On
the other hand, when premium volume is decreasing, unearned premium lia-
bility also decreases, and this usually results in showing abnormally large
statutory underwriting profits. To reach the true result, the decrease in the
equity must be deducted from the statutory underwriting profit or added to
the statutory underwriting loss, if one is shown.
13 Page 33, et seq.
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"The importance of this procedure may readily be demonstrated. Let us
first consider the situation of a fire insurance company whose annual pre-
mium writings are rapidly increasing. In five years, premiums written in-
creased from $600,000 to $7,700,000; unearned premiums increased from
$750,000 to $8,400,000, and a statutory underwriting loss of $3,000,000 was
reported. On the basis of its ratio of losses incurred to premiums earned,
(loaded 15% for a 'safety factor' as explained in Chapter III.), the increase
in the equity in the unearned premiums exceeded the statutory underwriting
loss by over $250,000.
"In times of decreasing premium volume the distortion is quite as great.
The premium writings of insurance companies decreased rapidly during the
five years ending with 1933. One excellently managed fire company reported
a statutory underwriting profit of $5,000,000; but its equity in unearned
premiums decreased $3,800,000.
"Both illustrations serve to emphasize the importance of correcting tht.
statutory underwriting results by taking into account the increase or decrease
of equity in unearned premiums. The examples are actual, and all com-
panies are affected similarly, in varying degrees."
The sample principle is stated in more detail in "Explanation of Statistical
Exhibits," Best's Insurance Reports, Fire and Marine, (1946), page XII, et seq.,
quoted in part as follows
:
"Underwriting Gain or Loss
:
"
'Statutory Underwriting Profit or Loss' is taken from the annual state-
ments except for adjustments to reflect uniform treatment of Federal income
and excess profits taxes, and represents a comparison of losses and expenses
incurred with premiums earned, adjusted with minor profit and loss items.
This statutory figure does not completely disclose the underwriting resuts.
We, therefore, also show our estimate of the gain or loss in the equity in
unearned premiums. This equity exists because the laws require that the
calculation of the unearned premium liability shall be based upon the full
amount of the premiums on all policies in force, less reinsurance, without
considering the expense of operation.
"The annual statements are prepared in accordance with the laws of the
various states, hence the insurance companies should not be criticised because
the statements do not reveal fully the results of the underwriting operations.
This situation is due primarily to two items
:
"Equity in Reserves
:
"First, the fact that the law requires unearned premiums to be set up at a
figure in excess of the amount which experience shows to be necessary in
the practical operation of insurance companies. This correspondingly re-
duces apparent profit or increases the apparent loss from underwriting, ex-
cept where the volume of business written is decreasing. These unearned
premiums are calculated upon the entire am^ount of the premiums under all
policies in force at the statement date, with no allowance for the necessary
expense of operation. They represent the estimated aggregate amount which
the insurance company would be obliged to tender to its policyholders as
return premiums for the unexpired terms should it wish to cancel every
policy in force. Since the premiums are sufficient to absorb both losses and
expenses, it follows that every well-managed company has an equity in un-
earned premiums roughly equal to the percentage of the premiums written
consumed by the expenses of operation. If such a company desires to re-
insure its business and retire, another company may be found which will
assume all the outstanding policy liability for a payment much smaller than
the amount of the unearned premiums shown by the statement of the retiring
company. This discount or commission is allowed by the company assuming
the business because if it wrote, through its own agents, business on which
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the premiums would equal the unearned premiums of the company taken
over, it would pay to those agents and in other operating expenses practically
the same percentage of the premiums written as it allows to the retiring com-
pany on its unearned premiums. Therefore, in attempting to arrive at the
true underwriting results, the increase or decrease of this equity in the un-
earned premiums must be taken into account, and adjusted with the under-
writing profit or loss shown by the annual statement * * *."
A similar explanation is contained in "The Spectator Insurance Year Book,"
1946, page XXII.
"The 'trade profit' (which is not shown in the underwriting exhibit of
the different companies but .is discussed in the comment on underwriting
operations) has been included because it is felt that no true determination
of the underwriting results of any company can be made on the statutory
basis. The statutory requirements penalize the surplus of a company show-
ing a sizable increase in premium writings, and conversely the surplus is
favored where a reduction of premium writings occurs. In other words, a
company increasing its premium volume substantially might show an under-
writing loss because of the necessity of increasing the unearned premium
reserve, and on the other hand, a company reducing its premium volume
might show a sizable underwriting profit because of the releasing of un-
earned premium reserves."
The Hon. Clarence W. Hobbs, who before his death was Special Representa-
tive of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners in the National
Council on Compensation Insurance, dealt with the subject in the chapter "State
Supervision" which he contributed to Casualty Insurance Principles by G. F.
Michelbacher, (1942). Referring to fire insurance rating laws he said:
"Some of these laws have led to a great deal of litigation in recent years
* * * the following questions have been raised * * * and * * * are by no
means conclusively determined
:
"1. Whether underwriting profit shall be determined by a comparison of
premiums received and losses and expenses paid over the experience period,
or by a comparison of premiums earned and losses and expenses incurred
"It may be seen that, with so many important points to be settled, rate
making and rate supervision are sciences still far from exact.
"The National Association of Insurance Commissioners has endeavored
to fix a ratemaking formula for fire insurance involving the use of premiums
earned and losses and expenses incurred, as the basis, with loading of 5 per
cent, for underwriting profit, and an additional loading for the conflagration
hazard. While this is the prevailing practice, it is not universally recognized."
"Insurance, Its Theory and Practice in the United States," by Albert H.
Mowbray, (1946), presents a discussion of earned and unearned premiums
and of investment aspects, beginning at page 418. In a footnote to this dis-
cussion Mowbray says, "It is also difficult to estimate what is the real under-
writing profit or loss since the full unearned premium reserve is not required
under normal conditions for the future loss and expense payments on existing
policies."
Consideration of these quotations demonstrates that, although twenty-five years
have elapsed since the Commissioners' 1921 formula was adopted, expert authori-
ties are either unpersuaded as to its accuracy or state unqualifiedly that it does
not produce the true answer. The legal and expert authorities appear to afford
far greater support to points of view opposed to the 1921 formula than to those
which favor it.
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Analysis of Principles
After consideration of these diverse opinions, this subcommittee deemed it
essential to study afresh the basic principles involved, to approach de novo the
entire problem of a standard for the determination of underwriting profit.
The authorities cited and the Commissioners' 1921 formula deal with the prob-
lem of determining underwriting profit for a past period of time. It is necessary
to distinguish this problem from that presented by the pertinent subdivisions of
the "Making of Rates" sections of the All-Industry— Commissioners' Bills. The
A.I.C. Bills require due consideration of past and prospective loss experience,
past and prospective expenses, to a margin for (underwriting) profit and con-
tingencies, to policyholder dividends and all other relevant factors within and
outside the state. To the extent that the loss and expense factors used in rate
making involve estimates of prospective experience, they are of course, approxi-
mate, and after these factors are determined, it would be mathematically simple
to add a reasonable percentage for profit and contingencies. In other words, if
the loss, expense, dividend and other relevant factors of a rate are calculated, all
that is needed to fix the final rate is addition of the profit factor. No attempt has
been made by this subcommitte to explore the statistical or actuarial methods by
which prospective experience may be calculated. It has, however, endeavored to
study the means by which the true underwriting profit of companies may be de-
termined for past periods of time. It is pertinent to note the additional language
in Section 3(a), subdivision 3 of the Fire, Marine and Inland Marine Rate Regu-
latory Bill : "and in the case of fire insurance rates consideration shall be given
to the experience of the fire insurance business during a period of not less than
the most recent five year period for which such experience is available." A de-
termination of fire insurance experience is therefore expressly required, and the
value of an accurate determination will be equally great in other lines both for
the ascertainment of past and estimation of prospective experience.
A part of the subcommittee's research was devoted to a study of commercial
accounting authorities on profit, which in general business, is customarily termed
"net income."
Robert H. Montgomery, a leading authority on accounting says :" "If a public
accountant were asked to define the term 'net income', he would probably reply
:
'The net income of a business is the remainder of the earnings and profits from
all sources after providing for all costs, expenses and allowances for accrued or
probable losses.' "
Rules laid down by this commercial accounting authority as to the determina-
tion of net income are to be found in the same text, where in part he says :^^
"Good Accounting Practice Relating to the Statement of Income.— A re-
liable statement of income must be predicated on accounts which reflect good
accounting practice if such statement is to present fairly the results of opera-
tions of a concern for a specified period.
"When expenses are incurred and benefits are received in a given account-
ing period, good accounting practice requires that the resulting liabilities be
set up in the same period— as actual liabilities if the amounts have been de-
termined definitely, or in the form of estimated accruals or provisions if the
exact amounts of the liabilities are not then known. When items of income
arise or are collected in one period, and part thereof belongs to another
period, good accounting practice requires that accrued or deferred accounts
be set up so that the first period may not benefit by the inclusion of un-
realized or unearned income.
1* "Auditing Theory and Practice," Robert H. Montgomery, Sixth Edition (1940), page'421.
15 Ibid., page 407.
ccxxxii P.D. 9
"Good accounting practice requires that current income be reduced by pro-
visions for losses or expenses which are probable, even though not yet actu-
ally incurred. When losses or expenses are mere possibilities, the facts can
usually be displayed as a footnote to the financial statements. When it be-
comes apparent that the loss or incurrence of expense is probable, the situ-
ation should be reflected in the accounts. Experienced judgment is required
for determination of the appropriate treatment in borderline cases."
Applying these quotations to the determination of underwriting profit or loss
the items of income to be considered would be those from premiums (excluding
investment items for this portion of this discussion), and the deductions there-
from would be for losses and expenses, although the word "loss" must of course,
be given the insurance rather than the commercial meaning intended by Mr.
Montgomery.
This approach, therefore, suggests that the problem of determining under-
writing profit or loss for a specified past period of time requires determination of
the premiums, losses and expenses which are applicable to that period of time.
These factors will be considered in that order.
Premiums
Only two methods of establishing premiums in the computation of underwriting
profit or loss are to be found in the authorities— premiums received (often
termed "premiums written") and premiums earned.. These terms are well under-
stood in the business. Satisfactory short definitions are found in Best's Insur-
ance Reports, Fire and Marine,^** which, modified by substituting the word
"period" for "year" may be restated as follows
:
Net premiums written represents the aggregate net amount of the premiums
upon all policies issued during the period, whether collected or not, and after
deducting all return and reinsurance premiums.
Net premiums earned represents the adjustment of the net premiums written
with the increase or decrease during the period of the liability of the company
for unearned premiums.
The word "net," of course, refers to the deduction for gross premiums written
of all return and reinsurance premiums. Since both return premiums and rein-
surance premiums ceded are direct diminutions of income, the propriety of "net"
premiums as the basis for discussion seems obvious.
The terms are also defined in the Commissioners' 1921 formula^'^ in the same
sense, except that the manner of calculating earned premiums is more exactly
stated as
:
"From the amount of gross premiums written on insurance contracts dur-
ing the year deduct return premiums and premiums paid for reinsurance.
To the result so obtained add unearned premiums on outstanding business
at the end of the preceding year and deduct unearned premiums on outstand-
ing business at the end of the year."
A textbook explanation of earned premiums is found in Mowbray '}^
"Premiums Not Earned until Service Performed.— Premiums paid in ad-
vance, though legally the property of the company, have not been earned, for
no service has been rendered * * *.
"It is then, fair to say of that part of the premium designed to pay current
losses that it is earned pro rata as the term of the policy passes, and that the
16 1946 Edition, page XII.
1"
"Proceedings," 1922, page 21.
18 Mowbray, op. cit. page 418, et seq.
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part corresponding to the unexpired portion of the current term, and all
amounts charged in anticipation of losses to occur after the expiration of the
current term, are unearned."
As this quotation implies, the protection which an insurance policy affords is
rendered continuously over the term of the contract. The insurer earns the pre-
mium day by day as it provides the protection. The company must establish a
. liability for the aggregate portions of all net premiums received for w^hich it must
render insurance in the future, and which, therefore, are unearned premiums.
The unearned premium concept has a parallel in commercial accounting, as
indicated in the following quotation from Montgomery :^°
"When items of income arise or are collected in one period, and part there
of belongs to another period, good accounting practice requires that accrued
or deferred accounts be set up so that the first period may not benefit by the
inclusion of unrealized or unearned income."
,;
.
This reasoning directly supports the earned premium basis of allocating in-
i: come to the period for which underwriting profit or loss is to be determined. The
:1 incidence of premiums written, under this theory, has no relation to the amount
f of insurance protection rendered in a specified period. The directly relevant fac-
tor is premiums earned, which are measured by that part of aggregate premiums
on contracts written before and during the period which is applicable to protec-
tion rendered during the period. The formula— premiums written plus unearned
premiums at the beginning of the period and less unearned premiums at the end
of period— is a simple statement of the method of determining earned premiums.
The Virginia Corporation Commission case cited earlier is the only source
III which adopts a different earned premium formula. As stated in the reference
[[above, the Commission substituted "Liability on Unexpired Policies" for "Un-
; ; earned Premiums" in the formula. While the Commission's argument is exhaus-
i
tive, it may be generalized as based on the premise that policies in force may be
! carried to expiration or reinsured in another carrier for not over 55% of the
;
actual pro rata unearned portion of the premiums on such policies. This assumes
I
a profit factor, a loss factor to expiration, and a low expense factor because acqui-
j
sition costs have been expended at inception of the policies. It must be consid-
j
ered whether this confuses the problem of determining the premium income which
is applicable to a specified period of time, since the profit factor relates to profit
to be earned in a future period, and the problem is to calculate profi.ts in a past
period. On the same basis, factors of future loss and expense have no place in
:j the determination of income for a past period. The reasoning in this case is akin
to the "equity in unearned premiums" theory of Best,^° except that Best applies
i the correction directly to "statutory underwriting profit," rather than to the com-
'iputation of earned premiums.
Aetna v. Hyde and Aetna v. Travis, cited above, substitute "premiums re-
ceived" for "premiums earned." These decisions appear to be opposed to the
i
I
weight of authority, which holds, in effect, that income applicable to a specified
period of time should not be measured by the accident of when the income was
receiA^ed, but rather by whether the service purchased was performed in that
period. In any such length of time for which underwriting profit is to be estab-
lished, insurance companies furnish coverage for which premiums were "re-
ceived" in a prior year or years, and receive premiums for insurance which must
be rendered in the future, so that there is no direct relationship between the pre-
miums received and the insurance coverage rendered.
A quotation from a recent paper by Ralph H. Blanchard, Professor of Insur-
ance in the School of Business, Columbia University, defines earned premiums
precisely, and in language which is appropriate to the approach here adopted
:
19 Montgomery, op. cit., page 407.
20 Supra.
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"The earned premium on a given policy contract is that part of the total
premium for the policy which is applicable to a given period."^^
This quotation, as well as the previous discussion, may be directly related to
the theory that a sound underwriting profit or loss formula will be based on
earned premiums as the measure of income applicable to a past period of time.
Losses
Determination of the losses which are applicable to a specified past period of
time requires, as in the discussion of premiums, consideration of two methods
suggested in the authorities— losses paid and losses incurred. Professor Blan-
chard says
:
"Incurred losses are the losses paid and to be paid on account of particular
events.""^
Therefore, using fire insurance as an example, a fire which occurs during the
period of time for which experience is computed represents an "incurred" loss,
whether or not the claim is actually paid in that period or later. Paid losses in
any period will include those which occurred in prior periods.
The occurrence of a loss is, of course, fixed and definite in point of time ; it can
be allocated to a period of time with accuracy and can be related directly to the
earned premiums on the insurance covering the loss. The payment of a loss,
however, may be at almost any time after the event, as in third party liability
claims, which are often litigated, and final settlement may be postponed for years.
Substantial sums are frequently paid out long after liability policies have expired
and all premiums to which the losses were related have been earned.
Referring once again to the Commissioners' 1921 formula, the method of calcu-
lating losses incurred is there stated as
:
"To losses paid during the year, add salvage and reinsurance recoverable
outstanding at the end of the preceding year, and deduct salvage and rein-
surance recoverable outstanding at the end of the year. To the result so ob-
tained add all unpaid losses outstanding at the end of the year and deduct
unpaid losses outstanding at the end of the preceding year."^^
The salvage and reinsurance items directly reduce losses, and may be disre-
garded for this discussion. The soundness of the formula may be tested by logic.
Insurance companies always have claims in process of adjustment, and at each
statement date must establish a liability for unpaid claims. For any specified
period of time, if unpaid losses are exactly the same amount at the end of the
period as at the beginning, losses incurred must have exactly equalled losses paid.
However, if unpaid losses are greater at the end than at the beginning, then more
losses must have been incurred than were paid, and the reverse is true.
Reserves for unpaid losses are necessarily estimated, and any inaccuracy in the
estimates would produce a corresponding inaccuracy in losses incurred, except to
the extent that errors at the beginning and end of the period might be offsetting.
This fact, it may be argued, does not relate to the soundness of the formula, but
simply indicates the necessity for care in applying it. There are well-developed
methods of testing the accuracy of unpaid claim estimates.
The use of "losses paid" instead of "losses incurred" is supported by Aetna v.
Hyde and Aetna v. Trams, but other authorities suggest that the use of "losses
incurred" permits the establishment of a direct relationship with premiums earned
in any specified period of time.
21 "Survey of Accident and Health Insurance," Bureau memo. No. 62, Federal Security Agency,
Social Security Administration, Bureau of Research and Statistics, August, 1946, pg. 1.
22 Ibid., page 1.
23 "Proceedings" 1921, page 21.
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Expenses
The Commissioners' 1921 formula defines the method of ascertaining expenses
incurred as
:
"To all expenses paid during the year add expenses unpaid at the end of
the year and deduct expenses unpaid at the end of the preceding year."
The logic of this formula is the same as that underlying the computation of
losses incurred; previously discussed.
The "expenses paid" method is contended for only in Aetna v. Hyde and Aetna
V. Travis, in each case as a part of a "premiums received less losses and expenses
paid" formula. It is not found in other authorities. Nearly all expenses in the
insurance business can be paid with little delay, so that unpaid expenses are not
large in proportion to paid expenses for any reasonable length of time. There-
fore, there is little difference, ordinarily, between expenses incurred and expenses
paid.
Nevertheless, the expense element in the calculation of underwriting profit or
loss is, judging from a study of the legal and other authorities, the most trouble-
some of all. As was extensively argued in the Virginia case {Aetna v. Com-
monzvealth), insurance companies incur a large part of their total expense on
each policy at the time the policy is written, yet must at the same time establish
a liability for the entire pro rata unearned portion of the premium. Expenses at
inception of the policy may be as much as 35%, 40% or more of the total pre-
mium, and much more than the remainder will be set up as unearned. Since
there are not enough dollars in the premium to do both, the difference is taken
from surplus. The companies have contended that it is the balance of unearned
premiums which is established out of surplus
;
presumably it might also be argued
that unearned premiums are set up out of premiums, and that acquisition costs
are met out of surplus.
This method of doing business, which is a matter of common knowledge in the
insurance field, led the Virginia Corporation Commission to hold that unearned
premiums include "a pro rata part of those items of the expense element which
have been included in the premium for expenses already paid or incurred."'* For
this and other reasons, the Commission held that unearned premiums were an
overstatement of the companies' "Liability on Unexpired Policies," and substi-
tuted the latter term therefor in calculating premiums earned, as previously dis-
cussed. The practical effect of this change was, through reducing unearned pre-
miums by 45% at statement dates, to correspondingly increase earned premium
for the period by 45% of the increase in unearned premiums. Since the Com-
mission did not change materially losses or expenses incurred, the net result was
an equal increase in underwriting profit for the period. As was discussed, a
comparable correction is made by Best through calculating the increase or de-
crease in unearned premium equity, except that Best calculates the equity as a
separate statistical problem, and applies it directly to the statutory underwriting
profit or loss.
This subcommittee has considered the merits of both of these suggested
methods of modifying the statutory profit formula in the light of the suggested
approach that "determining underwriting profit or loss for a specified past period
of time requires determination of the premiums, losses or expenses which are
applicable to that period of time."^° The corrective measures urged by Best and
in the Virginia case both involve consideration of loss and profit elements in the
unearned premium, or, in other words, losses which will be sustained and profits
which will be realized in future periods of time. The premium and loss phases
24 Order and Opinion, op. cit., page 58.
25 Supra.
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have already been discussed and this portion of the report is devoted to consid-
eration of the suggested correction in treatment of expenses.
In opposition to the Commission's Order and Opinion in the Virginia case, the
stock fire companies argued this phase of the problem at length, as indicated in
the following quotations :^®
"As to the holding that the Unearned Premium includes an element for
expenses already paid or incurred, we respectfully submit that no such ele-
ment can be carried for reimbursement out of the Unearned Premium. Cer-
tainly an expense already paid may not properly be suspended pending the
termination of the liability on the contract. The Unearned Premium Re-
serve cannot be treated as containing any amount representing such expenses,
certainly unless such expenses are accrued, or distributed, over the life of
the policy. Obviously this would require these expense items to be capital-
ized and carried by the company as an asset in order to balance its books.
* * * But it is not permissible to carry in the company's statement as an
asset an item of expense which has been paid and is not recoverable, and, of
course, it is not the practice of the companies to do so. Such an item would
not be treated as an 'admitted asset' by the authorities by any State for sol-
vency purposes.
"Nor can a valid contention be made that, while it is not proper to accrue
paid expenses for solvency purposes, yet it is proper to do so for rate making
purposes. * * *
"Until the legislature sees fit to change the solvency standard, profits for
rate-making purposes must stand or fall as judged by that criterion.
"If a paid expense is not definitely recoverable, it has no place in the
assets of any company. Assets representing paid unrecoverable expenses do
not pay the the policyholder whose property has been destroyed by fire. * * *
"There is no prepayment of expense in any just sense, but expenses are
paid only for debts due and owing at the time when incurred and paid and
are not debts relating to some other or future period but debts owing and
payable for completed service or obligation during the period calculated.
"The testimony of Mr. Doscher (R. pp. 849-850, inclusive), illustrates
very clearly that it is not practicable to distribute expenses paid over the lift
of the policy, that it is not practicable to have different financial set-ups fos
solvency and profit purposes and that no recognized form of accounting pei
mits the setting up of an expense as an asset incurred or paid that is nol
recoverable.
" 'Q. Now, Mr. Doscher, it has been said in this case at various times,
and the question was raised with respect to the distribution of the ex-
penses of companies over the life of the policy. Will you state whether
or not, in your opinion as an accountant, that expense can be properly
distributable over the life of the policy in a recognized and proper
accounting method?
"
'A. Expenses that are paid and not recoverable, under good ac-
counting practice and good general business practice, cannot be allo-
cated over a given period. They are chargeable in the period when they
are paid, or when they are incurred, because of the fact that they are
not recoverable. Under existing regulations of the State of Virginia
and also all the States of the United States, no insurance company is
permitted to carry as an asset for the purpose of determining its sol-
vency, an accrued expense, or a deferred charge, whatever you call it.
26 Brief for the Appellants, Aetna v. Commonwealth, Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, page
ISO et seq.
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Those regulations specifically prohibit setting up any earnings of that
nature by a company and including them as admissible assets. General
business practice would preclude a company doing that. It would, no
doubt, have a serious effect on the financial condition of the company.
I know that, if I personally, were offered a policy of an insurance com-
pany that had a large sum of money set up as assets, representing ex-
penses actually paid or incurred which were not recoverable, I would be
inclined not to accept the policy, as the financial set-up would not be
sound on that basis. * * *
"
'Q. As an accountant, Mr. Doscher, do you know of any recog-
nized or proper form of accounting, in which you can set up as an asset
in your statement any expense which has actually been paid, or incurred,
and which cannot be recovered ?
"
'A. I do not know of any good, sound accounting practice or prin-
ciple that would permit the setting up as an asset of an expense incurred
or paid that is not recoverable.'
"It is not sound to capitalize an expenditure which has been made and the
money paid out, without right to recover, because it is in no sense an asset.
All that can be said to exist is a contingently possible recoupment of it, not
as of legal right, but by a custom in some cases, contrary to legal obligation.
This custom, of course, relates solely to the agent's commission. The agent
is in no case bound to reimburse any part of this expense, whatever the fu-
ture contingencies may be. If he does so in excepted cases, he does so as
a voluntary act and not because he is under legal obligation to do so. The
unanswerable fact in these considerations is that it is violative of every con-
ception of sound accountancy to treat as an asset a sum which may or may
not be recoverable, which has been expended for a completed service which
has been paid for and the recoupment of which is exceptional, contingent
and not resting in legal right. While there is a possibility of recovery of
a part of the agent's commission, in some cases, there is not even a possibil-
ity of recovery of any portion of other expenses which have been paid or
incurred. * * *
"There is a marked distinction between amortizing the discount in the sale
price of a bond and spreading expenses which have been already paid or in-
curred over the term of a fire insurance policy. In the former case the bond
has a definite period to run and it is a simple matter to pro rate the amount
of the discount over the term of the bond, but a fire insurance policy being
subject to cancellation at any time, there is no logical basis on which the
spread of the expenses could be pro rated.
"In support of his claim that a large element of the 'Unearned Premium'
represents expenses already paid or incurred, the Commissioner cites the
testimony of three of 'the companies' own witnesses, Messrs. Doscher, Hess
and Witt, extracts of which are given in Appendices 4, 5 and 6, respectively.
We respectfully submit that this evidence does not substantiate this claim.
This evidence was introduced for the purpose of showing, and does show,
that approximately 40% of the amount carried in the 'Unearned Premium
Reserve' at any time has been contributed from the paid in or accumulated
surplus of the company. This is occasioned by the fact that the total written
premium is not sufficient to pay, for the first year, losses and expenses in-
curred in connection with the acquisition and handling of the business prop-
erly chargeable against the premium and to put in the Reserve the unearned
part of the premium required by law, making it necessary that the company
provide the deficency from some other source than the amount of the pre-
miums received. Obviously, the only source from which it can come is the
surplus and the testimony and exhibits therewith show that the result is that
the amount so required to be taken from the surplus in order to meet the
requirements of the reserve amount to approximately 40% of the Reserve."
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This argument has certain major points, which may be summarized as follows
:
( 1 ) Unearned premiums by law must be established in full as a liability,
and no consideration can be given to the expense element therein unless it is
accrued as an asset and spread over the life of the policy.
(2) Such a procedure would be unsound because:
(a) The asset would be inadmissible in a statement of condition.
(b) A paid expense is not definitely recoverable, and to treat it as an
asset is violative of sound accountancy.
(3) There is no real prepayment of expense, because all such expense is
for debts owing and payable for completed service or obligation.
(4) There is no logical method on which the expenses could be pro rated
over the term of the policy.
As to point ( 1 ) , it is well understood, of course, that the establishment of un-
earned premiums is prescribed by law, and it follows that any correction for ex-
pense factors could, as stated, be accomplished only by accruing such items in an
asset account.
Point (2a) is well taken, because such an asset would be inadmissible (see, for
example, Section 71(2) New York Insurance Laws).
While it may be true as claimed in point (2b) that such paid expenses are not
always recoverable, the question as to whether setting up such an asset is sound
accountancy is dealt with in the text by Montgomery previously cited ; on page
245, et seq., Montgomery says : "Prepaid expenses * * * represent the residual
amount of an expenditure * * * made prior to the balance sheet date, with respect
to which a portion should be charged to income in subsequent periods * * *.
"It is a generally accepted principle of accounting that, where practicable,
expenses and costs which are a charge against earnings of more than one
period should be apportioned equitably to the specific periods which derive
the benefit * * *.
"From the standpoint of good accounting practice, there is no option as
to how items should be charged when the benefits therefrom clearly aid or
are reasonably expected to aid subsequent periods. If expenses are incurred
in a single year, or during a few years, and if those expenses are incurred
wholly for the purpose of increasing profits of future years, such expendi-
tures are clearly in the nature of an investment and should be apportioned
to income over the periods which are expected to benefit therefrom."
Montgomery also notes (page 260) that "Deferred Charges" accounts are re-
quired in Uniform Systems of Accounts for Telephone Companies prescribed by
the Federal Communications Commission, and that prescribed by the Securities
and Exchange Commission for Public Utility Holding Companies. Similar re-
quirements by other authorities were found in additional Uniform Systems of
Accounts examined as a part of the subcommittee's research.
This authority, obviously, is in conflict with the assertion in the Brief that such
treatment is "violative of sound accountancy." Montgomery, in fact, holds that
sound accountancy demand the accrual of prepaid expenses.
Studies by this subcommittee of accounting procedures which would reconcile
the establishment of a prepaid expense account for underwriting exhibit purposes
and yet disallow it as an asset for solvency purposes indicates that there are
parallel techniques in use for other items. The treatment of unauthorized rein-
surance in those states which disallow such reinsurance is an example. The un-
derwriting exhibit is not affected by such disallowance, but the effect on surplus
is handled by a separate entry through the "miscellaneous" or change in surplus
exhibit. This could be done for prepaid expenses, if such a procedure were de-
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cided upon, by setting up the account for underwriting exhibit purposes, charging
it off as a non-admitted asset, and carrying the adjustment through the surplus
exhibit. The net effect would be that surplus would be unchanged from present
practice, but the correction for increase or decrease in prepaid expenses would
be reflected from term to term in the underwriting exhibit.
On the assumption that the benefit from acquisition expense is received over
the term of the policy, accrual of such expenses is required under the principle
laid down by Montgomery. This is opposed to the argument in Point (3) that
such expense is for completed services.
If this approach to the handling of the expense element is deemed of sufficent
merit to justify further exploration, methods for accrual of such expenses would
have to be evolved, and it would be necessary at that time to consider point (4),
as to whether there is a logical method for pro-rating such expenses over the
term of the policy.
The desirability of further study of all phases of the expense problem is demon-
strated by reference to the original premise that the expense applicable to a
specified past period of time must be determined and by the conflicting argu-
ments set forth above. The expense incident to writing policies must, it appears,
be charged either to the period of time in which the expense is incurred, i.e., in
which the policy is written, or it must be spread over the term of the policy. This
is, of course, exclusive of those general overhead expenses which normally are
constant through policy terms. The only accounting method suggested in the
authorities reviewed for spreading expense over the policy term is by accrual of
prepaid items. In practical operation, the charging of expense to the period in
which it is incurred as in the Commissioners' 1921 formula, results in greater
expense charges, and therefore lower profit, when business is increasing and pre-
miums are being written at a faster rate than they are being earned. The reverse
is also true, and profits are thereby increased when premium volume is declining,
as was demonstrated in the quotations from Best and Spectator.^''
The importance of a correct method of handling any distortions due to rising
and falling premium volume is illustrated by the following record of net fire in-
surance premiums written from 1920 to 1945, inclusive :"^
Year Fire Premiums
1945 $663,000,000
1944 621,000,000
1943 583,000,000
1942 546,000,000
1941 508,000,000
1940 467,000,000
1939 448,000,000
1938 458,000,000
1937 473,000,000
1936 461,000,000
1935 473,000,000
1934 473,000,000
1933 453,000,000
1932 501,000,000
1931 567,000,000
1930 645,000,000
27 Supra.
28 Best's Insurance Reports — Fire and Marine, 1946, page VII.
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1929 723,000,000
1928 700,000,000
1927 706,000,000
1926 732,000,000
1925 699,000,000
1924 652,000,000
1923 673,000,000
1922 595,000,000
1921 571,000,000
1920 685,000,000
The great up and down trends are clearly shown, and it will be observed that
in 1920, 1923 and 1925-1929, inclusive, peaks were reached that exceed the 1945
figure.
Investment Profits
At the beginning of this report it was stated that the primary point at issue is
the propriety of including all or part of the investment earnings of an insurance
company in the profit factor allowed in the making of rates. The foregoing dis-
cussion was considered essential to consideration of an underwriting profit for-
mula; with this as a basis, consideration must also be given to the investment
aspects.
The subject of investment profits was referred to in 1917 by Commissioner
McMaster of South Carolina, who expressed doubt that investment operations of
fire insurance companies were charged with their full share of expense.^^ In
1918, Commissioner Button implied that profits on the investment of unearned
premiums should be considered.^"
The Commissioners' 1921 formula provides that "No part of the so-called bank-
ing profit (or loss) should be considered in arriving at the underwriting profit
(or loss)."
The resolution presented by Commissioner Hyde of Missouri in 1923,^^ which
was defeated by the Convention took a dual position— that all activities of in-
surance companies must be considered in rate making, all earnings "charged" to
profit, yet he added "It is preposterous that the policyholders should be charged
rates to cover losses occasioned by extravagant methods or unsafe or speculative
investment of funds."
In Aetna v. Hyde, previously discussed, the Supreme Court of Missouri, after
extensive reasoning, but relying in the end on statutory language (Section 6281,
R.S. 1919, Insurance Laws of Missouri) found that "interest on unearned pre-
miums is an underwriting profit." However, in the concurrent Federal Court
case, Aetna v. Hyde, 34 F (2d) 185 (D.C. Mo. 1929), this court held that in-
terest on unearned premiums should not be included in calculating underwriting
income.
In Aetna v. Travis,, 124 Kan. 350, 259 Pac. 1068 (1927), the Supreme Court
of Kansas debated whether investment earnings should be considered. The trial
court had decided in' the negative and the Supreme Court split equally, so that
the point was left undetermined.
In the Virginia case, Aetna v. Commonwealth, 169 S.E. 859 (Va. 1933), the
Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the Virginia Corporation Com-
mission, which included a determination that "income from the investment of
29 "Proceedings," 1917, page 291.
30 "Proceedings," 1919, page 167.
31 "Proceedings," 1923, page 115 et seq.
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premium income which is being- held to meet presently existing but future pay-
able liabilities" is income produced by rates, and should be included in profits
produced by rates. In its brief in this case, the companies argued, in part
:
( 1 ) The amount of unearned premiums is a bookkeeping figure ; the cor-
responding assets are the property of the company, not of the policyholders.
(2) That such assets are not impressed with a trust in favor of the policy-
holders.
(3) Unearned premiums change each day and exist only as of given dates
and not as of periods of time.
(4) Term policies allow a reduction in rates for prepayment of premiums.
Gephart, in "Principles of Insurance," Volume II, page 236, states in defining
"trade profit," that it includes ''interest earned during the year at the average
rate received during the time on the unearned premium fund, first deducting
from it the unpaid premiums."
The subject was considered in a paper "Financial Analysis of American Stock
Fire Insurance Companies from 1926 to 1936 Inclusive" by Robert Baker Mit-
chell, 1939. Quoting from pages 26 and 27
:
"Some analysts maintain that a share of investment income should be allo-
cated to the underwriting end of the business. The argument for the inclu-
sion of a share of investment income in underwriting income usually centers
on the contribution to earnings of premiums collected in advance and of the
investment of the Unearned Premium Reserve. Premiums are collected, on
the average, for two years in advance, the period of time varying, becoming
longer when business is better and shorter in times of business depression.
It is argued that premiums earned are less per dollar of risk on long term
policies because of the discount allowed the insured on such policies and that
part of the income accruing from the investment of such premium should
be treated as earned from underwriting. Therefore, these analysts include
an arbitrary proportion of unearned premiums in underwriting income. The
proportion is arbitrary because there is no inductive method of allocating
such income. This is partly because there is apparently no way of deter-
mining accurately what proportion of cash on hand is held to take care of
pending claims and what is held awaiting proper investment.
"Many analysts who include part of investment income in underwriting
income assume as their base not only an arbitrary figure for investments but
also an arbitrary interest figure. Even if a low rate of interest is used and
does seem to produce conservative results, it is necessary also to consider
the amount of investment losses which may have been incurred through
write-downs or sales of securities. These losses are almost entirely ignored
by those who include investment income in underwriting income. If part of
the return from investments is to be credited to underwriting, then under-
writing should also accept investment risks including losses which might
have been incurred.
"While there may be some basis for believing that a portion of invest-
ment profit should go to underwriting profit, the difficulties of presenting
anything more than an arbitrary apportionment makes the adjustment in-
advisable."
For many years the publications of Alfred M. Best emphasized the necessity
for crediting underwriting earnings with interest on reserves, but more recently
has considered the adjustment to be of trifling importance, as indicated by the
following excerpt from Best's Insurance Reports— Fire and Marine, 1946 page
XIII:
"* * * insurance institutions hold in their possession funds representing
(a) the unearned portion of premiums paid at the beginning of the term for
insurance running for a stipulated period, (b) loss claims in process of ad-
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justment. Since the companies hold these funds solely because they transact
an insurance business, and since such funds, in the main, do not represent
contributions by the stockholder, but, on the contrary, have their origin prin-
cipally in the premiums collected, at least a part of the interest earned by
the companies upon the invested portion of these unearned premium and
loss reserves should be considered, from the economic standpoint, to be part
of the underwriting income, and adjusted with the underwriting profit or
loss as usually computed. How much of the interest earned upon such re-
serves is properly a credit to the underwriting account is a question involv-
ing the consideration of many details of the operations of insurance com-
panies. To illustrate, the unearned premium liability is computed from the
date policies take effect, whereas the insurance companies cannot collect
from their agents the premium due until from forty-five to ninety days later
;
and the agents retain their commission when remitting to the companies, so
that the latter do not receive all of the premiums reported in their state-
ments, but only the net percentage remitted by the agents. Moreover, fire
insurance companies must carry large cash balances, so that claims may be
paid without delay, which further tends to reduce the investment earnings.
Therefore, it would be a grave error to assume that the underwriting
accounts should be credited with interest upon the reserves, computed at the
average rate earned by the companies. Years ago we thought an assumed
interest rate of 3% was reasonable. This was reduced to lj4% in 1942. Be-
ginning with the 1944 edition this item was omitted from our statistical ex-
hibits because careful study proved that the calculation is now of relatively
trifling importance as only a portion of such reserves are invested and earn-
ing interest ; and interest rates are now very low."
Mr. Best gave similar testimony in the recent District of Columbia case, where
he estimated that the correct rate at that time for figuring investment return on
reserves was .49%, too slight to be recognized.
In arguing this case, the companies relied upon the provision in the 1921 for-
mula that investment income on reserves should not be considered, and on the
fact that the problem is under study by this committee. They also argued that
the use of such a factor does not take into account the effect of depressions on
investments and the need for maintaining large cash balances ; that most fire pol-
icies are written for terms, on which a discount is given; that underwriting has
nothing to do with the movement of monies.
The foregoing is a review of opinion and authorities as to the propriety of in-
cluding investment earnings in underwriting profits, and presumably would merit
the consideration of the Association whether the rate-making standard is estab-
lished as either "underwriting profit" or "profit."
Consideration should also be given to other phases that would merit attention
only if "profit" is the standard. Some attention was given in the Virginia case
to a proposal that the return to which an insurer is entitled should be based upon
capital, surplus and undivided profits. The Commission's Order and Opinion
states (page 40), "Capital and surplus plus any other undivided profits consti-
tute the only basis upon which the company may justly be deemed to be entitled
to any sum in compensation for the general hazard of the business or the extra
hazard of a conflagration." Later, the opinion adds, "The insurer is clearly en-
titled to some profit from the insurance business in which it is engaged in addi-
tion to what it may be able to make by the conservative investment of its capital
and surplus without subjecting them to the hazard of the insurance business."
It may be argued that establishing a rate of profit in relation to capital funds
would induce the investment or retention in the business of capital beyond all
proper requirements ; also, that such a standard would remove the incentive to
provide underwriting capacity, for a guarantee of a return based on capital funds
would remove the incentive to increase premium volume, and would in fact lead
companies to reduce their exposure to underwriting loss. The reverse of this
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argument would be that a return based on premiums leads to over-expansion, and
that capital is attracted only by the competitive necessity of maintaining an ade-
quate financial position.
Summary
This sub-committee has found the entire subject of the determination of under-
writing profit, or of profit alone, to be complex and replete with conflicting the-
ories. This report makes clear, however, that the Commissioners' 1921 Standard
Profit Formula has not gained full acceptance either in the courts or in the
authorities. Full opportunity should be afforded for further exploration of its
basic principles, including the use of earned premiums, incurred losses and in-
curred expenses, as well as the propriety of its exclusion of "banking" profit. In
particular, it is suggested that methods of correcting statutory underwriting
profit or loss which are reviewed herein be examined, including the establishment
of an accrual account for prepaid expense.
This report is offered for the consideration of all concerned, and no inference
should be drawn that the sub-committee has made a determination upon any
aspect of the matter. It is suggested that representatives of the industry and all
other interested parties be invited to submit briefs on the subject and that an
opportunity for hearings be given.
Respectfully submitted,
(Signed) W. Ellery Allyn, Connecticut
(Signed) C. F. J. Harrington, Massachusetts
(Signed) Robert E. Dineen, New York, Chairman
November 22, 1946.
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APPENDIX J
REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON RATES AND RATING
ORGANIZATIONS AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION
OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSUR-
ANCE COMMISSIONERS, NEW YORK,
N. Y., DECEMBER Z-7 , 1946
The Committee met at the Hotel Delmonico in New York City on December
3-6, 1946 and at the office of the New York Insurance Department on December
7. The following members were present
:
Charles F. J. Harrington, Massachusetts, Chairman
J. Edwin Larson, Florida
Newell R. Johnson, Minnesota
Robert E. Dineen, New York
Also present were the following Commissioners
:
John D. Pearson, Indiana
Donald Knowlton, New Hampshire
Walter Dressel, Ohio
William A. Sullivan, Washington
The following departmental personnel were also present
:
E. A. Faircloth, Florida
John K. Tilton, Florida
Robert D. Williams, Washington
George H. McAteer, Washington
Lloyd Yaudes, W^isconsin
Alfred J. Bohlinger, New York
Thomas C. Morrill, New York
Raymond Harris, New York
Victor Cohen, New York
At the same time there was a meeting of the All-Industry Committee and con-
sultations were held between the two committees during the progress of the
meetings.
The meeting of the Committee was devoted to a consideration of three main
subjects-— regulatory treatment of the accident and health business, treatment
of the Federal Trade Commission Act on a state level and proposed amendments
to the model rating bills. They will be discussed in this report in the order
named.
Accident and Health Insurance
Reference should be made to the report of this Committee for the meeting held
October 23-26, 1946.
The Accident and Health Subcommittee of the Sherman Act Subcommittee of
the All-Industry Committee submitted a report to this Committee which had pre-
viously been adopted by the All-Industry Committee. In substance, this report
incorporated a request to defer action on the accident and health regulatory
problem until December, 1947. The spokesman for the subcommittee presented
certain oral arguments to this Committee as to why action should be deferred.
The members of this Committee agreed unanimously that a postponement was
not in the public interest and that the industry and the Commissioners should
come to grips with the problem at this time. The Accident and Health Subcom-
mittee thereupon submitted to this Committee a proposed statute for dealing with
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certain aspects of the accident and health business patterned in some respects
along the lines of the proposals set forth in the report of October 23-26 and in
some respects similar to the plans now used in New York, New Jersey and
Florida.
At the October meeting certain representatives of the industry had stated to
this Committee that appropriate legal machinery had to be devised to regulate
activities in concert in the accident and health field. At this meeting, however,
the members of this Committee were informed that those companies which had
heretofore followed those practices would revise or adjust their procedures so as
to eliminate the necessity for any legislation at this time covering concerted activ-
ities. At the October meeting it was pointed out that those companies which
acted in concert in the accident and health field transacted a relatively small pro-
portion of the business. In view of this determination this Committee concluded
that there was no occasion at this time to draft any legislation dealing with con-
certed activities and for that reason a less detailed form of legislation was con-
sidered.
Attached hereto and marked Exhibit A is a draft of proposed legislation en-
dorsed by the Accident and Health Subcommitte and the All-Industry Committee
and which was approved by this Committee as a satisfactory method of regu-
lating certain activities in the accident and health business. It is the product of
many hours of debate and of compromises on both sides. It will be noted that
this proposed bill provides for the filing of all policies, endorsements, etc., as
well as premium rates. It contains a provision enabling the Commissioner to
disapprove any policy provision or provisions which are unjust, unfair, inequi-
table, misleading, deceptive or which encourage misrepresentation of such policy.
It contains an additional provision enabling the Commissioner to disapprove the
policy "if the benefits provided therein are unreasonable in relation to the pre-
mium charged." This provision was incorporated in the bill to provide a Com-
missioner with an effective method of dealing with those companies which have
persisted in writing policies providing benefits which are not reasonable in rela-
tion to the premium charged. Under this bill the Commissioner will be able to
prohibit the use of policies which are fraudulent or manifestly unfair to the
public.
It will be noted that this bill provides a much less detailed regulatory ma-
chinery than that provided in the model fire and casualty rating bills. The
reasons for providing different administrative machinery for dealing with this
particular phase of the business is set forth in our report of October 23-26. This
bill does not attempt to deal with all improper or deceptive practices in the acci-
dent and health field. Such activities are covered in the unfair trade practices
act set forth later and will be discussed under the heading of "Unfair and De-
ceptive Practices in the Insurance Business".
Attention is particularly directed to the footnote on the accident and health
regulatory bill. The degree of existing regulation of this field varies from state
to state. Many different types of carriers are engaged in this business, some of
whose activities are regulated under specific statutes or sections of the statutes
relating to the individual type of carrier. In states which adopt the form of
regulation set forth in Exhibit A, it will be necessary to integrate this statute
with the overall regulatory scheme in order to avoid conflicts and duplications
and at the same time to make sure that this line of the business is adequately
regulated irrespective of the type of carrier engaged in carrying on the business.
Unfair and Deceptive Practices in the Insurance Business
Reference is made to the October 23-26 report of this Committee under the
heading, "Eederal Trade Commission Act". That report outlined a number of
alternative methods of dealing with the subjects embraced within the Federal
Trade Commission Act on a state level and for that reason we shall not restate
these optional methods of treatment of this problem in this report.
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Following a series of conferences between the All-Industry Committee and this
Committee and an adjustment of certain ideas set forth in the proposals of both
committees, a proposed bill was prepared, a copy of which is annexed hereto and
marked Exhibit B. An initial draft of this bill, dated December 3, 1946, was
approved by a majority vote of the All-Industry Committee and is on file with
this Committee, but the draft attached contains certain additional changes made
by this Committee upon which the All-Industry Committee has not yet had an
opportunity to act.
From the first the members of this Committee have felt that if the problems
created by the S.E.U.A. case and U. S. Public Law 15 were to be solved upon
a state level, it was necessary to devise an integrated program. The job could
not be done by a patchwork approach; the parts had to fit together within the
contemplation of U. S. Public Law 15. This point can best be illustrated by a
reference to the situation which confronted this Committee in connection with
conditions in the accident and health business. As we pointed out in our previous
report, it is a known fact that there are a number of companies operating in that
business which provide inadequate policy benefits at excessive prices. This situ-
ation could not continue. The problem was how to regulate it. Should it be
done by a rate regulatory bill such as the model bills ? Should it be treated
through a bill of the type set forth earlier in this report ? Should it be regulated
under an omnibus unfair trade practices act at a state level? If a decision was
reached not to deal with this problem under a bill similar to the model rating bills
and if no accident and health bill of the type set forth earlier in this report was
adopted, it was apparent that in order to cope with the situation an extremely
flexible unfair trade practices act was required. In the illustration given this
Committee has presupposed that the states wanted to cope with this problem on
a state level ; otherwise existing federal acts designed to cope with this problem
would become automatically operative after January 1, 1948. Similar illustra-
tions could be given in other branches of the business.
This brings us to a consideration of Exhibit B. That bill may be described as
an unfair and deceptive practices act containing prohibitions against certain enu-
merated practices and an omnibus provision designed to cover unenumerated
practices. It is the belief of this Committee that to the extent possible this act
provides adequate machinery for dealing with the scope of the Federal Trade
Commission act on a state level. We do not claim that this act can prevent the
Federal Trade Commission from exercising the broad powers conferred upon it
to act as the investigatory agent of Congress.
In the drafting of this bill certain prohibited practices have been set forth.
Most practices in the insurance business inimical to the public welfare are well
known and may be defined in a bill of this type. However, these practices some-
times vary from state to state and consequently legislation which might be neces-
sary in one state would not be necessary in another. The Committee emphasizes
that where this legislation is introduced consideration should be given to the
purely local problems of the state in drafting the definitive section of the bill.
It will be noted that under this proposed bill, while power is conferred upon
the Commissioner to issue cease and desist orders in connection with the enu-
merated practices, his power in connection with the unenumerated practices is
limited. Authority has ,been given to him to initiate proceedings, subpoena wit-
nesses, conduct hearings and make findings as to unenumerated practices. How-
ever, before his findings may be enforced it is necessary to bring an action in
court through the medium of the Attorney General of the state. That this pro-
cedure is more circuitous than one giving the Commissioner power to issue cease
and desist orders in any case is apparent. In considering this more restrictive
form of administrative procedure the Committee was influenced by certain con-
siderations : ( 1 ) Because of the experience of the states in regulating the business
over a period of many years, unfair and deceptive practices are well known to
the regulatory authorities and consequently should be set forth in the statute
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itself. This procedure, in the opinion of the Committee, is to be commended be-
cause under it people subject to the law know in advance what they may not do.
(2) Although the history of state legislation in the insurance business extends
back to 1807, until the present time no state had ever found it necessary to create
a state counterpart of the Federal Trade Commission Act, or to entrust to state
regulatory officials the specific power contained in the attached bill. The defini-
tive approach had been uniformly followed. In so far as the proposed statute is
concerned, state regulation is about to enter a new and broader regulatory field
in which we should seek an enlargement of procedural authority only as its need
is demonstrated.
If an adequate, overall regulatory pattern is enacted, including a comprehen-
sive enumeration of prohibited practices, the Committee was of the opinion that
there should be relatively few occasions for the use of this omnibus provision.
In this connection it must be remembered that that provision of the omnibus sec-
tion enabling the Commissioner to initiate proceedings, hold hearings and make
a report should in many instances deter those who are engaged in questionable
practices, thus eliminating the necessity for court procedure. If experience dem-
onstrates that a considerable number of cases arise under the omnibus clause, it
may well be that additional defined practices should be enumerated or that a
more direct administrative procedure will be required.
Proposed Amendments to the Model Rating Bills
Attached to this report (marked Exhibit C) is a report of the Sherman Act
Subcommittee of the All-Industry Committee dated December 5, 1946, contain-
ing proposed amendments to the model rating bills. The All-Industry Committee
by a majority vote adopted the report of its Sherman Act Subcommittee recom-
mending these changes. This Committee gave careful consideration to the pro-
posed amendments but time did not permit sufficient discussion to enable the
members of this Committee to reach a final conclusion and for that reason no
action was taken by this Committee upon the proposals.
The Committee completed its labors at a late hour on Saturady night, Decem-
ber 7, in order to have this material mimeographed for distribution to the mem-
bers of the Association when the mid-year meeting convenes on Sunday, at 2:30
P.M. While every effort was made to guard against inaccuracies, time did not
permit as careful and detailed a check of the language as the Committee would
have preferred. At the first opportunity the Committee will review this material
and make whatever editorial corrections may be necessary.
There were certain phases of the proposed bills which require additional study.
Furthermore, the Committee felt that upon further consideration it might well
be advisable to include in the definitive sections certain additional practices not
enumerated. A proposed solution of the interstate advertising problem was ex-
plored preliminarily but no final conclusion was reached and this subject requires
additional study. A supplemental report will be issued covering these phases of
the matter at the earliest opportunity, for the Committee has kept constantly in
mind the fact that many state legislatures will be meeting in January, 1947.
Respectfully submitted,
Charles F. J. Harrington, Massachusetts, Chairman
J. Edwin Larson, Florida
Newell R. Johnson, Minnesota
Robert E. Dineen, New York
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EXHIBIT A
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO LAW FOR PERSONAL ACCIDENT
AND HEALTH INSURANCE
A. No policy of insurance against loss or expense from the sickness, or
from the bodily injury or death by accident of the insured shall be issued or
delivered to any person in this State nor shall any application, rider or en-
dorsement be used in connection therewith until a copy of the form thereof
and of the classification of risks and the premium rates, or, in the case of
co-operatives or assessment companies the estimated cost pertaining thereto
have been filed v^ith the Commissioner of Insurance.
B. No such policy shall be issued, nor shall any application, rider or en-
dorsement be used in connection therewith, until the expiration of 30 days
after it has been so filed unless the Commissioner shall sooner give his
written approval thereto.
C. The Commissioner may, within 30 days after the filing of any such form,
disapprove such form (1) if the benefits provided therein are unreasonable
in relation to the premium charged, or (2) if it contains a provision or pro-
visions which are unjust, unfair, inequitable, misleading, deceptive or en-
courage misrepresentation of such policy. If the Commissioner shall notify
the insurer which has filed any such form that it does not comply with the
provisions of this section or sections, (insert here appro-
priate references to the Standard Provision Section and any other relevant
sections) it shall be unlawful thereafter for such insurer to issue such form
or use it in connection with any policy. In such notice the Commissioner
shall specify the reasons for his disapproval and state that a hearing will be
granted within 20 days after request in writing by the insurer.
D. The Commissioner may at any time, after a hearing of which not less
than 20 days' written notice shall have been given to the insurer, withdraw
his approval of any such form on any of the grounds stated in this section.
It shall be unlawful for the insurer to issue such form or use it in connection
with any policy after the effective date of such withdrawal of approval. The
notice of any hearing called under this paragraph shall specify the matters
to be considered at such hearing and any decision affirming disapproval or
directing withdrawal of approval under this section shall be in writing and
shall specify the reasons therefor.
E. Any order or decision of the Commissioner under this section shall be
subject to review by appeal (writ or certiorari) to the Court
at the instance of any party in interest. In the case of disapproval or with-
drawal of approval of a form previously in use the court shall determine
whether the filing of the appeal (petition for such writ) shall operate as a
stay of any such order or decision. The court may, in disposing of the
issue before it, modify, affirm or reverse the order or decision of the Com-
missioner in w^hole or in part.
Explanatory Notes:
Subsection "E" shopld be omitted in any state which has a specific general
provision for appeal from the review of decisions of the Commissioner of
Insurance. The scope of the review should be revised to conform to the
policy of the state in which this bill is introduced. Provisions for filings by
fraternal benefit societies may be included in this section in the case of
states having no other applicable provisions for such societies.
A more detailed explanation as to the manner of integrating this statute into
existing Insurance Laws will be set forth in an addendum to be issued by
this Committee following the December, 1946 meeting.
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EXHIBIT B
AN ACT RELATING TO UNFAIR PRACTICES IN THE BUSINESS
OF INSURANCE
Section 1 — Purpose
The purpose of this Act is to regulate the trade practices in the business of
insurance, in accordance with the intent of Congress as expressed in Public Law
15— 79th Congress, by defining, or providing for the determination of, all acts,
methods, and practices which constitute unfair methods of competition and unfair
,
or deceptive acts and practices in this state, and to prohibit the same.
] Secion 2— Definitions (As Used in this Act) :
(a) "Persons" shall mean any individual, corporation, association, partner-
ship, reciprocal exchange, inter-insurer, Lloyds insurers, fraternal benefit society
and any other legal entity, engaged in the business of insurance, including agents,
i brokers, and adjusters.
(b) ("Commissioner") shall mean the ("Commissioner") of Insurance of this
State.
Section 3— Unfair Methods and Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices Pro-
hibited
No person shall engage in this state in unfair methods of competition or in
unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of the business of insurance.
Section 4— Methods, Acts and Practices Which are Defined Herein as Unfair
or Deceptive
(a) The following are declared to be unfair methods of competition and unfair
or deceptive acts and practices in the business of insurance
:
(1) Misrepresentations and False Advertising of Policy Contracts. Mak-
ing, issuing, circulating, or causing to be made, issued, circulated, any esti-
mate, illustration, circular or statement misrepresenting the terms of any
policy issued or to be issued or the benefits or advantages promised thereby,
or the dividends or share of the surplus to be received thereon, or making
any false or misleading statement as to the dividends or share of surplus
previously paid on similar policies, or making any misleading representation
or any misrepresentation as to the financial condition of any insurer, or as
to the legal reserve system upon which any life insurer operates, or using
any name or title of any policy or class of policies misrepresenting the true
nature thereof, or making any misrepresentation to any policy holder insured
in any company for the purpose of inducing or tending to induce such policy-
holder to lapse, forfeit, or surrender his insurance.
(2) False Information and Advertising Generally. Making, publishing,
disseminating, circulating, or placing before the public, or causing, directly
or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, or placed be-
fore the public, in a newspaper, magazine or other publication, or in the
form of a notice, circular, pamphlet, letter or poster, or over any radio
station, or in any other way, an advertisement, announcement or statement
containing any assertion, representation or statement with respect to the
business of insurance or with respect to any person in the conduct of his
insurance business, which is untrue, deceptive or misleading.
(3) Defamation. Making, publishing, disseminating, or circulating, di-
rectly or indirectly, or aiding, abetting or encouraging the making, publish-
ing, disseminating or circulating of any oral or written statement or any
pamphlet, circular, article or literature which is false, or maliciously critical
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of or derogatory to the financial condition of an insurer, and which is calcu-
lated to injure any person engaged in the business of insurance.
(4) Boycott, Coercion and Intimidation. Entering into any agreement
to commit, or individually or by any concerted action committing any act of
boycott, coercion or intimidation resulting or tending to result in unreason-
able restraint of, or a monopoly in, the business of insurance.
(5) False Financial Statements. Filing with any supervisory or other
public official, or making, publishing, disseminating, circulating or delivering
to any person, or placing before the public, or causing directly or indirectly,
to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, delivered to any person, or
placed before the public, any false statement of financial condition of an in-
surer with intent to deceive.
Making any false entry in any book, report or statement of any insurer
with intent to deceive any agent or examiner lawfully appointed to examine
into its condition or into any of its affairs, or any public official to which
such insurer is required by law to report, or which has authority by law to
examine into its condition or into any of its affairs, or, with like intent, wil-
fully omitting to make a true entry of any material fact pertaining to the
business of such msurer in any book, report or statement of such insurer.
(6) Stock Operations and Advisory Board Contracts. Issuing or deliver-
ing or permitting agents, officers, or employees to issue or deliver, agency
company stock or other capital stock, or benefit certificates or shares in any
common-law corporation, or securities or any special or advisory board con-
tracts or other contracts of any kind promising returns and profits as an
inducement to insurance.
(7) Unfair Discrimination, (a) Making or permitting any unfair discrim-
ination between individuals of the same class and equal expectation of life
in the rates charged for any contract of life insurance or of life annuity or
in the dividends or other benefits payable thereon, or in any other of the
terms and conditions of such contract, provided that, in determining the
class, consideration may be given to the nature of the risk, plan of insur-
ance, the actual or expected expense of conducting the business or any other
relevant factor.
(b) *Making or permitting any unfair discrimination between individuals
of the same class involving essentially the same hazards in the amount of
premium, policy fees, or rates charged for any policy or contract of acci-
dent or health insurance or in the benefits payable thereunder, or in any of
the terms or conditions of such contract, or in any other manner whatever,
provided that, in determining the class, consideration may be given to the
nature of the risk, plan of insurance, the actual or expected expense of con-
ducting the business or any other relevant factor.
8. Rebates, (a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, know-
-
ingly permitting or offering to make or making any contract of life insur-
ance, life annuity or accident and health insurance, or agreement as to such i
contract other than as plainly expressed in the contract issued thereon, or
paying or allowing, or giving or offering to pay, allow, or give, directly or
indirectly, as inducement to such insurance, or annuity, any rebate or pre-
miums payable on the contract, or any special favor or advantage in the
dividends or other benefits thereon, or any valuable consideration or induce-
ment whatever not specified in the contract; or giving, or selling, or pur-
chasing or offering to give, sell, or purchase as inducement to such insurance
or annuity or in connection therewith, any stocks, bonds, or other securities
* In the event that unfair discrimination in connection with accident and health coverage is treated
in other statutes the above section should be omitted.
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of any insurance company or other corporation, association, or partnership,
or any dividends or profits accrued thereon, or anything of value whatsoever
not specified in the contract.
(b) Nothing in clause (7) or paragraph (a) of Clause (8) of this sub-
section shall be construed as including within the definition of discrimination
or rebates any of the following practices: (i) paying bonuses to policy-
holders or otherwise abating their premiums in whole or in part out of sur-
plus accumulated from non-participating insurance, provided that any such
bonuses or abatement of premiums shall be fair and equitable to policyholders
and for the best interests of the company and its policyholders: (ii) in the
case of life insurance policies issued on the industrial debit plan, making
allowance to policyholders who have continuously for a specified period made
premium payments directly to an office of the insurer in an amount which
fairly represents the saving in collection expense; (iii) readjustment of the
rate of premium for a group insurance policy based on the loss or expense
experience thereunder, at the end of the first year or of any subsequent year
of insurance thereunder, which may be made retroactive only for such policy
year.
(9) Requiring as a condition precedent to loaning money upon the se-
curity of a mortgage upon real property, that the owner of the property to
whom the money is to be loaned, negotiate any policy of insurance covering
such real property through a particular insurance agent or broker or brokers,
provided, however, that this provision shall not prevent the exercise by any
insurance company of its right to approve or disapprove of the insurance
company selected by the borrower to underwrite the insurance.
(Note: Each state may add such additional definitive acts as may be considered necessary or
desirable.)
(10) Any violation of any one of Sections ''-
(b) The enumeration in this Act of specific unfair methods of competition
and unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the business of insurance is not
exclusive or restrictive or intended to limit the powers of the (commis-
sioner) or any court of review under the provisions of Section 11 of this
Act.
Section 5— Power of (Commissioner)
The (commissioner) shall have power to examine and investigate into the
' affairs of every person engaged in the business of insurance in order to determine
whether such person has been or is engaged in any unfair method of competition
or in any unfair act or practice.
Section 6— Notice of Hearing
If the (commissioner) shall have reason to believe that any person is engaging
in this state in any unfair method of competition or in any unfair or deceptive
act or practice in the conduct of such business, as enumerated in subsection (a)
of Section 4, and that a proceeding by him in respect thereto would be to the
interests of the public, he shall issue and serve upon such person a statement of
Ik the charges and a notice of a hearing thereon to be held at a time and place fixed
in the notice, which shall not be less than .... days from the date of service
thereof.
Section 7— Hearing, Witnesses, Production of Books
At the time and place fixed for the hearing before the (commissioner), such
person shall have an opportunity to be heard and to show cause why an order
should not be made by the (commissioner) requiring such person to cease and
1 Insert section numbers of any other sections of the Insurance Law which it is deemed desirable
or necessary to include as an unfair trade practice.
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desist from the acts, methods or practices so complained of. The (commissioner)
upon such hearing may administer oaths, examine and cross-examine witnesses,
receive oral and documentary evidence, and shall have the power to subpoena
witnesses, compel their attendance, and require the production of books, papers,
records, correspondence, or other documents which he deems relevant to the in-
quiry. The (commissioner), upon such hearing may, and upon the request of
any party shall, cause to be made a written record of all the evidence offered or
introduced and proceedings had at such hearing.
Nothing in this Act contained shall require the observance at any hearing of
formal rules of pleading or evidence.
Section 8— Appearances.
Upon good cause shown, the (commissioner) may permit any person to inter-
vene, appear and be heard at such hearing.
Section 9— Cease and Desist Order and Review
If after hearing the (commissioner) shall determine that the acts, methods or
practices which are the subject of the inquiry are defined in subsection (a) of
Section 4, and shall be of the opinion that the person complained of has engaged
in such acts or practices in violation of the provisions of such subsection, he shall
reduce his findings to writing and shall issue and cause to be served on the per-
son charged with the violation of law an order requiring such person to cease
and desist from such method, act or practice. Until the expiration of the time
allowed for filing a (notice of appeal) (petition for writ of certiorari), if no
such (notice of appeal) (petition for such writ) has been duly filed within such
time, or, if a (notice of appeal) (petition for such writ) has been filed within
such time, then until the transcript of the record in the proceeding has been filed
in the court, as hereinafter provided, the (commissioner) may at any
time, upon such notice and in such manner as he shall deem proper, modify or
set aside, in whole or in part, any report or any order made or issued by him
under this section. After the expiration of the time allowed for filing a (notice
of appeal) (petition for writ of certiorari), if no such (notice of appeal) (peti-
tion for such writ) has been duly filed within such time, the (commissioner)
may at any time, after notice and opportunity for hearing, reopen and alter,
modify, or set aside, in whole or in part, any report or order made or issued by
him under this section, whenever in his opinion conditions of fact or of law have
so changed as to require such action or if the public interest shall so require.
(b) Any order of the (commissioner) directing any person to cease and desist
from using any method of competition or act or practice shall be subject to re-
view
(here insert language describing scope of review)
by (appeal) (writ of certiorari) to (the court) of
county.^ The court shall determine whether the filing of the (appeal) (petition
for such writ) shall operate as a stay of such order of the (commissioner). The
court may, in disposing of the issue before it, modify, affirm, or reverse the order
of the (commissioner) in whole or in part. To the extent that the order of the
(commissioner) is affirmed or modified, the court shall issue its own order com-
manding obedience to the terms of the order of the (commissioner).
3 The county in which the seat of government is located. If time within which appeal must be
taken should be limited, insert such provision.
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(c) No order of the (commissioner) or judgment of the court to enforce the
same shall in any wise relieve or absolve any person from any liability under any
other laws of this state.
(d) An order of the (commissioner) to cease and desist shall become final—
(1) upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a (notice of appeal)
(petition for writ of certiorari), if no such (notice of appeal) (petition for
such writ) has been duly filed within such time; or
(2) upon a final decision of the court if a judicial review has been sought
of the order of the (commissioner).
(e) If the report of the (commissioner) does not charge a violation of this
Act, then any party to the proceeding, including any intervenor, may within ....
days after the service of such report cause a like petition to be filed in the
.... court of county for a view of the report of the (commissioner).
Section 10— Penalty
Any person who violates an order of the (commissioner) to cease and desist
after it has become final, and while such order is in effect, shall forfeit and pay
to the state of a civil penalty of not more than $5,000 for each vio-
lation, which may be recovered in a civil action.
Section 11 — Procedure as to Undefined Methods of Unfair Competition or De-
ceptive Acts and Practices
(a) If the (commissioner) shall have reason to believe that any person en-
gaged in the business of insurance is engaging in this state in any method of
competition or in any act or practice in the conduct of such business other than
those enumerated in subsection (a) of Section 4, and that such method is an un-
fair method of competition or that such act or practice is unfair or deceptive,
and that a proceeding by him in respect thereto would be to the interest of the
public, he may, after a hearing held upon notice as provided in Section 6, make
a report in writing in which he shall state his findings as to the facts and serve
a copy thereof upon such person.
(b) If such report charges a violation of this Act and if such method of com-
petition, act or practice has not been discontinued, the (commissioner) may,
through the Attorney General of this state, at any time after .... days after
the service of such report cause a petition to be filed in the court
of this state within the district wherein the person resides or has his principal
place of business, to enjoin and restrain such person from engaging in such
method, act or practice. The court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and
shall have power to make and enter appropriate orders in connection therewith
and to issue such writs as are ancillary to its jurisdiction or are necessary in its
judgment to prevent injury to the public pendente lite.
(c) A transcript of the proceedings before the (commissioner) including all
evidence taken and the report and findings shall be filed with such petition. If
either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and
shall show, to the satisfaction of the court, that such additional evidence is ma-
terial and there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence
in the proceeding before the (commissioner) the court may order such additional
evidence to be taken before the (commissioner) and to be adduced upon the
hearing in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the court may
seem proper. The (commissioner) may modify his findings of the facts or make
new findings by reason of the additional evidence so taken, and he shall file such
modified or new findings with the return of such additional evidence.
(d) If in the judgment of the court the method of competition complained of
is unfair or the act or practice complained of is unfair or deceptive, and the pro-
ceeding by the (commissioner) with respect to such method of competition, act
or practice is of interest to the public, and the findings of the (commissioner)
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are supported by the weight of the evidence/ it shall issue its order enjoining
and restraining the continuance of such method of competition, act or practice.
Section 12— Procedure Additional
The powers vested in the (commissioner) by this Act, shall be in addition to
any other powers to enforce any penalties, fines or forfeitures authorized by law
with respect to the methods, acts and practices hereby declared to be unfair or
deceptive.
Section 13— Punishment for Failure to Obey Subpoena
In case of refusal of any person to comply with any subpoena issued hereunder
or to testify to any matter to which he may be lawfully interrogated, the
court of county or the county where said party resides on
application of the (commissioner) may issue an order requiring such person to
comply with such subpoena and to testify ; and any failure to obey such order of
the court may be punished by the court as a contempt thereof.
Section 14— Immunity from Prosecution
If any person shall ask to be excused from attending and testifying or from
producing any books, papers, records, correspondence or other documents at any
hearing on the ground that the testimony or evidence required of him may tend
to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, and shall notwith-
standing be directed to give such testimony or produce such evidence, he must
none the less comply with such direction, but he shall not thereafter be prose-
cuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transac-
tion, matter or thing concerning which he may testify or produce evidence pur-
suant thereto, and no testimony so given or evidence produced shall be received
against him upon any criminal action, investigation or proceeding, provided,
however, that no such individual so testifying shall be exempt from prosecution
or punishment for any perjury committed by him while so testifying and the
testimony or evidence so given or produced shall be admissible against him upon
any criminal action, investigation or proceeding concerning such perjury, nor
shall he be exempt from the refusal, revocation or suspension of any license, per-
mission or authority conferred, or to be conferred, pursuant to the Insurance Law
of this state. Any such individual may execute, acknowledge and file in the
office of the (commissioner) a statement expressly waiving such immunity or
privilege in respect to any transaction, matter or thing specified in such state-
ment and thereupon the testimony of such person or such evidence in relation to
such transaction, matter or thing may be received or produced before any judge
or justice, court, tribunal, grand jury or otherwise, and if so received or pro-
duced such individual shall not be entitled to any immunity or privilege on
account of any testimony he may so give or evidence so produced.
Section 15— Constitutionality
If any section, subsection, subdivision, paragraph, sentence or clause of this
Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, such decision shall not affect the remain-
ing portions of this Act.
4 The reference to the evidence required upon hearings before the court concerns itself with rules
of evidence. The rules of evidence vary in dilTerent jurisdictions. Appropriate language is to be
used in each state.
Part I cclv
EXHIBIT C
December 5, 1946
REPORT OF THE SHERMAN ACT SUBCOMMITTEE
The Conference Committee, after careful consideration of the proposals of the
National Association of Independent Insurers, recommended the adoption of the
following amendments to the Casualty and Surety and Fire, Marine and Inland
Marine Rate Regulatory Bills:
Section 4(a) of the Casualty Bill is amended to read as follows:
(a) Every insurer shall file with the (commissioner) every manual of
classifications, rules and rates, every rating plan and every modification of
any of the foregoing which it proposes to use. Every such filing shall state
the proposed effective date thereof, and shall indicate the character and ex-
tent of the coverage contemplated. When a filing is not accompanied by
the information upon which the insurer supports such filing^ and the (com-
missioner) does not have sufficient information to determine whether s%ich
filing meets the requirements of the Act, he may reqinre such insurer to
furnish the information upon which it supports such filing. Any filing may
be supported by (1) the experience or judgment of the insurer or rating
organisation making the filing, (2) the experience of other insurers or
rating organizations, or (3) any other factors which the insurer or rating
organization deems relevant. A filing and any supporting information shall
be open to public inspection after the filing becomes effective.
Section 4(a) of the Fire Bill is amended to read as follows
:
(a) Every insurer shall file with the (commissioner), except as to inland
marine risks which by general custom of the business are not written accord-
ing to manual rates or rating plans, every manual, minimum, class rate,
rating schedule or rating plan and every other rating rule, and every modifi-
cation of any of the foregoing which it proposes to use. Every such filing
shall state the proposed effective date thereof, and shall indicate the char-
acter and extent of the coverage contemplated. When a filing is not accomr-
panied by the information upon zuhich the insurer supports such filing, and
the (commissioner) does not have sufficient information to determine
zvhether such filing meets the requirements of the Act, he may require such
insurer to furnish the information upon zvhich it supports such filing. Any
filing may be supported by (1) the experience or judgment of the insurer
or rating organization making the filing, (2) the experience of other insurers
or rating organizations, or (3) any other factors zvhich the insurer or rating
organization deems relevant. A filing and any supporting information shall
be open to public inspection after the filing becomes effective. Specific in-
land marine rates on risks specially rated, made by a rating organization,
shall be filed with the (commissioner).
Section 5 of the Casualty Bill is amended by adding thereto the following
new subsection
:
(e) No manual of classifications, ride, rating plan, rating system, plan of
operation or any modification of any of the foregoing which establishes
standards for measuring variations in hazards or expense provisions, or
both, shall be disapproved if the rates thereby produced meet the require-
ments of this Act.
Section 5 of the Fire Bill is amended by adding thereto the following new
subsection
No manual, minimum, class rate, rating schedide, rating plan, rating
ating system, plan of operation or any modification of any of the fore-
(e)
rule, r m
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going shall be disapproved if the rates thereby produced meet the require-
ments of this Act.
These amendments were offered and adopted for the purpose of avoiding pos-
sible misinterpretation of the intent of the sections amended. The amendments
do not represent a departure in principle from the Bills as approved at Portland,
Oregon, in June, 1946.
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON RATES
AND RATING ORGANIZATIONS AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION
OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE
COMMISSIONERS
NEW YORK, N. Y., DECEMBER 3-7, 1946
The purpose of this supplemental report is to call attention to certain items
contained in Exhibit B (An Act Relating to Unfair Practices in the Business of
Insurance) attached to the report heretofore made by this Committee. In order
that the members of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners may
have all available material, there is attached hereto the proposed bill covering un-
fair trade practices which was submitted to your Committee by the All-Industry
Committee, being the revision of December 3, 1946.
Section 2(a). The words "including agents, brokers and adjusters" are
new. The All-Industry Committee suggested adding agents and brokers and
your Committee proposed that adjusters be included in the definitions.
Section 4(a) (1). The words "or the dividends or share of the surplus to
be received thereon, or making any false or misleading statement as to the
dividends or share of surplus previously paid on similar policies, or making
any misleading representation or any misrepresentation as to the financial
condition of any insurer, or as to the legal reserve system upon which any
life insurer operates," have been added by your Committee.
Section 4(a) (2). The words "or placing before the public, or causing,"
have been added by your Committee.
Section 4(a) (3). The words "of or derogatory to the financial condition
of an insurer," have been added by your Committee.
Section 4(a) (4). The words "or individually" have been added by your
Committee.
Section 4(a) (5). In place of the words "any financial statement or an
insurer which does not accurately state its true financial condition" contained
in the All-Industry revision of December 3rd, your Committee has proposed
the words "any false statement of financial condition of an insurer with intent
to deceive." The entire second paragraph concerning the making of false
entries in books, etc. has been proposed by your Committee.
Section 4(a) (7) (a). The words "involving essentially the same hazards,
expense elements" contained in the All-Industry revision of December 3rd
have been omitted and the words "provided that, in determining the class,
consideration may be given to the nature of the risk, plan of insurance, the
actual or expected expense of conducting the business or any other relevant
factor" have been proposed by the All-Industry Committee.
Section 4(a) (7) (b). The words "and expense elements" contained in
the All-Industry revision of December 3rd have been omitted. The All-
Industry Committee proposed the words "or in any other manner whatever,
provided that, in determining the class, consideration may be given to the
nature of the risk, plan of insurance, the actual or expected expense of con-
ducting the business or any other relevant factor."
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Section 4(a) (8) (a). The words "knowingly permitting or offering to
make or" and "or paying or allowing, or giving or offering to pay, allow, or
give, directly or indirectly," have been proposed by your committee.
Section 4(a) (8) (b). The words "provided that any such bonuses or
abatement of premiums shall be fair and equitable to policyholders and for
the best interests of the company and its policyholders ; in the case of life
insurance policies issued on the industrial debit plan," have been proposed
by your committee.
Section 4(a) (9). This entire subsection was proposed by your Committee.
Section 4(a) (10). This is a revision of Section 4(a) (9) of the All-
Industry revision of December 3rd. The words which have been deleted
represent a purely editorial change.
Section 4(b). The change in the last line of this subsection is purely edi-
torial and was necessitated by changes in section numbering.
Section 6 of the All-Industry revision of December 3rd covering the subject
of multiple state advertising by foreign or alien insurers has been omitted in its
entirety.
Concerning the foregoing changes, your Committee has not explored them
thoroughly and the same may be said in so far as the All-Industry Committee is
concerned.
Regarding the balance of Exhibit A attached to your Committee's report, Sec-
tions 6 and 14 are new sections which have been proposed by your Committee.
Section 9 has been adopted from the draft of bill marked Exhibit "D" attached
to your Committee's report of October 23-26, 1946.
Section 11 has been adopted from Section 5 of the All-Industry revision of
December 3rd with such changes as have been necessitated in procedure arising
from the fact that Section 5 of the All-Industry revision of December 3rd em-
braced in one section the procedures embodied in Sections 9 and 11 of Exhibit
"A" attached to your Committee's report of December 2)-7 , 1946.
None of the foregoing four sections, namely, 7,9, 11 and 14, has been consid-
ered by the All-Industry Committee.
Your Committee has given no consideration to the problems arising out of the
Clayton Act. Due to insufficient time your Committee has been unable to con-
sider this subject.
Respectfully submitted,
Charles F. J. Harrington, Massachusetts, Chairman
J. Edwin Larson, Florida
Newell R. Johnson, Minnesota
Robert E. Dineen, New York
Maynard Garrison, California
Revision of December 3rd
AN ACT RELATING TO UNFAIR PRACTICES IN THE BUSINESS
OF INSURANCE
Section 1 — Purpose
The purpose of this Act is to regulate the trade practices in the business of
insurance, in accordance with the intent of Congress as expressed in Public Law
15— 79th Congress, by defining, or providing for the determination of, all acts,
methods, and practices which constitute unfair methods of competition and unfair
or deceptive acts and practices in this state, and to prohibit the same.
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Section 2— Definitions (As Used in this Act)
(a) "Person" shall mean any individual, corporation, association, partner-
ship, reciprocal exchange, inter-insurer, Lloyds insurers, fraternal benefit
society and any other legal entity, engaged in the business of insurance.
(b) ("Commissioner") shall mean the ("Commissioner") of Insurance of
this state.
Section 3— Unfair Methods and Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices Pro-
hibited
No person shall engage in this state in unfair methods of competition or in un-
fair or deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of the business of insurance.
Section 4(a) — Methods, Acts and Practices Which are Defined Herein as Un-
fair or Deceptive
The following are declared to be unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts and practices in the business of insurance
:
(1) Misrepresentations and False Advertising of Policy Contracts. Mak-
ing, issuing, circulating, or causing to be made, issued, circulated, any esti-
mate, illustration, circular, or statement, the terms of any policy issued or to
be issued or the benefits or advantages promised thereby, or the dividends or
share of the surplus to be received thereon, or using any name or title of any
policy or class of policies misrepresenting the true nature thereof, or making
any misrepresentation to any person insured in any company for the purpose
of inducing or tending to induce a policyholder in any company to lapse,
forfeit, or surrender his insurance.
(2) False Information and Advertising Generally. Making, publishing,
disseminating, circulating, or placing before the public, or causing, directly
or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, or placed before
the public, in a newspaper, magazine or other publication, or in the form of
a notice, circular, pamphlet, letter or poster, or over any radio station, or in
any other way, an advertisement, announcement or statement containing any
assertion, representation or statement with respect to the business of insur-
ance or with respect to any person in the conduct of his insurance business,
which is untrue, deceptive or misleading.
(3) Defamation. Making, publishing, disseminating, or circulating, di-
rectly or indirectly, or aiding, abetting or encouraging the making, publish-
ing, disseminating or circulating of any oral or written statement or any
pamphlet, circular, article or literature which is false or maliciously critical
and which is calculated to injure any person engaged in the business of in-
surance.
(4) Boycott, Coercion and Intimidation. Entering into any agreement to
commit, or by any concerted action, committing, any act of boycott, coercion
or intimidation resulting or tending to result in unreasonable restraint of, or
a monopoly in, the business of insurance.
(5) False Financial Statements. Filing with any supervisory or other
public official, or making, publishing, disseminating, circulating or delivering
to any person, or placing before the public, or causing directly or indirectly,
to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, delivered to any person, or
placed before the public, any financial statement of an insurer which does not
accurately state its true financial condition.
(6) Stock Operations and Advisory Board Contracts. Issuing or deliver-
ing or permitting agents, officers, or employees to issue or deliver, agency
company stock or other capital stock, or benefit certificates or shares in any
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common-law corporation, or securities or any special or advisory board con-
tracts or other contracts of any kind promising returns and profits as an in-
ducement to insurance.
(7) Unfair Discrimination, (a) Making or permitting any unfair dis-
crimination between individuals of the same class involving essentially the
same hazards, expense elements and equal expectation of life in the rates
charged for contracts of life insurance or of life annuity or in the dividends
or other benefits payable thereon, or in any other of the terms and conditions
of such contracts.
(b) *Making or permitting any unfair discrimination between individuals
of the same class involving essentially the same hazards and expense ele-
ments, in the amount of premium, policy fees, or rates charged for any policy
or contract of accident or health insurance or in the benefits payable there-
under, or in any of the terms or conditions of such contract.
(8) Rebates, (a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, making
any contract of life insurance, life annuity or accident and health insurance,
or agreement as to such contracts other than as plainly expressed in the con-
tract issued thereon, or paying or allowing, or offering to pay or allow, as
inducement to such insurance, or annuity, any rebate of premiums payable
on the contract, or any special favor or advantage in the dividends or other
benefits thereon, or any valuable consideration or inducement not specified
in the contract ; or giving, or selling, or purchasing or offering to give, sell,
or purchase as inducement to such insurance or annuity or in connection
therewith, any stocks, bonds, or other securities of any insurance company or
other corporation, assocation, or partnership, or any dividends or profits
accrued thereon, or anything of value whatsoever not specified in the contract.
(b) Nothing in clause (7) or paragraph (a) of Clause (8) of this sub-
section shall be construed as including within the definition of discrimina-
tion or rebates any of the following practices: (i) paying bonuses to policy-
holders or otherwise abating their premiums in whole or in part out of sur-
plus accumulated from non-participating insurance; (ii) making allowance
to industrial policyholders who have continuously for a specified period made
premium payments directly to an office of the insurer in an amount which
fairly represents the saving in collection expense; (iii) readjustment of the
rate of premium for a group insurance policy based on the loss or expense
experience thereunder, at the end of the first year or of any subsequent year
of insurance thereunder, retroactive only for such policy year.
(Note: Each state may add such additional definitive acts as may be considered necessary or
desirable.)
j
(9) Any violation of any one of Sections of the
statutes of this state is also hereby declared to be an unfair method of com-
petition and an unfair or deceptive act and practice in the business of in-
surance.'^
(b) The enumeration in this Act of specific unfair methods of competition
i and unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the business of insurance is not
I
exclusive or restrictive or intended to limit the powers of the (commissioner)
or any court of review under the provisions of Section 5 of this Act.
iSection 5— Procedure as to Defined and Other Unfair Acts and Practices
i
' (a) If the (commissioner) shall have reason to believe that any person en-
;gaged in the business of insurance is engaging in this state in any unfair method
Ij
* In the event that unfair discrimination in connection with accident and health coverage is treated
in other statutes the above section should be omitted.
1 Insert section numbers of any other sections of the Insurance Law which it is deemed desirable
or necessary to include as an unfair trade practice.
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of competition or in any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of
such business, other than those enumerated in Subsection (a) of Section 4, or if
he shall have reason to believe that any such person is engaging in this state in
any method of competition or in any act or practice enumerated in Subsection
(a) of Section 4, and that a proceeding by him in respect to any such method of
competition, act or practice whether or not so enumerated, would be to the in-
terest of the public, he may issue and serve upon such person a statement of the
charges and a notice, of a hearing thereon to be held at a time and place fixed
in the notice which shall not be less than .... days from the date of service
thereof. The (commissioner) shall, after such hearing, make a report in writing
in which he shall state his findings as to the facts, and serve a copy thereof upon
such person.
(b) If such report charges a violation of this Act and if such method of com-
petition, act or practice has not been discontinued, the (commissioner) may,
through the Attorney General of this State, at any time after .... days after the
service of such report cause a petition to be filed in the court of
this state within the district wherein the person resides or has his principal place
of business, to enjoin and restrain such person from engaging in such method,
act or practice. The court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and shall
have power to make and enter appropriate orders in connection therewith and to
issue such writs as are ancillary to its jurisdiction or are necessary in its judg-
ment to prevent injury to the public pendente lite.
(c) A transcript of the proceedings before the (commissioner) including all
evidence taken and the report and findings shall be filed with such petition. If
either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and
shall show, to the satisfaction of the court, that such additional evidence is ma-
terial and there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence
in the proceeding before the (commissioner) the court may order such additional
evidence to be taken before the (commissioner) and to be adduced upon the
hearing in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the court may
seem proper. The (commissioner) may modify his findings of the facts or make
new findings by reason of the additional evidence so taken, and he shall file such
modified or new findings with the return of such additional evidence.
(d) If the court finds that the method of competition, act or practice com-
plained of is enumerated in Subsection (a) of Section 4, or, if not so enumerated,
that in the judgment of the court, the method of competition complained of is
unfair, or the act or practice complained of is unfair or deceptive, and in either
case that the proceeding by the (commissioner) with respect to such method of
competition, act or practice whether or not enumerated in Section 4 is of interest
to the public and that the findings of the (commissioner) are supported by the
weight of the evidence, it shall issue its order enjoining and restraining the con-
tinuance of such method of competition, act or practice.
(e) If the report of the (commissioner) does not charge a violation of this
Act, then any party to the proceeding, including any intervener, may within ....
days after the service of such report cause a like petition to be filed in the
court of county for a review of the report of the (com-
missioner.
Section 6— Multiple State Advertising by Foreign or Alien Insrtrers. If any
foreign or alien insurer engages in this state in an unfair method of competition
or in an unfair or deceptive practice as defined in clauses (1) and (2) of Sub-
section (a) of Section 4, by means of any advertisement, announcement or state-
ment, in any magazine or other periodical publication having a general circula-
tion in more than five states, or by means of any radio broadcast to more than
fii'e states, including the state of domicile of such insurer, and if the laws of the
state where such insurer is domiciled make provision for the enjoining of such
method of competition or practice, it shall be the duty of the (commissioner) to
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advise the insurance supervisory official of such domiciliary state of the violation
in order that he may take appropriate action, but the (commissioner) shall have
no authority to proceed, with respect to such violation, under Section 5 of this
Act. For the purpose of this section the domiciliary state of an alien insurer
shall be deemed to be its state of entry, or the state of the principal office in the
United States.
Section 7— Potver of (Commissioner)
The (commissioner) shall have power to examine and investigate into the
affairs of every person engaged in the business of insurance in order to determine
whether such person has been or is engaged in any unfair method of competition
or in any unfair act or practice.
Section 8— Hearing, Witnesses, Production of Books
At the time and place fixed for the hearing before the (commissioner), such
person shall have an opportunity to be heard. The (commissioner) upon such
hearing may administer oaths, examine and cross-examine witnesses, receive oral
and documentary evidence, and shall have the power to subpoena witnesses,
compel their attendance, and require the production of books, papers, records,
correspondence, or other documents which he deems relevant to the inquiry. The
(commissioner), upon such hearing may, and upon the request of any party shall,
cause to be made a written record of all the evidence offered or introduced and
proceedings had at such hearing.
Nothing in this Act contained shall require the observance at any hearing of
formal rules of pleading or evidence.
Section 9— Appearances
Upon good cause shown, the (commssioner) may permit any person to inter-
vene, appear and be heard at such hearing.
Section 10— Procedure Additional.
The powers vested in the (commissioner) by this Act, shall be in addition to
any other powers to enforce any penalties, fines or forfeitures authorized by law
with respect to the methods, acts and practices hereby declared to be unfair or
deceptive.
Section 11 — Punishment for Failure to Obey Subpoena
In case of refusal of any person to comply with any subpoena issued hereunder
or to testify to any matter to which he may be lawfully interrogated, the
court of county or the county where said party resides on
application of the (commissioner) may issue an order requiring such person to
comply with such subpoena and to testify ; and any failure to obey such order of
the court may be punished by the court as a contempt thereof.
Section 12 —• Constitutionality
If any section, subsection, subdivision, paragraph, sentence or clause of this
Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, such decision shall not affect the remain-
ing portions of this Act.
(Add immunity from prosecution clause similar to Sec. 25 of New York Insurance Law.)
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REPORT ON FIRES
Compiled by
THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
DIVISION OF FIRE PREVENTION
For the Year Ending December 31, 1946
118 P.D. 9
Report of Division of Fire Prevention
Department of Public Safety
Boston, November 1, 1947
Commissioner of Insurance, 100 Nashua Street, Boston.
I have the honor to submit in compliance with the provisions of section 7, chapter
148 of the General Laws, the forty-third annual report of this ofl&ce on fires reported
during the year ending December 31, 1946, as follows:
State, including the City of Boston
The total number of fires reported throughout the State during the year 1946
was 10,034; of these 6,376 were in frame buildings, 2,272 in brick, stone or cement
buildings, and 1,386 other than building fires.
Sound valuation of the property damaged by fire . . . $328,470,457 00
Amount of insurance at risk thereon ..... 380,921,922 00
Total loss thereon 17,294,928 62
Total insurance loss thereon ...... 14,858,475 50
There were 145 fires of incendiary origin, or 1.41 per cent.
Total loss thereon 479,541 38
There were 321 fires of unknown origin, or 3.10 per cent.
Total loss thereon . . . . . . . . 2,939,466 74
State, not including the City of Boston
The total number of fires reported in the State, not including the City of Boston,
during the year 1946 was 7,010; of these 5,302 were in frame buildings, 1,056 in
brick, stone or cement buildings, and 652 other than building fires.
Sound valuation of the property damaged by fire . . . $190,394,281 00
Amount of insurance at risk thereon ..... 224,017,177 00
Total loss thereon 12,917,802 03
Total insurance loss thereon ...... 10,932,668 41
There were 123 fires of incendiary origin, or 1.23 per cent.
Total loss thereon 255,817 45
There were 236 fires of unknown origin, or 2.35 per cent.
Total loss thereon 2,284,023 95
City of Boston
The total number of fires reported in the City of Boston during the year 1946
was 3,024; of these 1,074 were in frame buildings, 1,216 were in brick, stone or
cement buildings, and 734 other than building fires.
Sound valuation of the property damaged by fire . . . $138,076,176 00
Amount of insurance at risk thereon ..... 156,904,745 00
Total loss thereon 4,377,126 59
Total insurance loss thereon . . . . . . 3,925,807 09
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In General
There were 10,034 fires reported during the year 1946, which is an increase of
1,118 over the total for 1945. The amount of loss increased $2,214,930.
Of the total number of fires in 1946, 62% occurred in residential buildings.
Also, 81% of the fatal fires occurred in residential buildings.
There were 71 fires which caused 109 deaths, including 55 men, 28 women and
26 children, which was an increase of 12 deaths over 1945.
During the year, 83 arrests were made for incendiarism, which resulted in 73
convictions. There were 2 "not guilty" verdicts and 8 cases were dismissed.
Edward H. Whittemore,
State Fire Marshal.
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Statistics of Fires in Massachusetts in 1946.
The following table shows the number of fires occurring in the cities and towns
of the Commonwealth, the character of the buildings in which they originated
(whether brick, stone, cement or frame), and the total valuation, total insurance
at risk, total loss, and total insurance loss during the year:
—
Table Nc
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Table No.
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Table No.
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Table No. 1.
—
Showing Number of Fires, etc.—Continued.
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Table No.
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Table No. 2.
—
Fires classified by Causes, Number of Fires from Cause and Loss.
("S" signifies State, exclusive of Boston; "B" signifies Boston.)
CAUSE.
Boiling over of fat, tar, oils, etc. .
Total, buildings
Total, contents
Total, buUdings and contents
Burning soot ....
Total, buildings
Total, contents
Total, buildings and contents
Careless smoking
Total, buildings
Total, contents
Total, buildings and contents
Careless use of matches
Total, buildings
Total, contents
Total, buildings and contents
Children and matches .
Total, buildings
Total, contents
Total, buildings and contents
D efective chimneys
Total, buildings
Total, contents
Total, buildings and contents
Defective construction
Total, buildings
Total, contents
Total, buildings and contents
Defective heating apparatus
Total, buildings
Total, contents
Total, buildings and contents
Defective heating apparatus (oU burning)
Total, buildings ....
Total, contents .
. . .
Total, buildings and contents
Number
of Fires.
B.
130
24
S. 1,538
B. 1,077
Loss.
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Table No. 2.
—
Fires classified by Causes, etc.—Continued.
("S" signifies State, exclusive of Boston; "B" signifies Boston.)
CAUSE.
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Table No. 2.
—
Fires classified by Causes, etc.—Continued.
("S" signifies State, exclusive of Boston; "B" signifies Boston.)
CAUSE.
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Table No. 2.
—
Fires classified by Causes, etc.—Continued.
("S" signifies State, exclusive of Boston; "B" signi^es Boston.)
CAUSE.
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Table No. 2.
—
Fires classified by Caitses, etc.—Concluded,
("S" signifies State, exclusive of Boston; "B" signifies Boston.)
CAUSE.
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Table No. 3.
—
Giving Description of Property, etc.—Continued.
("S" signifies State, exclusive of Boston; "B" signifies Boston.)
PROPERTY Number
of Fires.
Barber shops and beauty parlors
Total .
Barns and stables
Total .
Blacksmith shops .
Total
.
BoardiBg and lodging houses and dormitories
Total .
Boats .
Total .
Bowling alleys
Total .
Bridges
Total .
Buildings in process of construction
Total
Business blocks and office buildings
Total .
Carpenter shops
Total .
Churches
Total .
Cloak and suit or clothing factories or shops
Total .
Clothing or furnishing stores
Total .
Club and lodge rooms
Total .
Coal yards .
Total .
Cotton mills
Total .
s.
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Table No. 3.
—
Giving Description of Property, etc.—Continued.
("S" signifies State, exclusive of Boston; "B" signifies Boston.)
PROPERTY Number
of Fires.
Department stores ... S 4
B." 4
Total
^
Docks and wharves ... S 2
B. 6
Total
^
Drug stores..... S 2
b! 6
Total ^
Dry cleaning and dyeing establishments ... S 13
B. 5
Total ^
Dwellings g_ 3902
B. 1,276
Total 5J78
Factories and workshops not otherwise listed
. . S. 220
B. 49
Total
. . . . , , , . 269
Food and canning plants
. ,
. .
. S. 37
b! 16
Total ••....... 53
Foundries ...... S 10
B. 5
Total
, ]^
Garages S. 332
B. 49
Total 381
Gas and electrical plants .... S 8
B.' 1
Total
. . . ...
.
. 9
Gasoline filling stations ... S 35
B. 3
Total ••..... 3g
Greenhouses ..... S 8
B.
Total ^
^^•^ S. 15
B. 2
Total
_
'^
Henneries ...... S 92
B. 4
Total •«...... 96
Hospitals ...... S 18
B. 11
Total ........ 29
Hotels ...... S 25
B." 18
Total '^~
Loss.
Buildings.
SI,492 79
2,463 29
3,956 08
515 50
9,013 50
9,529 00
1,503 00
2,274 01
3,777 01
6,568 04
6,696 72
12,264 76
2,909,429 34
869,754 25
3,779,183 59
866,758 86
103,951 20
970,710 06
86,730 29
28,535 10
115,265 39
11,282 97
8,725 04
20,008 01
236,489 09
11,923 08
248,412 17
7,384 69
3,000 00
10,384 69
24,586 32
275 00
24,861 32
5,168 50
5,168 50
41,418 31
200 00
41,618 31
72,302 51
1,364 00
73,666 51
39,942 71
495 00
40,437 71
37,892 14
10,466 57
48,358 71
Contents.
«7,612 58
2,420 03
10,032 61
2,380 44
2,380 44
4,637 00
1,206 46
5,843 46
3,846 51
3,228 49
7,075 00
1,044,152 77
376,264 29
1,420,417 06
1,225,726 44
84,190 47
1,309,916 91
169,800 01
19,888 40
189,688 41
16,228 83
1,100 00
17,328 83
201,079 26
13,323 68
214,402 94
4,123 00
4,123 00
16,996 75
16,996 75
2,025 00
2,025 00
4,460 83
15 00
4,475 83
34,021 41
34,021 41
7,534 34
340 00
7,874 34
9,224 65
4,550 67
13,775 32
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Table No. 3.
—
Giving Description of Property, etc.—Continued.
("S" signifies State, exclusive of Boston; "B" signifies Boston.)
PROPERTY
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Table Xo. 3.
—
Giving Description of Property, etc.—Concluded.
("S" signifies State, excliisive of Boston; "B" signifies Boston.)
PROPERTY
Railroad buildings and rolling stock
Total ....
Restaurants
Total ....
Schools and academies, private
Total .
Schools, public
Total .
Storehouses and warehouses
Total .
Shoe factories
Total .
Stores and dwellings
Total .
Stores, retail, unclassed
Total .
Summer cottages and camps
Total .
Tailor shops
Total .
Tanneries
Total .
Theatres
Total .
Unclassed
Total .
Woodworking plants with power
Total .
Woolen mills
Total .
Grand total
Total State, exclusive of Boston
Niomber
of Fires.
S.
B.
S. 100
B. 44
B.
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Table No. 4.
—
Number of Incendiary and Unknown Fires in the State, exclusive of
Boston, and in Boston, and the Number of Arrests and Convictions in the State,
from the year 1916 to 1946, inclusive.
State, exclusive
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